Getty, J.
On November 12, 2007, the petitioner, Charles Reger, Jr., was moving a cafeteria table while working as a custodian for respondent Washington County Board of Education ("Employer"), when the table fell on Mr. Reger, pinning him to the ground. Following the accident, Mr. Reger was diagnosed with significant injuries, primarily to his back and neck, and was unable to perform his custodial work. Mr. Reger thereafter sought and received two different sets of disability benefits from the Employer and respondent Maryland Association of Boards of Education Compensation Self-Insurance Fund ("Insurer"), each awarded by a different state agency: he was granted temporary total disability benefits by the Workers' Compensation Commission ("WCC" or "the Commission") and ordinary disability retirement benefits by the State Retirement Agency, the administrative arm of the Maryland State Retirement and Pension System ("MSRPS").
Employer and Insurer (collectively, "Respondents") subsequently petitioned the WCC to offset Mr. Reger's ordinary disability benefits against his temporary total disability benefits pursuant to the statutory offset provision in Maryland Code (1991, 2008 Repl. Vol.), Labor and Employment Article ("LE") § 9-610.
Mr. Reger petitioned for judicial review of the WCC's decision before the Circuit Court for Washington County. After holding a hearing as to cross-motions for summary judgment, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Commission, holding that "[a]s a matter of law in this case, the benefits are indeed within the statute similar and therefore the statutory offset applies." Mr. Reger noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals from the circuit court's ruling and, in an
The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the WCC correctly applied LE § 9-610 to find that the Respondents were entitled to offset the ordinary disability benefits already paid to Mr. Reger against the temporary total disability benefits paid to him by the Respondents. We shall affirm the WCC's finding. Under the circumstances of this case, both sets of benefits were awarded to compensate Mr. Reger for the same back and neck injuries. Because both sets of benefits compensated Mr. Reger for the same injury, pursuant to LE § 9-610, the benefits were legally "similar benefits," and the statutory offset properly applied to prevent a double recovery for the same injury.
For approximately 29 years, Mr. Reger worked as a custodian for the Washington County Board of Education. On November 12, 2007, while working at Williamsport High School, a large folding cafeteria table fell on Mr. Reger while he was moving it, pinning him to the ground. Mr. Reger suffered injuries to his neck, back, left leg, and left elbow. Immediately after the accident, Mr. Reger was unable to perform his regular duty custodial work, but was able to return to work on light-duty. His final day of work as a custodian was in May of 2008.
On February 29, 2008, roughly three and a half months after his work injury, Mr. Reger saw Dr. Thomas Larkin at Parkway Neuroscience and Spine Institute about his injuries. Mr. Reger's medical records from that visit indicate a diagnosis of "SPONDYLOLISTHESIS (738.4)."
Following the November 12, 2007 accident, Mr. Reger received initial temporary
On November 7, 2008, the WCC held a hearing on Mr. Reger's claim. At that hearing, Mr. Reger's counsel provided the WCC with a surgical recommendation from a physician at the University of Maryland Medical Center that Mr. Reger undergo "lumbar
In an attempt to prove a causal connection between the accident and the contemplated surgery, Mr. Reger's counsel asked him a series of questions during direct examination. Mr. Reger testified that he had never missed any time from work or sought any medical treatment for "any back problems" prior to the November 12, 2007 accident. When questioned about an earlier 2004 injury involving a file cabinet, Mr. Reger acknowledged receiving an MRI and going to "some physical therapy" as a result of that incident, but denied that the incident had resulted in any back problems. He also testified that he went back to performing custodial work after the 2004 injury, describing it as "very physical work" that included regular bending and lifting.
The WCC entered an order finding that Mr. Reger had reached maximum medical recovery and that the requested lumbar surgery was not causally related to the November 12 accident. On November 24, 2008, Mr. Reger filed a request for rehearing before the WCC. Attached as an exhibit, he provided a letter from his treating physician, Dr. Larkin, that stated,
The WCC denied Mr. Reger's request for a rehearing.
Thereafter, Mr. Reger timely sought judicial review of the WCC's decision in the Circuit Court for Washington County. A one-day jury trial was held on September 9, 2009. The jury returned a verdict finding that Mr. Reger's lumbar surgery was causally related to the November 12 accidental injury. On September 16, 2009, the circuit court vacated the order of the WCC and remanded the case to the WCC for entry of an order finding,
While Mr. Reger's petition for judicial review of the WCC decision that he had reached maximum medical recovery was pending before the Washington County circuit court, he sought benefits through a different avenue and filed an application with the State Retirement Agency for accidental disability retirement benefits on or about February 23, 2009. In the "Statement of Disability" section to be completed by the applicant, Mr. Reger was asked to describe his "disability or medical condition." His response indicated conditions to his lower back, neck, shoulder, left leg, and left hand. He also described how he could not physically perform certain functions of his job, including climbing steps or ladders, standing for a long time, lifting items, mowing grass, scrubbing doors, shoveling snow, etc. In the application, Mr. Reger's witness described the November 12 accident stating, "[Mr. Reger] was moving a folding table with assistance of [another custodian] when table lost balance and fell on Mr. Reger's legs and put him to the floor, landing hard on his back."
As part of the application, Mr. Reger's treating physician, Dr. Larkin, signed a Physician's Medical Report and described Mr. Reger's medical history as including "cervical spinal stenosis" and "lumbosacral spondylosis,"
On August 19, 2009, the Medical Board of the State Retirement Agency issued its written recommendation, which stated,
On September 15, 2009, the Disability Unit of the State Retirement Agency transmitted a letter to Mr. Reger accepting the Medical Board's recommendation, that Mr. Reger was "entitled to an
On November 12, 2009, Mr. Reger submitted a letter of intent to the Medical Board Secretary electing the first option and withdrawing his accidental disability retirement claim. Mr. Reger began receiving ordinary disability benefits from the MSRPS on a payment schedule that began on his date of retirement, March 1, 2009.
On December 1, 2009, Mr. Reger presented to Dr. Charles Sansur for a surgical consultation and examination. Dr. Sansur wrote to Dr. Larkin, Mr. Reger's treating physician for his back and neck symptoms, and stated that Mr. Reger "was found to have a resultant spine injury from [the November 12, 2007] accident and has a diagnosis of a L5-S1 spondylolisthesis with pars fractures bilaterally." On March 10, 2010, Mr. Reger underwent lumbar surgery — a surgical fusion at L5-S1 — and, thereafter, participated in rehabilitative treatment. At some point during the course of Mr. Reger's surgical or post-surgical treatment, Dr. Sansur gave him a permanent restriction on returning to work as a custodian due to the condition of his back and neck.
After Mr. Reger's surgery, a follow-up independent medical examination ("IME") — was conducted by orthopedic surgeon Robert A. Smith, M.D.
Thereafter, Mr. Reger once again filed issues with the WCC, and on January 5, 2011, Mr. Reger appeared once more before the WCC. At this hearing, Mr. Reger again testified at the WCC hearing that prior to the November 12, 2007 accident, he had never had any discomfort or sought treatment for a problem with his neck. Mr. Reger requested the continuation of temporary total disability benefits, this time based upon a recommendation from Dr. Sansur for cervical spine and left elbow surgery. Mr. Reger presented a report from Dr. Sansur, dated November 6, 2010, which stated,
The Employer and Insurer contended that the elbow and spine injuries for which Mr. Reger was seeking surgery were not causally related to his November 12, 2007 accident.
In an order dated January 10, 2011, the WCC found that Mr. Reger was entitled to temporary total disability from September 25, 2010, and continuing "until the completion of an independent neurosurgical evaluation and assessment."
After reviewing the neurosurgical report, the WCC denied coverage for Mr. Reger's cervical surgery on or about November 11, 2011.
Mr. Reger filed a petition for judicial review of that decision on December 14, 2011. Following another one-day jury trial on August 8, 2012, the WCC's order was vacated and the case was remanded to the WCC for entry of an order finding Mr. Reger's second proposed surgery to be causally related to the November 12, 2007 accidental injury.
On October 23, 2013, the Employer and Insurer filed issues with the WCC arguing that, under LE § 9-610, the benefits paid for Mr. Reger's injury through workers' compensation should be offset by Mr. Reger's ordinary disability benefits. On November 8, 2013, another hearing was held before the WCC. Mr. Reger's counsel claimed at that hearing that the two benefits were "not at all [for] the same condition" and that "there is clear evidence that there is pre-existing [injury]." Mr. Reger's counsel further argued that when the State Retirement Agency granted Mr. Reger ordinary disability benefits and denied accidental disability benefits it was "essentially saying we don't believe this [was] accident related and we believe it is due to some other things" such as a "degenerative condition." And, he claimed that "the law is clear that there is no offset for ordinary [disability benefits]." Therefore, he contended that the WCC was bound by that State Retirement Agency determination that the benefits were for ordinary disability benefits and could not offset those benefits. Counsel for the Employer and Insurer countered that both benefits stemmed from the November 12, 2007 accidental injury, and that under LE § 9-610 the General Assembly clearly "want[ed] to prevent a public employee from receiving benefits from two sources for the same problem." By order dated November 13, 2013, the WCC found that the Employer and Insurer were entitled to an offset under LE § 9-610.
In that order, the WCC stated that Mr. Reger had been paid for three previous periods for which he had been granted temporary total disability benefits by the Commission — from July 16, 2008 to September 9, 2009
The Commission found that during all three periods in which Mr. Reger received temporary total disability benefits, he also received ordinary disability retirement benefits. And, the Commission found that the sum of the ordinary disability retirement benefits paid to Mr. Reger during those three periods was $62,808.68. Therefore, the Commission found that the Employer and Insurer were "entitled to a credit of $62,808.68 against future awards
The Commission also found that Mr. Reger was entitled to receive temporary total disability benefits from January 15, 2011 to March 4, 2011 and July 29, 2013 to November 18, 2013.
Mr. Reger petitioned for judicial review of the WCC's decision on November 22, 2013 pursuant to LE § 9-737,
At the summary judgment hearing, Mr. Reger's counsel argued that the ordinary disability benefits that Mr. Reger received were awarded for a permanent partial disability, and thus were dissimilar as a matter of law to his temporary and total disability benefits awarded through the WCC. When questioned by the circuit court judge as to why he likened ordinary disability benefits to permanent partial disability, Mr. Reger's counsel stated that they were equivalent "because Mr. Reger is not precluded from returning to work [in a light-duty job] by receipt of ordinary disability [benefits], whereas [if he receives] accidental disability [benefits], he may not do any work of any kind."
Mr. Reger's counsel also reiterated the argument made before the WCC that Mr. Reger's ordinary disability benefits were "based solely on his [pre-existing] spondylotic spinal changes, which is why the [State Retirement Agency] gave him ordinary disability, not accidental disability." The circuit court judge questioned him as to that claim,
In response to Mr. Reger's arguments, counsel for the Employer and Insurer contended that Mr. Reger's November 12, 2007 work accident was the basis for his request for workers' compensation benefits as wells as his request for disability retirement benefits. And, counsel asserted that "the same physical incapacity" arising from the 2007 accident "formed the basis for both the Workers[`] Compensation [Comission] award and the retirement award." Counsel noted that Mr. Reger had testified three times during prior proceedings before the WCC that he had never experienced physical problems with his neck or back in performing his job duties prior to the 2007 accident.
Counsel for the Employer and Insurer disagreed with Mr. Reger's counsel's claim that an award of ordinary disability retirement benefits is equivalent to permanent partial disability. He also disputed Mr. Reger's claim that the ordinary disability retirement benefits could not be offset as a matter of law,
After hearing the parties' respective arguments, the circuit court judge issued his summary judgment ruling on the record, stating,
Later that same day, the circuit court entered a written order granting summary judgment in favor of the Employer and Insurer.
On August 5, 2016, the Court of Special Appeals issued an unreported opinion that affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Employer and Insurer. Reger v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Educ. et al., No. 1937 Sept. Term 2014, 2016 WL 4173032 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016). The Court of Special Appeals stated that the circuit court "focused on the correct legal question and correctly concluded that both sets of benefits were awarded to compensate for wages lost." Id. at *10. The intermediate appellate court agreed with the circuit court that "the ordinary [disability] retirement benefit in this case that was accepted by [Mr. Reger] is tantamount to a wage loss benefit for his position as a custodian," that was "analogous to the temporary total disability Workers' Compensation benefit, which is also a wage loss from his custodial position." Id. The Court of Special Appeals also noted that the circuit court had found that "Mr. Reger submitted both of his claims based on the same medical condition and physical incapacity, and submitted the same evidence to both the State Retirement Agency and the WCC." Id. The Court of Special Appeals concluded that "[w]here, as here, both benefits serve as a wage loss benefit tied to the same underlying injury and incapacity, the offset provision in LE § 9-610 must be applied to ensure only a single recovery for the single injury." Id.
Mr. Reger thereafter petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted on November 22, 2016. 450 Md. 421, 149 A.3d 547 (2016). After granting certiorari, we also granted a motion of county officials representing various local jurisdictions and boards in Maryland to file an amici curiae brief in this matter.
Mr. Reger presents a single issue for our review, which we have rephrased:
After first setting forth the applicable standard of review and summarizing the contentions of the parties, we shall discuss each of these questions in sequence. See infra, Part III.(A)-(C).
Section 9-745 of the Labor and Employment Article governs appeals of decisions by the Workers' Compensation Commission. That statute sets out two paths by which an aggrieved claimant may challenge a decision of the Commission:
Balt. Cty. v. Kelly, 391 Md. 64, 67-68, 891 A.2d 1103 (2006). Here, Mr. Reger requested a jury trial before the circuit court, placing his petition to the circuit court for judicial review of the decision of the WCC on the second path of LE § 9-745. Had his case reached a jury, he would therefore have received an "`essentially' de novo trial."
However, prior to the case being submitted to a jury, both parties agreed that there was no dispute of material fact and that the case could be appropriately resolved through summary judgment. And, after reviewing the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment and holding a hearing as to those motions, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Employer and Insurer as to the benefits offset issue, ruling as a matter of law that Mr. Reger's ordinary disability benefits and temporary total disability benefits were "similar" and that, consequently, "the statutory offset [in LE § 9-610] applies." The circuit court's holding was then affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals. Reger, No. 1937 Sept. Term 2014, 2016 WL 4173032 at *10.
"In an appeal from judicial review of an agency action, we review the agency's decision directly, not the decision of the Circuit Court or the Court of Special Appeals." Hollingsworth v. Severstal Sparrows Point, LLC, 448 Md. 648, 654, 141 A.3d 90 (2016). Although generally, "`the decision of the Commission is presumed to be prima facie correct,' this presumption does not `extend to questions of
In this case, the WCC's decision that is the sole issue on appeal involves the meaning and application of a statute, which is a question of law subject to de novo review. In interpreting a statute, we adhere to this Court's well-settled principles of statutory construction. The Court defers to "the policy decisions enacted into law by the General Assembly." Phillips v. State, 451 Md. 180, 196, 152 A.3d 712 (2017). "We assume that the legislature's intent is expressed in the statutory language and thus our statutory interpretation focuses primarily on the language of the statute to determine the purpose and intent of the General Assembly." Id.
Id. at 196-97 (quoting Douglas v. State, 423 Md. 156, 178, 31 A.3d 250 (2011) (quoting Evans v. State, 420 Md. 391, 400, 23 A.3d 223 (2011))).
When this Court interprets an ambiguous or unclear statutory provision that is part of the Workers' Compensation Act, "additional principles of interpretation enter the equation." Hollingsworth, 448 Md. at 655, 141 A.3d 90 (quoting Montgomery Cty. v. Deibler, 423 Md. 54, 61, 31 A.3d 191 (2011)). We must interpret the provision in light of the purpose of the Act, which we have stated is "to protect workers and their families from hardships inflicted by work-related injuries by providing workers with compensation for loss of earning capacity resulting from accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment." Id. (quoting Elms v. Renewal by Andersen, 439 Md. 381, 399, 96 A.3d 175 (2014)). Thus, because the Act is a "remedial statute," to the extent that the plain language of the Act is ambiguous or unclear, it must be "construed as liberally in favor of injured employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes." Id. (quoting Elms, 439 Md. at 399, 96 A.3d 175). However, we may not "stifle the plain meaning of the Act, or exceed its purposes, so that the injured worker may prevail." Id. (quoting Elms, 439 Md. at 399, 96 A.3d 175). Similarly, "when the language is plain" we cannot "create an ambiguity that does not exist in order to interpret the Act more favorably to the claimant." Id. at 655-56, 141 A.3d 90.
Maryland Code, Labor & Employment Article § 9-610 ("LE § 9-610") provides, in pertinent part,
(emphasis added).
Mr. Reger contends that, as a matter of law, workers' compensation benefits PAID by the WCC should never be offset under LE § 9-610 by ordinary disability retirement benefits paid by the MSRPS because, according to Mr. Reger, "the two benefits are paid for different purposes." Mr. Reger insist's that ordinary disability benefits "do not compensate for work-related injuries," and therefore are not a "similar benefit" that should be offset pursuant to LE § 9-610. Mr. Reger contrasts ordinary disability benefits with accidental disability benefits, which the State Retirement Agency awards for accidental workplace injuries and are thus, according to Mr. Reger, "perfectly analogous to workers' compensation benefits." Mr. Reger also maintains that the legislative history of LE § 9-610, in particular an amendment to the statute enacted in 1997, indicates that the General Assembly intended the offset to apply solely to accidental disability benefits. Therefore, he claims that the Commission, the circuit court, and the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that Mr. Reger's ordinary disability benefits were "similar benefits" to his temporary total disability benefits, and thus subject to the statutory offset.
Even if ordinary disability benefits were subject to the offset in LE § 9-610, Mr. Reger also contends that the offset should not apply in his case. He asserts that the State Retirement Agency awarded him ordinary disability retirement benefits "based solely on [ ] preexisting degenerative back problems." And, he further claims that the Medical Board of the State Retirement Agency "very specifically found Mr. Reger was not disabled because of his [accidental] injury of November 12,
Mr. Reger insists that the Court of Special Appeals failed to recognize that the State Retirement Board awarded and paid him ordinary disability benefits based upon his degenerative back injuries and instead improperly focused on the fact that he had applied for accidental disability benefits based on the same November 12, 2007 accidental injury that was the basis for his WCC benefits. He claims that the Court of Special Appeals has thereby "punished him for asking for[,] but not being paid[,] accidental disability retirement benefits by denying him his workers' compensation benefits."
In contrast, the Respondents maintain that cases interpreting LE § 9-610 and its predecessor statutes have made clear that the General Assembly intended to ensure a "single recovery for a single injury" for public employees, and to prevent double payment from the public purse to a governmental employee who is covered by both a pension or other benefit plan and the workers' compensation statute. And, Respondents contend that LE § 9-610 was not limited to offsetting only accidental disability benefits, as it is clear from the language of the statute that "there was never any intent by the Legislature to limit [that] offset to pension benefits, let alone one particular type of pension benefits." Respondents also offer a policy argument that construing the offset to apply solely to accidental disability benefits would increase instances of double recovery, as employees could easily avoid the offset by choosing to apply for ordinary disability benefits instead of accidental disability benefits from the State Retirement Agency, while also applying for workers' compensation benefits from the WCC for the same injury.
Instead, Respondents assert that the only limiting language in LE § 9-610 is that the offset only applies to "similar benefits." Respondents claim that, in this case, the ordinary disability benefits paid to Mr. Reger by the MSRPS are "similar benefits" to his workers' compensation benefits and, consequently, the Commission, the circuit court, and the Court of Special Appeals did not err in holding that the offset in LE § 9-610 applied. Respondents note that in Newman v. Subsequent Injury Fund this Court held that service retirement benefits awarded solely based on age and length of service had "no relation whatsoever to [an employee's accidental] injury and the disability resulting therefrom," and therefore were not "similar" to workers' compensation benefits under the predecessor statute to LE § 9-610. 311 Md. 721, 724, 537 A.2d 274 (1988). Respondents contend that "[i]mplicit in the Newman rationale is that when there is a relationship and both the [workers' compensation benefit] and the pension benefit result from or were triggered by the same injury, incapacity, or disability, they are legally `similar.'" Respondents also urge us to rely upon the holding in Reynolds v. Board of Education of Prince George's County, where the Court of Special Appeals upheld the application of the LE § 9-610 offset when an employee received both ordinary disability benefits and workers' compensation benefits based in part upon the Court of Special Appeals' holding that both benefits were awarded based on "a single medical condition" and the "same physical incapacity" that occurred when the employee's preexisting asthmatic condition was triggered by her exposure to
Respondents claim, in this case, that both sets of benefits awarded to Mr. Reger stemmed from a disability caused by his November 12, 2007 accident which, similarly to Reynolds, involved an "acute stimulus" or triggering event (Mr. Reger's November 12, 2007 work accident) that exacerbated a preexisting condition (Mr. Reger's degenerative back disease). In support of that claim, Respondents note that Mr. Reger "never experienced any physical limitation in the performance of his job duties prior to the November 12, 2007 accident," and that he submitted the same medical records and relied upon the November 12, 2007 accident before both the WCC and the State Retirement Board.
Finally, Respondents criticize Mr. Reger's reliance on the Medical Board recommendations and State Retirement Agency's decision to award Mr. Reger ordinary disability benefits, and to deny him accidental disability benefits. They insisted that the Medical Board's recommendation and State Retirement Agency's decision do not suggest that those benefits are not similar to Mr. Reger's temporary total disability benefits, noting that "[i]rrespective of the label given the disability benefit provided by the [State Retirement Agency]... it is without question that the dual benefits [Mr. Reger] received as a result of a disability triggered by the same event are subject to offset under [LE] § 9-610."
The amici curiae agree with the Respondents that "the same injury can result in an
In order to resolve whether the WCC properly applied the statutory offset provision, we shall first determine the legislative intent behind that provision, in particular the intent behind the "similar benefits" language. Then, we shall determine whether, as a matter of law, a payment by a governmental employer of ordinary disability benefits could be deemed a "similar benefit" to a payment of temporary total disability benefits. Then, we shall decide whether, under the circumstances of this case, Mr. Reger's ordinary disability benefits were a "similar benefit" to his temporary total disability benefits.
In Blevins v. Baltimore County, 352 Md. 620, 724 A.2d 22 (1999), this Court traced the legislative history and intent behind the offset provision now contained in LE § 9-610 in detail, including the legislative intent behind the "similar benefits" language. In that case, we noted that "[l]ocal government employees have been dealt with specially since the first enactment of the workers' compensation law in 1914." Id. at 635, 724 A.2d 22. The original Workers' Compensation Act, 1914 Md. Laws, ch.
However, the Act also stated that "[w]henever, and so long as, by State law, City Charter, or Municipal Ordinance, a provision equal or better than that given under the terms of this Act is made for municipal employees injured in the course of employment such employee shall not be entitled to the benefits of this Act." Acts 1914, ch. 800, s. 34. In Nooe v. City of Baltimore, cited approvingly by this Court in Blevins, Chief Judge Orth of the Court of Special Appeals characterized Section 34 as reflecting that, from the time of the adoption of the Act, it has been "the policy of the General Assembly, as expressed in its legislative enactments, that an employee of the government shall not receive workmen's compensation benefits in addition to other benefits furnished by the employer accruing by reason of an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment." 28 Md.App. 348, 349, 345 A.2d 134 (1975), cert. denied, 276 Md. 748 (1976). Judge Orth concluded that the General Assembly's concern as to "governmental authorities being obliged to pay benefits to an employee twice as a result of the same injury," was also expressed in the preamble to the original 1914 Act, which stated in pertinent part,
Id. at 352, 345 A.2d 134 (quoting Acts 1914, ch. 800).
The original statutory provision expressed in Section 34 of the 1914 Act, although "expanded from time to time to add new categories of governmental, or quasi-governmental, employees," remained in force until 1970, "when, as part of a bill deleting the requirement that employment be `extra-hazardous' to be covered, the entire provision dealing with non-military State and local government personnel was repealed." Blevins, 352 Md. at 636, 724 A.2d 22. See 1970 Md. Laws, ch. 741. Although the reason for the appeal was "not entirely clear[,]" see Blevins, 352 Md. at 636, 724 A.2d 22, it was apparently in reaction to this Court's ruling in Montgomery County v. Kaponin, 237 Md. 112, 205 A.2d 292 (1964). In Blevins, we summarized the holding of Kaponin,
Blevins, 352 Md. at 636 to 637, 724 A.2d 22 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). We noted in Blevins that the significance of the Kaponin holding was that it largely circumvented the General Assembly's intent that employees injured in a work accident who were provided with benefits from municipal employers that were more generous than those provided by the Act should not have a double recovery, because "[i]t is questionable whether many, or any, local pension plans could satisfy the comparability standard imposed by Kaponin; pension plans — even disability retirement plans — do not ordinarily provide medical benefits." Id. at 637, 724 A.2d 22. See also Nooe, 28 Md.App. at 352, 345 A.2d 134 (noting that "the manifest purpose of [Acts 1914, ch. 800, s. 34, subsequently recodified at Article 101, § 33 of the Chapter Laws of Maryland] was to a large extent circumvented by the Kaponin holding").
However, "[w]hatever may have been the legislative purpose" of the repeal of the provision in 1970, a successor provision was enacted by the General Assembly in 1971 as an emergency measure. Blevins, 352 Md. at 637, 724 A.2d 22. See 1971 Md. Laws, ch. 785. That provision, subsequently codified at Section 33(c) of Article 101 of the Maryland Code (1957, 1979 Repl. Vol.) provided, in pertinent part,
(emphasis added). As Judge Orth noted in Nooe, that successor provision was plainly a dollar-for-dollar offset provision, providing for "offsets of workmen's compensation benefits against the benefits otherwise furnished by a [public] employer," as opposed to a "a qualification statute such as the Court of Appeals found the former statute to be" in Kaponin. 28 Md.App. at 352, 345 A.2d 134. And, for the first time, the General Assembly included a comparison between the employer-provided benefit and a "similar benefit" required under the Workers' Compensation Act.
We noted in Blevins that it was "not entirely clear from the face of the 1971 enactment what the Legislature had in mind when it inserted the limiting word `similar' only near the end of [§ 33(c)], in the provision dealing with the situation where the alternative benefit [provided by the governmental employer] is less than
The first cases that arose from the 1971 law "dealt with situations in which the alternative benefit that the [governmental employer] sought to set off was, in fact, a disability retirement benefit" that was awarded for the same injury for which the worker also sought worker's compensation benefits and, thus, "the issue of `similarity' did not arise." Id. In Nooe, the Court of Special Appeals held that when a Baltimore City police officer received a special disability benefit under a Baltimore City retirement program for an accidental injury sustained in the course of his employment that was more than the worker's compensation benefits to which he was entitled, "the liability and obligation of [Baltimore City] for the workmen's compensation benefits were satisfied and discharged" by the payment of the special disability benefit. 28 Md.App. at 353-56, 345 A.2d 134.
In Mazor v. State Department of Correction, a prison guard suffered severe injuries after being stabbed and beaten by an inmate, resulting in his being unable to return to work. 279 Md. 355, 357, 369 A.2d 82 (1977). The prison system determined the guard was totally and permanently incapacitated and awarded him an accidental disability pension by the State equivalent to $5380 per year. Id. Subsequently, he filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits, was found by the Commission to have sustained a permanent 60% disability as a result of the incident, and was awarded compensation benefits amounting to $3380 per year. Id. at 357-58, 369 A.2d 82. On appeal from the Commission's order, a circuit court concluded that the Department of Corrections could set off the disability pension benefit under § 33(c) and, because the disability pension benefit was greater than the workers' compensation benefit, that it was discharged from liability for the workers' compensation benefit.
On appeal, we affirmed the circuit court's ruling. We concluded that the statute provided for the offset of benefits by both employers and insurers standing in the position of the employer, and that the offset could be applied for injuries that did not cause the employee's death. Id. at 361-63, 369 A.2d 82. In reaching those conclusions, we considered both the workers' compensation benefits and pension disability benefits awarded to the prison guard as "facet[s] of an overall system of wage-loss protection," which had as its "underlying principle" the goal of restoring "to the worker a portion of wages lost by physical disability, unemployment, or old age." Id. at 363, 369 A.2d 82. We concluded that "although two or more causes of wage loss may coincide, the benefits need not cumulate, for the worker experiences but one wage loss." Id. (citing 4 Arthur Larson, Law of Workmen's Compensation
Similarly, in Frank v. Baltimore County, we held that pension benefits received by a disabled police officer from a contributory pension plan were "benefits provided by the employer" within meaning of § 33(c) and that, because those benefits were equal to or better than any worker's compensation benefits to which the officer was entitled, the offset provision applied. 284 Md. 655, 657, 399 A.2d 250 (1979). Although we did not rely upon the "similar benefits" language in the statute to reach that conclusion, we stated that "[u]pon reading section 33 the scheme that unmistakably emerges is that the General Assembly wished to provide only a single recovery for a single injury for government employees covered by both a pension plan and workmen's compensation." Id. at 659, 399 A.2d 250. And, we again described the offset provision as "consistent with the generally recognized policy underlying all wage-loss legislation" that under a "`logical system'" an employee who experiences only one period of wage loss "`should receive only one wage loss benefit.'" Id. (quoting 4 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 97.10, at 18-9 (1979) (footnote omitted)).
In Oros v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, the Court of Special Appeals considered the cases of three Baltimore City police officers injured in the course of their employment, who were paid full sick leave salary from the City during their absence from work. 56 Md.App. 685, 686-87, 468 A.2d 693 (1983). Recognizing that the statutory offset in § 33(c) applied to any attempt to claim worker's compensation benefits for temporary total disability in addition to the sick leave benefits, the officers "bowed to the inevitable" and declined to claim their temporary total disability benefits. Id. at 687, 468 A.2d 693. However, when the officers reached maximum medical recovery, they sought permanent partial disability benefits, which the Commission granted. Id. at 687-88, 468 A.2d 693. The City, noting that the compensation benefit for temporary total disability benefits was only two-thirds of the officers' salary, reasoned that "the one-third overage it paid built up a credit in the nature of a savings account that the City could offset against its future obligation for permanent partial disability." Id. at 688, 468 A.2d 693.
The Court of Special Appeals rejected the City's offset argument, relying upon the "similar benefits" language in § 33(c) — apparently the first Maryland court to rely on that language in a case involving the offset provision. The Court of Special Appeals recognized that "the overriding theme" in prior cases where the offset had been applied "was the determination of legislative intent of § 33(c) which would minimize the burden on the public treasury that would result from duplicating benefits to public employees." Id. at 689, 468 A.2d 693. However, the intermediate appellate court distinguished temporary total disability benefits, which it viewed as "solely wage-loss benefits," from permanent partial disability benefits, which it regarded as "more in the nature of earning capacity impairment benefits." Id. at 690, 468 A.2d 693. The Court of Special Appeals noted that permanent partial disability benefits "are based purely on the medical condition of the employee after maximum improvement has been reached
We affirmed the result reached by the Court of Special Appeals, but on different grounds, and without relying upon the "similar benefits" language in the statute. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Oros, 301 Md. 460, 483 A.2d 748 (1984). We held that, under the workers' compensation law of the time, "an injured worker (or his dependents) is entitled to receive seriatim the benefits for each of the separate disabilities as were caused by the nature and extent of his injury," and that a benefit awarded by a governmental employer that is sufficient to offset one workers' compensation benefit may not also be used to offset a separate workers' compensation benefit. Id. at 470, 483 A.2d 748.
The first case in which this Court squarely addressed the meaning and impact of the "similar benefit" language in § 33 was Newman v. Subsequent Injury Fund, 311 Md. 721, 537 A.2d 274 (1988). In that case, a county employee sustained a work-related injury, and was awarded permanent partial disability benefits by the WCC. Id. at 723, 537 A.2d 274. The employee did not seek a separate disability benefit from her employer, but retired on ordinary service retirement. Id. The retirement benefits were less than the workers' compensation benefits, and the county sought to offset them pursuant to § 33(c). After the Commission denied the offset, the county prevailed before a circuit court and the Court of Special Appeals.
This Court, however, reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. We held that although the phrase "similar benefit" appears only in one phrase near the end of the statute, it also "qualifies the provision at the beginning of the section as to the benefits furnished employees by employers" because there was no "`reasonable distinguishing purpose to suggest that ["similar"] was not intended to be implicit in the foregoing sentences.'" Id. at 724, 537 A.2d 274 (quoting Oros, 56 Md. App. at 689, 468 A.2d 693). We therefore concluded that in order for the statutory offset to apply, "the two benefits received must be `similar.'" Id. We concluded that the two benefits at issue in the case were not similar and therefore the offset did not apply, explaining,
Id.
We proceeded to discuss prior cases in which this Court had addressed the offset provision — including Mazor, Frank, and Oros — and although we noted that we had never previously discussed the "similar benefits" language, we concluded that "the tenor of [§ 33(c)] as reflected in our opinions is that the offsetting benefits be `similar' ones." Id. at 724-26, 537 A.2d 274. We also noted that in several previous cases concerned with § 33(c) we had looked to 4 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 97.10 (1979),
Id. at 726-27, 537 A.2d 274 (footnote omitted). However, we concluded that the previous cases in which § 33 was held to apply "were all decided in the context of dual benefits
Summarizing the broad holding of the case, we stated in Newman that the legislative intent behind the offset provision was "to preclude double-dipping into the same pot of comparable benefits." Id. at 728, 537 A.2d 274 (quoting Oros, 56 Md. App. at 694, 468 A.2d 693 (emphasis added)). But, "[t]he corollary is, that when the benefits are dissimilar, the setoff provisions of § 33(c) do not apply." Id.
In Fikar v. Montgomery County, we held that the § 33(c) statutory offset between workers' compensation benefits and a county-sponsored disability retirement plan applied "when the workers' compensation benefits are paid for vocational rehabilitation." 333 Md. 430, 431, 635 A.2d 977 (1994). We stated that it was "luminously clear" that the General Assembly had enacted the offset provision to ensure "a single recovery for a single injury for government employees covered by both a pension plan and workmen's compensation." Id. at 435, 635 A.2d 977 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Applying our construction of the statute in Newman, we noted that "[i]n order for the statutory offset of § 33(d)
We noted that the petitioner in Fikar "urge[d] us to disregard the fact that both
In 1991, "the General Assembly enacted the Labor and Employment Article as part of the ongoing code revision process." Blevins, 352 Md. at 641, 724 A.2d 22. As part of that revision, the offset provision previously codified at Article 101 § 33(d) was recodified as LE § 9-610. After the recodification, LE § 9-610(a) read as follows:
The newly recodified statute lacked the crucial "similar benefit" language of its predecessor. This Court addressed that discrepancy in Blevins, 352 Md. 620, 724 A.2d 22.
This Court discussed the legislative history of the offset provision in detail, including our holding in Newman that the offset should be limited to "similar" benefits awarded on the basis of the same injury so as to prevent a double recovery for the same injury. Id. at 635-41, 724 A.2d 22. We noted the long-standing principle that "a change in a statute as part of a general recodification will ordinarily not be deemed to modify the law unless the change is such that the intention of the Legislature to modify the law is unmistakable." Id. at 642, 724 A.2d 22 (quoting Duffy v. Conaway, 295 Md. 242, 257, 455 A.2d 955 (1983). We held that this Court "must presume that the General Assembly was aware of our decision in Newman when it enacted the 1991 law," and "would therefore have been aware ... that the only benefits that a county was entitled to set off against a workers' compensation award were those that were similar to the compensation benefits — those which, if not set off, would permit a double recovery for the same injury." Id. Concluding that there was no evidence of legislative intent to overturn the Newman decision, we held that "it is evident that the General Assembly did not intend to make any substantive change to the law in deleting the word `similar.'" Id. at 644, 724 A.2d 22.
In 1997, prior to our holding in Blevins, but pre-dating the issuance of the WCC decisions at issue in that case and therefore not discussed in that opinion, the General Assembly amended LE § 9-610 to add a qualifying clause to the first sentence of LE § 9-610(a), stating that the offset applies for all benefits awarded to governmental employees or their dependents "[e]xcept for benefits subject to an offset under § 29-118 of the State Personnel and Pensions Article ("SP")." 1997 Md. Laws ch. 279. That qualifying clause has remained in force since 1997. However, the same law that added the qualifying clause also amended SP § 29-118(a) to read as follows,
Finally, in 1999, in apparent response to our holding in Blevins, the General Assembly once again amended LE § 9-610 to add the word "similar" back to the statute. 1999 Md. Laws ch. 340. The stated purpose of the amendment was to "clarify[ ] that certain workers' compensation benefits should be offset only for a payment of certain disability retirement benefits." Id.
We distill the following three principles from the above-described legislative history of LE § 9-610, and the cases that have applied and clarified the statutory offset provision. First, the overall legislative intent behind the offset provision now contained in LE § 9-610 was "that the General Assembly wished to provide only a single recovery for a single injury for government employees covered by both a pension plan and [workers'] compensation," and to thereby prevent employees from receiving a double recovery for the same injury. Fikar, 333 Md. at 435, 635 A.2d 977 (quoting Frank, 284 Md. at 659, 399 A.2d 250).
Second, as clarified in Newman, the specific language in the statute that "payment of the benefit by the employer satisfies, to the extent of the payment, the liability of the employer ... for payment of
Third, although early cases discussing the statutory offset provision suggested it should apply to offset workers' compensation benefits against any other benefit that compensates the employee for wage loss, this Court explicitly rejected that rationale in Newman, emphasizing that "our statute focuses only on dual recoveries for a single on-the-job injury" and "does not encompass setoffs for every type of wage-loss benefit available." Id. at 727, 537 A.2d 274.
We shall apply these principles to Mr. Reger's first contention that, as a matter of law, workers' compensation benefits awarded by the WCC should never be offset under LE § 9-610 by ordinary disability retirement benefits granted by the State Retirement Board to a governmental employee. Mr. Reger insists that "the two benefits are paid for different purposes" and that because ordinary disability benefits "do not compensate for work-related injuries," those benefits are therefore not a "similar benefit" to workers' compensation benefits that should be offset pursuant to LE § 9-610. Mr. Reger contrasts ordinary disability benefits with accidental disability benefits, which he asserts are awarded for accidental workplace injuries and are thus "perfectly analogous to workers' compensation benefits." However, under the principles set forth in Newman and the other cases described above, the "purpose" for which ordinary disability benefits are awarded — whether to compensate for lost wages, or for loss of future earning capacity, or for some other purpose — is entirely irrelevant to our analysis of whether the statutory offset in LE § 9-610 can apply to offset those benefits against a workers' compensation award. Instead, the only relevant inquiry is whether ordinary disability benefits can, as a matter of law, be "similar" to workers' compensation benefits — meaning that the two sets of benefits were awarded as a recovery for the same injury or, in other words, stemmed from the same cause.
In his brief, Mr. Reger also asserts that the 1997 amendment to LE § 9-610 "indicates that legislature believed the `similar benefits' in [LE] § 9-610 were limited to accidental disability benefits." Mr. Reger relies upon a fiscal note from the Department of Fiscal Services and a house committee floor report, which refer to the purpose of the 1997 amendment as providing for the offset of workers' compensation benefits against an "accidental disability benefit" paid to the retiree. However, as described above, that amendment modified the offset provision in SP § 29-118 to state that a retiree who was employed by a county board of education who receives a disability benefit through that employer remains subject to the offset provision in LE § 9-610. Thus under the plain language of the 1997 amendment, the General Assembly intended that the offset in LE § 9-610 still apply to retirees of a county
In order to determine whether ordinary disability benefits can be awarded on the basis of the same injury as workers' compensation benefits, we shall examine their eligibility criteria set by statute. As to ordinary disability retirement benefits, SP § 29-105(a) provides that,
The statute does not mandate that the Medical Board or the State Retirement Agency, the administrative arm of the MSRPS, must determine the cause of the physical incapacity of the employee. Instead, they must only determine that the employee is physically unable to perform his normal duties, and that his incapacitation is likely to be permanent and should result in retirement.
In contrast, temporary total disability benefits "are those paid to a[n] injured worker who is wholly disabled and unable to work because of the injury." Buckler v. Willett Const. Co., 345 Md. 350,
As ordinary disability benefits may be awarded for
Our holding is consistent with the statutory purpose of the offset provision to prevent a double recovery for the same injury. We agree with the Respondents that Mr. Reger's position that we should restrict the offset solely to accidental disability benefits is contrary to the statutory purpose because it would increase instances of double recovery. As governmental employees may choose to apply only for ordinary disability retirement benefits from the MSRPS, such a ruling would incentivize them to do so, knowing that they could also obtain a second recovery for the same injury from the WCC that would not be subject to the statutory offset.
Although we have held that ordinary disability benefits may be "similar benefits" to workers' compensation benefits when both sets of benefits are awarded based on the same injury, we must still determine whether Mr. Reger's ordinary disability benefits were on the basis of the same injury as his temporary total disability benefits. Mr. Reger focuses our attention on the Medical Board's recommendation and State Retirement Agency decision to deny him accidental disability benefits but grant him ordinary disability benefits. The Medical Board recommendation stated,
Mr. Reger maintains that when the Medical Board denied his claim for accidental disability retirement benefits, it "very specifically found [that] Mr. Reger was not disabled because of his [accidental] injury of November 12, 2007." The State Retirement Agency subsequently sent a letter to Mr. Reger accepting the Medical Board's recommendation, and stating that Mr. Reger was "entitled to
In contrast, the Respondents contend that the State Retirement Agency did not find that Mr. Reger's ordinary disability benefits were awarded for injuries that are separate and distinct from the injuries he sustained as a result of his November 12, 2007 accidental injury, for which he received temporary total disability benefits. And, Respondents claim that other evidence in the record, especially the fact that Mr. Reger made similar claims and submitted similar evidence before both the WCC and State Retirement Agency, show that both sets of benefits awarded to Mr. Reger stemmed from the same injury.
Contrary to Mr. Reger's assertions, neither the Medical Board nor the State Retirement Agency ever expressly stated that they were denying accidental disability benefits based on a finding that Mr. Reger was not disabled as a result of the November 12, 2007 accident. Instead, the Medical Board stated only that "the evidence submitted concerning the accident did not prove that this event caused the permanent disability." Just as for ordinary disability benefits, the criteria for accidental disability retirement benefits are set in statute. However, the criteria are significantly more stringent for accidental disability benefits. SP § 29-109(b) provides,
(emphasis added).
Thus, the Medical Board's recommendations and State Retirement Agency's decision may have simply reflected that Mr. Reger presented insufficient evidence to prove that his back injury was the "natural and proximate result" of the November 12, 2007 accident, but presented clear evidence that he was permanently incapacitated. Under those circumstances, the State Retirement Agency lacked the authority to award him accidental disability benefits for his injuries because he had not
However, an equally plausible interpretation of State Retirement Agency's decision to award Mr. Reger ordinary disability benefits is that the agency believed that the back and neck injuries he suffered were caused by preexisting conditions, and were not directly attributable to his November 12, 2007 accident. As Mr. Reger points out, the Medical Board's recommendation and State Retirement Agency decision stated that Mr. Reger was entitled to receive ordinary disability "due to" his preexisting back and neck conditions of cervical spondylosis and stenosis lumbar spondylosis.
Even if the State Retirement Agency did, in fact, award Mr. Reger ordinary disability benefits instead of accidental disability benefits based upon a finding that his incapacity to work was proximately caused by his pre-existing back problems rather than the November 12, 2007 accident, that finding would not necessarily imply that he sustained two separate and distinct injuries. As we shall explain, because the State Retirement Agency applies a different legal standard when making disability benefit determinations than the WCC applies when deciding whether to award temporary total disability benefits, a single injury may result in the denial of accidental disability benefits but the grant of temporary total disability benefits.
In Courtney v. Board of Trustees of Maryland State Retirement Systems, we interpreted the "natural and proximate cause" standard in the predecessor statute to SP § 29-109(b), and stated that an accidental injury under the statute "does not include unexpected results not produced by accidental causes," and that "[a]n unexpected result (the incapacitating injury) attributable to a preexisting condition is not, therefore, an accidental injury." 285 Md. 356, 363, 402 A.2d 885 (1979) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Thus, a claimant seeking accidental disability retirement benefits who also suffers from preexisting conditions must show that his injury and resultant incapacity were caused by the work accident, as opposed to a the natural degeneration or progression of the preexisting condition. See e.g., Courtney, 285 Md. at 364-65, 402 A.2d 885 (affirming State Retirement Agency decision to deny accidental disability benefits on the basis of the agency's finding that an employee's "nervous breakdown and mental disability (were) attributable to a preexisting condition of paranoia-schizophrenia"); Eberle v. Balt. Cty., 103 Md.App. 160, 174-75, 652 A.2d 1175 (1995) (holding that under a Baltimore City code provision that was identical to the current version of SP § 29-109(b)(1), "[b]ased on the medical reports that were riddled with references to a preexisting degenerative arthritis problem in addition to hypertension and a chronic overweight problem, it
In contrast, temporary total disability benefits are to be awarded "without regard to pre-existing disease or infirmity." Electrical General Corp. et al. v. LaBonte, 229 Md.App. 187, 200, 144 A.3d 856 (2016) (quoting Martin v. Allegany Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 73 Md.App. 695, 700, 536 A.2d 132 (1988)). Instead, the WCC is limited to looking solely to "the final [workplace] accident contributing to the disability" and determining if it is sufficient basis to award temporary total disability benefits. Id.
Given the disparate standards for awarding the two benefits, particularly that the WCC is
That conclusion is further bolstered by the Court of Special Appeals' holding in Reynolds v. Board of Education of Prince George's County, 127 Md.App. 648, 736 A.2d 391 (1999). In Reynolds, the appellant was employed by the Board of Education of Prince George's County as a bus driver. Id. at 650, 736 A.2d 391. The appellant "was exposed to diesel fuel and its fumes while operating a bus, and as a result of the exposure, began to suffer from a variety of health problems including headaches, respiratory difficulties, and skin irritations." Id. She filed a claim with the WCC alleging that she was disabled as the result of an occupational disease, and ultimately was awarded permanent partial disability benefits "as the result of a work-related occupational disease resulting from exposure to diesel fuel." Id. at 650-51, 736 A.2d 391. Thereafter, the appellant applied for accidental disability benefits "as the result of her health problems resulting from exposure to diesel fuel and fumes." Id. at 651, 736 A.2d 391. The Medical Board "denied appellant's claim for accidental
The WCC determined that the employer was not entitled to offset the ordinary disability benefits against the workers' compensation benefits because, in the Commission's view, they were not "similar" benefits. Id. The employer appealed to the circuit court and, after employer filed a motion for summary judgment, the circuit court reversed the WCC and held that the statutory offset in LE § 9-610 applied. Id. at 652, 736 A.2d 391. The employee subsequently appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which initially upheld the circuit court in an unreported opinion. Id. However, in light of our holding in Blevins clarifying the meaning of LE § 9-610, we vacated that judgment and remanded for reconsideration. Id. at 653, 736 A.2d 391.
Following that remand, the Court of Special Appeals issued a reported opinion, in which it held that "the ordinary disability retirement benefits awarded to appellant are similar to the workers' compensation permanent partial disability benefits awarded to appellant, and the offset provision applies." Id. at 655, 736 A.2d 391. The Court of Special Appeals reasoned that, based on the facts of the case, "there was a single medical condition caused by appellant's exposure to diesel fuel while suffering from an asthmatic condition" that was the basis for both benefits awards. Id. The intermediate appellate court noted that "[a]ppellant claimed the same medical condition and physical incapacity and submitted the same evidence to both the medical board and the Commission." Id. And, the Court of Special Appeals explained that workers' compensation law "recognizes that an occupational disease may be compensable, and in fact, the Commission awarded compensation in this case." Id. In contrast, it noted that "[t]he State Retirement and Pension System awards disability retirement benefits for an accidental injury but does not recognize a work-related occupational disease," but may award ordinary disability retirement benefits for an occupational disease. Id. Having explained that the fact that the benefits were awarded was merely a result of the different legal standards applied by the WCC and the State Retirement Agency, the Court of Special Appeals emphasized that the statutory offset should still apply because "the same physical incapacity on the part of appellant formed the basis for the workers' compensation award and for the ordinary disability retirement award." Id. The Court of Special Appeals in Reynolds also offered an alternative rationale for why the statutory offset should be applied, stating that "[t]he ordinary disability retirement benefit is tantamount to a wage loss benefit," and therefore is "similar to a workers' compensation award." Id.
We agree with the Court of Special Appeals' statement in Reynolds that the statutory offset should apply when "the same physical incapacity ... formed the basis for the workers' compensation award and for the ordinary disability retirement award." In those circumstances, both sets of benefits were awarded based on the same overall injury, and the employee is not entitled to a double recovery.
Our sole point of disagreement with the intermediate appellate court's reasoning in Reynolds is as to its alternate explanation for why the statutory offset should apply: that because ordinary disability retirement benefits and the workers' compensation benefits at issue in that case are both "wage loss benefit[s]" they are per se "similar" benefits. As noted previously, we explicitly rejected that rationale in Newman, where we stated that the statutory offset now contained in LE § 9-610 "focuses only on dual recoveries for a single on-the-job injury" and "does not encompass setoffs for every type of wage-loss benefit available." 311 Md. at 727, 537 A.2d 274. We note that ordinary disability retirement benefits do not necessarily preclude an employee from working in the future — an employee need only show that he is "incapacitated for the further performance of the normal duties of
In summary, as clarified by our above analysis about the differing standards the State Retirement Agency and WCC apply to award disability benefits, and as further supported by the Court of Special Appeals' reasoning in Reynolds and in the instant case, we conclude that when a claimant suffers a single overall injury that involves a preexisting condition that was exacerbated or triggered by an accidental injury, the State Retirement Agency and WCC may both award the claimant benefits for that single injury but make contrasting findings as to the cause of the injury. In order to ensure that the statutory intent and purpose of LE § 9-610 to prevent a double recovery for the same injury prevail, we hold that in those circumstances, the WCC may properly apply the statutory offset in LE § 9-610, and issue an order permitting the employer or insurer to set off the temporary total disability benefit against the ordinary disability retirement benefits.
In determining whether the two sets of benefits were awarded for the same injury, the WCC may consider any relevant evidence that may clarify the injuries for which the temporary total disability and ordinary disability retirement benefits were awarded, and whether the benefits were awarded for the same or separate injuries. That relevant evidence may include the Medical Board's recommendation or State Retirement Agency's order supporting an award of ordinary disability retirement benefits. But, because the State Retirement Agency and WCC may have reached different conclusions as to the cause of a same injury, the WCC may also consider other evidence in the record, which may include medical reports, information stated in a claimant's application for benefits, or witness testimony presented to the WCC.
In the instant case, it is clear that Mr. Reger was paid both ordinary disability benefits and temporary total disability benefits as compensation for the same back and neck injuries. Although Mr. Reger's custodial position involved "very physical work" that included regular bending and lifting, he repeatedly testified to the WCC that he had never missed any time from work or sought any medical treatment for "any back problems" prior to the November 12, 2007 work accident.
(emphasis added). Thus, Mr. Reger's own testimony before the WCC as well as the medical opinion of his own treating physician submitted to the Commission plainly indicate that, while he may have had an undiagnosed degenerative back medical condition prior to the November 12, 2007 accident, he did not suffer from a back
The WCC initially denied Mr. Reger temporary total disability benefits but, after a petition to the circuit court for judicial review, a jury returned a verdict in his favor, and the circuit court vacated the order of the WCC and remanded for entry of an order finding,
Thus, it is clear that Mr. Reger's temporary total disability benefits from July 16, 2008 to September 9, 2009 were awarded on the basis of the back injuries he sought treatment for following the November 12, 2007 accident that required back surgery and rendered him unable to work. The same is true of his second period of temporary total disability benefits from September 25, 2010 to November 8, 2013. Mr. Reger secured those additional benefits after he had again sought to receive temporary total disability benefits until he could undergo and recover from a second proposed surgery, for neck and left arm and elbow pain. He was again initially denied benefits by the WCC, and again successfully
Mr. Reger's application to the MSRPS for accidental disability benefits similarly reflects that he sought benefits for the same back injuries that he suffered after the November 12, 2007 accident. Mr. Reger's description of his "disability or medical condition" indicated conditions relating to his lower back, neck, shoulder, left leg, and left hand. He also described how,
Thus, the record plainly demonstrates that both sets of benefits were awarded for the
In summary, we hold that the legislative intent behind the overall offset provision now contained in LE § 9-610 is to prevent employees of a Maryland governmental unit or quasi-public corporation who are covered by both a pension plan and workers' compensation from receiving a double recovery for the same injury. Similarly, we conclude that the legislative intent behind the specific language in the statute that "payment of the benefit by the employer satisfies, to the extent of the payment, the liability of the employer ... for payment of
We further hold that, as a matter of law, ordinary disability benefits can be legally similar to workers' compensation benefits, if the record reflects that the cause of the incapacity for which ordinary disability benefits were awarded was the same workplace accidental injury or occupational disease that was the basis for the workers' compensation benefits.
Finally, we hold that in this case, the record reflects that the ordinary disability benefits paid to Mr. Reger were based on the same injury as his temporary total disability benefits. Although the State Retirement Agency arguably found that the injury for which it was awarding Mr. Reger ordinary disability benefits was caused by his preexisting degenerative back problems, whereas his temporary total disability benefits from the WCC were awarded for his November 12, 2007 accident, that does not imply that each benefit was awarded for a separate and distinct injury. The State Retirement Agency and WCC apply different legal standards to determine whether a beneficiary is entitled to a disability benefit. Therefore, when a disability claimant suffers an injury involving a preexisting condition that is triggered or exacerbated by a work accident, the two agencies may both award benefits for the same injury but ascribe different causes to that injury. Under those circumstances, in order to determine whether ordinary disability benefits and workers' compensation benefits were awarded on the basis of the same injury, the WCC is not bound to prior agency findings as to causation. Instead, the WCC may consider any relevant evidence or argument submitted as to the basis for each benefit, which may include: letters or orders granting a benefit, information stated in a claimant's application for benefits, and evidence submitted to the agency, such as medical records or witness testimony. Here, that evidence clearly shows that both sets of benefits were awarded to compensate the same injuries; Mr. Reger claimed in both applications for benefits that he was seeking benefits for the same back and neck injuries, submitted
Although Mr. Reger has been granted two sets of benefits for the same injury, he is entitled to only one recovery for that single injury. Therefore, we hold that the WCC did not err in its determination that the offset provision in LE § 9-610 applies in this case, and that the Respondents are entitled to offset Mr. Reger's ordinary disability benefits against his temporary total disability benefits. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals is affirmed.
