WILLIAM M. NICKERSON, Senior District Judge.
Plaintiff Robert Shank filed this action against his former employer, the Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners (BCBSC) alleging that he was discriminated against on the basis of his race (white). He also named as defendants several employees of BCBSC (Jerome Jones, Jerry Watkins, and William Watkins) and one former employee of BCBSC (Kevin Seawright). The Complaint contains four counts: Count I — a race discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
Defendants Jones, Jerry Watkins and William Watkins have filed Answers to the Complaint. Defendant BCBSC, however, has filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety, ECF No. 7, arguing under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendant BCBSC also argues in its motion that it is an arm of the state and therefore is immune from suit under § 1983. Also pending is a motion filed by Plaintiff for default judgment against Defendant Seawright. ECF No. 12.
The Court turns first to the motion for default judgment. The record reveals that Plaintiff mailed summonses to Seawright at an address associated with BCBSC headquarters and also to his home address, understanding that Seawright had recently resigned from his position with Baltimore City schools. A restricted delivery receipt signed by Defendant Seawright and reflecting delivery at Seawright's home address was submitted with Plaintiff's Proof of Service filed on August 22, 2011. ECF No. 3. When no answer was filed by Seawright, Plaintiff moved for entry of default judgment against Seawright on October 28, 2011. ECF No. 12. With that motion, Plaintiff's counsel submitted an affidavit clearly indicating that service had been made on Seawright at his home address. ECF NO. 12-1, Morris Decl. at ¶ 2. The Clerk of the Court entered the default on November 1, 2011, but no default judgment was entered by the Court.
Notwithstanding the clear indication in the record that Seawright had been properly served, counsel for the remaining Defendants, as "friends of the Court," filed an opposition to the motion for default judgment, opining that Seawright was "never served with process." ECF No. 14 at 1. Apparently not reading Plaintiff's motion, Defendants' counsel accuses Plaintiff of having "never made any efforts to confirm whether Defendant Seawright received service or not."
While the Court finds that Defendant Seawright was properly placed in default, the Court concludes that the default, nonetheless, should be vacated. Where possible, federal courts favor the resolution of disputes on their merits, rather than on procedural grounds.
In
Turning to Defendant BCBSC's motion to dismiss, the Court finds limited merit in BCBSC's Rule 12(b)(6) argument. Plaintiff presents detailed allegations concerning the events that led to his termination. Plaintiff was hired as an Education Building Supervisor in July 2006 by BCBSC's Facilities Director, Thomas Palardy, a white male. Shortly thereafter, Palardy was replaced by Defendant Jerry Watkins, an African American male. Plaintiff was initially highly successful in his new position. At a meeting of other Education Building Supervisors and other facilities staff, including Plaintiff's supervisors, Plaintiff was singled out by BCBSC's Chief Operating Officer Keith Scroggins for his exceptional performance in handling the maintenance of his assigned school.
After being singled out by Scroggins for recognition, Plaintiff alleges his relationship with his supervisors, Defendants in this action, turned immediately for the worst. Plaintiff was subjected to disciplinary action on the basis of falsified accusations and was otherwise frustrated in the performance of his assigned duties. In February 2009, Plaintiff's employment with BCBSC was terminated. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, who are African American, were motivated by "
In moving to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), BCBSC does little more than recite the basic elements of a Title VII claim. Apparently pasting its argument from a brief from another case, it then contends that "[t]he Complaint is made of mostly of [sic] Plaintiff's bald allegations of discrimination based on her [sic] admitted "problematic" relationship with her [sic] immediate supervisor and other supervisory staff." Mot. at 6. Although Plaintiff soundly met BCBSC's Rule 12(b)(6) argument in his Opposition, BCBSC did not file any Reply in further support of their motion to dismiss.
The Court acknowledges that the allegations in support of Plaintiff's discrimination claim could be stronger. Under the facts alleged in the Complaint, plain jealousy without a racial motivation could be inferred as the reason for Plaintiff's termination. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, however, a complaint must simply "contain sufficient factual matter ... to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'"
The Court will also defer resolving the issue of BCBSC's status as an arm of the state and entitlement to Eleventh Amendment immunity at this stage of the litigation. In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant BCBSC
Compl. ¶ 4. In moving to dismiss on the ground of Eleventh Amendment immunity, BCBSC relies heavily on a recent decision of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in which that court opined in a footnote that, in its view, "there is no doubt that [BCBSC] is properly regarded as a State agency."
While immunity issues are generally decided at the earliest possible stage of litigation, this Court has previously deferred that decision in the face of poor briefing and an inadequate factual record.