DEBORAH K. CHASANOW, District Judge.
On April 21, 2011, a jury awarded Plaintiffs William Wallace and Georgiana Wallace a total of $3,003,001 in nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages because of an incident occurring on the evening of December 27, 2007. Among other things, the jury concluded that two Montgomery County police officers, Defendants Patricia Poulos and Shon Barr, violated certain of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights, ostensibly in the course of serving a temporary protective order ("TPO"). Both sides subsequently filed post-trial motions: Plaintiffs filed a motion for equitable relief and for judgment as a matter of law as to three claims rejected by the jury (ECF No. 169), while Defendants moved for a new trial or remittitur (ECF No. 168). Following submission of Defendants' motion, Plaintiffs also moved for limited post-judgment discovery to aid their opposition to Defendants' motion. (ECF No. 181). The court now rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being deemed necessary. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs' motion for equitable relief and for judgment as a matter of law will be denied, and Defendants' motion for a new trial or remittitur will be granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs' motion for post-judgment discovery will be denied as moot.
The following represents the facts as they were presented at trial. William Wallace is the father of five children, including a daughter named Georgiana, who was three years old at the time of the incident that gave rise to the present litigation. After a contentious custody dispute in 2006 between Wallace and Georgiana's biological mother, Deanne Upson, a Virginia court awarded Wallace full custody in March 2007.
On December 27, 2007, Upson appeared pro se in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and requested a civil TPO against Wallace. Upson led the court to believe that she had been awarded custody of Georgiana and that Wallace had threatened her in some way. The court accordingly issued the requested ex parte order, which instructed that (a) Wallace was not to "assault, threaten, stalk, harass or physically abuse" Upson or Georgiana, and (b) custody was to be "left under the provisions of the custody case D.C. Superior Court 2004 PCS 1375."
After obtaining the order, Upson drove to Wallace's home in Montgomery County and called the Montgomery County Police Department. She informed the police that she had an order to pick up her daughter and asked for an officer's help in delivering the order to Wallace. Montgomery County Police dispatched two officers, Defendants Shon Barr and Patricia Poulos. Poulos and Barr then accompanied Upson onto Wallace's property.
From there, the parties' accounts diverged substantially.
Wallace says that he was in his house when he spotted a police cruiser coming up his driveway. He testified that he walked from his house into his garage to open the garage door and speak with the police officers away from Georgiana (who was in the house). Before he could get out of the
Wallace testified that Poulos immediately confronted him and asked if he had been in D.C. court that morning. When he answered that he had not, Poulos purportedly told him he "should have been" because the "D.C. court h[ad] transferred custody of Georgiana to her mother." When Wallace offered to show his Virginia custody orders, Poulos responded that she did not care about his order because she had her own order. Once Wallace was able to look at the D.C. order, he tried to explain to Poulos that it was not a custody order. She did not respond to his explanations, but instead insisted that Wallace bring Georgiana out of the house.
Wallace testified at trial that Georgiana then appeared at the door to the garage. He took her back inside the house and insisted she remain there. He then returned to the garage and told the officers that he would not bring Georgiana out. Wallace testified that the officers responded aggressively, continuing to insist that he bring his daughter out of the house and even pointing a taser at him. Eventually, said Wallace, the officers grabbed him by the arm and pushed him down onto the hood of a car. Barr handcuffed him.
Wallace testified that he then watched as Poulos entered his house, although he told her not to enter. Poulos picked up Georgiana — who by this point was screaming and crying — and carried her out of the house, passing just by Wallace. Poulos placed Georgiana in Upson's vehicle and then returned to the garage. She took Wallace's wallet out of his pocket, again without his permission, to obtain identification. The officers eventually arrested Wallace and took him into custody.
Officers Poulos and Barr recounted an entirely different version of events regarding their visit to Wallace's home. According to the officers, they arrived at the home and introduced themselves to Wallace when they saw him in his garage. Poulos informed Wallace that she and Barr were there to serve him with a TPO, and she entered the garage to avoid having to yell while reading it. Poulos and Barr maintain that Wallace never told them that he had custody of Georgiana. Wallace apparently became "enraged" and began cursing and screaming almost immediately after Poulos started reading the TPO, asserting that he would not comply with the order and puffing out his chest, balling his fists, and flailing his arms. Poulos then saw Wallace turn toward Georgiana, who was on the steps leading from the house into the garage, "throw" her into the house and slam the door in her face.
Wallace then turned back toward Poulos, with his fists balled, and moved toward her. To protect herself, Poulos stepped back, pulled out her taser, and pointed it at Wallace. Fearing that Wallace would physically attack his partner, Barr stepped in behind Wallace and placed him in handcuffs. Poulos determined that Wallace had violated the TPO by throwing Georgiana through the doorway, and he was placed under arrest. Believing no other adult was in the home, Poulos then entered Wallace's home to retrieve Georgiana and carried her, along with a jacket that she had retrieved just inside the home, outside the garage.
The remaining facts are uncontroverted. The officers transported Wallace to the Montgomery County Detention Center's central processing unit, at which time Barr prepared a Statement of Probable Cause and Statement of Charges, which stated that Wallace had "pushed his daughter into the house and shut the door" and that he had violated Section 4.508.1 of the Maryland Family Law Code.
After his release, Wallace appeared in D.C. Superior Court on December 28 and convinced the judge to vacate the TPO that had been issued to Upson the previous day. Wallace also hired a private investigator who was able to locate Georgiana at the home of Upson's lawyer. Wallace testified that, when he arrived, he found Georgiana in stained toddler clothes, shoeless, and with her bags packed for a "trip."
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Poulos, Barr, Sergeant Kevin Burns, the officers' shift supervisor, and Montgomery County on January 28, 2008, asserting violation of their federal and state constitutional rights, as well as numerous state law claims. The following claims against Poulos and Barr went to trial and were ultimately submitted to the jury: (1) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the First and Fourth Amendments to the United States Constitution; (2) claims for violations of Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Constitution; and (3) claims for false arrest/imprisonment, malicious prosecution, assault, battery, and intentional interference with custodial relationship.
On May 19, 2011, Poulos and Barr moved for a new trial or, in the alternative, for remittitur. The same day, Plaintiffs moved for judgment as a matter of law on the following claims that the jury rejected:
Plaintiffs have moved for judgment as a matter of law as to three claims that the jury rejected: (1) assault of Wallace by Poulos and Barr; (2) battery of Wallace by Poulos and Barr; and (3) battery of Georgiana by Poulos. Defendants respond in two ways. First, they contend that Plaintiffs waived these arguments by failing to preserve them properly prior to submission of the case to the jury. Second, they argue that the jury could have reasonably found in favor of Poulos and Barr on each of these claims. These arguments will be addressed in turn.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 governs the requirements for making both initial and renewed motions for judgment as a matter of law. Specifically, Rule 50(b) provides that a party may file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law within twenty-eight days of the entry of judgment.
Here, Plaintiffs moved for judgment under Rule 50(a) at the close of Defendants' case. In their brief, Plaintiffs requested judgment as a matter of law on numerous claims, including the assault and battery claims against Poulos and Barr. Defendants contend that such requests were insufficient
As to the battery claims, Defendants' argument is without merit. The basis of Plaintiffs' request for judgment on the battery claims — under both motions — relates to the detention and subsequent arrest of Wallace and the act of carrying Georgiana from the home and placing her in Upson's vehicle. Plaintiffs' brief in support of their Rule 50(a) motion stated these facts in detail and requested judgment as a matter of law because Defendants had failed to provide the jury with a "legally sufficient evidentiary basis" to reject these facts and find in their favor. (ECF No. 151-1, at 1). During oral argument of the Rule 50(a) motion, Plaintiffs' counsel again set forth these facts and asserted that Poulos and Barr had failed to submit evidence that would permit a reasonable juror to find that their actions were legally justified. While Plaintiffs' Rule 50(b) motion may address these battery claims in greater detail than the Rule 50(a) motion, the renewed motion sets forth the same basic facts and arguments as the initial motion, thereby giving Defendants adequate notice of the purported deficiencies in their defense to the battery claims.
The portion of Plaintiffs' Rule 50(b) motion seeking judgment against Poulos and Barr for Wallace's assault claim, however, requires a different result. The alleged use of the taser by one of the officers is the sole factual basis on which Plaintiffs now seek judgment as a matter of law on Wallace's assault claim. In the brief accompanying their Rule 50(a) motion and in oral argument of that motion, however, the only basis articulated by Plaintiffs' counsel for judgment on the assault claim was the officers' act of detaining and subsequently arresting Wallace. At no point in either written or oral argument did Plaintiffs' counsel ever state that Plaintiffs sought judgment on this claim because one of the officers took out a taser and pointed it at Wallace. Because Plaintiffs did not move for judgment on this basis at trial, they failed to provide Defendants with notice that their defense of the assault claim may have been deficient in this respect. Permitting Plaintiffs to raise the issue now would not comport with the principle of ensuring "fair conduct of litigation," Singer, 45 F.3d at 829, and, as a result, their Rule 50(b) motion on the assault claim is not properly preserved.
Because Plaintiffs failed to preserve the argument they now raise with respect to Wallace's assault claim, their Rule 50(b) motion need only be considered as to their battery claims. "Under Rule 50, a court should render judgment as a matter of law when a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, "[j]udgment as a matter of law is proper only when there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the proper judgment." Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC v. United States, 571 F.3d 373, 381 (4th Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). If there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find in the non-movant's favor, the motion must be denied. Dotson v. Pfizer, Inc., 558 F.3d 284, 292 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 114, 175 L.Ed.2d 234 (2009); see also Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 255, 259 (4th Cir.2001) (emphasizing the court's limited purpose of evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, as courts are "compelled to accord the utmost respect to jury verdicts and tread gingerly in reviewing them"). In making its determination, the trial court must consider "the record as a whole in the light most favorable to the non-movant." Dotson, 558 F.3d at 292.
Wallace asserts that Poulos and Barr battered him by detaining and subsequently arresting him without cause, and that Poulos battered Georgiana by picking her up and carrying her to Upson's car. "A battery occurs when one intends a harmful or offensive contact with another without that person's consent." Nelson v. Carroll, 355 Md. 593, 600, 735 A.2d 1096 (1999). Thus, in the absence of physical contact, a battery claim must fail. Griffith v. Truette, 866 F.Supp. 254, 257 (D.Md.1994); Claiborne v. Cahalen, 636 F.Supp. 1271, 1280 (D.Md.1986). Additionally, when defendants have legal justification for their actions, a claim for battery cannot advance. Hines, 157 Md.App. at 551, 852 A.2d 1047. For this reason, "officers are privileged to commit a battery pursuant to a lawful arrest," as long as they use reasonable force in doing so. French v. Hines, 182 Md.App. 201, 265, 957 A.2d 1000 (2008). The jury instructions in this case informed the jury regarding these principles. (See generally ECF No. 154).
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Defendants, the jury could have found that neither officer committed a battery during the visit to Wallace's home.
Following from the events above, the jury could also have found that Poulos was legally justified in carrying Georgiana out of the home to Upson's vehicle, and thus did not commit battery when she did so. Poulos testified that she only approached Georgiana and picked her up after determining that Wallace was under arrest and would be transported to the police station. Believing that no other person was in the home, Poulos stated that she feared leaving three-year-old Georgiana home alone. Poulos explained that she carried Georgiana from the home for that reason and placed her with Upson, who had provided documentation that she was Georgiana's biological mother. Given these circumstances, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Poulos's contact with Georgiana was neither offensive nor harmful.
For these reasons, Plaintiffs' renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law will be denied.
Plaintiffs have also moved for equitable relief, requesting that the court expunge Wallace's arrest record stemming from the December 27, 2007, incident. Defendants do not oppose this request and ask only that the court fashion relief in accordance with the provisions relating to expungement found in the Criminal Procedure Article of the Maryland Code. See Md.Code. Ann., Crim. Pro., §§ 10-101 et seq.
Expungement of a state criminal record, however, "must be sought through the state court system." Dennis v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 34 Fed.Appx. 950 (4th Cir.2002); see also Azeez v. Keller, No. 5:06-0106, 2010 WL 1380024, at *4 (S.D.W.Va.2010) (finding that a state circuit court, rather than a federal district court, was "the proper forum" for a motion to expunge a state criminal record where a state statute identified the state court as the appropriate court in which to seek expungement), appeal dismissed, 408 Fed. Appx. 685 (4th Cir.2011). Similar to the state statute at issue in Azeez, Sections 10-103 through 10-106 of the Maryland Criminal Procedure Code set out the process for requesting expungement in Maryland and specify the appropriate state courts in which such requests should be filed. Because Plaintiffs seek expungement of a state arrest record and Maryland provides a procedure for expungement in its state courts, Plaintiffs' request for equitable relief will be denied.
Defendants move for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
Importantly, Defendants do not ask to start the trial from the beginning. Rather, they ask that the court order a new trial on the issue of punitive damages. Such a partial new trial may be ordered when "it clearly appears that the issue to be retried is so distinct and separable from the others that a trial of it alone may be had without injustice." Rice v. Cmty. Health Ass'n, 203 F.3d 283, 290 (4th Cir. 2000). Courts have often recognized that damages, and punitive damages in particular, are such an issue. See, e.g., Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d at 598 (same).
As an alternative to a new trial on punitive damages, Defendants also seek remittitur. "Remittitur, which is used in connection with Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a), is a process ... by which the trial court orders a new trial unless the plaintiff accepts a reduction in an excessive jury award." Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 294, 305 (4th Cir.1998) (quotation marks omitted). The decision as to whether damages should be subject to remittitur also lies within the discretion of the trial court. Robles v. Prince George's Cnty., Md., 302 F.3d 262, 271 (4th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 945, 123 S.Ct. 1634, 155 L.Ed.2d 486 (2003).
Defendants suggest they are entitled to a new trial on the issue of punitive damages for two reasons. First, they contend that the jury was improperly told that the County would indemnify Defendants against any punitive damages award. Second, they argue that the punitive damages award is so excessive that it violates their right to due process.
Defendants first argue that the court inappropriately "permitted Plaintiffs to inform the jury that the government [(i.e., the County)] was going to indemnify the officers for any award of damages." (ECF No. 168, at 8). In opening statements and closing argument, counsel for Plaintiffs told the jury that Montgomery County would pay any punitive damages award. Defendants protest that these references introduced information that is irrelevant to the issue of punitive damages; they further maintain that "[it] is clear ... that the introduction of this evidence caused the jury to award amounts that would punish the County ... rather than the actual Defendants." (Id. at 8-9). Plaintiffs respond that they were permitted to mention the indemnification agreement
At the outset, it is not clear whether Defendants' objection has even been preserved. This matter was discussed by the parties just before opening statements, when Plaintiffs' counsel explained that he planned to reference the indemnification agreement in his opening statement. When the court asked whether there was any objection, counsel for the Defendants responded: "I object to it only because it's no different than if someone had insurance [and they wanted to] mention the insurance company. I mean that's essentially what we have." When the court then asked whether such insurance would be relevant to the issue of punitive damages, counsel for the Defendants argued that such information should not go before the jury only because the Plaintiffs had not yet established their entitlement to punitive damages. He conceded, however, that "at the point that ... the elements necessary to get to punitive damages have been established, then [Plaintiffs] can make that argument." Thus, the court understood Defendants to be arguing that it was premature to mention evidence of indemnification. They did not suggest, as they do now, that the indemnification agreement was entirely irrelevant to the issue of punitive damages.
"A motion for a new trial should not be granted ... when the moving party has failed to timely object to the alleged impropriety giving rise to the motion." Dennis v. Gen. Elec. Corp., 762 F.2d 365, 367 (4th Cir.1985); see also 11 Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2805 (2011 supp.) ("A principle that strikes very deep is that a new trial will not be granted on grounds not called to the court's attention during the trial unless the error was so fundamental that gross injustice would result."). In this case, Defendants most certainly failed to object on the ground they now raise. Cf. Mourning v. Brown Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., No. 96-1171, 1997 WL 626543, at *4 (4th Cir. Oct. 10, 1997) ("[A]n objection on specific grounds does not preserve the error for purposes of appeal on other grounds." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Fed.R.Evid. 103(a) ("Error may not be predicated on a ruling that admits ... evidence ... unless ... a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context."). But perhaps more troublingly, Defendants' original objection tacitly indicated their belief that the indemnification agreement would be relevant to the issue of punitive damages. To consider Defendants' objection now would allow them to upset a jury verdict with a new theory that was never put before the court at an appropriate time.
But even had Defendants preserved their objection, their argument would fail, as "a defendant's financial position is a proper consideration in assessing punitive damages." Stamathis v. Flying J, Inc., 389 F.3d 429, 442 (4th Cir.2004); see also, e.g., Cortez v. Trans Union, LLC, 617 F.3d 688, 718 (3d Cir.2010); Deters v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., Inc., 202 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir.2000). Indeed, Defendants' own proposed jury instructions acknowledged that "the defendant's ability to pay" was relevant (ECF No. 127, at 2), and they make no present argument that the jury should have been barred from hearing all information concerning their finances.
Defendants nevertheless invoke Federal Rule of Evidence 411, which limits the admissibility of "evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability." A strict, technical reading of the rule would suggest it inapplicable on its face, as indemnification is different from liability insurance. See, e.g., Galaxy Computer Servs., Inc. v. Baker, 325 B.R. 544, 551 n. 2 (E.D.Va.2005) ("The Court does not consider the indemnification agreement to be liability insurance for purposes of Rule 411."). Yet even assuming the rule does apply to this case, it only states that insurance is inadmissible "upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully"; the rule "does not require" such evidence to be excluded when it is "offered for another purpose." Fed.R.Evid. 411. The indemnification agreement in this case was only used in the damages context and therefore would not fall within the scope of the Rule 411. See, e.g., Dallas v. Goldberg, No. 95 Civ.
Defendants also rely heavily on a seventeen-year-old case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Larez v. Holcomb, 16 F.3d 1513 (9th Cir. 1994). In Larez, the plaintiff's attorney informed the jury that the City of Los Angeles would indemnify the defendant — a police officer facing a § 1983 claim — for any punitive damages. Id. at 1520. The Ninth Circuit determined that the indemnification was irrelevant and reversed, explaining:
Id. at 1521 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Judge Pregerson dissented, noting that — rather than resulting in a windfall to the plaintiff — "jurors as taxpayers arguably might lower a punitive damage award where they know that the city, not the defendant, will bear the costs." Id. at 1525 (Pregerson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The rationale advanced in Larez is unpersuasive. Far from "distracting" the jury, the indemnification agreement in this case would be relevant to several aspects of the jury's punitive damages determination. For one, informing the jury of the indemnification agreement makes jurors aware that Defendants' ability to pay is essentially a moot point. For another, telling the jury about indemnification ensures that jurors have an accurate understanding of the likely deterrence effect of their judgment. When an officer is fully indemnified, specific deterrence is substantially diminished and perhaps eliminated.
Defendants also assert that the punitive damage awards of $500,000 and $2.5 million to Wallace and Georgiana, respectively, were so excessive as to violate their due process rights. Plaintiffs largely respond by emphasizing the perceived reprehensibility of the acts involved in this case. Defendants have the better end of this argument.
Plaintiffs first suggest that Defendants "were not denied due process" because the jury was "properly instructed on the issue of punitive damages and [D]efendants made no objections to the instructions that were given." (ECF No. 171, at 18). By now, however, it is axiomatic that "the Constitution imposes a substantive limit on the size of punitive damages awards." Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 420, 114 S.Ct. 2331, 129 L.Ed.2d 336 (1994). Thus, a plaintiff may not appeal to the mere fact that the jury was properly instructed to preserve even the most egregious award. Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States adopted its current approach to punitive damage awards partly because "[j]ury instructions typically leave the jury with wide discretion in choosing amounts," State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003), which potentially opens the door to arbitrariness.
The Supreme Court has articulated three guideposts for courts to consider when determining whether a jury's award of punitive damages violates due process: "(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases." Id. at 418, 123 S.Ct. 1513. Together,
Before considering these guideposts in detail, however, a threshold matter must be resolved. The parties disagree about the scope of facts relevant to a determination of whether the punitive damages award is excessive. According to Defendants, those facts should be limited to the officers' entry into Plaintiffs' garage and home and the seizure of Wallace — not the seizure of Georgiana — because the federal claims for which the officers were found liable related only to these facts. Plaintiffs disagree, referencing not only the facts cited by Defendants, but also relying heavily on facts related to Georgiana's unlawful seizure, the subject of state law claims only. Limiting the facts to those integral to the federal claims is the more reasoned choice. The jury in this case expressly declined to award any punitive damages to either Plaintiff in relation to any of the state law claims. As a result, considering facts integral to those state claims, but not the federal claims, in determining the reasonableness of the federal punitive damages awards would ignore the jury's conclusion that those facts did not warrant imposition of punitive damages. Cf. Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 809-10 (2d Cir.1996) (evaluating only the facts related to a malicious prosecution claim when determining whether a punitive damages award violated due process, even though the case also involved assault and battery claims against a police officer, because the plaintiff had received punitive damages only as to the malicious prosecution claim).
With that threshold issue resolved, the guideposts can now be considered. "[T]he most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct." BMW of N. Am., Inc., 517 U.S. at 575, 116 S.Ct. 1589. Courts are instructed to consider the following factors when evaluating this first guidepost:
State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419, 123 S.Ct. 1513. Additionally, the Supreme Court has cautioned that a punitive damages award need not be sustained simply because one of these factors weighs in a plaintiff's favor. Id. (further reasoning that the absence of all of these factors will render "any award suspect"). In performing this analysis, the reviewing court must accept the underlying facts found by the jury. Mendez v. County of San Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir.2008).
The first two factors arguably support a finding of reprehensibility, and thus a significant punitive damages award. The officers' conduct, as presented by Wallace and presumably credited by the jury, involved at least the threat of violence, a circumstance viewed as reprehensible, particularly when it involves an official using state authority. Mendez-Matos v. Municipality of Guaynabo, 557 F.3d 36, 53 (1st Cir.2009).
Other factors relevant to a determination of reprehensibility, however, weigh against a substantial punitive damage award. There is no evidence that Poulos and Barr had acted similarly on any prior occasion, making this an "isolated incident," a consideration that other courts have found highly persuasive when considering whether a punitive damages award violates due process. See Mercado-Berrios v. Cancel-Alegria, 611 F.3d 18, 30 (1st Cir.2010); Mendez, 540 F.3d at 1121. Plaintiffs here also were not financially vulnerable, as Wallace was (and remains) a partner in a reputable law firm and earns a significant annual salary in this position. See Mendez-Matos, 557 F.3d at 54 (noting that "no evidence" suggested that the plaintiff, the supervisor of a crew constructing a large government center, was financially vulnerable).
"The second and perhaps most commonly cited indicium of an unreasonable or excessive punitive damages award is its ratio to the actual [or potential] harm inflicted on the plaintiff." BMW of N. Am., Inc., 517 U.S. at 580, 116 S.Ct. 1589. There is no bright-line ratio that punitive damages awards cannot exceed, State Farm, 538 U.S. at 424-25, 123 S.Ct. 1513, because the focus of the inquiry is on whether "the measure of punishment is both reasonable and proportionate to the
Even considering these principles, the punitive damages awards here are clearly excessive. The jury awarded Wallace $1 in nominal damages, but $500,000 in punitive damages against the defendants — a "breathtaking" ratio of 500,000:1. See BMW of N. Am., Inc., 517 U.S. at 583, 116 S.Ct. 1589. Similarly, the punitive damages award to Georgiana against Poulos was $2.5 million, more than 833 times her compensatory award of $3,000. See id. (reasoning that ratios exceeding 500:1 "must surely raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow" (internal quotation marks omitted)). The second guidepost may indeed have reduced relevance in the context of § 1983 cases, but that is not to say that it has no relevance. See Mendez, 540 F.3d at 1122 ("In this case, the jury awarded a staggering $250,000 in punitive damages, even though the jury found that [the plaintiff] suffered no compensable injury from [the defendant's] actions."). The substantial disparity between the compensatory and punitive damages in this case thus renders the amount of the punitive awards highly suspect.
The final guidepost requires comparison of the punitive damages award to civil or criminal penalties that have been authorized or imposed for comparable misconduct. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 517 U.S. at 583, 116 S.Ct. 1589. The parties disagree about the appropriate civil and criminal benchmarks to apply in this case, but this dispute need not be resolved here. Courts addressing § 1983 cases have noted that Congress did not specify a "quantum of damages" when drafting that section. Casillas-Diaz v. Palau, 463 F.3d 77, 86 (1st Cir.2006). Therefore, when using this guidepost to determine whether a defendant had fair notice about the amount of the award, the appropriate benchmark is the amount of punitive damages awarded in analogous cases. Id.; Davis v. Rennie, 264 F.3d 86, 117 (1st Cir.2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1053, 122 S.Ct. 1909, 152 L.Ed.2d 820 (2002).
The cases cited by Plaintiff in support of the punitive damages awards here are largely inapposite because the vast majority of them do not involve police misconduct at all.
Even after concluding that the punitive damages awards violated Defendants' due process rights, the question of remedy remains. When the court determines that a punitive damages award is unconstitutionally excessive, it might be reasonable to order a new trial on punitive damages, with or without remittitur. See Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 285 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing this option). Alternatively, a number of courts have allowed or directed the trial court to enter judgment for the maximum amount of constitutionally acceptable punitive damages. See id. As Defendants note in their motion papers, the latter approach is not "remittitur" in the purest sense, but is instead entry of judgment as a matter of law:
Johansen v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 170 F.3d 1320, 1331 (11th Cir.1999) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 931, 120 S.Ct. 329, 145 L.Ed.2d 256 (1999); accord Ross v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 293 F.3d 1041, 1049 (8th Cir.2002); Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F.Supp.2d 567, 575, 592 (D.Md.2008) (quoting Johansen), reversed on other grounds by 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir.2009), aff'd, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 179 L.Ed.2d 172 (2011); cf. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 285 F.3d at 1151 (concluding that an appellate court may simply lower the amount of punitive damages itself, without remanding for a new trial); Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 236 F.3d 1342, 1351 (Fed.Cir.2001) (finding that a new trial was not required where "reduction in a damages award [is based] on purely legal grounds"), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1035, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001).
Here, Defendants obviously could not have challenged the punitive damages award as excessive before submission of the case to the jury. Therefore, a request for "remittitur" without the offer of a new trial — which the court will construe as a request for judgment as a matter of law — does not fall neatly under Rule 50(a). Nor is Rule 50(b) a clear fit. Although Defendants did not make an initial motion under Rule 50(a), "manifest injustice" would result if their due process argument was not considered because those awards were unconstitutionally excessive, thereby violating Defendants' due process rights. Because any awards greater than the ones noted above would be unconstitutional, judgment will be entered in those amounts pursuant to Rule 50.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' motion for equitable relief and for judgment as a matter of law will be denied, while Defendants' motion for remittitur or a new trial will be granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs' motion for post-judgment discovery will be denied as moot. A separate order will follow.
