J. FREDERICK MOTZ, District Judge.
Before the court is self-represented plaintiff Darren Johnson's ("Johnson") prisoner civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants, Corizon, Inc., Lauri Russell,
Darren Johnson, an inmate formerly incarcerated at the Western Correctional Institution ("WCI"), and currently incarcerated at the Patuxent Institution, states that he has suffered from various medical issues since 2007, including pain in his lower back and right shoulder, numbness in his right leg and feet, diabetes, and "a severe case of diarrhea with stomach problems." Complaint, at 1. He claims he has received constitutionally inadequate medical care because: 1) the WCI medical department lacks a system to enable inmates to prove they have placed sick call slips; 2) his pain relief medication has constantly been changed by subsequent doctors after being set by an initial doctor, see id. at 2, and; 3) Dr. Joubert and Medical Director Laura Russell failed to provide and ensure proper medical treatment in response to his sick call complaints filed "12-3-09, 2-4-10, 3-2-11, 5-13-11, 9-25-11, 10-5-11, and 10-13-11," ECF No. 3 Supplement to Complaint, at 8. As relief, Johnson asks this court to order WCI to provide proper medical treatment,
Verified copies of Johnson's medical records show he filed numerous Requests for Administrative Remedies (ARPs) while at WCI alleging that he had received improper medical care since 2009. ECF No. They are summarized below.
Johnson did not appeal any of the adverse decisions to his ARPs "because it seem[ed] like the system had made up it's [sic] mind that [he] was going to be denied on [his] appeals as well." Complaint supplement, ECF Document No. 3, at 2.
In support of his dispositive pleading, Warden Morgan has also submitted his affidavit attesting that his "responsibilities are solely to act as chief administrator of WCI. . . . It is beyond the scope of [his] job title . . . to perform any kind of medical, dental, or mental health treatment on a patient or prescribe a particular course of treatment." Exhibit 10, Declaration of Warden J. Philip Morgan, at ¶ 2. Warden Morgan further declares that he exercises no "supervisory control over the medical care providers," and lacks authority to "dictate the kind of treatment a patient is to receive," or to "influence the medical decisions of the private health care providers contracted to work with the state." Id. at ¶ 3. Warden Morgan attests he "neither interfered with nor delayed the provision of health care to inmate Johnson." Id. at ¶ 4.
In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, the Medical Defendants have filed copies of Johnson's pertinent medical records to demonstrate that his medical concerns at issue were addressed. ECF No. 14, Exhibit D. Care for his shoulder pain has included physical therapy, medication, diagnostic x-rays, and a steroid injection. See id. As a health services administrator, Mary Jo Sabatelli state that her duties "included but were not limited to onsite management of the medical department, investigation of inmate grievances related to inmate medical issues, and insuring that Corizon met its various contractual obligations." Exhibit D, ¶ 3. (affidavit of Mary Jo. Sabetelli). She attests that she is not a physician, and "was not responsible for making diagnoses, providing medical care, or determining the medical necessity of any treatment or plan of care." Id. ¶¶ 6-7.
Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is properly granted only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The moving party must demonstrate through the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any," that a reasonable jury would be unable to reach a verdict for the non-moving party. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317(1986). When this burden is met, the non-moving party then bears the burden of demonstrating that there are disputes of material fact and that the matter should proceed to trial. See Matsushita Electric Industrial Company v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
A material fact is one that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine issue over a material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. In considering a motion for summary judgment, a judge's function is limited to determining whether sufficient evidence exists on a claimed factual dispute to warrant submission of the matter to a jury for resolution at trial. Id. at 249. Further, the court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See United States v. Diebold, 369 U.S. 654, 655(1962); In re Apex Express Corporation, 190 F.3d 624, 633 (4th Cir. 1999).
A federal court must liberally construe pleadings where, as here the plaintiff is a self-represented litigant, in order to allow development of potentially meritorious cases. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of fact, but to decide whether there is an issue of fact to be tried.
Warden Morgan raises Johnson's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies as an affirmative defense in this case. As noted, Johnson states that he failed to appeal any of the adverse decisions to his ARPs "because it seem[ed] like the system had made up it's mind that [he] was going to be denied on [his] appeals as well."
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), prisoners are required to ". . . exhaust such administrative remedies as are available prior to filing suit in federal court." Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4
Johnson is required under the PLRA to properly exhaust all administrative remedies prior to filing suit but, as he acknowledges in his complaint, he has failed to do so. He provides no factual predicate for his conclusory and self-serving statement that an appeal would provide futile, consequently, his claims against Warden Morgan must be dismissed due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The government is "obligat[ed] to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). When prison officials show "deliberate indifference" to a prisoner's "serious medical needs," their actions or omissions give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. at 104. The prison official "must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The medical treatment provided must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness. See Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990). Prison officials are entitled to rely on medical judgments and expertise of prison physicians and medical personnel concerning the course of treatment deemed necessary for prisoners. See Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 167 (4th Cir. 1995); see also Miltier 896 F.2d at 854-55 (stating that supervisory prison officials are entitled to rely on professional judgment of trained medical personnel and may be found to have been deliberately indifferent by intentionally interfering with a prisoner's medical treatment ordered by such personnel).
A defendant must know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. "[T]he [defendant] must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and he must also draw the inference." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Thus, a health care provider must have actual knowledge of a serious condition, not just knowledge of the symptoms. See Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 168 (4th Cir. 1998). Mere negligence or malpractice does not rise to a constitutional level. See Miltier v. Born, 896 F.2d 848 (1990). An inmate's disagreement with medical providers about the proper course of treatment does not support an Eighth Amendment cause of action. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985); Wester v. Jones, 554 F.2d 1285 (4th Cir. 1977); Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1975).
Johnson's claims of inadequate medical care fail to meet the standard for establishing a violation of constitutional magnitude. First, Warden Morgan was entitled to rely on the judgment of medical professionals. There is no allegation presented that Warden Morgan interfered with the administration of his medical care. Johnson's ARPs were investigated by corrections personnel, Johnson was informed of findings, and follow-up was conducted as appropriate.
In regard to the medical defendants, Johnson fails to specify how Dr. Joubert allegedly failed to provide adequate medical treatment and acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. His allegation that he is "constantly being given and taken off pain medication cold turkey," does not appear to focus on Dr. Joubert. Complaint, at 2. Moreover, even when viewed in the light most favorable to him, Johnson's allegation fails to amount to show deliberate indifference. An inmate may disagree with his treatment or the treatment might be negligent, but deliberate indifference demands more. Here, Johnson's verified and undisputed medical records show that he was seen by medical providers, received diagnostic tests, and been prescribed medication and other courses of treatment for his complaints of chronic pain and diarrhea. Further, Johnson fails to provide any factual basis for his claims that the Health Services Administrators failed to properly oversee his treatment. As noted, the Health Administrator does not make diagnoses, provide medical care, or determine the medical necessity of a course of treatment. See supra, p. 5.
To the extent the complaint names Corizon, the contractual medical provider,
Lastly, Johnson's claim the WCI medical department lacks a system to enable inmates to prove they have placed sick call slips does not state a cognizable federal claim; Johnson fails to specify any federal law or constitutional provision violated in this regard.
For these reasons, the court will grant summary judgment in favor of all defendants. A separate order follows.
