ROGER W. TITUS, District Judge.
Plaintiff filed three complaints involving her termination as an employee at Global High Wealth ("GHW"), a division in the Large Business and International section of the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") under the U.S. Department of Treasury ("Agency"). Defendants move to transfer venue to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for the three consolidated cases. For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be granted.
Plaintiff is a tax attorney and certified professional accountant. Civil Action No. RWT-11-2818 Compl. at 2. Plaintiff held a position at GHW for a probationary period of one year. Doc. No. 2, Attach. 1 at 2. On May 10, 2011, the Agency informed Plaintiff by letter that it was terminating her employment for allegedly providing misleading information of her preemployment experience. Id. On May 19, 2011, Plaintiff submitted a written response to the allegations. Doc. No. 2, Attach. 2. On May 26, 2011, the Agency informed Plaintiff by letter that after consideration of her response, her termination would be effective May 28, 2011. Doc. No. 2, Attach. 4 at 2.
Defendants maintain Plaintiff falsely indicated on her resume that she had worked for five years with Ashbourne and Company, which Defendants allege is a nonexistent company. Doc. No. 2, Attach. 1 at 2. Defendants also allege Plaintiff provided information that contradicts an affidavit signed by her previous employer about why the employment ended. Id.
Plaintiff initiated three lawsuits against the Defendants. On September 30, 2011, Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against her supervisors at GHW and the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury. Civil Action No. RWT-11-2818 Compl. at 4-5. Plaintiff alleges GHW made false and defamatory accusations in her personnel file without granting her an evidentiary hearing, thus damaging her reputation and integrity and negatively affecting her future employment.
On December 30, 2011, Defendants filed a motion to consolidate the three claims, Doc No. 8, which this Court granted on January 19, 2012. Doc. No. 9. This Court directed the parties to file all future documents in Civil Action No. RWT-11-2818 and administratively closed Civil Action Nos. RWT-11-3199 and RWT-11-3546.
After consolidation, Defendants seek to transfer the consolidated cases to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) where, Defendants argue, venue is proper for all three cases.
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) provides: "The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought." The purpose of § 1406(a) is for "removing whatever obstacles may impede an expeditious and orderly adjudication of cases and controversies." Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962).
Transfer is appropriate to avoid procedural complications or obstacles to adjudication, such as improper venue or lack of personal jurisdiction. See Estate of Bank v. Swiss Valley Farms Co., 286 F.Supp.2d 514, 522 (D. Md. 2003); In re Carefirst of Maryland, Inc., 305 F.3d 253, 256 (4th Cir. 2002). Venue is improper when there is an "impediment to a decision on the merits." Porter v. Groat, 840 F.2d 255, 257 (4th Cir. 1988). If a court finds venue to be improper, that court should dismiss the case or, if justice requires, transfer the case to a district where venue is proper or to where it would have had venue had the case originally been brought there. Id. at 258.
Defendants argue that the consolidated cases should be transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia because venue in this Court is improper as to Plaintiff's § 1983 claim. Doc. No. 14 at 3-5. Defendants also contend that this Court should transfer the entire consolidated action to ensure a speedy resolution of the matter. Plaintiff maintains venue is proper in this Court because she alleges that the Defendants "deprived her of her rights under color of state laws." Doc. No. 15 at 3. Therefore, Plaintiff concludes that because all three claims can be heard by this Court so judicial efficiency is not an issue.
Plaintiff's first lawsuit alleges a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against her former supervisors at GHW. Civil Action No. RWT-11-2818 Compl. at 4. However, § 1983 allows for suits against state officials, not federal officials. A claim against a federal official may be brought as a Bivens
In a Bivens claim, venue is established by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Simpson v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 496 F.Supp.2d 187, 193 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 544 (1980)); Freeman v. Fallin, 254 F.Supp.2d 52, 57 (D.D.C. 2003) (applying § 1391(b) to a Bivens action); Cameron v. Thornburgh, 983 F.2d 253, 257 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (applying § 1391(b) to a Bivens action).
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) provides:
Therefore, Plaintiff's Bivens action may be heard in a venue where all the defendants reside, or in the venue where the issue substantially arose.
Here, all the defendants do not reside in one forum, see Doc. No. 14 n.5; therefore, the proper venue is where a substantial part of the events arose. See § 1391(b)(2). Defendants contend that venue is proper in the District of Columbia "where Plaintiff worked and was terminated as a probationary employee." Doc. No. 14 at 5. Plaintiff argues that Maryland is the proper venue because after her first notice of termination, she was directed to work from her home in Maryland. Doc. No. 15 at 5. Further, Plaintiff maintains she received her final notice of termination at her home in Maryland. Id.
Plaintiff's argument that venue is established by merely sending a letter into a forum is unpersuasive. For example, in Database America, Inc. v. Bellsouth Advertising & Publication Corp., plaintiffs sought to transfer venue to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey from the United States District Court for the District of Georgia under § 1391(b)(2), claiming they received a Cease-and-Desist letter in New Jersey. 825 F.Supp. 1216, 1223 (D.N.J. 1993). The plaintiffs argued that sending a Cease-and Desist Letter to their home forum established venue. The court rejected plaintiff's arguments and reasoned that merely sending a letter into a forum does not establish substantial activity that gives rise to a claim. Id. at 1225-26 ("To find that the mere sending of the Cease-and-Desist Letter into this judicial district sufficiently established venue would be inconsistent with the purposes of the statutory venue requirement."). The court held that because the majority of activity giving rise to the claim took place in Georgia, it would be inconvenient to the defendant to adjudicate in New Jersey. Id. at 1227. This Court finds this reasoning persuasive.
Venue under § 1391(b) is established where substantial activity giving rise to the claim took place. Id. at 1227. Plaintiff's job post at GHW was in the District of Columbia, where GHW is located. See Doc. No. 14, Attach. 3; Doc. No. 14, Attach. 6. Additionally, Plaintiff's lawsuit alleges discriminatory acts while employed at GHW. Compl. at 6. Finally, Plaintiff received her first notice of termination in the District of Columbia. Doc No. 2, Attach. 1 at 2. While Plaintiff may have received her final termination letter at her home in Maryland, the substantial portion of her claims arose within the District of Columbia while employed at GHW. Therefore, the District Court for the District of Columbia is the only proper venue for Plaintiff's first claim.
Plaintiff's second lawsuit alleges violations of the ADEA and the Equal Pay Act.
Therefore, Plaintiff may bring the second claim in either Maryland or the District of Columbia. See §1391(e)(1)(a)-(b). Defendants argue that, as a matter of efficiency, this claim should also be transferred to the District Court for the District of Columbia.
In Benton v. England, the plaintiff, a resident of Maryland, sued her former employer, the Department of the Navy, in the District Court for the District of Maryland for employment discrimination. 222 F.Supp.2d 728, 729 (D. Md. 2002). Defendant moved to transfer venue to the District Court for the District of Columbia. Id. The court held that because venue was proper for only some claims in Maryland, but was proper for all claims in the District of Columbia, for reasons of efficiency all the claims would be transferred, rather than dismissing one claim for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 731.
Similarly in Lengacher v. Reno, the plaintiff, a Virginia resident, sued his employer, the Department of Justice, located in the District of Columbia, under the ADEA and the Rehabilitation Act. 75 F.Supp.2d 515, 517 (E.D. Va. 1999). Defendant moved to transfer venue from the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to the District Court for the District of Columbia. Id. While venue for the ADEA claim was proper in either Virginia or the District of Columbia, the Rehabilitation Act required that the case be brought in the District of Columbia. Id. at 518. The court reasoned, "when two or more claims amount to a single cause of action . . . proper venue as to one claim will support adjudication of both claims." Id. The court considered "judicial economy, convenience, avoidance of piecemeal litigation, and fairness to the litigants." Id. (citing Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). As a result, for reasons of convenience and economy, the entire case was transferred to the District Court for the District of Columbia where venue was proper for all claims. Id. at 520.
Here, although venue for Plaintiff's ADEA claim is proper in both this Court and the District Court for the District of Columbia, for reasons of fairness and judicial economy of resolving all the claims at once, venue is more appropriate in the District Court for the District of Columbia. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Transfer Venue will be granted.
Plaintiff's third lawsuit alleges violations under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552A(g)(5). A civil suit may be brought against an agency in the district court where the complainant resides, or in the District of Columbia. See § 552A(g)(5). Therefore, this Court may hear the third claim. However, as explained by the courts in Benton and Lengacher, when there is a venue that is proper for all the claims in an action, it is appropriate to transfer the entire action to that venue. Benton, 222 F. Supp. 2d at 731; Lengacher, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 520. Thus, because Plaintiff's Bivens claim may only be heard in the District of Columbia, transferring the entire action to the District Court for the District of Columbia would be judicially efficient and avoid piecemeal litigation. Therefore, Defendants' Motion to Transfer Venue will be granted.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion to Transfer Venue to the District Court for the District of Columbia will be granted. A separate Order follows.
