WILLIAM D. QUARLES, JR., District Judge.
Joseph Weigel sued the State of Maryland and Armistead Homes Corporation ("Armistead") for declaratory and injunctive relief. ECF No. 1. On September 12, 2012, Weigel moved for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") and preliminary injunction. ECF Nos. 2, 3. On October 15, 2012, Weigel and others
Armistead is a nonprofit, nonstock cooperative housing corporation that owns, in
In exchange for membership, members are
ECF No. 16-6 at 2.
Under the Dwelling Leasehold, a member "defaults" when he "default[s] in the performance of any of the covenants, or agreements or conditions on the part of the Member to be preformed [sic] under this Dwelling Leasehold." ECF No. 16-2 at 3 (Part IV(5)). The Dwelling Leasehold incorporates, by reference, the Conditions of Dwelling Leaseholds (the "Conditions"). ECF No. 16-2 at 2 (Part I).
ECF No. 16-3 at 2 (¶ 5(c)).
Upon a member's default, Armistead must provide him with notice of the default
The Plaintiffs and the proposed class are members and leaseholders of Armistead and, accordingly, "assumed and agreed to become bound by all the covenants of [D]welling [L]easeholds, pertaining to the respective premises." ECF No. 20 111136, 49; ECF No. 22-1 at 3. Each owns one or more licensed dogs "believed to be" pit bulls or pit bull mixes. ECF No. 20 ¶¶ 20-22, 39-40. Under Maryland law, licensed dogs are "personal property." Md.Code Ann., Art. 24 § 11-506.
Tracey v. Solesky ("Tracey") arose from a pit bull attack on a young boy named Dominic Solesky.
At the close of the plaintiffs' case, the court granted the defendant landlord's motion for judgment. Tracey, 50 A.3d at 1078. The court held that that there was
On April 26, 2012, the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed and directed the Court of Special Appeals to remand for a retrial. Tracey, 50 A.3d at 1089-90. The court recognized that the trial judge had correctly applied the then-prevailing standard of negligence to the landlord's conduct. Id. at 1078. However, the court decided to "modify[ ]" that standard, "as it relates to attacks by pit bull and crossbred pit bull dogs against humans." Id. at 1079. Under the court's new rule,
Id. at 1089.
This modification was warranted, the court reasoned, because of pit bulls'"aggressive and vicious nature" and "capability to inflict serious and sometimes fatal injuries," Tracey, 50 A.3d at 1080. The court relied upon "strong dicta" in Matthews v. Amberwood Associates Ltd. Partnership, Inc.
Judge Greene
On May 25, 2012, the defendant landlord moved for reconsideration, arguing that "the imposition of a `new duty' on landlords was fundamentally unfair and unconstitutional as applied."
However, the court granted the motion in part to delete any reference to crossbred pit bulls, "so that the Court's holding would apply only to pit bulls that are not cross-breds." Tracey, 50 A.3d at 1097. The court gave two reasons for this amendment. First, there was "never any assertion, suggestion, or finding in this case that the dog was a cross-bred." Id.
Before the April 26, 2012 Tracey decision, Armistead's "Handbook for Member-Residents" permitted members' ownership of "no more than two animals." ECF No. 20 ¶ 41. The Handbook did not prohibit pit bulls. Id. At a June 7, 2012 meeting, Armistead's board of directors considered a motion that no pit bull or cross-bred pit bull be permitted on Armistead's premises, and that any leaseholder who "caused" or "allows" any such dog to be brought onto the premises "shall have committed a material breach of the Dwelling Leasehold and the Conditions of Dwelling Leasehold." ECF No. 16-1 ¶ 4. The motion passed unanimously. Id. By August 10, 2012 letter, Armistead President Sharon Vick notified members of the new rule:
ECF No. 16-4 at 2 (emphasis in original).
The Plaintiffs assert that they and the proposed class "subsist on an extremely low income and cannot afford to pay the rents charged elsewhere" and "will be forced to sleep in parks, under bridges, or in their cars, or to set up tents or trailers in the woods" if evicted. ECF No. 20 ¶¶ 1, 37.
ECF No. 20-1 118. The Plaintiffs stress that, if BARCS closes, the public "will not be able to bring in sickly animals that are infected with contagious diseases, posing a serious public health risk to both people and animals." ECF No. 22-1 at 2. They conclude that immediate action is necessary to prevent these "looming catastrophic consequences." Id. at 3.
On September 12, 2012, Weigel sued the State of Maryland and Armistead for declaratory and injunctive relief. ECF No. 1.
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), the Court must dismiss an action if it discovers it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff has the burden of proving the Court has jurisdiction, and the Court must make all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Khoury v. Meserve, 268 F.Supp.2d 600, 606 (D.Md.2003), aff'd, 85 Fed.Appx. 960 (4th Cir.2004). The Court may "look beyond the pleadings" to decide whether it has subject matter jurisdiction, but it must presume that the factual allegations in the complaint are true. Id.
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), an action may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint, but does not "resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir.2006).
The Court bears in mind that Rule 8(a)(2) requires only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 325-26 (4th Cir.2001). Although Rule 8's notice-pleading requirements are "not onerous," the plaintiff must allege facts that support each element of the claim advanced. Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 764-65 (4th Cir.2003). These facts must be sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).
This requires that the plaintiff do more than "plead[ ] facts that are `merely consistent with a defendant's liability'"; the facts pled must "allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955). The complaint must not only allege but also "show" that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (internal quotation marks omitted). "Whe[n] the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
"The determination whether to dismiss with or without prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6) is within the discretion of the district court."
The State Defendants move to dismiss on the grounds that the Plaintiffs' Due Process claims (Counts I-IV, VII, VIII) are barred by the Eleventh Amendment; Chief Judge Bell and the judges of the Court of Appeals have absolute immunity from the Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief; the Plaintiffs have failed to allege any claim against the State officials; the Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their voidfor-vagueness claims (Counts I, II, VII); the Plaintiffs' Takings claims (Counts V, VI, IX) are not ripe for review; and the amended complaint, as a whole, fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. ECF No. 25.
The Plaintiffs contend that the State Defendants are "proper parties" under Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 560 U.S. 702, 130 S.Ct. 2592, 177 L.Ed.2d 184 (2010); the Takings claims are constitutionally cognizable; the Ex parte Young
"Article III generally requires a federal court to satisfy itself of its jurisdiction over the subject matter before it considers the merits of a case." Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999). As with subject matter jurisdiction generally, Khoury, 268 F.Supp.2d at 606, the burden of proof "lies squarely on" the Plaintiffs to show that they have standing to invoke federal jurisdiction, and their claims are ripe for review.
There are two parts of standing: Article III standing, which ensures that a suit presents a "case" or "controversy" as required by the Constitution, and "prudential standing," which encompasses "judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984).
To satisfy Article Ill's "injuryin-fact" requirement, the Plaintiffs must show an "invasion of a legally protected interest," that is (1) concrete and particularized, and (2) "actual or imminent." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). When a plaintiff seeks prospective relief, he must show a continuing injury; standing for retrospective relief can be based on past injuries alone
Here, the Plaintiffs are all members of Armistead and licensed owners of dogs whom they "believe[ ] to be" pit bulls or pit bull mixes. ECF No. 20 ¶¶ 20-22, 36, 49. Licensed dogs are "personal property" under Maryland law. Md.Code Ann., Art. 24 § 11-506. And, "[t]here is no doubt that a membership in [Armistead], together with the related leasehold interest in a dwelling unit, constitutes a property interest." 85 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 265, 267 (2000). Before the Tracey decision, Armistead's "Handbook for Member-Residents" permitted members to own "no more than two animals." ECF No. 20 ¶ 41. Because of the decision in Tracey,
Accepting all properly pled factual allegations in the complaint as true, and construing all facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have articulated sufficiently particularized and concrete harm to sustain a finding of injury in fact. Cf. Doe v. Va. Dep't of State Police, 713 F.3d at 752-53; Dias v. City & Cnty. of Denver, No. 07-CV-00722-WDM-MJW, 2010 WL 3873004, at *8 (D.Colo. Sept. 29, 2010) (owners of pit bulls have a "personal stake and interest" in challenging regulations specific to the breed).
Traceability is established if it is "likely that the injury was caused by the conduct complained of and not by the independent action of some third party not before the court." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 154 (4th Cir.2000) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130). Here, the causation requirement is met because the Plaintiffs have sued all relevant State Defendants conceivably involved in "passing" and "enforcing" Tracey, as well as the private party (Armistead) who has allegedly "implemented" the decision, to the Plaintiffs' detriment.
An injury is redressable if it is "likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). But, "no explicit guarantee of redress to a plaintiff is required to demonstrate a plaintiffs standing." Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 100 (4th Cir.2011). Here, the Plaintiffs request various forms of declaratory and injunctive relief, including a judgment that Tracey is "unconstitutional, void, and unenforceable," and a preliminary and permanent injunction restraining Armistead from evicting tenants "based on" the decision. ECF No. 20 at 31. There is some—contested—authority that a federal district court may declare unconstitutional a state court decision that effects a Fifth Amendment taking. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 560 U.S. 702, 130 S.Ct. 2592, 2601, 177 L.Ed.2d 184 (2010) (plurality opinion). A decision that Tracey is unconstitutional would likely redress the Plaintiffs' injury (loss of their pitbulls or membership), as Armistead expressly
Thus, the Court finds, at this stage in the proceedings, that the Plaintiffs have adequately shown standing to assert their claims.
"Although the phrasing makes the questions of who may sue and when they sue seem distinct, in practice there is an obvious overlap between the doctrines of standing and ripeness." Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 2.4 (4th ed. 2003). A claim should be dismissed as unripe if the plaintiff has not yet suffered injury and any future impact "remains wholly speculative." Gasner v. Bd. of Supervisors, 103 F.3d 351, 361 (4th Cir. 1996).
Regulatory takings claims are generally subject to additional ripeness requirements. Specifically, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the government entity charged with implementing the regulations in question has issued a "final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue," and (2) the plaintiff has sought and been denied just compensation through available and adequate state procedures. Williamson Cnty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186, 195, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985). Three caveats to this general rule are relevant here. First, Williamson does not apply when a plaintiff challenges the facial validity of a regulation.
The Supreme Court has held that Williamson's ripeness prongs are "prudential hurdles," Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 734, 117 S.Ct. 1659, 137 L.Ed.2d 980 (1997), not jurisdictional requirements, Stop the Beach, 130 S.Ct. at 2610 (majority opinion). The above-stated reasons persuade this Court that adjudication on the merits is appropriate. The Court will therefore consider the Defendants' nonjurisdictional bases for relief: immunity, and failure to state a claim.
The State Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' Due Process claims against them (Counts I-IV, VII, VIII) are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, and Chief Judge Bell has absolute judicial immunity from the Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief. ECF No. 25.
The Eleventh Amendment provides that, "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI.
The Amendment has been construed to "bar[ ] suit in federal court against an unconsenting state and any governmental units that are arms of the state unless Congress has abrogated the immunity." Coleman v. Md.Ct.App., 626 F.3d 187, 191 (4th Cir.2010) (emphasis added) (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755-57, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999)). To determine whether a party is an "arm of the state," courts consider four, "nonexclusive" factors:
In addition to suing the State of Maryland, the Plaintiffs have sued the Maryland Court of Appeals and several state officials. ECF No. 20. There can be no doubt that, having been "vested" with the "Judicial power" of the State of Maryland, the Court of Appeals is an "arm" of that state. See Md. Const. Art 4, §§ 1, 14, 18; Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 1-301; Fishback v. Maryland, No. JFM-12-927, 2012 WL 1145034, at *2 (D.Md. Apr. 4, 2012) (dismissing, on Eleventh Amendment grounds, the plaintiff's complaint against the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and the Maryland Court of Special Appeals).
There are several exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment bar. Equity In Athletics, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 107 n. 13 (4th Cir.2011). Relevant here, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Amendment does not prevent private individuals from bringing suit against State officials for prospective or declaratory relief for ongoing violations of federal law.
"General authority to enforce the laws of the state is not sufficient to make government officials the proper parties to litigation challenging the law." Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 331 (4th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, although O'Malley and Gansler are generally under a duty to enforce and protect Maryland law, neither is charged with the duty to "enforce" Tracey. See id. Similarly, Chief Judge Bell can neither commence nor threaten to commence proceedings under the decision. Cf. Shalaby v. Freedman, No. C 03-03358 CRB, 2003 WL 22416492, at *4 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 21, 2003) ("It is thus unsurprising that [the plaintiff] has not cited a single case, and the Court has not located any, in which a plaintiff challenging a civil statute enforced by private litigants was able to avoid the Eleventh Amendment bar by suing the judges of a state."), aff'd, 138 Fed.Appx. 897 (9th Cir.2005).
Thus, Counts I through IV, VII, and VIII are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.
"It is well-established that judges enjoy judicial immunity from suits arising out of the performance of their judicial functions." Brookings v. Clunk, 389 F.3d 614, 617 (6th Cir.2004) (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967) and Mann v. Conlin, 22 F.3d 100, 103 (6th Cir.1994)).
Here, Chief Judge Bell acted in a quintessentially judicial capacity when he participated in the Tracey decision. Further, he did not exceed his judicial authority;
The claims against Judge Bell are barred by absolute judicial immunity.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege facts sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Here, the Plaintiffs sued "to prevent the Defendants from enforcement of [Tracey] ... and from unilaterally taking their constitutionally protected property interests in their leasehold agreements and membership in Armistead ... and/or their constitutionally protected interests in their dogs." ECF No. 22-1 at 1. The amended complaint appears to assert three substantive bases for relief: (1) Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process (Counts I, II); (2) Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process (Counts III, IV); and (3) Fifth Amendment judicial taking
"A fundamental principle in our legal system is that laws which regulate persons or entities must give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or required." FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2307, 2317, 183 L.Ed.2d 234 (2012). The "void-forvagueness" doctrine, which stems from the right to procedural due process,
Under Tracey, "upon a plaintiffs sufficient proof" that a dog involved in an attack is a "pit bull," and that the owner or landlord knows or should know that the dog is a "pit bull," the owner or landlord is strictly liable for the damages caused to a plaintiff who is attacked by the dog. Tracey, 50 A.3d at 1089. The Plaintiffs emphasize that Tracey does not identify which physical or behavioral traits characterize a "pit bull," or explain what information would constitute "knowledge" that a dog is a pit bull. ECF No. 20 ¶¶ 65-68, 77-79. They argue that Tracey's failure to articulate such a standard "deprives the Plaintiffs and those similarly situated of procedural due process." Id. ¶¶ 69, 81.
The Plaintiffs have not identified—and the Court has not found—any controlling authority that applies the void-for-vagueness doctrine to judicial decisions. See generally ECF Nos. 20, 22; cf. Swagler v. Neighoff, 398 Fed.Appx. 872, 879 (4th Cir. 2010) ("[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine focuses on legislation—not `policies and actions.'" (emphasis added)). Even assuming the doctrine's relevance, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that it applies to civil actions only when "the exaction" of obedience to a rule or standard is "so vague or indefinite as really to be no rule or standard." Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123, 87 S.Ct. 1563, 18 L.Ed.2d 661 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted). Tracey does not "exact" obedience to any rule. It merely cautions that, if a person chooses to own or keep a pit bull, he will be strictly liable should the dog injure another person. See Tracey, 50 A.3d at 1089. Contrary to the Plaintiffs' suggestion, the distinction is not mere semantics.
The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause "guarantees more than fair process."
The Plaintiffs assert, without citation to any authority, that the right to own and keep dogs is fundamental. ECF No. 20 ¶¶ 88, 102. They argue that Tracey's imposition of strict liability for pit bull attacks is not "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest"—and in fact is arbitrary and irrational—because there is authority that pit bulls can be affectionate animals; the Plaintiffs' dogs are affectionate in fact; and Tracey "does nothing to protect against situations that could cause an unexpected attack." Id. ¶¶ 89, 94, 103, 108. Alternatively, the Plaintiffs assert that "there is no rational relation between the imposition of strict liability on owners of `pit bulls.'" Id. ¶¶ 97, 111; see id. ¶¶ 90, 104 (stating that Tracey's imposition of strict liability is "not a reasonable means of advancing any legitimate governmental interest").
The right to own and keep dogs is not fundamental. Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 230, 41 S.Ct. 103, 65 L.Ed. 235 (1920) (property in dogs is "of an imperfect or qualified nature and [dogs] may be subjected to peculiar and drastic police regulations by the state without depriving their owners of any federal right").
The Plaintiffs allege that Tracey "and its designations of a `pit bull' as applied to owners and landlords being strictly liable for a dog attack" are "not a reasonable means of advancing any legitimate governmental interest." ECF No. 20 ¶¶ 90, 104; see also id. ¶¶ 92, 106. The Plaintiffs do not appear to dispute that the protection of health and public safety is a legitimate state interest. Instead, they insist that Tracey did not create specific rules or regulations that would "foster" such protection. Id. ¶¶ 93, 107. Their argument is wrong.
Strict liability "maximizes deterrence and eases enforcement difficulties." Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 134, 122 S.Ct. 1230, 152 L.Ed.2d 258 (2002). Here, the imposition of strict liability on pit bull owners encourages those persons to take extra precautions in keeping and caring for their dogs. Such precautions were necessary, the Tracey court reasoned, in light of evidence establishing the breed's unusual dangerousness.
Under the Fifth Amendment, "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V.
The Plaintiffs allege that Tracey, "on its face and as applied," effects a "judicial taking." ECF No. 20 ¶¶ 116, 129. Although the precise grounds for their argument are unclear, the Plaintiffs appear to allege that Tracey has appropriated the Plaintiffs' property interests in Armistead and their dogs and given those interests to Armistead and BARCS, respectively. See id. ¶¶ 118-20, 131-33; ECF No. 34 at 20 (claiming that the "effect" of Tracey "is that `pit bulls' are being taken from [Armistead's] [r]esidents").
There is some authority that a judicial decision can effect a Fifth Amendment taking. In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 560 U.S. 702, 130 S.Ct. 2592, 177 L.Ed.2d 184 (2010), a four-Justice plurality opined that "[i]t would be absurd to allow a State to do by judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat." Id. at 2601. Stop the Beach provoked widespread controversy and criticism.
There are two categories of unconstitutional "takings" under federal law. The "paradigmatic" taking, requiring just compensation, occurs when the government directly appropriates or physically invades private property. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537, 125 S.Ct. 2074, 161 L.Ed.2d 876 (2005). However, mere government regulation of private property may, in some instances, be sufficiently "onerous" to also support a Fifth Amendment takings claim. Id. The analysis in such a takings case "necessarily begins" with determining whether the government's action "actually interfered" with a property interest. See Sunrise Corp. of Myrtle Beach v. City of Myrtle Beach, 420 F.3d 322, 330 (4th Cir.2005).
The Plaintiffs appear to allege that Armistead has acted in concert with the Maryland Court of Appeals to "take" their property. See ECF No. 22-1 at 10 ("There should be no dispute that Armistead... is taking the Residents' property pursuant to [Tracey].").
Even the owner of real property "necessarily expects the uses of his property to be restricted, from time to time, by various measures newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers." Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992). And, "in the case of personal property ... [the owner] ought to be aware of the possibility that new regulation might even render his property economically worthless." Id. at 1027-28, 112 S.Ct. 2886. Such is the "burden borne to secure the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized community." Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67, 100 S.Ct. 318, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (interal quotation marks omitted). This is all the more true in the case of a "heavily regulated and highly contentious activity."
Accepting the Plaintiffs' well-pled allegations as true, Brockington, 637 F.3d at 505, there has been no actual, government interference with the Plaintiffs' property. Sunrise Corp., 420 F.3d at 330. No government actor has physically taken possession of any part of the Plaintiffs' property, or denied all economically viable use thereof.
The amended complaint does not plead a plausible Takings claim.
The Plaintiffs' state due process claims arise under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which provides that "no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land." Md. Const. Decl. of Rights, art. 24. "It has been clearly established that Article 24 protects the same rights as the Fourteenth Amendment...." Barnes v. Montgomery Cnty., Md., 798 F.Supp.2d 688, 700 (D.Md.2011). "Therefore, the analysis under Article 24 is, for all intents and purposes, duplicative of the analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment." Rosa v. Bd. of Educ. of Charles Cnty., Md., No. 8:11-cv-02873-AW, 2012 WL 3715331, at *6 (D.Md. Aug. 27, 2012) (citing Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 757 A.2d 118, 140-41 (2000); Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 601 A.2d 102, 108 (1992)).
As discussed above, the Plaintiffs have failed to state plausible federal due process claims. See supra Part II.B.3(a)-(b). The Plaintiffs have failed to state Maryland due process claims for the same reasons.
The Plaintiffs' state judicial taking claim arises under Article III, § 40 of the Maryland Constitution, which provides that, "[t]he General Assembly shall enact no Law authorizing private property, to be taken for public use, without just compensation, as agreed upon between the parties, or awarded by a Jury, being first paid or tendered to the party entitled to such
As discussed above, the Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged a federal taking. See supra Part II.B.3(c). Unlike the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Maryland's eminent domain provision is expressly limited to acts by the General Assembly. Md. Const. art. III, § 40; see Stop the Beach, 130 S.Ct. at 2601 (plurality opinion) (emphasizing that the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause "is not addressed to the action of a specific branch or branches"). Thus, even if the Plaintiffs had pled a judicial taking under Maryland law, the plain text of Maryland Constitution Article III, § 40 would preclude this Court's recognition of that cause of action.
For the reasons stated above, the State Defendants' motion to dismiss will be granted; all other pending motions will be denied as moot.
For the reasons discussed in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, it is, this 19th day of June, 2013, ORDERED that:
1. The State Defendants' motion to dismiss (ECF No. 25) BE, and HERBY IS, GRANTED;
2. All other pending motions (ECF Nos. 2, 3, 22, 28) BE, and HEREBY ARE, DENIED as moot;
3. The case is DISMISSED;
4. The Clerk of the Court shall CLOSE this case; and
5. The Clerk of the Court shall send copies of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to counsel for the parties.
Id. Within 10 days after receiving notice of an expulsion decision, the member can appeal it. Id.
In addition to demanding a jury trial, the Plaintiffs request that the Court: (1) declare that Tracey is "unconstitutional, void, and unenforceable"; (2) declare that Tracey "cannot be used [by Armistead] as a basis for evicting tenants"; (3) declare that leasehold agreements with Armistead that are "implicated by" Tracey are "still valid" and "preliminarily and permanently restraint[] interference with such leasehold agreements"; (4) preliminarily and permanently restrain "enforcement" of Tracey; (5) preliminarily and permanently restrain Armistead from evicting tenants "based on" Tracey; and (6) grant "such other and further relief as this Honorable Court deems just and proper." ECF No. 20 at 1, 31.
Counts III and IV further allege that Tracey "suddenly and unpredictably changed well-settled state law and violates the Due Process Clause of the [U.S.] Constitution for that reason as well." ECF No. 20 ¶¶ 96, 110. This argument apparently derives from a concurring opinion in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 560 U.S. 702, 130 S.Ct. 2592, 177 L.Ed.2d 184 (2010). In that case. Justice Kennedy contended that the Court "would be on strong footing in ruling that a judicial decision that eliminates or substantially changes established property rights, which are a legitimate expectation of the owner, is `arbitrary or irrational' under the Due Process Clause." Id. at 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Kennedy concluded that the Due Process Clause would "likely prevent" a state from doing "by judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat." Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Stop the Beach is insufficient to render the Plaintiffs' claim cognizable.