PETER J. MESSITTE, District Judge.
A Response to the above-captioned Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, along with exhibits and Petitioner's Traverse, were filed in the above-captioned case. The matter is now ready for dispositive review. The Court finds no need for an evidentiary hearing. See Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts and Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011); see also Fisher v. Lee, 215 F.3d 438, 455 (4th Cir. 2000) (petitioner not entitled to a hearing under 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(2)).
On October 2-3, 2007, Petitioner Chauncey Antonio Hill ("Hill") was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County on charges of child abuse, second-degree rape, and related offenses. ECF No. 9, Exs. 1, 2 & 5. At trial, the State established the following facts:
Id., Ex. 3.
Based on the evidence produced at trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict on charges of child abuse, second-degree rape and third-degree sexual offense. Id., Exs. 1, 2 & 5. Hill was sentenced to serve 15 years in prison for child abuse, a consecutive 10 year term for second-degree rape, and a consecutive five year term for third-degree sexual offense. Id.
Hill appealed the verdict to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland wherein he raised one issue: "Whether the trial court erred by admitting unreliable DNA evidence and the expert testimony founded on it where the chain of custody was incomplete and where witnesses were unable to testify regarding the condition of the evidence." Id., Ex. 2. The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, rejected Hill's claim and affirmed his convictions. Id., Ex. 5
Hill then filed a self-represented Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the Court of Appeals of Maryland, seeking review of the intermediate appellate court's judgment. Id., Ex. 6. The Court of Appeals denied the petition on November 13, 2009. Id., Ex. 7. He did not seek further review in the Supreme Court, making his conviction final on February 11, 2010, when the time for seeking review expired. See Sup. Ct. Rule 13.1. Hill's motion for modification of sentence, and motions to correct illegal sentences were denied. Id. Ex. 1 & 11.
Hill initiated post-conviction proceedings on July 26, 2010. As litigated and construed by the post-conviction court, Hill raised sixteen claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id., Ex. 8. Post-conviction relief was denied on May 31, 2011. Hill filed an application for leave to appeal the denial of post-conviction relief which was summarily denied on July 31, 2012; the court's mandate issued on August 31, 2012. Id., Exs. 8-10.
In the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed with this Court, Hill alleges his trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to object to the warrant or move to suppress the DNA evidence recovered from him; and (2) failing to raise the issue of merger at sentencing. Hill maintains that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the merger issue on direct appeal. He also claims that his sentence is illegal. ECF No. 1.
An application for writ of habeas corpus may be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The federal habeas statute at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 sets forth a "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings" Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997); see also Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447 (2005). This standard is "highly deferential" and "difficult to meet." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S ___, ___ 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011).
A federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus unless the state's adjudication on the merits: 1) "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States"; or 2) "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d). A state adjudication is contrary to clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1) where the state court 1) "arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law," or 2) "confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to [the Supreme Court]." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000).
Under the "unreasonable application" analysis under 2254(d)(1), a "state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as `fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Thus, "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law." Id. at 785 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Further under § 2254(d)(2), "a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance." Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S.290, ___, 130 S.Ct. 841, 849 (2010). "[E]ven if reasonable minds reviewing the record might disagree about the finding in question," a federal habeas court may not conclude that the state court decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Id.
The habeas statute provides that "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct," and the petitioner bears "the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). "Where the state court conducted an evidentiary hearing and explained its reasoning with some care, it should be particularly difficult to establish clear and convincing evidence of error on the state court's part." Sharpe v. Bell, 593 F.3d 372, 378 (4th Cir. 2010). This is especially true where state courts have "resolved issues like witness credibility, which are `factual determinations' for purposes of Section 2254(e)(1)." Id. at 379.
When a petitioner alleges a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show both that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The second prong requires the Court to consider whether there was "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A strong presumption of adequacy attaches to counsel's conduct, so strong in fact that a petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must show that the proceeding was rendered fundamentally unfair by counsel's affirmative omissions or errors. Id. at 696.
As the Supreme Court held in Strickland v. Washington, supra, "a state court conclusion that counsel rendered effective assistance of counsel is not a finding of fact binding on the federal court to the extent stated by [former] 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)[ now § 2254(e)(1)]." Id. at 698. Rather, "although state court findings of fact made in the course of deciding an ineffectiveness claim are subject to the deference requirement of § 2254[(e) (1)], . . . both the performance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact." Id. It follows, then, that new § 2254(d)(1) applies to the state court's conclusion that the petitioner's trial counsel rendered effective assistance of counsel and this Court may not grant relief on this claim as long as the state court denied the claim based on a reasonable application of the Strickland standard to the facts presented in the state court proceeding.
Hill claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the warrant or move to suppress DNA evidence recovered from him. ECF No. 1. The post-conviction court considered and denied this same allegation, finding, in pertinent part:
ECF No. 9, Ex.8, p. 18-19.
The post-conviction court also found that trial counsel was not ineffective as she objected to both the chain of custody, foundation, and reliability of the DNA evidence. Id., p. 15 & 19. The findings of facts are supported by the record which further demonstrates that trial counsel discussed at length with Petitioner how to confront the DNA evidence. Trial counsel testified that she decided against challenging the DNA evidence pretrial as it would have alerted the State to deficiencies which could then have been corrected prior to trial. Trial counsel, with Petitioner's approval, challenged the admission of the DNA evidence at the time it was introduced at trial. The post-conviction court found such a strategy reasonable, even though it ultimately was unsuccessful. Further, trial counsel testified that she "did not see any problem with the Virginia warrant" (ECF No. 21, Ex. 19, p. 67-68) and Petitioner has failed to carry his burden to demonstrate that the warrant was deficient. Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, a claim that counsel's decision was premised on trial strategy cannot be disturbed. See Evans v. Thompson, 881 F.2d 117, 125 (4th Cir. 1989) Having examined the post-conviction court's ruling as well as having independently examined the record, this Court is satisfied that in applying the Strickland standard to the instant allegations of trial counsel's allegedly deficient performance, Petitioner has not demonstrated the prejudice necessary to establish his trial attorney's ineffectiveness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Stamper v. Muncie, 944 F.2d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 1991) (challenge to counsel's trial decisions and/or tactics amounted to no more than "Monday morning quarter backing."). Moreover, the post-conviction court's analysis of Hill's ineffective assistance of counsel claim represents a reasonable application of existing law and the court's findings of facts are presumed correct. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(e). In short, Petitioner has failed to present a meritorious claim for federal habeas relief with respect to this claim.
Petitioner next claims that trial and appellate counsel failed to raise the issue of merger of sentences. ECF No. 1. Claims alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are also analyzed under the Strickland standard. See Smith v. Robins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000).
The post-conviction court found as follows:
ECF No. 9, Ex. 8, p. 17-18.
Petitioner's entire claim regarding merger of his sentence turns on the post-conviction court's ruling as it pertains to Maryland law and Maryland sentencing provisions in criminal cases. It is not the role of this Court to second guess those conclusions. See Rose v. Hodges 423 U.S. 19, 21B 22 (1975); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 503 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) ) ("[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.") The Court notes that there is no federal constitutional right to merger of convictions for the purpose of sentencing. See Hendricks v. Zenon, 993 F.2d 664, 674 (9th Cir. 1993). Thus the issue of whether the convictions should have merged is exclusively a State law matter, and is not cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Moreover, the likelihood of success either at sentencing or on appeal with regard to the issue of merger was minuscule, and counsel was not required to raise such an issue at the expense of burying good arguments.
Lastly, Petitioner alleges his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. ECF No. 1. To the extent Petitioner restates his claim regarding merger, the claim fails. As demonstrated, Petitioner was not entitled to merger of his sentences.
Stated as a separate Eighth Amendment claim, he is likewise entitled to no relief. The Eighth Amendment provides that: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005). In Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 22-24 (2003), the Supreme Court held: "The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather it forbids only extreme sanctions that are `grossly disproportionate' to the crime." Ewing, 538 U.S. at 22-23. The Fourth Circuit has held that proportionality review is not available for any sentence less than life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See United States v. Ming Hong, 242 F.3d 528, 532 (4th Cir. 2001). Petitioner received a total 30 year term of imprisonment and is eligible for parole.
Petitioner's separate sentences were within statutory and constitutional limits. The fact that the his sentences were ordered to be served consecutively does not establish an Eighth Amendment violation. See United States v. Ming Hong, 242 F.3d at 532 (holding that Eighth Amendment analysis focuses on the sentence imposed for each specific crime, not on the cumulative sentence). The sentencing court fashioned a sentence appropriate to Petitioner's crimes. Each consecutive sentence was based upon a separate crime of sexual misconduct against a child. Neither individually, nor taken together, was the sentence disproportionate. To the contrary, the court's sentence was a proportionate response to the gravity of the crimes. Relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is unwarranted.
The record establishes, and this Court determines, that Hill is not entitled to federal habeas relief. There is no basis upon which to find constitutional deficiencies in the state court proceedings, and Hill has failed to rebut the presumption of correctness of the findings of fact underlying the rejection of his grounds for post-conviction or appellate relief. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's Motion for Immediate Release (ECF No. 29) shall be denied.
Additionally, a Certificate of Appealability is not warranted. A Certificate of Appealability may issue "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U. S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The petitioner "must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong," Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), or that "the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further," Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). Because this Court finds that there has been no substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a Certificate of Appealability shall be denied. See 28 U. S.C.§ 2253(c)(2). Accordingly, the Petition shall be dismissed with prejudice and a Certificate of Appealability shall not issue. A separate Order follows.
