JILLYN K. SCHULZE, Magistrate Judge.
Presently pending is Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Order of May 7, 2015. ECF No. 49. The motion has been fully briefed and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion will be denied.
The court's May 7 Order granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's racial discrimination claim (Count I) and dismissed Plaintiff's retaliation claims (Counts II and III), fraud claim (Count IV), and breach of contract claim (Count V). ECF No. 48. Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of that Order only with respect to her retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count II).
A motion for reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) is granted only in limited circumstances. Microbix Biosystems, Inc. v. BioWhittaker, Inc., 184 F.Supp.2d 434, 436 (D. Md. 2000). Such a motion is appropriate in one of three scenarios:
Medlock v. Rumsfeld, 336 F.Supp.2d 452, 467-68 (D. Md. 2002). "[A] motion to reconsider is not a license to reargue the merits or present new evidence." Royal Insurance Co. of America v. Miles & Stockbridge, P.C., 142 F.Supp.2d 676, 677 n.1 (D. Md. 2001) (citing RGI, Inc. v. Unified Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 658 (4th Cir. 1992). In addition, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides that a court may relieve a party from a final judgment for the following reasons:
"Rule 60(b) is reserved for special limited circumstances where equity requires reconsideration," Medlock, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 467, and "[t]he moving party faces a substantial burden in connection with a motion for reconsideration of an Order of this Court." F.D.I.C. v. Heidrick, 812 F.Supp. 586, 588 (D. Md. 1991).
To maintain an action for retaliation, a plaintiff must show "(1) that [she] engaged in a protected activity; (2) that the employer took adverse employment action; and (3) that a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse action." Middleton v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 68 F.Supp.2d 665, 671-72 (D. Md. 1999). A plaintiff must also show that the retaliation produced an injury or harm. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006).
The adverse employment action alleged here occurred when Defendant filed a wrongful detainer action, rather than a holding over action, to remove Plaintiff from her apartment. Plaintiff asserts that a jury could conclude that Defendant's action was both materially adverse and retaliatory because it was done to prevent Plaintiff from filing a counterclaim or recovering attorney's fees if she prevailed.
To be materially adverse, the conduct must be such that, as stated in Burlington, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006), it "might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination." The court is at a loss to see how a reasonable worker would be dissuaded from making a charge of discrimination as a result of Defendant's conduct. Plaintiff's employment agreement allowed her to live in the apartment during the term of her employment. Plaintiff remained in the apartment after she was terminated (an action not challenged in this motion to reconsider). Defendant then sought to remove Plaintiff from the property. Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant had a legal right to remove her from the property. Rather, she contends that Defendant intentionally filed an incorrect removal action to obtain unwarranted tactical advantages, or, as Plaintiff puts it, "to vex and harass Plaintiff." ECF No. 49-1 at 10.
To be sure, "a lawsuit filed by an employer against an employee can constitute an act of unlawful retaliation under another federal statute governing employment rights," but only "when the lawsuit is filed with a retaliatory motive and lack[s] a reasonable basis in fact or law." Darveau v. Detecon, Inc., 515 F.3d 334, 341 (4th Cir. 2008). Here, even assuming Defendant had a retaliatory motive, Defendant did not lack a factual or legal basis for its action.
Alternatively, the conduct alleged here would not dissuade a reasonable worker from making a charge of discrimination. In Alexander v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., RWT 9-2402, 2011 WL 1231029 (D. Md. Mar. 29, 2011), an employee was required to work at the office instead of working from home, issued written warnings for tardiness, and excluded from meetings, but the court concluded that she did not articulate a harm that would dissuade a reasonable worker from making a charge of discrimination. "In requiring Alexander to work from the office, Marriott was merely enforcing generally applicable employment policies, the enforcement of which cannot support a retaliation claim." Id. at *22-23. As for the tardiness, Alexander never claimed that "she was not actually tardy on the dates she received warnings." Finally, "[m]ere exclusion from meetings—absent any tangible, corresponding injury—is not conduct that would dissuade a reasonable worker from making or pursuing a charge of discrimination." Id. at *23-24. Similarly, here, Defendant had an actual and uncontested right to remove Plaintiff from the apartment. The use of an incorrect procedural vehicle, absent any corresponding injury, would not dissuade a reasonable employee from pursuing a discrimination charge.
Finally, Plaintiff does not claim that this action actually removed her from the apartment.
Finally, Plaintiff notes that Defendant failed to serve her with a 30-day notice to quit. Again, however, noncompliance with a procedural requirement does not alter Defendant's substantive legal right to repossess the property. The fact that an employer commits procedural errors in pursuing a legitimate claim against an employee does not constitute unlawful retaliation. Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is denied.
A holding over action establishes the liability of a tenant "who shall unlawfully hold over beyond the expiration of the lease or termination of the tenancy." RP § 8-402(a); Eubanks, 125 Md. App. at 658. While this section "primarily applies to an action by a landlord against a tenant" pursuant to a "lease agreement," it is also apparent that "RP § 8-402 deals with something broader than contractual rent and tenancies." Eubanks, 125 Md. App. at 659, 669.
A wrongful detainer action is an action to remove a person who holds possession of the property of another without legal right. RP § 8-402.4. Wrongful detainer does not apply to cases of leasehold tenants holding over or failing to pay rent, it "encompass[es] a broader set of litigants including mortgagee/mortgagor and even possessor/trespasser." Eubanks, 125 Md. App. at 668.
Here, Defendant provided an apartment to Plaintiff as part of her employment contract. The parties never executed a lease agreement nor did Plaintiff ever pay rent. Under these circumstances, it is not abundantly clear whether a holding over action or a wrongful detainer action is the appropriate action. Assuming that the holding over action is the correct legal remedy in this case, Defendant nonetheless had "a reasonable basis in fact or law" to file a wrongful detainer action.