RICHARD D. BENNETT, District Judge.
Plaintiff Christen Brown ("Plaintiff" or "Brown") has brought this action against Baltimore City Police Officer Latisha
Plaintiff Christen Brown ("Plaintiff" or "Brown") filed the instant Complaint on March 9, 2015 in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland. See Not. of Removal, ¶ 1, ECF No. 1. Brown's claims arise out of an incident that allegedly occurred on July 13, 2013 between Brown, Officer Latisha Adams ("Officer Adams"), and other Baltimore City Police Officers. Compl., ¶ 9-37, ECF No. 2. Brown claims that Officer Adams approached her automobile because Brown was filming police activity with her cell phone. Id. at ¶ 14-17. According to Brown, Officer Adams reached into her car and grabbed the phone. Id. Later, Brown alleges, Officer Adams and at least one other officer ripped Brown out of her vehicle, arrested her, and did not return her phone, "all without probable cause." Id. at ¶ 21-25.
Defendants Baltimore City Police Department ("BPD") and Baltimore City Police Commissioner Anthony W. Batts ("Commissioner Batts") were served with copies of the summons and Complaint on March 18, 2015. See Affs. of Service, ECF No. 11-2. Officer Adams was served with a copy of the summons and Complaint on March 31, 2015. See Aff. of Service, ECF No. 11-3. Subsequently, on May 5, 2015, Defendant Latisha Adams filed a Notice of Removal to this Court (ECF No. 1).
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) (emphasis added). Courts are "obliged to construe removal jurisdiction strictly because of the "significant federalism concerns" implicated. Md. Stadium Auth. v. Ellerbe Becket Inc., 407 F.3d 255, 260 (4th Cir. 2005). Additionally, "[d]oubts about the propriety of removal should be resolved in favor of remanding the case to state court." Kelly v. JP Morgan Chase, National Association, No. TDC-15-1115, 2015 WL 9183428, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 17, 2015).
In the present case, Plaintiff objects to Defendants' removal as untimely. The Notice of Removal was filed 35 days after Officer Adams was served and 48 days after Commissioner Batts and the BPD were served, well in excess of Section 1446(b)(1)'s thirty-day deadline. See Affs. of Service, ECF Nos. 11-2, 11-3. Officer Adams "acknowledges that her Notice of Removal was [filed] . . . outside of the 30-day period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1446." Def.'s Response, ¶ 3, ECF No. 12. She does not contest remand, but rather "acknowledges Plaintiff's right to object to removal and remand the case to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City," given that removal "was untimely." Id. at ¶ 5. Therefore, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (ECF No. 11) is GRANTED with respect to her request for remand of this case. Accordingly, this case is remanded to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland.
A remand order may require the payment of attorneys' fees "incurred as a result of the removal." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Attorneys' fees should only be awarded under Section 1447(c) "where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. Conversely, when an objectively reasonable basis exists, fees should be denied." Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). "Whether to award costs and expenses is in this Court's discretion, and there is no presumption either for or against such an award." Cohn v. Charles, 857 F.Supp.2d 544, 549-550 (D. Md. 2012). In this case, while removal was untimely, Defendants did not "lack[] an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal." On the contrary, if Plaintiff had failed to object to the removal as untimely within thirty days, or had opted to waive removal, the present case may have remained in this court. In cases "`where remand would be justified by a defect in removal other than a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the defect must be asserted by a party's motion to remand filed within 30 days.'" Almutairi, et al. v. Johns Hopkins Health System Corp., et al., No. ELH-15-2864, 2016 WL 97835, at *3 (D. Md. Jan. 8, 2016) (citing Ellenburg v. Spartan Motors Chassis, Inc., 519 F.3d 192, 196-97 (4th Cir. 2008)). Additionally, "`A motion to remand the case because of a defect in removal procedure must be made within 30 days after filing the notice of removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). An untimely removal is a defect in removal procedure.'" Id. (citing Cades v. H & R Block, Inc., 43 F.3d 869, 873 (4th Cir. 1994)). "`After the expiration of the 30-day period following the filing of the removal notice, the right to object to nonjurisdictional defects in the removal process is considered waived. The expiration of this time period bars both a motion to remand (for nonjurisdictional defects) by any of the parties and a sua sponte remand on such grounds by the district court.'" Id. (citing 14C Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper & Joan E. Steinman, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3739, at 804-815 (4th ed. 2009 & Supp. 2015)). Therefore, given that Defendants had an objectively reasonable basis for filing a Notice of Removal, Plaintiff is not awarded attorneys' fees incurred as a result of the removal of this case. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is DENIED with respect to her request for attorneys' fees.
For the reasons stated above, it is this 11th day of January, 2016, ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (ECF No. 11) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Specifically, this case will be remanded to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland, but Plaintiff is not awarded attorneys' fees;
2. Defendants BPD and Commissioner Batts' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 4) is MOOT;
3. This case be and it hereby is remanded to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland;
4. The Clerk of Court forthwith transmit a certified copy of this Order and the record in this case to the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland;
5. The Clerk of the Court transmit a copy of this Memorandum Order to Counsel; and
6. The Clerk of the Court CLOSE this case.