WILLIAM D. QUARLES, Jr., District Judge.
Todd Bellows sued Darby Landscaping and Todd Dylan Darby (together, "Darby") for unpaid overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")
Darby Landscaping is a lawn and landscaping business owned by Todd Dylan Darby that provides services solely in Maryland. ECF Nos. 1 ¶¶ 9-10; 10-2 ¶¶ 1, 10.
From 2009 to 2014, Bellows was a lawn foreman for Darby Landscaping. ECF Nos. ¶ 28; 12-1 ¶ 2. In that capacity, Bellows used "insecticides, fertilizers, chemicals, power tools. and vehicles" that he believes "were manufactured out of state." ECF No. 12-1 ¶¶ 4-6. However, those items were bought in Maryland. ECF No. 10-2 ¶ 12. Although Bellows worked solely in Maryland, id. 51, 10, 14, he used federal interstate highways to travel to various jobs, ECF No. 12-1 ¶ 7.
On March 27, 2015, Bellows sued Darby for FLSA and MWHL violations. ECF No. 1.
Darby's motion is captioned as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6)
Ordinarily, the Court "is not to consider matters outside the pleadings or resolve factual disputes when ruling on a motion to dismiss." Bosiger v. U.S. Airways, 510 F.3d 442, 450 (4th Cir. 2007). However, under Rule 12(d), the Court, in its discretion, may consider matters outside the pleadings; if the Court does so, "the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56," and "[a]11 parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
Bellows has had adequate notice that Darby's motion might be treated as one for summary judgment. The motion's alternative caption and attached materials are themselves sufficient indicia. See Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 260-61. Additionally, Bellows has submitted a declaration containing factual assertions in response to the motion. See ECF No. 12-1.
The Court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (a);
The Court must "view the evidence in the light most favorable to ... the nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences in [its] favor," Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir. 2002), but the Court must abide by the "affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial," Bouchat v. Bait. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 526 (4th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The opposing party must produce evidence upon which a reasonable fact finder could rely. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23. The mere existence of a "scintilla" of evidence is insufficient to preclude summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
Darby contends that summary judgment is merited because Bellows cannot demonstrate "individual" or "enterprise" coverage under the FLSA. ECF No. 10 at 6, 8. Bellows contends that he is entitled to individual and enterprise coverage, ECF No. 11 at 3, 6.
The FLSA's overtime provisions apply to employees "who in any workweek [are] engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce" ("individual coverage"), and to employers that are "enterprise[s] engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce" ("enterprise coverage"). See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1); Russell v. Cont'l Rest., Inc., 430 F.Supp.2d 521, 524 (D. Md. 2006); Ramirez, 2015 WL 4282130, at *2. "Commerce" means "trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States or between any State and any place outside thereof." 29 U.S.C. § 203(b) (emphasis added). Relevant to enterprise coverage, an "[e]nterprise in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce" means an enterprise that "has employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or that has employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person," and has an "annual gross volume of sales made or business done [that] is not less than $500,000." Id. § 203 (s) (1) (A) .
Darby argues that Bellows is not entitled to individual coverage because Bellows performed services solely in Maryland, Darby buys "all goods and materials for the business in Maryland," and no goods or materials travelled in interstate commerce "as part of the operation of the business." ECF No. 10 at 10. Bellows agrees that goods and materials were bought in Maryland; however, he argues that his handling of goods that had traveled in interstate commerce, for the purpose of "provid[ing] services to clients, who are the end customers," demonstrates his entitlement to individual coverage. ECF No. 11 at 3-4.
To support his argument. Bellows relies solely on Brock v. Hamad, 867 F.2d 804, 808 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[I]t is well established that local business activities fall within the FLSA when an enterprise employs workers who handle goods or materials that have moved or have been produced in interstate commerce."). See ECF No. 10 at 1, 3-5, & nn. 13-21. However, Brock involved enterprise—not individual—FLSA coverage. See Brock, 867 F.2d at 807-08.
Contrary to Bellows's argument, individual coverage focuses on the employee's—not the employer's—activities. See Russell, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 524. To determine whether an employee is "engaged in commerce," 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1), "the test is `whether the work is so directly and vitally related to the functioning of an instrumentality or facility of interstate commerce as to be, in practical effect, a part of it, rather than isolated, local activity," Wirtz v. Modern Trashmoval, Inc., 323 F.2d 451, 457 (4th Cir. 1963)(quoting Mitchell v. Lublin McGaughy and Assocs., 358 U.S. 207, 212, 79 S.Ct. 260, 3 L. Ed. 2d 243 (1959)) (employees who collected and disposed of trash in Maryland were not entitled to individual coverage).
It is well settled that individual coverage does not apply to "employees who handle [interstate] goods after acquisition by a merchant for general local disposition." McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 493-94, 63 S.Ct. 1248, 1250, 87 L. Ed. 1538 (1943); see Russell, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 526 ("Plaintiff's handling of [restaurant] produce that may or may not have outof-state origins does not demonstrate that Plaintiff was engaged in interstate commerce."); Ramirez, 2015 WL 4282130, at *1, 3 (roofing and landscaping company's employee was not entitled to individual coverage).
Darby argues that Bellows is not entitled to enterprise coverage because Darby Landscaping has less than $500,000 in annual gross revenue. ECF No. 10 at 6-7. Bellows argues that Darby has "failed to affirmatively prove" that Darby Landscaping did not have "unreported cash payments," and this "failure to provide evidence . . . creates doubt" about the business's gross revenues. ECF No. 11 at 6-8.
Contrary to Bellows's contention, he—not Darby—bears the burden of providing evidence on the essential elements of his claim. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.
Here, Bellows proffers nothing more than his "belie[f]" that Darby Landscaping's annual revenue was more than $500,000 because one-time jobs were paid for in cash. ECF No. 12-1 ¶ 8. Bellows's speculation is insufficient to rebut Darby's tax returns. See Nat'l Enterprises, Inc. v. Barnes, 201 F.3d 331, 335 (4th Cir. 2000) (self-serving affidavit insufficient to defeat summary judgment) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505); see also Lopez, 2007 WL 4247646, at *3; cf. Rains, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 749-50. Thus, Bellows has not shown that he is entitled to enterprise coverage.
Accordingly, Darby is entitled to summary judgment on Bellows's FLSA claim. Because this Court has dismissed Bellows's federal claim, it must decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his MWHL claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2012).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if it "has dismissed all claims over which it ha[d] original jurisdiction."
Bellows's MWHL claim involves issues of state law that are best resolved by Maryland courts. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Bellows's MWHL claim. See ESAB Group, Inc., 685 F.3d at 394 ("[DJistrict courts retain inherent authority, once they have decided under § 1367(c) not to exercise jurisdiction, to remand these claims to state court."); see also Russell, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 527-28 (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims related to the plaintiff's FLSA claim); Ramirez, 2015 WL 4282130, at *3 (same); Aguilar, 2012 WL 1569552, at *7 (same).
For the reasons stated above. Darby's motion, construed as one for summary judgment, will be granted. The Court will dismiss without prejudice Bellows's state law claims.
ECF No. 12-1 ¶ 8.
