GEORGE L. RUSSELL, III, District Judge.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant's, Baltimore County,
Plaintiffs own the Berger House, which is approximately 133 years old, located at 319 Gun Road, Baltimore County, Maryland. In March 2012, DPW, in the process of repairing a collapsed portion of a storm water pipe near the Berger House, discovered a pipe running from the Berger House to the storm drain. The pipe was expelling waste from the Berger House into the storm drain and an adjacent stream. Shortly thereafter, DEPS was notified. On April 5, 2012, DEPS conducted an inspection and confirmed that the waste was being discharged from the Berger House to the storm drain. On April 27, 2012, DEPS sent a correspondence to Plaintiffs informing them that their sewage pipe violated several county ordinances and ordering them to eliminate the violations. The letter also outlined affirmative steps Plaintiffs could take to remedy the situation.
On May 19, 2012, DEPS performed another site inspection. The inspection determined that a drip dispersal system with advanced sewage pre-treatment was needed to eliminate the violations. Plaintiffs instead requested to be connected to the public sewage system. On August 3, 2012, DEPS informed Plaintiffs that connection to the public sewage system required community authorization and the resolution of other issues. Further, the process would take two to three years, and Plaintiffs would be required to install temporary septic holding tanks and remove their illegal sewage pipe. DEPS set a September 5, 2012 deadline for Plaintiffs to install the drip dispersal system or temporary holding tanks. On September 5, 2012, a DEPS inspection revealed the Berger House continued to illegally expel waste. Plaintiffs informed DEPS they would not install the temporary sewage tanks or the drip dispersal system. DEPS subsequently issued Plaintiffs a citation for violating county ordinances and proposed civil monetary penalties.
On October 5, 2012, Mr. Macgill and representatives of DEPS appeared before the Office of Administrative Hearings for Baltimore County for a hearing regarding the citation. On December 11, 2012, the administrative judge issued a written opinion imposing a $29,700 penalty. The judge suspended the penalty for sixty days and ordered Plaintiffs to either install the drip dispersal system or install the temporary tanks and apply for connection to the public sewage system. Mr. Macgill appealed the administrative judge's order to the Board of Appeals for Baltimore County. The Board held a hearing and issued a written opinion and order on April 30, 2013, affirming the administrative judge's decision.
On May 23, 2013, Mr. Macgill filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Maryland. On March 3, 2014, the court held a hearing and the parties reached a settlement regarding the penalty. The court issued an order stating that the administrative appeal was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice and Mr. Macgill was required to pay Baltimore County $12,500 within 30 days.
On April 3, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in this Court alleging violations of the United States and Maryland State Constitutions, the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, and the Maryland and Baltimore County Codes. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiffs invoke this Court's federal question and supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367 (2012), respectively. Baltimore County and DEPS filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment on August 4, 2015. (ECF No. 12). Mr. Macgill filed a Motion to Squash Defendants Request for Dismissal and/or Summary Judgment on August 21, 2015.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must set forth "a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."
"When `matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the [12(b)(6)] motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56.'"
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court must draw all justifiable inferences in the non-moving party's favor.
A "material fact" is one that might affect the outcome of a party's case.
Plaintiffs attempt to bring claims against the Office of Administrative Hearings for Baltimore County, the Board of Appeals for Baltimore County, and the Circuit Court for Baltimore County for violations of their rights under the U.S. Constitution. "Parties aggrieved by state administrative and judicial decisions must pursue review in state appellate tribunals, with the ultimate opportunity to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for review."
This Court "lack[s] jurisdiction to sit as [an] appellate tribunal[] over state administrative and judicial decisionmakers, absent explicit statutory authorization."
Baltimore County argues Plaintiffs' claims regarding the monetary penalty are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Res judicata "bars a party from relitigating a claim that was decided or
Baltimore County and DEPS imposed an initial civil penalty of $29,700. Mr. Macgill sought administrative review of the penalty and both the Office of Administrative Hearings for Baltimore County and the Board of Appeals for Baltimore County upheld the penalty. Mr. Macgill then sought judicial review before the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, where he ultimately entered into a settlement with DEPS and Baltimore County for a penalty amount of $12,500 and the matter was dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs now attempt to allege Baltimore County and DPW violated their Eighth Amendment right against excessive fines by imposing the monetary penalty.
First, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that DPW violated their Eighth Amendment rights because the evidence shows that DPW did not impose the civil penalty. The remaining parties as to the Eighth Amendment claim in the present litigation—Mr. Macgill and Baltimore County—are the same as the parties in the previous litigation. Also, Mrs. Macgill is in privity with Mr. Macgill as the co-owner of the Berger House. Second, this suit presents a claim that
Baltimore County argues that the departments within Baltimore County are not legal entities capable of being sued. Construing the Complaint liberally, Plaintiffs appear to bring claims for violations of their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) against Baltimore County and DPW. Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part: "Every person who, under color of [law], subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . ." Municipalities and their entities are considered persons under § 1983 and may be sued for damages for constitutional deprivations.
First, Plaintiffs appear to bring a claim against Baltimore County and DPW under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution for DPW's refusal to provide them with access to sewer service. The Takings Clause, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V. "To make a successful claim under the Takings Clause, a plaintiff must establish that it possesses a constitutionally protected property interest before the court will examine whether governmental use or regulation of that property constitutes a taking."
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that access to sewer service is a constitutionally protected property interest.
Second, Plaintiffs attempt to allege Baltimore County and DPW violated their procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege DPW withheld documents from them during the hearings before the Office of Administrative Hearings for Baltimore County and the Board of Appeals for Baltimore County. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . ." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. To state a valid procedural due process claim, Plaintiffs must demonstrate: (1) that they had a property interest; (2) of which Baltimore County and DPW deprived them; (3) without due process of law.
Whether Plaintiffs were deprived of a property interest without due process depends on whether they had a property right to access to public sewerage.
Lastly, Plaintiffs attempt to allege Baltimore County and DPW violated their equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause provides that "[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Clause "limits
Plaintiffs attempt to allege a claim against Baltimore County and DPW for discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101
Plaintiffs allege claims for violations of the Maryland State Constitution, the Maryland Code, and the Baltimore County Code. Because Plaintiffs originally filed this case under the auspices of a federal question, the dismissal of Plaintiffs' federal claims divests the Court of original jurisdiction over this matter. The Court, in its discretion, elects not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and, therefore, will dismiss the Complaint in its entirety. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) ("The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . [it] has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction . . . .").
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will GRANT Baltimore County's Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 12). Plaintiffs' Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk will be directed to CLOSE this case. A separate Order follows.
Even assuming Plaintiffs had a property interest in access to public sewerage, Baltimore County did not deprive them of their property interest without due process. Plaintiffs were given ample opportunity to avoid a citation from the County and obtain access to public sewerage. They participated in extensive administrative proceedings regarding the citation and the requirements for receiving public sewerage before deciding to voluntarily settle their dispute in the state trial court. Though Plaintiffs may not have received the outcome they had hoped for, "procedural due process does not require certain results—it requires only fair and adequate procedural protections."