THOMAS M. DIGIROLAMO, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Marie Martin seeks judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Defendant" or the "Commissioner") denying her application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act. Before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 11) and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 12).
Plaintiff was born in 1967, has a college education, and previously worked as a registered nurse and nurse practitioner. R. at 40, 159, 171. Plaintiff applied for DIB on May 17, 2011 (with a protective filing date of May 16, 2011), alleging disability beginning on December 17, 2010, due to breast cancer surgeries, back injury, knee arthritis, alopecia, uterine fibroid, allergic rhinitis, lower back injury, and cancer. R. at 124-25, 159, 170. The Commissioner denied Plaintiff's application initially and again on reconsideration, so Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). R. at 45-70, 75-76, 79-87. On July 22, 2013, ALJ Larry K. Banks held a hearing in Washington, D.C., at which Plaintiff and a vocational expert ("VE") testified. R. at 26-44. On August 22, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled from the alleged onset date of disability of December 17, 2010, through the date of the decision. R. at 8-25. Plaintiff sought review of this decision by the Appeals Council, which denied Plaintiff's request for review on November 6, 2014. R. at 1-7. The ALJ's decision thus became the final decision of the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981; see also Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07, 120 S.Ct. 2080, 2083 (2000).
On January 10, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court seeking review of the Commissioner's decision. Upon the parties' consent, this case was transferred to a United States Magistrate Judge for final disposition and entry of judgment. The case subsequently was reassigned to the undersigned. The parties have briefed the issues, and the matter is now fully submitted.
On September 9, 2011, a state agency medical consultant, A. Serpick, M.D., assessed Plaintiff's physical residual functional capacity ("RFC"). R. at 51-53. Dr. Serpick opined that Plaintiff could (1) lift and/or carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently; (2) stand and/or walk for a total of about six hours in an eight-hour workday; (3) sit for about six hours in an eight-hour workday; and (4) perform unlimited pushing and/or pulling. R. at 52. Plaintiff occasionally could kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps and stairs (but never ladders, ropes, or scaffolds). R. at 52. She could balance and stoop without limitation. R. at 52. Plaintiff had no manipulative, visual, communicative, or environmental limitations. R. at 52-53. Dr. Serpick ultimately opined that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as actually performed. R. at 53-54.
On June 5, 2012, another state agency medical consultant, Richard Surrusco, M.D., assessed Plaintiff's physical RFC. R. at 62-64. Dr. Surrusco opined that Plaintiff could (1) lift and/or carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently; (2) stand and/or walk for a total of about six hours in an eight-hour workday; (3) sit for about six hours in an eight-hour workday; and (4) perform unlimited pushing and/or pulling. R. at 62. Plaintiff frequently could balance and occasionally could stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps and stairs (but never ladders, ropes, or scaffolds). R. at 63. Although she had no manipulative, visual, or communicative limitations, Plaintiff was to avoid concentrated exposure to hazards such as machinery and heights. R. at 63-64. Dr. Surrusco also opined that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as actually performed. R. at 64-65.
In an opinion letter dated September 9, 2012, Tristan Shockley, M.D., of Metro Spine PC stated:
R. at 435-36.
On September 17, 2012, another state agency medical consultant, W. Backlund, M.D., noted Dr. Shockley's opinion but nonetheless affirmed Dr. Surrusco's assessment of Plaintiff's RFC to perform her past relevant work. R. at 437-39. On July 1, 2013, George H. Drakes, M.D., of Metro Spine PC signed an opinion letter nearly identical to Dr. Shockley's letter. R. at 442-43. Dr. Drakes did note, however, that Plaintiff
R. at 443. Plaintiff's last epidural steroid injection was done on November 14, 2012, and another injection was scheduled for July 24, 2013. R. at 443. During a follow-up evaluation on "July 11, 2013," Plaintiff reported that she continued to have back pain and pain radiating down her left leg. R. at 443.
The ALJ reviewed Plaintiff's testimony:
R. at 15-16; see R. at 29-39.
The VE testified that a hypothetical person with Plaintiff's same age, education, and work experience who could not work around dangerous machinery or unprotected heights and had the RFC outlined in Part III below could not perform Plaintiff's past work but could perform the sedentary, unskilled jobs of addresser, food and beverage order clerk, or taper for printed circuit boards.
On August 22, 2013, the ALJ found that Plaintiff (1) had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of disability of December 17, 2010; and (2) had an impairment or a combination of impairments considered to be "severe" on the basis of the requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations; but (3) did not have an impairment or a combination of impairments meeting or equaling one of the impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1; and (4) was unable to perform her past relevant work; but (5) could perform other work in the national economy, such as an addresser, food and beverage order clerk, or taper for printed circuit boards. R. at 13-20. The ALJ thus found that she was not disabled from December 17, 2010, through the date of the decision. R. at 20.
In so finding, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC
R. at 15.
The ALJ gave "substantial" but not "great" weight to the opinions of the state agency medical consultants because the ALJ did not agree with their opinions that Plaintiff could return to her past work as actually performed in the national economy. R. at 18. The ALJ did not afford controlling weight to Dr. Shockley's opinion:
R. at 18.
The ALJ also considered Plaintiff's credibility and found that her "medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, [her] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible for the reasons explained in this decision." R. at 18-19. In this regard, the ALJ found:
R. at 19. "Given this evidence, the undersigned concludes that [Plaintiff's] subjective complaints and alleged limitations are not fully persuasive." R. at 19.
The Social Security Act defines a disability as the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505, 416.905. A claimant has a disability when the claimant is "not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists . . . in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B).
To determine whether a claimant has a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act, the Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process outlined in the regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-25, 124 S.Ct. 376, 379-380 (2003). "If at any step a finding of disability or nondisability can be made, the [Commissioner] will not review the claim further." Thomas, 540 U.S. at 24, 124 S. Ct. at 379; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The claimant has the burden of production and proof at steps one through four. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2294 n.5 (1987); Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288, 291 (4th Cir. 2013).
First, the Commissioner will consider a claimant's work activity. If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i).
Second, if the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner looks to see whether the claimant has a "severe" impairment, i.e., an impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 404.1521(a), 416.920(c), 416.921(a).
Third, if the claimant has a severe impairment, then the Commissioner will consider the medical severity of the impairment. If the impairment meets or equals one of the presumptively disabling impairments listed in the regulations, then the claimant is considered disabled, regardless of age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 404.1520(d), 416.920(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(d); see Radford, 734 F.3d at 293.
Fourth, if the claimant's impairment is severe, but it does not meet or equal one of the presumptively disabling impairments, then the Commissioner will assess the claimant's RFC to determine the claimant's "ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory, and other requirements" of the claimant's past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1545(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.945(a)(4). RFC is a measurement of the most a claimant can do despite his or her limitations. Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 562 (4th Cir. 2006); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). The claimant is responsible for providing evidence the Commissioner will use to make a finding as to the claimant's RFC, but the Commissioner is responsible for developing the claimant's "complete medical history, including arranging for a consultative examination(s) if necessary, and making every reasonable effort to help [the claimant] get medical reports from [the claimant's] own medical sources." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(3), 416.945(a)(3). The Commissioner also will consider certain non-medical evidence and other evidence listed in the regulations. See id. If a claimant retains the RFC to perform past relevant work, then the claimant is not disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv).
Fifth, if the claimant's RFC as determined in step four will not allow the claimant to perform past relevant work, then the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there is other work that the claimant can do, given the claimant's RFC as determined at step four, age, education, and work experience. See Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472-73 (4th Cir. 2012). The Commissioner must prove not only that the claimant's RFC will allow the claimant to make an adjustment to other work, but also that the other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy. See Walls, 296 F.3d at 290; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can make an adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, then the Commissioner will find that the claimant is not disabled. If the claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work, then the Commissioner will find that the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v).
The Court reviews an ALJ's decision to determine whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. See Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). In other words, the issue before the Court "is not whether [Plaintiff] is disabled, but whether the ALJ's finding that [Plaintiff] is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law." Id. The Court's review is deferential, as "[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Under this standard, substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's conclusion. See Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472; see also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427 (1971).
In evaluating the evidence in an appeal of a denial of benefits, the court does "not conduct a de novo review of the evidence," Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986), or undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472. Rather, "[t]he duty to resolve conflicts in the evidence rests with the ALJ, not with a reviewing court." Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d 635, 638 (4th Cir. 1996). When conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the ALJ. Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erroneously assessed her RFC contrary to Social Security Ruling
The Court first turns to the ALJ's consideration of Plaintiff's credibility. Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 12-15, ECF No. 11-1. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in finding that her symptoms may not have been accurately reported, that they may not exist at the level of severity alleged, and that they may have had other mitigating factors (R. at 16). Id. at 14.
The Fourth Circuit reiterated the following standard in evaluating a claimant's complaints of pain or other symptoms. Dunn v. Colvin, 607 F. App'x 264, 272-73 (4th Cir. 2015). Whether "a person is disabled by pain or other symptoms is a two-step process. First, there must be objective medical evidence showing the existence of a medical impairment(s) which results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities and which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged." Id. at 272 (quoting Craig, 76 F.3d at 594). "At this stage of the inquiry, the pain claimed is not directly at issue; the focus is instead on establishing a determinable underlying impairment—a statutory requirement for entitlement to benefits—which could reasonably be expected to be the cause of the disabling pain asserted by the claimant." Id. at 272-73 (quoting Craig, 76 F.3d at 594). Second, after the first inquiry is complete, the ALJ must evaluate "the intensity and persistence of the claimant's pain, and the extent to which it affects her ability to work." Craig, 76 F.3d at 595; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1). "[T]his evaluation must take into account not only the claimant's statements about her pain, but also `all the available evidence,' including the claimant's medical history, medical signs, and laboratory findings, any objective medical evidence of pain (such as evidence of reduced joint motion, muscle spasms, deteriorating tissues, redness, etc.) . . . ." Craig, 76 F.3d at 595 (citation omitted); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1)-(2). The ALJ must also take into account "any other evidence relevant to the severity of the impairment, such as evidence of the claimant's daily activities, specific descriptions of the pain, and any medical treatment taken to alleviate it." Craig, 76 F.3d at 595; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3); see also SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *3 (July 2, 1996).
Stitely v. Colvin, 621 F. App'x 148, 150 (4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting Craig, 76 F.3d at 595).
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A).
Thus, in light of the foregoing, an ALJ may rely upon evidence of a claimant's daily activities to evaluate subjective complaints of pain, as "[t]he only fair manner to weigh a subjective complaint of pain is to examine how the pain affects the routine of life." Mickles v. Shalala, 29 F.3d 918, 921 (4th Cir. 1994); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i). Here, the ALJ noted Plaintiff's activities included performing household chores, attending to personal care, preparing meals, and going to dinner with her family. R. at 19 (citing R. at 152-53), 34-35. Plaintiff also testified that she drove to church and the grocery store. R. at 35. A claimant's daily living activities can provide substantial evidence to discount the claimant's credibility. See Medhaug v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 805, 817 (8th Cir. 2009) ("[A]cts such as cooking, vacuuming, washing dishes, doing laundry, shopping, driving, and walking, are inconsistent with subjective complaints of disabling pain."); Johnson, 434 F.3d at 658 ("The ALJ also found [the claimant's] complaints of pain to be inconsistent with her testimony of her routine activities. [The claimant] testified that she attends church twice a week, reads books, watches television, cleans the house, washes clothes, visits relatives, feeds the family pets, cooks, manages her household finances, and performs the stretches recommended by her chiropractor. [The claimant] also testified that she can lift approximately ten pounds. The ALJ logically reasoned that the ability to engage in such activities is inconsistent with [the claimant's] statements of excruciating pain and her inability to perform such regular movements like bending, sitting, walking, grasping, or maintaining attention."); Gross v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1163, 1166 (4th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (upholding a finding of no disability where claimant managed his household, grocery shopped, cooked, washed dishes, and walked to town every day); Rahe v. Astrue, 840 F.Supp.2d 1119, 1136 (N.D. Iowa 2011) (finding that substantial evidence in record of claimant's reported activities supported adverse credibility determination of ALJ, who found that claimant had "reported activities of daily living including preparing meals, completing household chores, laundry, and shopping, activities which are not limited to the extent one would expect, given the complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations"); Henry ex rel. Henry v. Astrue, Civil Action No. TMD-08-686, 2010 WL 3199344, at *5 (D. Md. Aug. 12, 2010) ("The ALJ reviewed Claimant's activities of daily living and noted he did some household cleaning, drove, grocery shopped, read, watched television, went outside on his own, and visited family and friends. The ALJ's consideration of Claimant's daily activities was proper based on the regulations . . . ." (citation omitted)). Substantial evidence thus supports the ALJ's determination of Plaintiff's credibility.
Plaintiff further maintains that the ALJ failed to consider the credibility factors under SSR 96-7p. Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 14, ECF No. 11-1. In Ketcher v. Apfel, 68 F.Supp.2d 629, 652 (D. Md. 1999), the plaintiff argued that "the ALJ failed to give a legitimate reason for disregarding the [plaintiff's] allegations, failed to take into consideration the factors listed in Social Security Ruling 96-7p, and did not set forth the weight he attributed to the evidence which influenced his credibility determination." This Court in Ketcher noted, however, that SSR 96-7p requires an ALJ to consider "the entire case record, including the objective medical evidence, the individual's own statements about symptoms, statements and other information provided by treating or examining physicians or psychologists and other persons about that symptoms and how they affect the individual, and any other relevant evidence in the case record." Ketcher, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 652. This Court in Ketcher ultimately found that the ALJ in that case considered the entire record and addressed the objective evidence as well as the plaintiff's subjective complaints. Id.
Here, before concluding that Plaintiff's subjective complaints and alleged limitations were not fully persuasive, the ALJ considered Plaintiff's activities of daily living (R. at 15, 18-19), the state agency medical consultants' opinions (R. at 18), and the evidence of record (R. at 16-18). The Court thus finds that the ALJ complied with SSR 96-7p. See Ketcher, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 652; see also Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1226 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) ("In citing to [20 C.F.R.] § 404.1529 and based on the findings and discussion, it is clear that the ALJ applied this Circuit's pain standard."). Plaintiff's assertion to the contrary is without merit.
Plaintiff also asserts that the ALJ erroneously assessed her RFC. Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 3-12, ECF No. 11-1. SSR 96-8p explains how adjudicators should assess RFC and instructs that the RFC
Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636 (4th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). The Fourth Circuit has held, however, that a per se rule requiring remand when the ALJ does not perform an explicit function-by-function analysis "is inappropriate given that remand would prove futile in cases where the ALJ does not discuss functions that are `irrelevant or uncontested.'" Id. (quoting Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam)). Rather, remand may be appropriate "where an ALJ fails to assess a claimant's capacity to perform relevant functions, despite contradictory evidence in the record, or where other inadequacies in the ALJ's analysis frustrate meaningful review." Id. (quoting Cichocki, 729 F.3d at 177). The court in Mascio concluded that remand was appropriate because it was "left to guess about how the ALJ arrived at his conclusions on [the claimant's] ability to perform relevant functions" because the ALJ had "said nothing about [the claimant's] ability to perform them for a full workday," despite conflicting evidence as to the claimant's RFC that the ALJ did not address. Id. at 637.
Plaintiff first maintains that the ALJ "failed to set forth a narrative discussion setting forth how the evidence supported each conclusion, citing specific medical facts and nonmedical evidence." Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 6, ECF No. 11-1. According to Plaintiff, the ALJ's decision "defies review" because the ALJ provided "no explanation to support his determination that [she] required a sit/stand option at 30 to 45 minute intervals, could perform no above shoulder lifting or constant reaching, was limited to the performance of simple instructions, and would be off task up to five percent of the workday." Id. The ALJ found, however, that Plaintiff was limited to work involving simple instructions and no complex tasks because of her pain and medication side effects. R. at 15, 40. Because of problems with concentration and focus, the ALJ found that Plaintiff would be off task up to 5% of the workday. R. at 15, 40-41. The ALJ also found that Plaintiff's RFC had greater exertional and manipulative limitations than those opined by the state agency medical consultants, and Plaintiff "points to no medical evidence that would change the RFC." Finch ex rel. Finch v. Astrue, Civil Action No. TMD 08-2706, 2012 WL 748383, at *3 (D. Md. Mar. 6, 2012). Plaintiff thus fails to demonstrate prejudice from the claimed error.
Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ erred in his consideration of the opinion evidence. In this regard, the Fourth Circuit in Dunn also reiterated the following standard for considering medical opinions. Dunn, 607 F. App'x at 267-68. When evaluating medical opinions, the ALJ should consider "(1) whether the physician has examined the applicant, (2) the treatment relationship between the physician and the applicant, (3) the supportability of the physician's opinion, (4) the consistency of the opinion with the record, and (5) whether the physician is a specialist." Johnson, 434 F.3d at 654; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. "An ALJ's determination as to the weight to be assigned to a medical opinion generally will not be disturbed absent some indication that the ALJ has dredged up `specious inconsistencies,'" Dunn, 607 F. App'x at 267 (quoting Scivally v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1070, 1077 (7th Cir. 1992)), "or has failed to give a sufficient reason for the weight afforded a particular opinion," id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (1998)); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).
A treating source's opinion on issues of the nature and severity of the impairments will be given controlling weight when well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and when the opinion is consistent with the other substantial evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); see Dunn, 607 F. App'x at 267. Conversely, however, "the ALJ holds the discretion to give less weight to the testimony of a treating physician in the face of persuasive contrary evidence." Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2001). "[I]f a physician's opinion is not supported by clinical evidence or if it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, it should be accorded significantly less weight." Craig, 76 F.3d at 590; see Meyer v. Colvin, 754 F.3d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 2014) ("[A] treating physician's opinion is to be accorded comparatively less weight if it is based on the physician's limited knowledge of the applicant's condition or conflicts with the weight of the evidence." (citing Craig, 76 F.3d at 590; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c))). An ALJ may reject a treating physician's opinion in its entirety and afford it no weight if the ALJ gives specific and legitimate reasons for doing so. See Bishop v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 583 F. App'x 65, 67 (4th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citing Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1202 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001); Craig, 76 F.3d at 589-90).
A medical expert's opinion as to whether one is disabled is not dispositive; opinions as to disability are reserved for the ALJ and for the ALJ alone. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). Generally, the more the medical source presents relevant evidence to support his opinion, and the better that he explains it, the more weight his opinion is given. See id. § 404.1527(c)(3). Additionally, the more consistent the opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight the ALJ will give to it. See id. § 404.1527(c)(4); see also Dunn, 607 F. App'x at 268.
Here, Plaintiff first erroneously contends that remand is warranted because the ALJ weighed Dr. Shockley's opinion but "did not evaluate the opinions of Dr. Drakes, [her] treating physician," as Dr. Drakes was Plaintiff's treating physician, while Dr. Shockley was not. Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 8, ECF No. 11-1. Rather, both the ALJ and Plaintiff's attorney recognized that Dr. Shockley, as Plaintiff's primary care provider, was a treating physician. R. at 6, 17. Further, Plaintiff concedes that the opinions of Drs. Shockley and Drakes are "virtually identical." Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 8, ECF No. 11-1. Because Plaintiff points to no harm from the ALJ's supposed error in failing to evaluate Dr. Drakes's opinion, her contention in this regard is unavailing. See Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409-10, 129 S.Ct. 1696, 1705-06 (2009) (burden is on party attacking agency's determination to show that prejudice resulted from error); McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 887 (9th Cir. 2011) ("Where harmfulness of the error is not apparent from the circumstances, the party seeking reversal must explain how the error caused harm."); Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 190 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004) ("[R]eversal is not required when the alleged error `clearly had no bearing on the procedure used or the substance of [the] decision reached.'" (quoting Mass. Trs. of E. Gas & Fuel Assocs. v. United States, 377 U.S. 235, 248, 84 S.Ct. 1236, 1245 (1964))).
Plaintiff then maintains that the ALJ erred in concluding that the opinions of Dr. Drakes (and Dr. Shockley) are based primarily upon her subjective complaints. Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 8-9, ECF No. 11-1. She asserts that Dr. Drakes explained her medical history, the support of the doctor's diagnosis by her MRI and EMG results in 2008, and the lack of lasting results from her epidural steroid injections. Id. at 8. Plaintiff also points to "substantial medical reports from Dr. Drakes, dating back to September 23, 2008." Id.
After Plaintiff's alleged onset date of disability, however, Dr. Drakes noted that, although she demonstrated pain "on extremes of motion," Plaintiff also demonstrated (1) no focal motor deficits or focal weakness in her lower extremities, (2) no overt evidence of instability, and (3) negative straight-leg raising bilaterally.
Plaintiff further asserts that the ALJ failed to evaluate under SSR 96-2p whether the opinions of Dr. Drakes (and Dr. Shockley) should be accorded controlling weight. Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 9, ECF No. 11-1. Under SSR 96-2p, however, "a finding that a physician's opinion is inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in a claimant's case record is adequate to support a determination that the opinion is not entitled to controlling weight." Burger v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., Civil No. SAG-14-1345, 2015 WL 467662, at *3 n.2 (D. Md. Feb. 2, 2015) (citing SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *4 (July 2, 1996)). Thus, "SSR 96-2p did not require the ALJ to make any additional findings to determine that [the] opinions [of Drs. Drakes and Shockley] were not entitled to controlling weight." Id.
Finally, Plaintiff points out that an ALJ must consider the factors cited in Johnson and in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) when not affording a treating source's opinion controlling weight. In this case, however, "[w]hile the ALJ did not explicitly analyze each of the Johnson factors on the record, the ALJ was clear that he concluded that the doctor's opinion was not consistent with the record or supported by the medical evidence, which are appropriate reasons under Johnson" to afford a treating physician's opinion less than controlling weight. Bishop, 583 F. App'x at 67. In short, substantial evidence supports the weight given to Dr. Shockley's opinion by the ALJ, whose error, if any, in not evaluating separately Dr. Drakes's opinion was harmless.
In sum, substantial evidence supports the decision of the ALJ, who applied the correct legal standards here. Thus, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 12) is
