GEORGE J. HAZEL, District Judge.
Petitioner Joseph Jermaine Pringle filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus relief. ECF No. 1. Respondents argue that the timely petition for habeas corpus relief should be dismissed because several of the grounds raised were not first presented in the state courts. ECF No. 7. Alternatively, they argue that several of the grounds presented fail to state cognizable claims and that Pringle otherwise is not entitled to habeas relief.
On May 2, 2011, Pringle entered an Alford
On October 12, 2011, Pringle filed a petition for post-conviction review in the Circuit Court for Howard County. ECF No. 1 at 2: ECF No. 7-1 at 3; ECF No. 7-3. As delineated by the post-conviction court, Pringle presented the following grounds in support of his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel: (1) counsel failed to file a motion for modification or reduction of sentence; (2) counsel failed to file an application for leave to appeal the conviction; (3) counsel failed to file a motion for review of sentence by a three-judge panel; (4) counsel gave Pringle "bad advice about the plea agreement"; (5) counsel failed to file a pretrial motion to suppress and did not call Detectives Grossman and Smith at the suppression hearing; and (6) counsel did not obtain a transcript of an in camera review of evidence. ECF 7-3 at 2-3. The post-conviction court heard testimony on the petition, as supplemented, and denied post-conviction relief in a memorandum opinion and order filed on May 31, 2013. Pringle appears to have presented the same grounds in his application for leave to appeal the denial of post-conviction relief. ECF No. 7-5. The application for leave to appeal was summarily denied by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in an unreported opinion filed on March 25, 2014.
Pringle signed his self-represented habeas corpus petition on September 22, 2014.
Pringle's Alford plea was based upon the following facts recited by the State:
ECF No. 7-2 at 14-18. The court accepted Pringle's plea and, pursuant to its terms, sentenced Pringle to the recommended sentence of ten years in prison without the possibility of parole. Id. at 18-26. Pringle's post-judgment and appellate rights were explained to him on the record. Id. at 27-28.
An application for writ of habeas corpus may be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The federal habeas statute at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 sets forth a "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings." Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997); see also Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 125 S.Ct. 847 (2005). The standard is "difficult to meet," and requires courts to give state-court decisions the benefit of the doubt. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 171, 131 S.Ct. 1388 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also White v. Woodall, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103, 131 S.Ct. 770 (2011)) (noting that a state prisoner must show state court ruling on a claim presented in federal court was "so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair minded disagreement").
A federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus unless the state's adjudication on the merits "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state adjudication is contrary to clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1) where the state court "arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law," or "confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to [the Supreme Court]." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000).
Under § 2254(d)(1)'s "unreasonable application" analysis, a "state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as `fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140 (2004)). Thus, "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law." Id. at 785 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Further, under § 2254(d)(2). "a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance." Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301, 130 S.Ct. 841 (2010). "[E]ven if reasonable minds reviewing the record might disagree about the finding in question," a federal habeas court may not conclude that the state court decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Id. "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because [it] concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773, 130 S.Ct. 1855 (2010).
The habeas statute provides that "a determination of a factual issue made by a state court shall be presumed to be correct," and the petitioner bears "the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). "Where the state court conducted an evidentiary hearing and explained its reasoning with some care, it should be particularly difficult to establish clear and convincing evidence of error on the state court's part." Sharpe v. Bell, 593 F.3d 372, 378 (4th Cir. 2010). This is especially true where state courts have "resolved issues like witness credibility, which are `factual determinations' for purposes of Section 2254(e)(1)." Id. at 379.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court. AEDPA requires "`a state prisoner [to] show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error ... beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103. "If this standard is difficult to meet" — and it is — "that is because it was meant to be." Id. at 102. A federal court reviewing a habeas petition will not lightly conclude that a State's criminal justice system has experienced the "extreme malfunctio[n]" for which federal habeas relief is the remedy. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Respondents correctly note that habeas petitioners must exhaust available state remedies before seeking relief in federal court. See Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 465, 129 S.Ct. 1769 (2009); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing § 2254(b)(1)(A)) ("It is axiomatic that a federal habeas court may not grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner has first exhausted the remedies available in the state courts.").
Before a petitioner seeks federal habeas corpus relief, he must exhaust each claim presented to the federal court by first pursuing remedies available in the state court. See Leonard v. Hammond, 806 F.2d 838, 840 (4th Cir. 1986). This exhaustion requirement is satisfied by seeking review of the claim in the highest state court with jurisdiction to consider the claim. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.Ct. 1728 (1999); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(c). In Maryland, this may be accomplished by raising certain claims on direct appeal and by way of post-conviction proceedings. See Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907, 911 (4th Cir. 1997); Spencer v. Murray, 18 F.3d 237, 239 (4th Cir. 1994). The exhaustion requirement demands that the petitioner "`do more than scatter some makeshift needles in the haystack of the state court record. The ground relied upon must be presented face-up and squarely; the federal question must be plainly defined. Oblique references which hint that a theory may be lurking in the woodwork will not turn the trick.'" Mallory v. Smith, 27 F.3d 991, 994-95 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Martens v. Shannon, 836 F.2d 715, 717 (1st Cir. 1988)). This exhaustion requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to federal habeas corpus relief, but a matter of comity. See Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134-35, 107 S.Ct. 1671 (1987). The state courts are to be afforded the first opportunity to review federal constitutional challenges to state convictions in order to preserve the role of the state courts in protecting federally guaranteed rights. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490, 93 S.Ct. 1827 (1973).
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted § 2254(c) to require a state prisoner to present his claims to the state's highest court, even if review is discretionary, when such review is part of the ordinary appellate review procedure. See O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845. This generally requires appealing state court decisions all the way to the state's highest court. Id. at 847. Exhaustion is not required if at the time a federal habeas corpus petition is filed petitioner has no available state remedy. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-98, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (1989); Bassett v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 932, 937 (4th Cir. 1990).
Notwithstanding Respondents' argument to the contrary, Pringle has exhausted his state court remedies; he did not file an appeal following his Alford plea, but he has completed state post-conviction review. The question before the Court is not whether Pringle has exhausted state court remedies, but rather whether various issues raised in Pringle's federal petition do not mirror the claims raised on post-conviction review, and are subject to the procedural default doctrine.
Pringle's claim concerning trial counsel's failure to file post-judgment motions (Ground 4) was presented by way of post-conviction and may be examined on the merits. The question of procedural default arises with Pringle's remaining claims.
Review of the post-conviction transcript shows that Pringle's grounds concerning the identity of the informant, deficiencies regarding a pretrial motion to suppress and a Franks hearing, and failure to obtain transcription of in camera review of the lead detective's testimony (contained in Grounds 1, 2 and 3) were developed at his post-conviction hearing as elements affecting the performance of trial counsel.
Where a petitioner has failed to present a claim to the highest state court with jurisdiction to hear it, the procedural default doctrine applies. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 749-50, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (1991) (failure to note timely appeal); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 489-91, 106 S.Ct. 2639 (1986) (failure to raise claim on direct appeal); Murch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41, 46, 93 S.Ct. 71 (1972) (failure to raise claim during post-conviction); Bradley v. Davis, 551 F.Supp. 479, 481 (D. Md. 1982) (failure to seek leave to appeal denial of post-conviction relief).
As the Fourth Circuit has explained:
Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1998).
If procedural default has occurred, a federal court may not address the merits of a state prisoner's habeas claim unless the petitioner can show (1) cause for the default and prejudice that would result from failing to consider the claim on the merits, or (2) that failure to consider the claim on the merits would result in a miscarriage of justice, i.e., the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96 (1986); Breard, 134 F.3d at 620. "Cause" consists of "`some objective factor external to the defense [that] impeded counsel's efforts' to raise the claim in state court at the appropriate time." Murray, 477 U.S. at 488.
Typically, if a claim is defaulted, a petitioner is given an opportunity to explain what "cause" excuses the default and what prejudice would result if the claim is barred, or to explain why the failure to consider the claim on the merits would result in the continued confinement of one who is actually innocent. A petitioner might also indicate whether he seeks a stay and abeyance so that he may attempt to exhaust any of his claims by seeking to reopen state post-conviction proceedings.
Such additional development of the record is not necessary here. Pringle did not preserve his claims of trial court error with regard to suppression of evidence because he failed to timely avail himself of the option of seeking leave to appeal. For reasons noted below, this failure came about not as a result of trial counsel's deficiencies, but because Pringle's wife and family friends, who could no longer afford private representation, informed trial counsel that the request for leave to appeal would be filed through the state public defender. ECF 19-1 at 36-37, 57-61. Further, after a suppression hearing that included the trial court's in camera interview of the lead detective, Pringle, through counsel, negotiated a plea arrangement that ended his right to assert any factual or legal defenses to the charges, but limited his mandatory prison sentence and the impact of this latest arrest and conviction in the future when faced with revocation of parole. ECF 19-1 at 24-35. As there is no allegation that the Alford plea was uncounseled or involuntary. Pringle cannot now assert actual innocence. See generally. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166 (1969). Procedural default bars consideration of Pringle's claims regarding trial court error; his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel may proceed for review on the merits.
Pringle asserts ineffective assistance of trial counsel concerning post-judgment matters, including filing an appeal, filing a motion for modification of sentence, and seeking review of sentence by a three-judge panel. When a petitioner alleges a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show both that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). The second prong requires the court to consider whether there was "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A strong presumption of adequacy attaches to counsel's conduct, so strong in fact that a petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must show that the proceeding was rendered fundamentally unfair by counsel's affirmative omissions or errors. Id. at 696. Although "strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable," it is equally true that "strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation." Id. at 690-91. Where circumstances are such that counsel should conduct further investigation to determine "whether the best strategy instead would be to jettison [a chosen] arguments so as to focus on other, more promising issues," failure to conduct further investigation can amount to constitutionally deficient assistance. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 395, 125 S.Ct. 2456 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Counsel should be strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment and the burden to show that counsel's performance was deficient rests squarely on the defendant. See Burt v. Titlow, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 10, 17 (2013).
Respondents contend that Pringle has no federal constitutional right to counsel in connection with his post-judgment motions. See Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88, 102 S.Ct. 1300 (1982) (stating that a criminal defendant cannot complain about ineffective assistance where he has no constitutional right to counsel to pursue discretionary relief). Such argument finds support in Maryland law, which provides that a defendant who pleads guilty forfeits any right to a direct appeal. See Bruno v. State, 332 Md. 673 (1993). Respondents have not addressed whether an Alford plea also results in such forfeiture, and absent such discussion, the Court declines to apply Bruno here.
Denial of Pringle's claims of ineffective assistance instead garners support in the post-conviction record, specifically the testimony provided by trial counsel Russell Neverdon, which the post-conviction court found credible:
ECF 7-3 at 9-10; see also ECF 19-1 at 57-62.
The post-conviction court also credited Neverdon's testimony that Pringle never asked that a motion for modification or reduction of sentence be filed, nor did he request that Neverdon seek three-judge panel review.
Pringle has no entitlement to appeal this denial of relief. A certificate of appealability may issue "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The petitioner "must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong," Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282, 124 S.Ct. 2562 (2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), or that "the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further," Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (2003). Because this Court finds that there has been no substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a certificate of appealability shall be denied. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
For the reasons stated above, Pringle's petition is DENIED, and a certificate of appealability shall not issue. A separate order shall follow.
