GEORGE J. HAZEL, District Judge.
On July 23, 2014,
On September 10, 2010, Matthews entered an Alford
ECF No. 6-3, at 2. The court summarily denied the Application on July 19, 2011. ECF No. 6-4 at 1-2. The mandate was issued on August 18, 2011. Id. at 3.
Matthews filed a counseled Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on March 19, 2013. ECF No. 6-5. Matthews raised the following grounds:
ECF No. 6-5 at 1; ECF No. 12-4 at 1. The post-conviction court denied the Petition on January 14, 2014. ECF No. 12-4. On February 28, 2014, Matthews filed an untimely pro se Application for Leave to Appeal the decision, which the Court of Special Appeals dismissed on jurisdictional grounds on July 22, 2014. ECF No. 6-7; ECF No. 6-8. The court's mandate issued on August 22, 2014. ECF No. 6-8.
The instant Petition was filed on July 23, 2014.
ECF No. 1 at 12-13; ECF No. 6 at 8. Respondents filed an answer in which they argued that two of Matthews' claims were unexhausted and two had been procedurally defaulted. ECF No. 6 at 14, 18. Matthews subsequently filed a "Motion to Withdraw Unexhausted Claims in Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Submit a [sic] Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Relief." ECF No. 7. On December 23, 2014, the Court granted Matthews' Motion to Withdraw his unexhausted claims and denied, without prejudice, his Motion to File an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Relief. ECF No. 8 at 1. The Court also gave Matthews additional time to respond to Respondents' argument that the two remaining claims had been procedurally defaulted. Id. at 2. Matthews filed a Reply on March 22, 2015. ECF No. 13.
An application for writ of habeas corpus may be granted only for violations of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012). Section 2254(d) provides that:
28 U.S.C. 2254(d). The statute sets forth a "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings," Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997), and is "difficult to meet," Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently observed that "[i]f this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be." Nicolas v. Attorney Gen. of the State of Maryland, 820 F.3d 124, 131 (4th Cir. 2016)(quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 102).
A state adjudication is contrary to clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1) where the state court "arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the [Supreme] Court on a question of law" or "confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to [the Supreme] Court." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). Under the "unreasonable application analysis" under 2254(d)(1), a "state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as `fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Thus, "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law." Id. at 785 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under § 2254(d)(2), "a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance." Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). "[E]ven if reasonable minds reviewing the record might disagree about the finding in question, on habeas review that does not suffice to supersede the trial court's . . . determination." Id. (internal citation omitted). "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because [it] concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010).
The habeas statute provides that "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). "The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." Id. "Where the state court conducted an evidentiary hearing and explained its reasoning with some care, it should be particularly difficult to establish clear and convincing evidence of error on the state court's part." Sharpe v. Bell, 593 F.3d 372, 378 (4th Cir. 2010). This is especially true where the state court has "resolved issues like witness credibility, which are `factual determinations' for purposes of Section 2254(e)(1)." Id. Matthews' claims will be examined under this framework.
Matthews' remaining two claims are that: (1) he was not informed of the nature and elements of first-degree murder; and (2) his plea counsel misled him with respect to the terms of the plea agreement. ECF No. 8 at 1-2. The Court must first determine whether these claims, despite being exhausted, have been procedurally defaulted.
Respondents argue that Matthews has procedurally defaulted his remaining exhausted claims, noting that the circuit court denied the claims on the merits and that, "[d]espite opportunity to do so, Matthews failed to file a timely Application for Leave to Appeal this adverse decision, and the time for doing so has long ago expired." ECF No. 6 at 18 (internal citation omitted). The Court of Special Appeals dismissed Matthews' untimely Application. ECF No. 6-8. Therefore, Respondents contend, the claims have been procedurally defaulted for federal habeas purposes. ECF No. 6 at 18.
In response, Matthews first asserts that the claims are not procedurally defaulted because he did not "deliberately bypass state procedural rules . . .," ECF No. 13 ¶ 3, or "intentionally relinquish or abandon a known right or privilege of his claims," id. ¶ 7. Matthews, relying on § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii), contends that a habeas petitioner does not have to exhaust state court remedies where circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant. Id. ¶ 10 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii)). He argues that interference of state officials "denie[d] him a meaningful opportunity of full and fair litigation review . . . ." Id. ¶ 3.
The exhaustion doctrine, codified at 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1),
In O'Sullivan, the Supreme Court stated: "To . . . `protect the integrity' of the federal exhaustion rule, we ask not only whether a prisoner has exhausted his state remedies, but also whether he has properly exhausted those remedies, i.e., whether he has fairly presented his claims to the state courts." 526 U.S. at 848 (internal citation omitted); see also id. at 844 ("Section 2254(c) requires only that state prisoners give the state courts a fair opportunity to act on their claims."). The inquiry, then, is "[w]hether a prisoner who fails to present his claims in a petition for discretionary review to a state court of last resort has properly presented his claims to the state courts . . . Because we answer this question `no,' we conclude that [petitioner] has procedurally defaulted his claims." Id. at 848. Stated differently, "state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." Id. at 845. The O'Sullivan Court noted, however, that:
Id. at 847-48; see also Breard v. Pruettt, 134 F.3d 615, 619 (1998)(quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 375 n.1 (1991))("A procedural default also occurs when a habeas petitioner fails to exhaust available State remedies and `the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.'").
Respondents argue that "the only exhausted claims raised in Matthews' petition are procedurally defaulted for federal habeas corpus purposes . . . ." ECF No. 6 at 18. When a claim is procedurally defaulted, a federal court may not address the merits of a state prisoner's habeas claim unless the petitioner can show: (1) both cause for the default and prejudice that would result from failing to consider the claim on the merits; or (2) that failure to consider the claim on the merits would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice, i.e., the conviction of one who is actually innocent. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986). "Cause" consists of "some objective factor external to the defense [that] impeded counsel's efforts to raise the claim in State court at the appropriate time." Breard, 134 F.3d 615, 620 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted). In order to demonstrate prejudice, a habeas petitioner must show "not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); see also Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494 (quoting Frady). Even when a petitioner fails to show cause and prejudice for a procedural default, a court must still consider whether it should reach the merits of a petitioner's claims in order to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1995).
As noted above, the Court of Special Appeals dismissed Matthews' appeal of the denial of his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on jurisdictional grounds, i.e., because the appeal was untimely. ECF No. 6-8, at 1-2. Such dismissal clearly rests on an adequate and independent state ground. See Breard, 134 F.3d at 619 ("If a state court clearly and expressly bases its dismissal of a habeas petitioner's claim on a state procedural rule, and that procedural rule provides an independent and adequate ground for the dismissal, the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted his federal habeas claim."). Therefore, the Court concludes that Matthews has procedurally defaulted his remaining two claims.
Alternatively, Matthews argues that he has shown both cause for and prejudice resulting from the procedural default of his claims. Regarding cause, he states that he did not receive a copy of the post-conviction court's January 14, 2014, Statement and Order until February 6, 2014, ECF No. 1, at 11, or even know that an order had been issued, ECF No. 13 ¶ 13. Matthews contends that the certified case history he requested from the circuit court "is void of any such statement and order . . .," thereby showing cause. Id. ¶ 7. Further, he contends that "the Clerk's Case History . . . is confusing, out of order in sequence of events and dates of the calendar that no lay person such as Petitioner or Professional Law Person[n]el cannot reasonably rely on for accuracy verbatim a statement and order filed by the Court denying Petitioner post-conviction relief." Id. ¶ 8; see also ECF No. 13-2.
Although there were circumstances "external to the defense" that delayed Matthews' ability to file his Application for Leave to Appeal in the Court of Special Appeals, those circumstances did not impede his ability to file "at the appropriate time," Breard, 134 F.3d at 620., First, the post-conviction hearing concluded on December 20, 2013. ECF No. 12-3, at 1. The judge stated that he would "prepare and file a Statement and Order with respect to [his] decision in this case as soon as possible." Id. at 112. There is no evidence in the record that Matthews made any inquiries of his post-conviction attorney as to whether a decision had been issued until his mother "found out and informed [him]." ECF No. 1-1 at 11. He does not say when this occurred.
Second, and more importantly, by his own admission, Matthews received a copy of the Circuit Court's January 14, 2014, Statement and Order from counsel on February 6, 2014.
In sum, Plaintiff's procedural default was not due to external circumstances, but, rather, though his own decisions. Further, as Plaintiff has not proven cause for his procedural default, the Court will not address his prejudice arguments as a showing of both cause and prejudice is required to excuse a procedural default. See Breard, 134 F.3d at 620 (declining to address prejudice because petitioner had not shown cause for his procedural default).
Additionally, although Matthews has not argued the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception, the Court, nevertheless, must consider whether failing to consider Matthews' claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice or, in other words, the conviction of one who is actually innocent of the crime charged. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 314-15, 321. In this context, a petitioner's claim of actual innocence is "not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits." Id. at 315. "To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence that was not presented at trial." Id. at 324. To meet this gateway standard, "a petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 327.
Matthews has provided no new evidence or any basis for the Court to conclude that he is actually innocent of the murder to which he pled guilty, save an occasional unsupported statement that he did not commit the crime, ECF No. 1 at 13; ECF No. 1-1, at 2, 5, and a narrative of his version of events surrounding the murder, ECF No. 1-1 at 3-4. That account differs markedly from the statement of facts presented by the Assistant State's Attorney at the plea hearing, ECF No. 6-2, at 12-17, which Matthews, through counsel, agreed the State would be able to prove if he were to go to trial, id., at 17-18 ("[W]e agree those are the facts the State would elicit were this case to go to trial. No additions, corrections, or modifications to that.").
Matthews has not demonstrated cause for the procedural default of his two remaining claims, or that "no reasonable juror would have found [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. Therefore, the Court finds that the claims have been procedurally defaulted for federal habeas purposes.
Even if Matthews had not procedurally defaulted his claims, they would fail on the merits, as the Circuit Court found. ECF No. 6 at 18. As noted above, Matthews first alleges that he did not understand what he was pleading to, and, second, that his attorney misled him as to the terms of the plea agreement. ECF No. 1 at 12-13.
The Circuit Court, in a Statement and Order filed on January 14, 2014, found with respect to Matthews' first claim that:
Md. Rule 4-242(c) requires that a defendant's guilty plea be knowing and voluntary. For a [plea] to be knowing and voluntary, the defendant must make the plea with a full "understanding of the nature of the charge." Md. Rule 4-242(c)(1). The lawfulness of a defendant's guilty plea is determined, whether, considering of the totality of the circumstances, a judge "could fairly determine that the defendant understood the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty." State v. Priet, 289 Md. 267, 291 (1981). Furthermore, as explained in State v. Daughtry, 419 Md. 35, 71 (2011) Maryland Rule 4-242(c) does not require counsel for the defendant or the court to recite on the record the elements of the offense; the determination is made by examining whether the totality of the circumstances demonstrate the defendant has entered a plea knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently.
ECF No. 12-4 at 2-4 (transcript citation omitted).
"A guilty plea operates as a waiver of important rights, and is valid only if done voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, `with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.'" Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)); see also Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 644-45 (1976) (stating that a guilty plea "cannot support a judgment of guilt unless it was voluntary in a constitutional sense"); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970) ("The standard was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative causes of action open to the defendant."). If a defendant pleads guilty without having been informed of the crime's elements, the standard is not met and the plea is invalid. Stumpf, 545 U.S. at 183; Henderson, 426 U.S. at 645 (noting that plea could not be voluntary unless defendant received "`real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process'") (quoting Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941)).
Matthews claims that the "elements and nature of the charge were not explained to [him] or on record." ECF No. 1 at 13. Here, as he did in his state post-conviction petition, Matthews relies on State v. Daughtry, 18 A.3d 60 (Md. 2011). In Daughtry, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that:
Id. at 81. The Daughtry court reiterated that the test for determining whether a guilty plea is voluntary under current Rule 4-242(c) "is whether the totality of the circumstances reflects that a defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into the plea." Id. at 81-82. The court went on to list factors that should aid the trial court in making the determination: (1) the complexity of the charge; (2) the personal characteristics of the accused; and (3) the factual basis proffered to support the court's acceptance of the plea. Id. at 82. Finally, the court noted that it did not matter whether the defendant informs the trial court that he either understood personally, or was made aware by or discussed with his attorney, the nature of the charges against him; whether defense counsel informs the trial court that he informed his client of the charges against him; or the court informs the defendant of the charges against him. Id. at 83. "The presence of any one of these scenarios on the record is strong evidence, absent other circumstances tending to negate a finding of voluntariness (e.g., mental incapacity, lack of grasp of English language, etc.), that the defendant entered the guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily." Id. at 83-84.
It is clear from the transcript of the plea hearing that the court did not rely on a presumption that, because Matthews was represented by counsel and had discussed the plea with him generically, he had been informed of the nature of the charge against him. Daughtry, 18 A.3d at 81; ECF No. 6-2 at 9-12. In this case, Matthews testified that he understood the nature of the crime to which he was pleading guilty, first degree murder, or had discussed with counsel the nature of the crime. ECF No. 6 Ex. 2 at 10. Counsel testified that he had discussed the nature and elements of first degree murder with Matthews. Id. The court asked Matthews if he understood what first degree murder was, to which he responded affirmatively. Id. at 10-11. Thus, all three scenarios listed in the Daughtry decision are present in the instant case, unlike the situation in Daughtry, where the court found none of the above scenarios present. Daughtry, 18 A.3d at 84. Although Matthews argues that the elements and nature of a charge of first degree murder were not explained to him on the record, ECF No. 1 at 13, Daughtry does not require that the explanation of the nature and elements of the charge be done on the record. Daughtry, 18 A.3d at 81; see also ECF No. 12-4 at 3.
Moreover, there are no "circumstances tending to negate a finding of voluntariness," Daughtry, 18 A.3d at 84, present in the instant case. For example, the results of Matthews' pretrial evaluations for competency and criminal responsibility were that he was both competent and criminally responsible. ECF No. 12-4 at 3. As the post-conviction court noted, Henslee testified that, although he believed that Matthews at times had difficulty understanding issues, Henslee compensated by taking extra time to break down the concepts. ECF No. 12-4 at 3-4; see also ECF No. 12-3 at 76. Further, Matthews testified at the plea hearing that he could read, write, and understand English. ECF No. 6-2 at 4.
Turning to the Statement of Reasons and Order of the Court, the post-conviction court listed several reasons for rejecting Matthews' contention that his plea was not knowing and voluntary. First, it credited Henslee's testimony that he "recalled specifically explaining the term `premeditation' to both Petitioner and his family . . . ." ECF No. 12-4 at 4. As noted above, "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Credibility determinations "are `factual determinations' for purposes of Section 2254(e)(1)." Sharpe, 593 F.3d at 378.
Next, the Circuit Court also found credible the colloquy between Matthews and Henslee at the plea hearing, during which Matthews indicated that he understood what it meant to plead guilty and had been informed of the elements of the charge against him.
ECF No. 6-2 at 9-11. After asking Matthews if he had any questions he wished to address to the court and allowing him to consult with counsel, the court continued:
Id. at 11-12.
Based on the foregoing exchange, giving due deference to the post-conviction court's factual findings, and considering the totality of the circumstances, this Court cannot find that the Circuit Court either unreasonably applied clearly established federal law to the facts of this case, or that the circuit court unreasonably determined the facts in light of the evidence presented in the circuit court proceeding, as required under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), in determining that Matthews knew what he was pleading to and understood what he was doing. Matthews has not rebutted the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. See Sharpe, 593 F.3d at 379. Moreover, pleading guilty in order to avoid a conviction for first degree murder and a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole, and, instead, receiving a life sentence with all but sixty years suspended, ECF No. 1-1 at 1, represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternatives available to him. See Alford, 400 U.S. at 31; see also Brady, 397 U.S. at 751 (declining to hold that a guilty plea is compelled and invalid under the Fifth Amendment when motivated by the defendant's desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty rather than face a wider range of possibilities extending from acquittal to conviction and a higher penalty).
The Court rejects Matthews' argument that he did not understand what he was pleading guilty to or understand the consequences of an Alford plea. Matthews had ample opportunity to ask any questions during the plea hearing. Although he states that his attorney "told me just agree and say yes to what I say," ECF No. 1-1 at 2, it is clear from Matthews' responses to counsel's and the court's inquiries that the Circuit Court did not unreasonably conclude that Mathews' plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Accordingly, Matthews' first ground for relief is rejected.
Turning to Matthews' second claim, that counsel misled him regarding the terms of the plea agreement, Matthews alleges that his trial attorney told him that he "would only receive 15 years for 2
When a petitioner alleges a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show both that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Representation is deficient if it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, considering all the circumstances. Id. at 688.
To satisfy the first part of this standard, it must be demonstrated that counsel's performance was not "within the range of competence normally demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Id. at 687. The standard for assessing such competence is "highly deferential" and has a "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 669. A federal court's consideration of ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising from state criminal proceedings is limited on habeas review due to the deference accorded trial attorneys and state appellate courts reviewing their performance. A petitioner must overcome the "`strong presumption' that counsel's strategy and tactics fall `within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'" Burch v. Corcoran, 273 F.3d 577, 588 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Strickland, 466 at 689). "There is a strong presumption that counsel's attention to certain issues to the exclusion of others reflects trial tactics rather than sheer neglect." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 109 (2011)(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sharpe v. Bell, 593 F.3d 372, 383 (4th Cir. 2010)("Counsel is not required to engage in the filing of futile motions."). "The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both `highly deferential,' and when the two apply in tandem, review is `doubly' so." Harrington, 526 U.S at 105 (citations omitted). "When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel's actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard." Id.
The second prong requires the court to consider whether counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial whose result is reliable and that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-94. "The benchmark of an ineffective assistance claim must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result." Id. at 686. It is not enough "to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding." Id. at 693. Rather, counsel's errors must be "so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Id. at 687. A determination need not be made concerning the attorney's performance if it is clear that no prejudice would have resulted had the attorney been deficient. See id. at 697.
The principles governing ineffectiveness claims apply in federal collateral proceedings as they do on direct appeal or in a motion for new trial. Id. at 697. Indeed, the presumption that a criminal judgment is final is at its strongest in collateral attacks on that judgment. Id.
Moreover, the same principles apply in the context of guilty pleas. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985). The Hill Court held that "the two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. at 58; see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 n. 12 (2010) ("In Hill, the Court recognized — for the first time — that Strickland applies to advice respecting a guilty plea."). The first prong of the Strickland test is nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence stated above. Hill, 474 U.S. at 58.
Id. at 59. The Hill Court reiterated that, as stated in Strickland, "these predictions of the outcome at a possible trial, where necessary, should be made objectively . . . ." Id. at 59-60; see also Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372 (noting that "to obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances").
Turning to the facts of Matthews' case, the record shows that the plea agreement was explained at the outset of the plea hearing. The Assistant State's Attorney began by stating:
ECF No. 6-2 at 2. Defense counsel confirmed his understanding of the plea agreement and added that "the Defense is obviously free to put on whatever mitigation evidence we wish and we are free to ask for whatever we want." Id. at 3. Asked if he understood the plea agreement being offered, Matthews responded affirmatively. Id. The court stated that it had bound itself to a cap of sixty years to serve. Id. After the Assistant State's Attorney presented the statement of facts, which the defense agreed the State would elicit were the case to go to trial, the court found Matthews guilty of first degree murder. Id. at 12-18.
The post-conviction court stated, in relevant part:
ECF No. 12-4 at 4-6 (internal citation omitted). The court found:
Id. at 7.
As noted in the Statement and Order, in addition to Matthews' and Henslee's testimony, the post-conviction court heard testimony from Matthews' mother. She testified that she and Henslee met with her son to discuss pleading guilty under Alford. ECF No. 12-1 at 13-15. According to Ms. Matthews, she "talked [Matthews] into taking the plea," id. at 16, because she did not want him to "end up with life without parole," id. She understood that a sentence of life without parole was a possibility because, in the words of the Assistant State's Attorney, "the facts are horrible." Id. at 42. She further stated that it was her understanding that Henslee believed that, if Matthews went to trial, he would receive a sentence of life without parole. Id. at 20.
Ms. Matthews also testified about the terms of the plea agreement being discussed:
Id. at 16-17. Asked about the sixty years, she responded:
Id. at 19. Ms. Matthews further stated:
Id. at 23. On cross-examination, she testified that Henslee did not guarantee that he could get a thirty year sentence, "but he, he was very convincing." Id. at 44. Ms. Matthews did not mention any reference to fifteen years during her testimony.
Ms. Matthews was also asked whether second degree murder was discussed at the meeting:
Id. at 22-23.
The plea agreement was explained at the outset of the plea hearing. ECF No. 6-2 at 2. It was made clear that defense counsel was free to argue for a lower sentence and present mitigation evidence. Id. at 2-3.
The transcript of the plea hearing provides ample support for the post-conviction court's finding that Henslee did not mislead Matthews regarding the terms of the plea agreement. That determination rests largely on the court's credibility findings. This Court must defer to the Circuit Court's factual findings unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, which Matthews has not provided. This Court concludes, therefore, that the post-conviction court's determination of the facts was not unreasonable.
In concluding, the Circuit Court stated that:
ECF No. 12-4 at 7-8. Therefore, the post-conviction court denied the application for post-conviction relief. Id. at 8.
The post-conviction court did not incorrectly or unreasonably apply clearly established federal law to the facts of the case. Moreover, deferring to the state court's factual findings, including its credibility determinations, this Court cannot say that the post-conviction court unreasonably determined the facts of this case. Accordingly, there is no basis for this Court to overturn the circuit court's decision.
Matthews' claims have been procedurally defaulted for federal habeas purposes. Even if that were not the case, Matthews' claims fail on the merits, giving due deference to the state court's factual findings. The Petition, therefore, will be denied and dismissed.
A Certificate of Appealability ("COA") will not issue because Matthews has not made a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2); see Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings in the United States District Courts. A separate Order follows.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (2012).
Md. Rule 4-242(c).
As mitigation, Henslee pointed to evidence that Matthews was under the influence of drugs the night of the murder. Id. at 24-26. Henslee produced an expert witness who testified regarding the effects of PCP, one of the drugs Henslee argued Matthews had taken that night. id. at 27-45. Matthews' mother also testified at the sentencing hearing, as did his father, an aunt, and a neighbor. Id. at 46-67. Finally, Matthews addressed the court. Id. at 87-91.
