GEORGE J. HAZEL, District Judge.
James Houck is currently incarcerated at the Western Correctional Institution in Cumberland, Maryland. He is suing Defendants Wexford Health Sources, Inc., Robustiano J. Barrera, M.D., Psychiatric Services at WCI, and Psychiatric Services at JCI,
After considering the pleadings and exhibits, the Court concludes a hearing is unnecessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). For reasons to follow, the Medical Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 31. treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The Medical Defendants' Motion to Seal, ECF No. 32, is GRANTED. Plaintiffs Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 37, 50. and 51 are DENIED. Plaintiffs "Motion to Order the Medical Department or Mental Health Services to Treat Mr. Houck," ECF No. 43, will be DENIED without prejudice.
The Court will grant Houck twenty-eight days to provide additional information to obtain service on the individuals who prescribed the medication Risperdal, which he alleges has caused negative side effects. Failure to provide the supplemental information as directed herein will result in dismissal of this case.
Houck was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this case. ECF No. 11. As such, this Court is required under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2) to review the complaint and dismiss any claim that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. To bring a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a constitutional right or federal law and (2) show that "the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 639 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).
Claims under § 1983 are directed at "persons," and Houck provides no evidence that Psychiatric Services at JCI and Psychiatric Services at WCI are "persons" or independent entities amenable to suit under § 1983. See Harden v. Green, 27 F. App'x. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973) (New Jersey Prison Medical Department not a person for § 1983 suit purposes)). However, where a self-represented litigant alleges a cause of action which may be meritorious against persons unknown, the district court should afford him a reasonable opportunity to determine the correct person or persons against whom the claim is asserted, advise him how to proceed, and direct or permit amendment of the pleadings to bring that person or persons before the court. Harden, 27 F. App'x. at 178 (citing Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1152-53 (4th Cir. 1978); Coleman v. Peyton, 340 F.2d 603, 604 (4th Cir. 1965)). Accordingly, Houck will be granted additional time to provide the names of the individuals who prescribed Risperdal for him, whether he brought his concerns about the side effects he alleges to their attention, the dates and circumstances of the notification, and the response he received. Houck is reminded that failure to provide this information within the requisite time period may result in dismissal of this claim without prejudice and without further notice from the Court.
The Medical Defendants' Motion is styled as a Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Ordinarily, a court "is not to consider matters outside the pleadings or resolve factual disputes when ruling on a motion to dismiss." Bosiger v. U.S. Airways, 510 F.3d 442, 450 (4th Cir. 2007). If the court does so, "the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56," and "[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). When the movant expressly captions its motion "in the alternative" as one for summary judgment and submits matters outside the pleadings for the court's consideration, however, the parties are deemed to be on notice that conversion under Rule 12(d) may occur; the court "does not have an obligation to notify parties of the obvious'" Laughlin v. Metro. Washinglon Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 261 (4th Cir. 1998).
A district judge has "complete discretion to determine whether or not to accept the submission of any material beyond the pleadings that is offered in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and rely on it, thereby converting the motion, or to reject it or simply not consider it:" 5C CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1366, at 159 (3d ed. 2004, 2011 Supp.). This discretion "should be exercised with great caution and attention to the parties' procedural rights." Id. at 149. In general. courts are guided by whether consideration of extraneous material "is likely to facilitate the disposition of the action," and "whether discovery prior to the utilization of the summary judgment procedure" is necessary. Id. at 165, 167.
Ordinarily, summary judgment is inappropriate "where the parties have not had an opportunity for reasonable discovery." E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. Kolon Indust., 637 F.3d 435, 448-49 (4th Cir. 2011). However, "the party opposing summary judgment `cannot complain that summary judgment was granted without discovery unless that party has made an attempt to oppose the motion on the grounds that more time was needed for discovery.'" Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Evans there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc.. 346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The Court should "view the evidence in the light most favorable to . . . the nonmovant, and draw all inferences in [his] favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witnesses' credibility." Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002). Because Houck is self-represented, his filings are liberally construed. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). But the Court must also abide by its "affirmative obligation . . . to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial." Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal citations omitted).
Houck faults Defendants for failing to monitor his high blood pressure on a daily basis. Additionally, he alleges he was prescribed Risperdal
The Medical Defendants filed Dr. Barrera's declaration with their dispositive motion. ECF No. 31.5. Dr. Barrera is a Wexford employee who serves as Medical Director at Jessup Correctional Institution and Western Correctional Institution, the facilities where Houck was incarcerated at the times relevant to the claims presented.
Dr. Barrera attests that Houek has a history of hypertension (high blood pressure), schizoaffective disorder, and bipolar disorder. ECF No. 31-5 ¶ 4 (Dr. Barrera Decl.) Risperdal is a prescription mental health medication used to treat schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. Id. ¶ 5. Further, Dr. Barrera attests that Wexford does not contract with the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS) to provide mental health services to Maryland inmates. Id. ¶ 6. Dr. Barrera states he did not prescribe Risperdal for Houck, and Wexford employees do not have the authority to alter Houck's mental health medication regimen. Id. ¶ 7. Further, Dr. Barrera attests Houck never complained to him of Risperdal's side effects. Id. at ¶ 8. Dr. Barrera states that if Houck had complained to him, he would have referred Houck to his treating mental health providers. Id.
Regarding Houck's treatment for hypertension, Dr. Barrera attests Houck is regularly evaluated by prison medical providers as a chronic care inmate and prescribed Atenolol, Norvasc, Lisinopril, and Clonidine HCL
Houck's undisputed medical records show that between January 8, 2015 and December 4, 2015, Houck was evaluated for hypertension and had his blood pressure checked on: January 9, January 13, January 14, January 16, April 22, September 5, September 24, September 25, October 5, October 6, October 20,
Dr. Barrera also attests that contrary to Houck's allegations, his blood pressure does not require daily monitoring, because he is on an appropriate drug regimen for hypertension. Id. ¶ 13. Houck's hypertension is properly controlled when Houck is fully compliant with his hypertension plan of care. Houck is regularly seen by prison health care staff as a chronic care patient, and may request more immediate access to providers by using the prison sick call system. Id. ¶ 17.
In response, Houck filed a letter from Kevin J. McCamant, PhD, a licensed clinical psychologist at the JCI Psychology Department. The letter, dated February 3, 2015, lists Risperdal among "past psychiatric medications" prescribed for Houck. Houck's medical records, beginning on March 12, 2015, show he is prescribed 2 milligrams of Respirodone daily. ECF 32-1 at 10, 13, 15, 16, 17. Houck also filed a March 25, 2015, from J.D. Hess, MA PA-II-C, at the Western Correctional Institution which states Houck was being prescribed Risperdal. ECF No. 34-2; ECF No. 35-1 at 3. None of the records indicate Houck complained of suffering side effects from Risperdal.
Houck claims he informed Dr. Barrera of his concerns about Risperdal. Houck filed an Administrative Remedy Procedure Request on February 26, 2016, complaining of breast enlargement, blurred vision, and stomach discomfort, and requesting to be taken off the medication. ECF 34-2. The ARP response, dated February 26, 2016, read: "Have you submitted a sick call requesting to be removed? If so when?" The ARP was dismissed for procedural reasons. Houck was directed to resubmit the ARP with additional information for investigation by March 12, 2016. Id. Houck resubmitted the ARP on March 1, 2016, stating he had submitted sick call slips several times and received no response. Id at 3. The ARP was dismissed for failure to resubmit as instructed. Id.
Houck claims he submitted a sick call slip about the side effects, asking to be taken off Risperdal on December 1, 2015 (ECF No. 42-2 at 5); December 2, 2015 (ECF No. 42-2 at 4); February 26, 2016 (ECF No. 42-2 at 6); April 22, 2016, (ECF No. 34-2 at 4, ECF No. 35-1 at 4) and May 5, 2016 (ECF No 42-2 at 3). The sick call slips, however, bear no date stamp, signature or other indicia signifying they were received by the medical or mental health departments. Id. Additionally, Houck claims he talked to Dr. Barrera about his concerns on November 9, 2015. ECF No. 41; ECF No. 51.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when the official shows "deliberate indifTerence to serious medical needs of prisoners." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104; see also Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014). A deliberate indifference claim consists of both an objective and subjective component. Jackson, 775 F.3d at 178. Objectively, the inmate's condition must be "serious," or "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Id. (quoting Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008)). Subjectively, "[a]n official is deliberately indifferent to an inmate's serious medical needs only when he or she subjectively `knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety,'" Jackson, 775 F.3d at 178 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). If a risk is obvious, a prison official "cannot hide behind an excuse that he was unaware of a risk, no mailer how obvious." Brice v. Va. Beach Corr. Ctr., 58 F.3d 101, 105 (4th Cir. 1995); see also Makdessi v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126, 133 (4th Cir. 2015).
Dr. Barrera attests that Houck never told him of his concerns about Risperdal, and his declaration is unrefuted by affidavit or other verified evidence. Even if it were assumed that Houck's claim alleges mailers of serious medical need, he fails to demonstrate the Medical Defendants were aware of his concerns and thus acted with deliberate indifference to them. As noted, Houck's sick call slips bear no date stamp, signature, or other notice of receipt by the medical department. Houck's ARP response directed him to indicate whether he had filed a sick call slip before his concerns could be investigated, and his generally-stated response that he had filed sick call slips was deemed insufficient for further investigation. Houck does not dispute Dr. Barrera's statement that he does not have authority to stop the medication. Thus. even when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Houck and all inferences drawn in his favor, it is insufficient to suggest there is a genuine issue of material fact whether the Medical Defendants knew of Houck's concerns and his desire to stop the Risperdal. Absent any genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Medical Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, the Medical Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a mailer of law.
In regard to his blood pressure treatment, Houck fails to address or dispute the Medical Defendants' response. Contrary to Houck's assertions, he does not require daily blood pressure monitoring. Further. Houck is prescribed medications to manage his condition, is seen regularly for blood pressure check-ups as a chronic care patient, and when he is compliant with his medical treatment plan. his hypertension is well-managed. Absent any evidence to the contrary, there is no evidence to suggest the Medical Defendants' treatment amounts to deliberate indifference to Houck's hypertension. There is no genuine question of material fact in dispute, and the Medical Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
For these reasons, the Medical Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 31, and Motion to Seal, ECF No. 32, will be granted. Houck's Motions for Summary Judgment, ECF Nos. 37, 50, and 51, will be denied. Houck's Motion to Order the Medical Department of Mental Health Services to Treat Mr. Houck, ECF No. 43, will be denied without prejudice. Houck will be granted twenty-eight days to provide the names of the individuals who prescribed Risperdal for him and to state whether he notified them of the side effects he alleges and the response he received. A separate Order follows.
