GEORGE J. HAZEL, District Judge.
Presently pending before the Court is Christopher Garza and George Easton Jr.'s (together, "Plaintiffs") Motion for Attorneys' Fees, ECF No. 17, arising out of their successful class action lawsuit against Mitchell Rubenstein & Associates. P.C. ("Defendant") for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act ("FDCPA"). 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. No hearing is necessary. Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). For the following reasons. Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees is granted.
This case began as a class action lawsuit against Defendant for violating § 1692g(a)(4) of the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act ("FDCPA") by failing to provide proper disclosures for how consumers could verify and dispute the legitimacy of the debts they owed. ECF No. 1. On April 11, 2016. Plaintiffs filed a Consent Motion for Settlement, ECF No. 16. Following a settlement hearing on April 25, 2016, the Court entered an Order of Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, ECF No. 22. The settlement agreement included, in relevant part, that Defendant would pay the two named Plaintiffs, Garza and Easton, $1,000.00 each, and that it would create a common fund in the amount of $12,425.00 to be distributed on a pro rata basis to each of the 884 class members, Id. at 3.
Contemporaneously with their Consent Motion for Settlement. Plaintiffs also moved for an award of attorneys' fees and costs. ECF No. 17. In their motion, Plaintiffs noted that, pursuant to the settlement agreement. Defendant would not oppose the first $20,000.00 in requested fees and expenses, and that Plaintiffs would not seek more than $35,000.00 in fees and expenses. Id. at 3. Reflecting this agreement, Plaintiffs requested $35,000.00 in attorneys' fees and expenses, based on 87.5 hours of work completed by four attorneys from the law firm of Greenwald. Davidson Radbil PLCC, ("GDR"); 11.7 hours completed by local counsel: and an estimated $1,234.53 in litigation related costs. ECF No. 17-1. Defendant submitted a Response to Plaintiff's Motion on April 25, 2016, amended on April 26, 2016, arguing that the Court should award Plaintiff only $20,000.00 in fees and expenses. ECF No. 23. Plaintiffs filed a Reply in support of their Motion on May 12, 2016, reiterating their request for $35,000.00 in fees and expenses. ECF No. 24. They noted that GDR attorneys had dedicated an additional 32.2 hours on the case, bringing the total compensable hours to 131.4 hours, and submitted a final bill of expenses totaling $1,166.52, a slight downward departure from their previous estimate. ECF No. 24 at 1; ECF No. 24-1 at 14.
While the payment of attorneys' fees and costs to plaintiffs who prevail on FDCPA claims is mandatory. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3), "the statute makes clear that calculation of the appropriate award must be left to the district court." Carroll v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 53 F.3d 626, 628 (4th Cir. 1995). To recover attorney's fees and costs, a plaintiff must be a "prevailing party," a threshold question for which the Court accords a "generous formulation." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). A plaintiff is a "prevailing party" for the purpose of attorney's fees if the plaintiff succeeds "on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit." Id. Plaintiffs here obtained payment following the parties' settlement agreement, which was affirmed by this Court, and is therefore a "prevailing party" entitled to attorney's fees. See Nelson v. A&H Motors. Inc., Civil No. JKS 12-2288. 2013 WL 388991, at *1 (D. Md. Jan. 30, 2013). This contention is not disputed by the parties.
The most useful starting point for establishing the proper amount of an award is the "lodestar." or "the number of hours reasonably expended, multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983): see also Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169, 174 (4th Cir. 1994). The court must adjust the number of hours to delete duplicative or unrelated hours, and the number of hours must be reasonable and represent the product of "billing judgment." Caperton, 31 F.3d. at 175 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437). "When the plaintiff prevails on only some of the claims, the number of hours may be adjusted downward; but where full relief is obtained, the plaintiff's attorney should receive a fully compensatory fee and in cases of exceptional success, even an enhancement." Id. at 174-75 (internal citations omitted). In assessing the overall reasonableness of the lodestar, the court may also consider the twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express. Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974) ("the Johnson factors"), specifically:
See Caperton, 31 F.3d at 175. These factors, however, "usually are subsumed within the initial calculation of hours reasonably expended at a reasonable hourly rate [, i.e., the lodestar]." Randle v. H & P Capital, Inc., 513 F. App'x 282. 283-84 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 n. 9) (alteration in original). Furthermore. "[i]n considering the Johnson/Barber factors, the court is to consider all twelve factors, but need not robotically list each factor or comment on those factors that do not apply." Dodeka, L.L.C. v. AmrolDavis, No. 7:10-CV-17-D. 2010 WL 3239117, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 16, 2010).
In determining whether counsel's hourly rates are reasonable, the court must consider whether "the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation." Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 890 n.11 (1984). "[D]etermination of the hourly rate will generally be the critical inquiry in setting the reasonable fee, and the burden rests with the fee applicant to establish the reasonableness of a requested rate." Plyler v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273, 277 (4th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). As part of its inquiry, the court may rely on "affidavits from other attorneys attesting to the reasonableness of the hourly rates," and also the court's "knowledge of the market." Beyond Sys., Inc. v. World Ave. USA. LLC, No. PJM-08-921, 2011 WL 3419565 at *3 (D. Md. Aug. 11, 2011). In this District, the Court's "market knowledge" is set forth in Appendix B of the U.S. District Court of Maryland Local Rules, which provides Guidelines Regarding Hourly Rates based upon length of professional experience, as follows:
Loc. R. App. B(3) (D. Md. 2016). Plaintiffs ask the Court to award attorney's fees at the following hourly rates: Jesse S. Johnson: $350.00 (over six years of experience): Michael L. Greenwood: $400.00 (over 11 years of experience); James L. Davidson: $400.00 (over 12 years of experience): Aaron D. Radbil: $400.00 (9 years of experience) and Eric Stravitz $250.00 (experience and length of bar membership not listed). ECF No. 17 at 6-7; ECF No. 17-1 at ¶¶ 20-21.
Defendant argues that the rates for Johnson, the lead attorney on the case, should be adjusted downward, to $275.00 per hour, in accordance with what the local rules would suggest is reasonable for an attorney with six years of experience. ECF No. 23 at 2. Johnson acknowledges that his rate is higher than the local guidelines would recommend, but argues that it is justified because Plaintiffs were successful, the guidelines are not binding, similar rates were recently approved by this Court in other cases, and Johnson's specific rate was approved in a recent class action case in the Northern District of California. ECF No. 24 at 10-11. As the Fourth Circuit has emphasized, "market rate should guide the fee inquiry." Grissom v. The Mills Corp., 549 F.3d 313, 321 (4th Cir. 2008). A close look at the cases within this circuit on which Plaintiffs rely shows that they do not support his request for an upward deviation from the local guidelines. The $350.00 hourly rate that Plaintiffs asserts Judge Garbis awarded in Stillmock v. Weis Markets, was actually subsumed within a lower blended rate of $289.00 per hour. Stillmock v. WeisMarkets, Inc., No. CIV.A. MJG-7-1342, ECF No. 128-1 at 11. Furthermore, in McDaniels v. Westlake Servs., while Judge Hollander did find that an award of $350.00 per hour in attorney's fees was reasonable, departing slightly above the guidelines in effect at that time, the lawyer in question had 10 years of experience. McDaniels v. Westlake Servs., LLC, No. CIV.A. ELH-11-1837, 2014 WL 556288, at *14 (D. Md. Feb. 7, 2014). Thus, the Court finds that an hourly rate of $275 rather than $350 is reasonable based on the local market rate for an attorney with Johnson's skill and experience.
Turning next to attorneys Greenwood, Davidson and Radbil, Defendant does not dispute their rates but argues that their hours should be disallowed in full as they did not formally enter an appearance in the case, ECF No. 23 at 4. Defendant does not provide a citation for this proposition and the Court finds no support for it in the case law. As Plaintiff notes, the fourth Circuit recently held that attorney's fees "includes authorization for reimbursement for work performed not only by attorneys but also by persons doing `tasks traditionally performed by an attorney and for which the attorney would customarily charge the client,' regardless of whether a licensed attorney, paralegal, or law clerk performed them." Priestley v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 410, 416 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hyatt v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d 239, 255 (4th Cir.2002)) (reversing district court's denial of attorneys' fees for work completed by out-of-state attorneys under the Equal Access to Justice Act). If the legal work of a person unable to enter an appearance in court, such as a paralegal or law clerk, is compensable, so must the work of a licensed attorney, as long as their work is properly documented and not found to be duplicative. Thus, the Court finds that the hours of Greenwood. Davidson and Radbil are eligible for reimbursement.
Plaintiffs argue that because Defendant did not contest the hourly rates of Greenwood, Davidson and Radbil, the Court must approve them, noting that "[t]he district court cannot decrease a fee award based on factors not raised at all by the adverse party." Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990)(internal citation omitted).
Finally, Plaintiffs request attorney's fees at a rate of $250 per hour on behalf of local liaison counsel, Eric Stravtiz. Plaintiffs have put forward no information regarding Stravtiz's experience or length of bar membership. However, even calculating Stravitz's fees at the lowest permissible rate of $150 per hour, the lodestar total amounts to more than the $35,000 requested by Plaintiffs.
As required by Appendix B of the Local Rules, counsel for Plaintiffs submitted their fee application accompanied by time records organized by litigation phase, requesting compensation for 104.3 hours of work by Johnson: a combined 15.4 hours of work by Greenwald, Davidson and Radbil and 11.7 hours by Stravtiz. ECF No. 24-1 at 3.
However, reviewing the two major filings in the case—the Motions for Preliminary and Final Approval of Class Action Settlement—the Court notes that while the motions submitted in this case do share language with motions submitted in other cases, see e.g., ECF No. 23-2. Plaintiffs also spend considerable amount of time citing to applicable Fourth Circuit precedent not relevant to earlier submissions. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs dedicated a reasonable amount of time to researching and drafting the motions and will not reduce the amount of time requested for motions practice.
Defendant also argues that the fees for Stravtiz should be disallowed in full as the billing records are repetitive and non-descriptive, including such entries as "reviewed court notice." ECF No. 23 at 4. While the Court agrees that Stravtiz could have been more detailed in his record-keeping, the descriptions are adequate. In addition, the amount of time Stravitz dedicated to such routine tasks as "review court notice" was a mere .1 hours per time entry. Thus, the Court finds that Stravtiz's request for 11.7 of compensable time is reasonable for his work as liaison counsel.
Having determined the reasonable rate and reasonable hours expended, the Court will now calculate the lodestar. Johnson, the lead attorney, dedicated 100 hours to this case, which at a rate of $275.00 per hour, justifies an award of $27,500.00.
Plaintiffs also argue that the Johnson factors support their requested award of $35,000 in attorneys' fees and costs, emphasizing in particular counsel's skill and experience: the uncertainty of outcome at trial: their contingency fee arrangement: their successful results and the similarity between their requested award and those in other FDCPA settlements. ECF No. 17 at 5-15. Defendant does not address the Johnson factors specifically and the Court finds that such considerations were "subsumed within the initial calculation of hours reasonably expended at a reasonable hourly rate[, i.e., the lodestar]." Randle v. H & P Capital, Inc., 513 F. App'x 282, 283-84 (4th Cir. 2013)(quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 n. 9)(alteration in original). Therefore, the Court does not find the application of the Johnson factors here warrant a departure from the lodestar amount.
Finally, Plaintiffs' level of success warrants an award of the full lodestar amount. "The Fourth Circuit has described the analysis of the level of success as the third step of a fee calculation, noting that courts `should award some percentage of the remaining amount, depending on the degree of success enjoyed by the plaintiff.'" McFeeley v. Jackson St. Entm't, LLC. No. CV DKC 12-1019. 2016 WL 4269042, at *3 (D. Md. Aug. 15, 2016)(quoting McAfee v. Boczar, 738 F.3d 81, 88 (4th Cir. 2013)). "What the court must ask is whether `the plaintiff achieve[d] a level of success that makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award.'" Doe v. Kidd, 656 F. App'x 643. 657 (4th Cir. 2016)(quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434)). Here, the settlement agreement included, in relevant part, that Defendant would pay the two named Plaintiffs. Garza and Easton. $1,000.00 each, and that it would create a common fund in the amount of $12,425.00 to be distributed on a pro rata basis to each of the 884 class members. ECF No. 22 at 3. In addition. Defendant agreed to change the language in its debt collection letters going forward, to address Plaintiffs' concerns. ECF No. 16 at 4. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' recovery justifies the fee award.
Plaintiffs also request reimbursement for the following costs: $400 filing fee; $50 pro hac vice admission: $68 service of process: $2.10 PACER charges: and $646.42 in travel expenses from Boca Raton. Florida to Greenbelt. Maryland to attend the final settlement approval hearing. ECF Nos. 17-1; 24-1. Defendant does not challenge these costs and the Court finds them reasonable. Therefore, the Court will grant those amounts, totaling $1,166.52, in full. When added to the attorney's fees, the total amount in fees and costs would equal $36,265.27. The parties have agreed to limit the total award for attorney's fees and costs to $35,000.00 and the Court, therefore, awards that amount.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees, ECF No. 17. is granted. Plaintiffs are awarded $35,000.00 in attorney's fees and costs. A separate Order shall issue.
