RICHARD D. BENNETT, District Judge.
Currently pending before this Court is Defendants Anne Arundel County Police Department, Anne Arundel County, Maryland ("the County"), Officer Angela Thomas, and Officer William Selander's Motion to Dismiss pro se Plaintiffs Keon Crowell and Tina Crenshaw's Amended Complaint.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, this Court "accept[s] as true all well-pleaded facts in a complaint and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Wikimedia Found. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 422 (4th Cir. 2015)). Further, as pro se Plaintiffs, this Court has "liberally construed" the pleadings and held them to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Alley v. Yadkin County Sheriff Dept., No. 17-1249, 698 Fed.App'x 141 (4th Cir. Oct. 5, 2017).
On October 5, 2017, Plaintiff Keon Crowell filed a Complaint on behalf of himself and the other Plaintiff in this case, Plaintiff Tina Crenshaw. (ECF No. 1.) The Complaint contained two allegations relating to an incident that occurred two years prior on October 4, 2015. Specifically, it is alleged that Plaintiff Crowell was falsely arrested by Officer Selander and Officer Thomas was negligent in her duties as to Plaintiff Crenshaw. (Id.) On October 16, 2017, this Court entered an Order dismissing two of the defendants named in the Complaint
Two weeks later, the remaining Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 9.) In response, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 12.) The Amended Complaint, however, does not contain any additional allegations and asserts the same claims as the Original Complaint: violations of Plaintiffs' First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights (Counts I-III), false arrest (Count IV), malicious prosecution (Count V), defamation (Count VI), and police misconduct (Count VII).
Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the dismissal of a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is "to test the sufficiency of a complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006). While a complaint need not include "detailed factual allegations," it must set forth "enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest" a cognizable cause of action, "even if . . . [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plaintiff cannot rely on bald accusations or mere speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court "`must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint'" and must "`draw all reasonable inferences [from those facts] in favor of the plaintiff.'" E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); Hall v. DirectTV, LLC, 846 F.3d 757, 765 (4th Cir. 2017). However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions drawn from those facts. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "A court decides whether [the pleading] standard is met by separating the legal conclusions from the factual allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations, and then determining whether those allegations allow the court to reasonably infer" that the plaintiff is entitled to the legal remedy sought. A Society Without A Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 937 (2012). A pro se plaintiff's pleadings are "to be liberally construed" and are "held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Alley v. Yadkin County Sheriff Dept., No. 17-1249, 698 Fed.App'x 141 (4th Cir. Oct. 5, 2017). However, even a pro se litigant's complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege a "plausible claim for relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claims cannot proceed against the Anne Arundel County Police Department because it is not a legal entity that can be sued. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b)(3), whether an entity can sue or be sued is question of state law where the court sits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(3). "Under Maryland law, it is well-established that county police departments are agents of the county and not treated as separate legal entities." Garnes v. Maryland, No. RDB-17-1430, 2018 WL 276425, at *4 (D. Md. Jan. 3, 2018); Taylor v. Leggett, No. PX-16-115, 2017 WL 1001281, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 25, 2017). Accordingly, the Anne Arundel County Police Department is not a separate legal entity and Defendants' Motion is GRANTED as to Defendant Anne Arundel County Police Department, which is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as a party in this proceeding.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to state any claims against the County for violations of their First, Fourth, or Fourteenth Amendment rights. Construing Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint liberally, they have brought these constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), a § 1983 cause of action may lie against a local government or municipality when execution of the government's unconstitutional policy or custom causes a plaintiff injury. Walker v. Prince George's Cty., Md., 575 F.3d 426, 431 (4th Cir. 2009) (stating that the liability of the municipality only arises where the employees' unconstitutional actions are taken in furtherance of a municipal policy or custom). In order to support a Monell claim, "(1) the municipality must have actual or constructive knowledge of the custom and usage by its responsible policymakers, and (2) there must be a failure by those policymakers, as a matter of specific intent or deliberate indifference, to correct or terminate the improper custom and usage." Randall v. Prince George's County, 302 F.3d 188, 210 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, there must be a "direct causal link" between the policy or custom and the deprivation of rights. See Bd. Of the Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (holding that there must be a "direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights before a municipality may be held liable" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see also S.P. v. City of Takoma Park, 134 F.3d 260, 272 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that a plaintiff must show a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights).
The Amended Complaint contains no allegations suggesting that Anne Arundel County has an unconstitutional policy or custom that caused the Plaintiffs alleged injuries. Even if this Court were to consider the factual allegations found in Plaintiffs' Response to the Motion to Dismiss the Original Complaint,
Defendants also argue that Anne Arundel County is immune from Plaintiffs' state law claims because they relate to the operations of the County's police department. Anne Arundel County is a county and political subdivision of the State of Maryland. Md. Ann. Code art. 25A § 1 (2009). Under Maryland law, a local government is immune from direct tort actions related to its "governmental" functions. Douglas v. Target Corp., No. RWT-08-2408, 2009 WL 2168920, at *2 (D. Md. July 16, 2009) (citing Buffington v. Baltimore County, Md., 913 F.2d 113, 125 (4th Cir. 1990); DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 729 A.2d 354 (Md. 1999)). While the distinction between "governmental" functions and "proprietary" functions is not always clear, the Maryland Court of Appeals has definitively stated that activities taken by a police officer to enforce a state's criminal law "is quintessentially governmental in nature." DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 48, 729 A.2d 354, 370 (Md. 1999); Watson v. City of Aberdeen, No. JKB-15-0307, 2015 WL 2174885 (D. Md. May 8, 2015) ("It is settled in Maryland that municipalities are not liable for the acts or omissions of police officers because the officers are performing duties of a public, essential governmental nature . . . [and t]hus the City will be dismissed from all state nonconstitutional claims.") Accordingly, local governments are immune from tort suits arising from police activities. Douglas, 2009 WL 2168920, at *2.
The only allegations contained in the Amended Complaint are that Plaintiff Crowell was falsely arrested by Officer Selander for disorderly conduct and Officer Thomas was negligent in her duty to Plaintiff Crenshaw on October 4, 2015.
Plaintiffs have failed to state any cognizable claim against Officers Thomas and Selander. There are merely two conclusory allegations that Officer Selander falsely arrested Plaintiff Crowell and Officer Thomas was negligent in her duties as to Plaintiff Crenshaw. As noted above, a Plaintiff cannot rely on bald allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts that, taken as true, show they are entitled to relief under their various claims for constitutional violations, false arrest, malicious prosecution, defamation, or police misconduct. Further, as to the state law claims, the Officers are protected by public official immunity given that Plaintiffs have not pled that the officers acted with malice. See Baltimore Police Dept. v. Cherkes, 140 Md.App. 282, 329-30, 780 A.2d 410 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (explaining that a public official is shielded by public official immunity for discretionary acts taken within the scope of his or her official duties unless a plaintiff's allegations support an inference of malice). Accordingly, Defendants' Motion is GRANTED as to the Defendants Thomas and Selander, who are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as parties in this case.
For the reasons stated above, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 13) is GRANTED.