DEBORAH K. CHASANOW, District Judge.
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this civil rights case is the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Prince George's County (the "County") and Prince George's County Police Officers Alton Bradley and Daniel Conley. (ECF No. 42). The issues have been fully briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment will be granted.
On March 8, 2015, Plaintiff La'Moore Queen Devi ("Plaintiff") was driving through the parking lot of an apartment complex in Temple Hills, Maryland, when she was pulled over by private security for the apartment complex for failing to stop at a stop sign. (ECF No. 43-2, at 4). The security officer informed Plaintiff that he was going to issue her a citation for failing to stop at the stop sign.
On March 9, Jabari Bishop, another security officer for the apartment complex who "knew that [Plaintiff] was barred from the apartment complex on March 8," called 911 and reported a complaint for trespass after he observed Plaintiff on the premises of the apartment complex. (ECF Nos. 42-7 ¶¶ 2-5; 44-1 (audio recording of the 911 call)). Defendants Bradley and Conley arrived at the apartment complex in response to Mr. Bishop's call, and Mr. Bishop informed them that Plaintiff had returned to the premises after being banned the day before. (ECF No. 42-7 ¶¶ 6-7).
Defendants submitted a video recording obtained from a body camera worn by one of the security officers that depicts the following events. As seen in the video, Defendants Bradley and Conley and the security officers walked to the apartment that Plaintiff was in, and Defendant Bradley knocked on the door. (ECF Nos. 42-3, at 7:20-8:10; 42-4, at 10). Plaintiff answered the door, and Defendant Bradley advised Plaintiff that she was under arrest. (ECF Nos. 42-3, at 9:04; 42-4, at 10-11). Plaintiff responded, "What for?" (ECF No. 42-3, at 9:05). Defendant Bradley advised Plaintiff that she was under arrest for trespassing. (ECF Nos. 42-3, at 9:06; 42-4, at 11). Plaintiff replied that she was not trespassing and explained to Defendant Bradley that she was stopped by a security officer the day before for not stopping at a stop sign. (ECF No. 42-3, at 9:07-9:12). Defendant Bradley asked Plaintiff whether she was going to put her bags down. (ECF Nos. 42-3, at 9:12-9:13; 42-4, at 11). Plaintiff went into the apartment to put her bags down, and Defendants Bradley and Conley entered into the apartment behind her. (ECF Nos. 42-3, at 9:24-9:35; 42-4, at 11). Plaintiff disputes that she resisted arrest. The video shows that when Defendant Bradley attempted to grab Plaintiff's arm to effectuate the arrest, Plaintiff swung her arm in the air while walking away from Defendant Bradley. (ECF Nos. 42-3, at 9:38-9:40; 42-4, at 12). Officer Conley stepped in front of Plaintiff to stop her from walking any further, and Defendants Bradley and Conley then pushed Plaintiff to a nearby wall to get her arms behind her back and handcuff her. (ECF No. 42-3, at 9:40-10:30). Plaintiff again explained that she was only stopped the day before for not stopping at a stop sign, and Defendants Bradley and Conley escorted her out of the apartment. (Id. at 10:32-10:55).
Plaintiff was charged with trespassing upon private property, resisting arrest, and failing to obey a lawful order of a law enforcement officer. (ECF No. 43-6). Those charges were dismissed nolle prosequi on December 7, 2015. (ECF No. 1-4).
On February 2, 2018, Defendants moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's remaining claims of malicious prosecution (Count I) and gross negligence (Count III) against Defendants Bradley and Conley and Plaintiff's claim of excessive force (Count V) against all Defendants.
A motion for summary judgment will be granted only if there exists no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4
Defendants Bradley and Conley argue that Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim fails because probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff for trespass. (ECF No. 42-1, at 8). To establish the tort of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show: 1) the defendant instituted a criminal proceeding against the plaintiff; 2) the criminal proceeding was resolved in the plaintiff's favor; 3) the defendant did not have probable cause to institute the proceeding; and 4) the defendant acted with malice or a primary purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice. Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 183 (2000).
"Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within an officer's knowledge — or of which he possesses reasonably trustworthy information — are sufficient in themselves to convince a person of reasonable caution that an offense has been or is being committed." Wadkins v. Arnold, 214 F.3d 535, 539 (4
DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 32 (1999). Wanton trespass on private property prohibits a person from (1) entering private property, (2) after being notified by the owner or the owner's agent not to do so, (3) unless entering under good faith claim of right or ownership. Md.Code Ann., Crim. Law § 6-403(a) (West 2010).
Here, Defendants Bradley and Conley had probable cause to believe that Plaintiff was trespassing. On March 8, the day before Plaintiff's arrest, Defendant Bradley arrived at the apartment complex in response to a call for trespass. (ECF No. 42-4, at 4-5). Defendant Bradley was informed by private security for the apartment complex that they banned Plaintiff from the premises and verbally informed her of such. (Id. at 5). On March 9, Defendants Bradley and Conley arrived at the apartment complex, in response to Mr. Bishop's 911 call reporting that Plaintiff was trespassing. (ECF Nos. 42-7 ¶ 6; 44-1). Mr. Bishop informed Defendants Bradley and Conley that Plaintiff was back on the premises after being banned the day before (ECF No. 42-7 ¶ 7), and Defendant Conley heard Defendant Bradley state that he was at the apartment complex the day before and was informed by the security officers that Plaintiff was banned from the premises (ECF Nos. 42-3, at 6:47-6:53; 42-5, at 6). Although Plaintiff expressed that she was only stopped by the security officers the day before for failing to stop at a stop sign, Defendants Bradley and Conley were informed that the security officers verbally notified Plaintiff that she was banned from the premises.
Section 1983 prohibits a person acting under the color of law from depriving another of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Count V of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Bradley and Conley deprived her of her Fourth Amendment rights in violation of § 1983 when they arrested her without probable cause. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 77, 78). Plaintiff does not assert a claim against the County under Count V but requests relief against Defendants Bradley, Conley, and the County, jointly and severally. (Id. at 13). Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that "the County is a proper party to this claim as an indemnitor in connection with the alleged constitutional violations." (ECF No. 43, at 19). Although Section 5-303(b) of the Local Government Tort Claims Act ("LGTCA") requires the County to indemnify a judgment against its employee for damages resulting from a tortious act committed by the employee within the scope of employment, the LGTCA does not permit a plaintiff to sue the County directly. Williams v. Prince George's Cty., 112 Md.App. 526, 554 (1996) (citing Khawaja v. Mayor & City Council, City of Rockville, 89 Md.App. 314, 325-36 (1991)). There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and the County can be sued directly under § 1983 only if the alleged unconstitutional action Plaintiff complains of resulted from a County policy, practice or custom. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 694 (1978). Plaintiff brought claims against the County in Count VI of her complaint, alleging failure to train properly and unconstitutional customs with respect to excessive force, which were dismissed at the motion to dismiss stage (ECF No. 31, at 8-11). Therefore, the County cannot be sued directly for Plaintiff's excessive force claim against Defendants Bradley and Conley and judgment will be entered in favor of the County.
Plaintiff argues that because there was no probable cause for her arrest, any force used by Defendants Bradley and Conley was excessive, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (ECF No. 43, at 14). As previously mentioned, probable cause existed for Plaintiff's arrest, and her argument to the contrary fails. Plaintiff alternatively argues that "even if the officers had probable cause to effectuate an arrest, the amount of force used in this case was excessive." (Id.). The Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable seizures bars police officers from using excessive force during the course of an arrest. Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4
Plaintiff appears to argue that no force was necessary at all to effectuate her arrest. Plaintiff contends that "[a] reasonable officer would have called out or given some form of verbal command prior to using excessive force[,]" and, "[a]lternatively, the officers could have proceeded to confirm that [Plaintiff] was not wanted on the property, and merely escorted [her] of[f] the premises[.]" (ECF No. 43, at 17). "[T]he right to make an arrest . . . necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Although Plaintiff contends that she was compliant and did not resist arrest, the video recording clearly shows that any force used by the officers was minimal and due to Plaintiff's continuous movement after being advised that she was under arrest for trespass.
Defendants Bradley and Conley argue that Plaintiff's gross negligence claim fails because they "acted reasonably and arrested Plaintiff based on probable cause" and "did not act recklessly with disregard for the consequences of their actions." (ECF No. 42-1, at 17).
Under Maryland law, gross negligence is viewed "as something more than simple negligence, and likely more akin to reckless conduct." Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 187 (2007) (citing Taylor v. Harford Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 384 Md. 213, 229 (2004)).
Id. (citations omitted). "An officer's actions are grossly negligent when they are `so heedless and incautious as necessarily to be deemed unlawful and wanton, manifesting such a gross departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily careful and prudent person under the same circumstances so as to furnish evidence of indifference to consequences.'" Henry, 652 F.3d at 536 (citation omitted). Plaintiff argues that "[t]he facts of this case show that the defendants willfully disregarded [Plaintiff's] rights when they unlawfully used excessive force in grabbing [Plaintiff's] arms and pushing her up against a wall[,]" and that "[t]he ensuing arrest in prosecution of [Plaintiff] further violated her rights as there was no probable cause[.]" (ECF No. 43, at 24). Again, probable cause existed for Plaintiff's arrest and the force used by Defendants was not excessive. The actions of Defendants do not constitute a "gross departure" from ordinary conduct or reckless conduct. Therefore, judgment will be granted in favor of Defendants Bradley and Conley as to Plaintiff's gross negligence claim.
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Prince George's County, Alton Bradley, and Daniel Conley will be granted. A separate order will follow.
