MEMORANDUM

JAMES K. BREDAR, District Judge.

I. Background

Plaintiff Joahn Barron Frazier filed an Amended Complaint alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681× (2012). (ECF No. 15.) Plaintiff contends that Defendants1 failed to disclose Plaintiff's full consumer file pursuant to 1681g(a)(1).2 Defendant Equifax Inc. ("Equifax") and putative defendant, Equifax Information Services, LLC ("EIS"), filed a Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) asserting two grounds for dismissal. First, Equifax contends that it is not a consumer reporting agency ("CRA") and, therefore, cannot be held liable under the FCRA. Mot. Dismiss First Am. Compl. 1, Apr. 5, 2018, ECF No. 18. Second, Defendants allege that Plaintiff failed to provide facts sufficient to support her claim for relief by offering "merely speculative and conclusory allegations" that she did not receive a full consumer file disclosure. Mot. Dismiss First Am. Compl. I. No hearing is required. Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). The motion will be granted.3

II. Standard of Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires "[a] pleading that states a claim for relief [to] contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). This standard "does not require "detailed factual allegations: but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face:" lqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570), Facial plausibility exists "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id An inference of a mere possibility of misconduct is not sufficient to support a plausible claim. Id at 679. As the Twombly opinion stated, "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." 550 U.S. at 555. "A pleading that offers `labels and conclusions' or `a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' . . . Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders `naked assertion[s]' devoid of `further factual enhancement.' khal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 557). Although when considering a motion to dismiss a court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint, this principle does not apply to legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Twomhly, 550 U.S. at 555.

III. Allegations of the Complaint

On September 19, 2017. Plaintiff made a written request for "all information in [her] consumer file" to Equifax.4 Compl. Ex. B, Jan. 9. 2018, ECF No. 1 (emphasis omitted); see First Am. Compl. 19, Mar. 22, 2018, ECF No. 15. In response, EIS sent Plaintiff a letter that Plaintiff contends "was not responsive to her request." First Am. Compl. ¶ 20; see Compl. Ex. C. Unsatisfied with Defendants' response, Plaintiff made a "second and final request for a full consumer file disclosure" to Equifax. First Am. Compl. ¶ 25 (emphasis omitted); see Compl. Ex. G. In response to her second request, Equifax allegedly sent Plaintiff a "credit report" that was also "not responsive to her request." First Am. Compl. ¶ 28: Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. A, Apr. 20, 2018, ECF No. 21.

On January 9, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants alleging violations of the FCRA, citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1). First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 20, 21. Equifax filed a Motion to Dismiss the original complaint. Mot. Dismiss. Mar. 6, 2018, ECF 11, and Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint. Based "upon information and belief," Plaintiff contends that "there is substantial information relating to I her] that is contained in all Defendants' files that has not been disclosed to her."5 First Am. Compl. ¶ 34.

IV. Analysis

A. The Court may plausibly infer that Equifax is a CRA

Equifax argues that it is not a CRA.6 Equifax relies on three district court summary judgment decisions7 and the fact that EIS, not Equifax, prepared Plaintiffs disclosure.8 Mot. Dismiss First Am. Compl. 3. Plaintiff contends that Equifax is a CRA. First Am. Compl. ¶ 7. Plaintiff asserts that Equifax has "held itself out repeatedly . . . as the actual operating entity" that "freely transfer[s] . . . consumer information and data . . . for commercial purposes" and claims that Equifax sent her the report because it had a bolded "EQUIFAX" label on the first page. First Am. Compl. ¶ 7-8; Pl.'s Opp'n 3, Ex. A. Plaintiff suggests, however, that the issue of whether Equifax is a CRA should be resolved at the summary judgment stage. Pl.'s Opp'n 5. As a preliminary matter, the Court first addresses whether it can make such a determination when considering a motion to dismiss.

Courts have held that a defendant's status as a CRA should be decided on a motion for summary judgment,9 not through a motion to dismiss. See Scott v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 18-CV-60178-ALTONAGA/Seltzer, 2018 WL 3360754, at *4-5 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2018) (finding that Equifax's contention that it is not a CRA is "more appropriately presented and resolved at summary judgment"); see also Jones v. Equifax, Inc., No. 3:14cv678, 2015 WL 5092514, at *4 n.l 1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 27, 2015) (noting that the cases cited by Equifax to support a finding that it was not a CRA were unpersuasive for a motion to dismiss because "every decision . . . was rendered at the summary judgment stage"); Wikert v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 3:11-cv-00786-J-37JRK, 2012 WL 333787, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2012) (making a "reasonable inference" while considering the defendant's motion to dismiss that the defendant is a CRA and recognizing that "[s]hould [the] [d]efendant have evidence that [it] is not a CRA, it may present it at a later stage of this litigation"). Accordingly, to survive Equifax's motion to dismiss and proceed to discovery, Plaintiff need only plead sufficient facts to allow this Court to make a reasonable inference that the defendant is a CRA. Scott. 2018 WL 3360754, at *5; see Marricone v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 09-CV-1123, 2009 WL 3245417, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 6. 2009) (concluding that without binding case law that the defendant is not a CRA, a plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations that the defendant acted as a CRA under the circumstances of the case should survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss).

In Scott v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., a case concerning an analogous motion to dismiss, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida found that the plaintiff pled "facts sufficient to show Equifax is a CRA at this phase of the litigation." Scott, 2018 WL 3360754, at *4. In its reasoning, the court emphasized three items in the plaintiffs complaint that it used to reach its decision. First, the plaintiff alleged that "he submitted two requests for his full consumer file disclosures to Equifax and received responses from Equifax." Id. (citing Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22-23, 28, 31). Second, the plaintiff stated that "Equifax operate[d] as a seller of credit report information." Id. (citing Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7-8). Lastly, the complaint included a letter from Equifax sent in response to the plaintiffs request. Id. at *5 (citing Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23, 31). The court concluded that the letter alone provided "a reasonable inference that Equifax is a CRA." Id.; see Wikert, 2012 WL 333787, at *3 (finding that the "Credit Reports" attached to the complaint "at the very least[] support a `reasonable inference' that [defendant] is a CRA" and recognizing other district court decisions that have reached the same conclusion (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1949)).

As in Scott, Plaintiff contends that she sent two requests to Equifax and, in response to her second request, received a "credit report" with "the name `EQUIFAX' in big bold letters on the first page" of the report. Pl.'s Opp'n 3, Ex. A; First Am. Compl. ¶ 28. Plaintiff, however, only provided a portion of the report attached to her Opposition. She redacted the entire body of the report, leaving only Equifax's logo (as described above), Equifax's URL, the date, Plaintiff's name and address, an identification number, and "Page 1 of 18" at the bottom. Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. A. Nonetheless, based on the parts of the report provided, supported by Plaintiff's factual allegation that she received a credit report from Equifax, it is reasonable to infer that the exhibit is the first page of Equifax's disclosure to Plaintiff. Accordingly, as in Scott, the report, paired with Plaintiffs factual allegations, is enough to overcome Defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to Equifax's contention that it is not a CRA. If Equifax has evidence that would refute the Court's conclusion, it may file a motion for summary judgment and present its evidence to the Court. See Wikert, 2012 WL 333787, at *3.

Although the Court draws the inference from the First Amended Complaint that Equifax Inc. is a CRA, the Court offers no opinion as to whether Plaintiff can succeed at the evidentiary stage in establishing proof of such. Given the cases in which Equifax Inc. was not found to be a CRA when evidence was presented in summary-judgment motions, the Court is doubtful Plaintiff would he able to prove otherwise. However, Plaintiff's contention survives Equifax's motion to dismiss. Because the Court so holds, it need not reach Plaintiff's alternate contention that Equifax is an alter ego of its subsidiaries and, therefore, that Equifax is a CRA.

B. Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support her claim for relief

Defendants10 allege that Plaintiff failed to "state facts sufficient to support a claim for relief under the FCRA" because she "merely recites in conclusory fashion that she did not receive a full disclosure."11 Mot. Dismiss First Am. Compl. 11. Plaintiff contends that the document she received was "not responsive to her request" because it omitted "substantial information." First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28, 34. Defendants argue, however. that Plaintiff's complaint is void of "any factual enhancement that specific information that should have been in the disclosure was missing." Mot. Dismiss First Am. Compl. 13.

A complaint based exclusively "upon information and belief' is "insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss." Mann Bracken. LLP v. Exec. Risk Indemnity, Inc., Civ. No. DKC 15-1406, 2015 WL 5721632, at *7 (D. Md. Sept. 28, 2015) (quoting Harman v. Unisys Corp., 356 F. App'x 638, 640-41 (4th Cir. 2009)). However, a distinction exists between cases that use "upon information and belief" as a deficient substitute for describing the necessary particulars of a claim and those cases "where a plaintiff does not have personal knowledge of the facts being asserted" because they are within the defendant's control. Id. (quoting Malibu Media. LLC v. Doe, Civ. No. PWG-13-365, 2014 WL 7188822. at *4 (D. Md. Dec. 16, 2014)). When accompanied by "specific factual allegations," the latter use may overcome a motion to dismiss. Doe v. Salisbury Univ., 123 F. Supp. 3d. 748. 768 (D. Md. 2015).

In Scott, the plaintiff pled "upon information and belief' that the following was missing from the disclosure he received from the defendants:

Scott, 2018 WL 3360754, at *6 (citations omitted) (quoting Am. Compl. ¶ 38. 39, 41). The plaintiff clari lied that his claim focused on information that "may have been at some time in the past provided to an unknown third party or might be provided at some time in the future to a third party." Id. at *7 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Am. Compl. ¶ 43). Lastly, the plaintiff contended that `one can only surmise' the information ['the] [d]efendants share with third parties `must obviously contain information that the consumer has never seen and the consumer reporting agencies don't want him or her to see for some unknown reason.'" Id. (original alterations omitted) (quoting Am. Compl. ¶ 47).

The district court held that the plaintiffs "speculative guesswork . . . render[ed] the pleading incapable of withstanding a motion to dismiss." Id. The court reasoned that the plaintiff failed to "point to what information is actually missing" from the disclosure or the "specific facts" that he relied on to allege that the defendants did not meet the disclosure requirements of the FCRA. Id. The court further emphasized the plaintiffs lack of direct knowledge and the use of "might" and "may," which illustrated the hypothetical nature of the plaintiff's complaint. Id.

In the instant case, based "[u]pon information and belief," Plaintiff alleges that "there is substantial information relating to [her] that is contained in all Defendants' files that has not been disclosed to her." First Am. Compl. ¶ 34. While she has "no direct knowledge" of the information in Defendants' files,12 First Am. Compl. ¶ 32, Plaintiff speculates as to the following possible omissions:

First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34, 35. Plaintiff further contends,

First Am. Compl. 39 (emphasis omitted). Lastly, Plaintiff asserts,

First Am. Compl. 43.

Plaintiff's allegations are nearly identical to those made by the plaintiff in Scott. Plaintiff admits that she has no direct knowledge of the content in Defendants' files and can only postulate as to what should have been included in the disclosures. Plaintiff also uses words such as "may" and "might" and includes the exact language the court in Scott referred to as a "telling[]" example of the plaintiffs speculation.13 Scott, 2018 WL 3360754. at *7; First Am. Compl. ¶ 39. While it may be true that the information Plaintiff is seeking is within the control of Defendants, Plaintiff fails to accompany her conclusional allegations based "upon information and belief" with "specific factual allegations" that led her "to accuse Defendants of failing to meet their disclosure requirements under the FCRA." Scott, 2018 WL 3360754, at *7. As in Scott, even when considering all facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff and accepting her allegations as true, the Court cannot reasonably infer that the Defendants violated their disclosure requirements pursuant to § 1681 g(a)(1) of the FCRA. The complaint fails to state a claim for relief.

V. Conclusion

Although the Court rules in Plaintiff's favor as to whether she has successfully alleged Equifax Inc. is a CRA, the Court agrees with Defendants that she has nevertheless failed to state a claim for relief. A separate order dismissing Plaintiffs complaint against Equifax Inc. will follow.