CATHERINE C. BLAKE, District Judge.
The plaintiffs, thirty-seven employees of Mack Trucks, Inc. ("Mack Trucks") and/or Volvo Group North America, LLC ("Volvo")
The union defendants are the plaintiffs' exclusive collective bargaining agent under the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"). (Compl. ¶ 52). In 2011 and 2012, the employer defendants and union defendants signed a memorandum of understanding ("MOU") and memorandum of agreement ("MOA") regarding how the seniority of temporary employees who are later hired as permanent employees would be calculated. (Id. ¶¶ 60, 61). At some point, however, the seniority and, in particular, the employees' vacation entitlements became disputed, and the union filed a grievance (the "wage grievance") on November 7, 2016. (Id. ¶ 53; ECF 11-2 at 34, 2016 Wage Grievance).
Sometime in 2017 or 2018, the employer defendants began informing the plaintiffs that they would need to repay the amount they had been overpaid for used and unused vacation time. (Id. ¶ 65). On April 11, 2018, the union consulted an attorney, who advised the union that the repayments were in violation of the 2011 MOU and 2012 MOA. (Id. ¶ 68). Local 171's president, David Dopp, also sought legal advice from this lawyer personally regarding the seniority status and wage deductions and, after he did so, the lawyer was unable to represent the plaintiffs because doing so would create a conflict of interest with Dopp. (Id. ¶ 72). The plaintiffs allege that David Dopp "appears to have intentionally created a conflict of interest," and on July 5, 2018, the plaintiffs sent Dopp a demand to "immediately obtain replacement counsel ... due to Mr. Dopp's improper actions." (Id. ¶ 72-73).
The plaintiffs allege in Count III
In the plaintiffs' corrected motion for leave to amend their complaint, they seek to add another allegation that the union defendants attempted to thwart, refused to process, and refused to pursue grievances filed by the plaintiffs in December 2018 relating to the wage deductions made between June 2018 and December 2018. (ECF 19-2, Proposed Am. Compl. ¶ 74).
To survive a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of a complaint "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted). "To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff need not `forecast' evidence sufficient to prove the elements of the claim. However, the complaint must allege sufficient facts to establish those elements." Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). "Thus, while a plaintiff does not need to demonstrate in a complaint that the right to relief is `probable,' the complaint must advance the plaintiff's claim `across the line from conceivable to plausible.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Additionally, although courts "must view the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the plaintiff," they "will not accept `legal conclusions couched as facts or unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments'" in deciding whether a case should survive a motion to dismiss. U.S. ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. North Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 455 (4th. Cir. 2013) (quoting Wag More Dogs, LLC v. Cozart, 680 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2012)).
Leave to amend should be freely granted under Rule 15(a), and amendments are generally accepted absent futility, undue prejudice, or bad faith. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Matrix Capital Mgmt. Fund, LP v. BearingPoint, Inc., 576 F.3d 172, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that leave to amend "should be denied only when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or amendment would be futile.").
The union defendants argue in their motion to dismiss that the plaintiffs' claim for breach of the duty of fair representation ("DFR claim") is time-barred, as the complaint was filed past the six-month statute of limitations set forth in Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). The plaintiffs argue that the applicable statute of limitations is Maryland's three-year statute of limitations for contract claims.
The parties first disagree as to whether the plaintiffs can bring a DFR claim under state law, or whether they must bring it under federal law.
Davis v. Bell Atl.-W. Virginia, Inc., 110 F.3d 245, 247 (4th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). Multiple courts have held that state law claims by an employee against her union alleging breach of the duty of fair representation
Here, the plaintiffs' claim is based on the union's position as their exclusive bargaining representative, and resolution of the claim would require interpretation of the CBA. See Ramey v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 580 F.Supp.2d 44, 47 (D.D.C. 2008) ("To the extent that the Union had a duty to Ramey, that duty is defined and governed by a [CBA], as well as applicable federal statutes. To assess whether the Union failed to properly discharge a duty owed to plaintiff requires an interpretation of the CBA."). Additionally, much of the misconduct alleged by the plaintiffs involves the grievance and arbitration procedures, which arise from the CBA. See Compl. ¶ 52 ("The Union is Plaintiffs' `exclusive collective bargaining agent' under the CBA"); ¶ 53 (arbitration process permitted under the CBA); ¶ 74 (the union breached its duty by withdrawing the wage grievance and refusing to demand arbitration). Therefore, to the extent plaintiffs assert a state law DFR claim, it is preempted, and must instead arise under federal law.
The plaintiffs cite two Maryland state court cases in support of their argument that they can bring a state law DFR claim. See Stanley v. Am. Fed. of State and Mun. Employees Local No. 553, 165 Md.App. 1, 15 (2005); Byrne v. Mass Transit Admin., 58 Md.App. 501, 508 (1984) ("The duty of fair representation does not arise under the LMRA, but rather as a private cause of action under State law for breach of contract."). As the union defendants point out, however, the cases cited by the plaintiffs both involved claims by public sector employees. See Stanley, 165 Md. App. at 5 (the plaintiff worked for the City of Cumberland); Byrne, 58 Md. App. at 507 (the MTA, the plaintiff's employer, "is an agency and instrumentality of the State of Maryland"). But because of the NLRA's definition of "employer," "neither the NLRA nor the LMRA covers public employees" of a State or a political subdivision, and those employees cannot "sue their unions under the NLRA for a breach of the duty of fair representation." Adams v. Am. Fed. of State, 167 F.Supp.3d 730, 741 (D. Md. 2016) (citations omitted); see Byrne, 58 Md. App. at 507 ("Since § 152(2) of the LMRA specifically excludes the State, and implicitly its agencies, from the purview of the Act, an action against MTA under claim of the authority of the LMRA will not lie."). Therefore, the DFR claims at issue in Byrne and Stanley could not be brought under the federal labor statutes, but those cases are distinguishable, as the plaintiffs here are private sector employees.
Accordingly, the applicable statute of limitations for the plaintiffs' DFR claim is six months. As the Supreme Court held in DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, in a claim against an employer for breach of the CBA and against the union for breach of its duty of fair representation, the federal statute of limitations in § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act should govern both claims. 462 U.S. 151, 154-55 (1983).
Given this six-month statute of limitations, the union defendants argue that the DFR claim is untimely. The affirmative defense that a claim is time-barred is not typically considered at the motion to dismiss stage. Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007). Such a defense may be reached at this stage only "in the relatively rare circumstances where facts sufficient to rule on an affirmative defense are alleged in the complaint." Id.
"The six-month limitations period begins to run from the time when [the plaintiff] discovered his injury or should have discovered it through the exercise of reasonable diligence." Taylor, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 591 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As the Fourth Circuit has explained:
Dement v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. Co., 845 F.2d 451, 460 (4th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
As the plaintiffs filed their complaint on January 10, 2019, any alleged misconduct occurring more than six months prior, before July 10, 2018, of which the plaintiffs knew or should have known, is time-barred. Therefore, to the extent the plaintiffs' DFR claim is based on the union defendants' withdrawal of the 2016 wage grievance, entering into the 2017 MOU, or creating a conflict of interest with the attorney, it is time barred. The wage grievance was withdrawn on September 19, 2017, (Compl. ¶ 53), and even if the plaintiffs did not immediately learn that it was withdrawn, they should have known at least by June 4, 2018, when the employer defendants began deducting money from their wages. (Id. ¶ 69). Although it is not clear when the plaintiffs learned of the 2017 MOU or the creation of the conflict of interest, they knew about it at least as of July 5, 2018, as both were referenced in the demand letter sent to David Dopp. (Compl. ¶ 73 (demand made on behalf of the plaintiffs); ECF 11-3 at 3
The plaintiffs argue that the statute of limitations period is restarted every time the employer defendants deduct money from their paychecks. This is incorrect as to the DFR claim against the union defendants. As the above makes clear, the statute of limitations began running when the plaintiffs learned or should have learned of the defendants' alleged breach of the DFR, not every time the plaintiffs feel the effects of the alleged breach.
Punitive damages are not available in duty of fair representation actions. Peterson v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 759 F.2d 1161, 1167 (4th Cir. 1985); Shufford v. Truck Drivers, Helpers, Taxicab Drivers, Garage Employees & Airport Employees Local Union No. 355, 954 F.Supp. 1080, 1085 (D. Md. 1996) (punitive damages are not available in a case alleging a breach of the duty of fair representation). The plaintiffs' only argument for punitive damages is that the plaintiffs' claim arises under Maryland common law, not federal law. As discussed above, plaintiffs' DFR claim must arise under federal law or else it is preempted. Therefore, punitive damages are not available for the DFR claim.
Accordingly, the court will grant the union defendants' motion to dismiss.
In their corrected motion for leave to file an amended complaint, the plaintiffs seek to add an allegation regarding the union defendants' refusal to process grievances in December 2018.
As an initial matter, the court notes that the plaintiffs' characterization of the 2016 wage grievance is seemingly contradicted by the plaintiffs' own complaint, which states that the wage grievance was "related to the ... wage deductions." (Compl. ¶ 53; Proposed Am. Compl. ¶ 53). It is not clear, however, whether the 2018 grievances and the 2016 grievance are duplicative, especially as it appears that the 2016 grievance did not reference any potential wage deductions. Further, the 2017 MOU, which was signed after the withdrawal of the 2016 wage grievance, states, after a paragraph about repaying the vacation overpayment, that "Article 5 of the 2016 Mack Master Agreement would still be applicable if the Union elects to file a grievance." (ECF 11-2 at 47). This implies that it was at least contemplated that another grievance regarding the repayment or deductions might be filed. The court does not have sufficient information at this time to determine whether the plaintiffs knew or should have known, prior to July 10, 2018, that the union defendants had made a final decision not to pursue grievances relating to the wage deductions, or to determine whether the December 2018 grievances were merely a request for the union to reconsider its earlier decisions.
The statute of limitations for the DFR claim as it relates to the 2018 grievances would begin to run once the grievance process was exhausted or broke down, which occurred when the union allegedly refused to process the grievances or take them to Step 2 after they were denied. According to the proposed amended complaint, this occurred in December 2018, and thus, the claim based on this alleged breach could be timely.
The defendants also argue that the proposed amendment relating to the December 2018 grievances would be futile because "the Union does not have exclusive authority to vindicate Plaintiffs' claims that the Company violated Maryland state law." (ECF 21, Defs.' Opp'n to Pls.' Corrected Mot. for Leave to Amend at 11). It appears that the plaintiffs, however, are instead arguing that the union defendants did not properly process their grievances regarding the deductions. This does not involve vindicating the plaintiffs' state law claims. Therefore, the court cannot find that the DFR claim based on the 2018 grievances would be futile, and will grant the plaintiffs' motion to amend, consistent with the court's previous rulings regarding the time-barred claims in the initial complaint.
For the reasons stated above, the court will grant the union defendants' motion to dismiss and will grant the plaintiffs' corrected motion for leave to file an amended complaint to the extent that it asserts a DFR claim based on the failure to process and/or pursue the December 2018 grievances. A separate order follows.
