SAUFLEY, C.J.
[¶ 1] The State Tax Assessor appeals from a summary judgment entered by the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Murphy, J.) in favor of BCN Telecom, Inc., on BCN's appeal from the assessment of a state service provider tax, 36 M.R.S. § 2552(1)(E) (2011),
[¶ 2] This matter was decided by the Superior Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. The court considered the matter de novo, see 36 M.R.S. § 151-D(10)(I) (2015),
[¶ 3] The following facts are drawn from the parties' statements of material facts and their stipulated facts and exhibits. During the relevant audit period of March 1, 2008, to October 31, 2011, BCN functioned in Maine both as a competitive local exchange carrier (CLEC), supplying local telephone service, and an interexchange carrier (IXC), providing long-distance service between exchange areas. BCN charged a monthly rate for local calls and a per-minute rate for interstate and intrastate long-distance calls. BCN had no employees stationed in Maine but resold telecommunications services to business and residential customers in Maine for both local and long-distance services.
[¶ 4] In its role as an IXC, BCN was, in some instances, charged PICCs, which are fees or end-user charges that a local exchange carrier may impose to recover a portion of the interstate local loop cost from an IXC. See 47 C.F.R. § 69.153 (2014).
[¶ 5] BCN's bills to its customers included a line item that it labeled, "PICC: Primary InterExchange Carrier Charge." The charges that it thereby imposed on customers were not, themselves, PICCs, which are, by definition, paid by IXCs as long as customers, like those of BCN, have selected an IXC. See 47 C.F.R. § 69.153(a), (b). Thus, the charge listed on the customers' bills by BCN was more in the nature of a pass-through charge, although, as described below, the charge significantly exceeded the costs incurred by BCN. BCN imposed its "PICC" charges on those business customers with multiple long-distance lines that did not negotiate with BCN to avoid paying the charges. BCN did so in part to recover PICCs that it had paid to local exchange carriers and in part to realize a profit.
[¶ 6] BCN limited the charges that it imposed to an amount not exceeding the maximum PICC authorized for a local exchange carrier to charge an IXC by federal regulation. See 47 C.F.R. 69.153(a), (e).
[¶ 7] Nationwide, BCN, in its capacity as an IXC, paid a total of $386,802.46 in PICCs to local exchange carriers during the period established for the audit. It then charged its customers $6,736,257.78, nationwide, in fees that it designated "PICC" in its bills. In Maine alone, BCN charged $825,940.30 to customers under this "PICC" designation, more than double the amount of the costs it incurred on a nationwide basis.
[¶ 8] Maine Revenue Services determined that BCN's "PICC" revenues were subject to a service provider tax as part of BCN's sale price for in-state "[t]elecommunications services." 36 M.R.S. §§ 2551(15), 2552(1)(E), 2557(34) (2011). BCN was assessed $41,296.96 in taxes and $7,778.60 in interest. BCN sought reconsideration, see 36 M.R.S. § 151(2) (2015), and the Sales and Use Tax Division of Maine Revenue Services affirmed the assessment. BCN sought review of the reconsidered decision by filing a written statement of appeal with the Maine Board of Tax Appeals in October 2012. See 36 M.R.S. § 151(2)(E), (F)(1) (2015). The Board affirmed the imposition of the tax. See 36 M.R.S. § 151-D(10)(I).
[¶ 9] BCN filed a timely petition for review of final agency action in the Superior Court. See id.; M.R. Civ. P. 80C. The parties conducted discovery and, at the direction of the court, entered a joint stipulation of facts and exhibits. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment with statements of material facts and supporting materials. After considering the parties' submissions, the court granted BCN's motion for summary judgment, concluding that BCN's charges were not part of the "sale price" of telecommunications services, 36 M.R.S. §§ 2551(15), 2552(2) (2011), and that, even if they were, they were exempt from taxation because they were charges for interstate telecommunications services. The Assessor appeals to us. See 14 M.R.S. § 1851 (2015); M.R. App. P. 2.
[¶ 10] "Statutes imposing taxes are construed most strongly against the government and in the citizen's favor and may not be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used." Camp Walden v. Johnson, 156 Me. 160, 165, 163 A.2d 356 (1960); see also Capitol Bank & Tr. Co. v. City of Waterville, 343 A.2d 213, 218 (Me. 1975) ("[T]ax statutes are to be construed strictly against the taxing authority."). During the audit period, the statute at issue here provided, "A tax at the rate of 5% is imposed on the value of ... [t]elecommunications services" sold in Maine. 36 M.R.S. § 2552(1)(E).
[¶ 11] As it applies here, "`[s]ale price' means the total amount of consideration, including cash, credit, property and services, for which ... services are sold ... without any deduction for the cost of materials used, labor or service cost, interest, losses and any other expense of the seller." 36 M.R.S. § 2551(15) (emphasis added). "Sale price" is specifically defined to include "any consideration for services that are a part of a sale." Id. Telecommunications
[¶ 12] We conclude, based on the plain language of the statute, that BCN's "PICC" charges to its Maine customers were included in the "total amount of consideration," 36 M.R.S. § 2551(15), that the multiple-line business customers paid to BCN for telecommunications services. See Camp Walden, 156 Me. at 165, 163 A.2d 356. Although BCN argues that the "PICC" charges were access charges — not consideration for actual telecommunications services — BCN did not require all multi-line business customers to pay these charges to access services, and the charges were part of the total compensation paid for telecommunication services. See 36 M.R.S. § 2551(15). BCN could have taken into account its need to cover costs and earn a profit through its ordinary rate-setting process, and there was nothing about the "PICC" charge that distinguished it as anything other than a charge for telecommunications services.
[¶ 13] When a tax exemption is being interpreted, it must be "construed narrowly." Brent Leasing Co. v. State Tax Assessor, 2001 ME 90, ¶ 15, 773 A.2d 457. "[A]n exemption from taxation, while entitled to reasonable interpretation in accordance with its purpose, is not to be extended by application to situations not clearly coming within the scope of the exemption provisions." Robbins v. State Tax Assessor, 536 A.2d 1127, 1128 (Me. 1988) (quotation marks omitted). To the extent that the applicability of the exemption cannot be determined on the facts provided on summary judgment, the matter must be resolved in favor of the Assessor because "[t]he burden of proof is on the taxpayer," 36 M.R.S. § 151-D(10)(I), which must make a prima facie showing of the applicability of the exemption for its claim to survive the cross-motions for summary judgment. Estate of Cabatit v. Canders, 2014 ME 133, ¶ 8, 105 A.3d 439; Kondaur Capital Corp. v. Hankins, 2011 ME 82, ¶ 17, 25 A.3d 960.
[¶ 14] The exemption at issue here applied to "[s]ales of interstate telecommunications service." 36 M.R.S. § 2557(34). Although the PICC is a creature of federal law that is chargeable to an IXC, see 47 C.F.R. § 69.153, BCN has offered no evidence to demonstrate that the charges that
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