Hon. Peter G. Cary, Bankruptcy Court, District of Maine.
This matter is before me on the Second Application of Molleur Law Office ("MLO") for Compensation for Services (Docket Entry ("DE") 287). In making my determination I have considered, among other things, the second fee application, the objections of debtor Mark P. Sangillo and the Chapter 13 Trustee (DE 295, 301), and MLO's responses to those objections (DE 297, 302). I also reviewed MLO's first fee application, the various objections to it, and MLO's responses (DE 119, 150, 160, 161, 165, and 167).
MLO bears the burden of proof as the applicant. In re Hansbury, 2015 WL 2445051, at *1 (Bankr.D.Me. May 20, 2015). The law I apply in reviewing fee applications is set forth in In re Mullen, 2014 WL 4988269, at *1 (Bankr.D.Me. Oct. 6, 2014).
Mr. Sangillo filed for bankruptcy relief on March 26, 2014. In January of 2015, MLO filed its first fee application seeking $40,443.05 in fees and $680.37 in costs. There were three objections; one each by
MLO did so on December 30, 2015. This time around MLO sought allowance of an additional $30,811.95 in fees and $474.97 in expenses, and the Trustee and Mr. Sangillo objected. A hearing was held on February 3, 2016. At the hearing and in his papers, the Trustee raised several concerns including:
MLO responded to these objections by admitting the first, clarifying the second (MLO confirmed that it would only seek payment of $36,000 through the Plan or pre-petition payments), denying the third and fifth, and asserting that its voluntary agreement to waive collection of over $40,000 overcame the fourth and sixth.
Mr. Sangillo objected on the grounds that the fees sought by MLO exceed the benefits of the case. At the hearing, Mr. Sangillo offered that it was early in the case for the fees to be so high. He added that though MLO and he had a major misunderstanding in the beginning, their working relationship had since then been satisfactory.
At the hearing, MLO, the Trustee, and Mr. Sangillo agreed that the matter was appropriate for me determine on the record before me.
Generally, the Bankruptcy Code permits the award of reasonable compensation for legal services rendered by debtor's counsel in connection with a chapter 13 case provided they were necessary and beneficial to the debtor's estate or the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(4). In keeping with my prior decisions on fee applications and as directed by Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Sullivan), 674 F.3d 65, 69 (1st Cir. 2012), I apply a "flexible paradigm" when I consider and determine fee awards. In doing so here I can dispense with several of the Trustee's objections. First, there is no statute or rule requiring a debtor to approve counsel's fee application, however sensible or politic that might be.
However, MLO's fee application seeks approval of fees and expenses in excess of $72,000
This opinion does not determine whether this rule applies to obtaining client consent prior to filing fee applications, especially in this case where Mr. Sangillo's opposition to the fee application became quite clear by the filing of his objection.