D. BROCK HORNBY, District Judge.
This case is primarily a patent dispute. It involves skin markers that medical practitioners use to demarcate a particular area or feature of concern that will then be highlighted on subsequent x-rays. There are also accusations of trademark infringement, false advertising, false patent marking, and deceptive trade practices. After a hearing on June 3, 2010, I construe the claims of the two patents held by the warring patent holders, and rule upon their motions for claim construction, summary judgment, and exclusion of expert testimony.
The plaintiffs (they are Dr. Danforth S. DeSena, the inventor, and his company, Solstice Corporation (collectively "Solstice")) ask me to construe claims 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 10 of their U.S. Patent No. 5,193,106 (the '106 patent) and to grant them summary judgment on claims 1, 2 and 3. The defendant Beekley Corporation ("Beekley") moves for summary judgment of non-infringement on claims 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 10 of the '106 patent.
The '106 patent is entitled "X-Ray Identification Marker." According to Solstice's legal memorandum:
Pls.' Mot. For Summ. J. 1-2 (citations and figures omitted) (Docket Item 110).
What the patent actually says is:
Claim 1, '106 patent col. 5-6 ll. 51-53 and ll. 1-13 (Docket Item 56-2) attached as Ex. A to Pls.' Mot. For Claims Construction. Claims 2 and 3 are dependent claims, deriving from Claim 1. Claim 6 is the same as Claim 1 through subpart a, but has a different subpart b and subpart c as follows:
Id. at col. 6 ll. 33-42. Claims 7 and 10 are dependent claims, deriving from Claim 6.
The major controversy between the parties on this patent is the significance of the repeated references in the patent to the foot and podiatry. Beekley says that its products do not infringe the '106 patent because it sells its allegedly infringing devices solely for mammography, not podiatry, and Solstice admits that there is no evidence that Beekley's mammography markers are used in podiatry. Pls.' Opp'n Statement of Facts and Additional Facts in Resp. to Def.'s Mot. For Summ. J. ¶ 1 (Docket Item 112-1); Flannery Aff. ¶¶ 13, 14 (Docket Item 67-1) attached as Ex. O to Wantek Aff. Solstice maintains that these are nevertheless infringing activities because, according to its reading of the '106 patent, it is not limited to podiatric uses. There are other disagreements, but that is the major point of controversy.
The Federal Circuit has prescribed the rules for construing a patent's claims. Specifically, "[i]t is a `bedrock principle' of patent law that `the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.'" Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir.2005) (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed.Cir.2004)). The Federal Circuit has explained that a reason for this, quoting the Supreme Court, is that "it is `unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of the law, to construe it in a manner different from the plain import of its terms.'" Id. (quoting White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 52, 7 S.Ct. 72, 30 L.Ed. 303 (1886)). The words of a claim "are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning," "the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention." Id. at 1312-13 (citations omitted). Sometimes, "the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words." Id. at 1314.
That is the case here. On its face, the '106 claims are explicitly for a marker device that is to be used for x-rays of "problematic deep structures of the foot," with tape that can be attached to the "skin of the foot," where the size of the marker is related to "cutaneous landmarks of podiatric pathologies." These statements of the claims use commonly understood words with widely accepted meaning. They do not cover mammography.
But Solstice says that this conclusion places too much weight on the use that the inventor envisioned for the apparatus and on the claims' preamble (the portion of the
Solstice says that for the '106 patent, the reference to "problematic deep structures of the foot" does not recite "essential structure or steps," or "give life, meaning or vitality to the claim." According to Solstice, the reference states only a "purpose or intended use for the invention." The invention, says Solstice, is an x-ray identification marker, as the patent title states; use in podiatry is merely one possible use. Pls.' Mot. for Claim Construction at 10-11 (Docket Item 56). Solstice also points to Catalina's language that where the patent is for an apparatus, as here, "preambles describing the use of an invention generally do not limit the claims because the patentability of apparatus . . . claims depends on the claimed structure, not on the use or purpose of that structure." Catalina, 289 F.3d at 809.
Catalina also says, however, that "statements of intended use or asserted benefits in the preamble may, in rare instances, limit apparatus claims, but only if the applicant clearly and unmistakably relied on those uses or benefits to distinguish prior art." Id. According to Catalina, "clear reliance on the preamble during prosecution to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art transforms the preamble into a claim limitation." Id. at 808 (speaking of patent claims generally, not just apparatus claims); accord Bass Pro Trademarks, LLC v. Cabela's, Inc., 485 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed.Cir.2007).
Under "Description of the Prior Art," the initial 1990 application for the '106 patent discussed in detail the difficulties of x-rays for podiatrists, and the need to relate things like palpable masses and cutaneous lesions to underlying deep structure problems in the foot. It then discussed particular patents already in
The examiner rejected the claims in March of 1991 due to, among other reasons, the Williams prior art. Patent Application Serial No. 07573897 at Bates Nos. 53-55 (Docket Item 79) attached as Ex. B Part 2 to Regan Aff. In responding to the rejection, the inventor stated that "the purpose of his invention is to provide an x-ray examination device to be used by podiatrists [emphasis in original] in the evaluation of problematic deep structures of the foot. The amended language of the two independent claims clearly describes a device which achieves this goal."
The examiner rejected the application again in September 1991 for, among other reasons, additional prior art (Michelson). Id. at Bates Nos. 73-74. In a December 1991 response, the applicant "respectfully submits that his marker device is completely distinct from the marker disclosed by Michelson in that it is specifically [emphasis in original] directed to podiatric pathologies only [emphasis added] and it overcomes the problems of prior art marker devices in that it highlights rather than obscures the area of interest with the radiopaque material." Amendment Request for Reconsideration at 5 (Docket Item 78-1) attached as Ex. C to Regan Aff. Here again, the applicant relied on podiatric use to distinguish the prior art and narrow the scope of his invention. The patent examiner considered this amendment, but still did not allow the application. Advisory Action of January 6, 1992 at Bates No. 88 attached as Ex. B Part 3 (Docket Item 80) to Regan Aff.
Id. at Bates No. 171. Solstice challenged the size limitation that the examiner imposed.
The public record of the prosecution history, therefore—the "official record that is created in the knowledge that its audience is not only the patent examining officials and the applicant, but the interested public"
I also consider the specification. The Federal Circuit instructs that "claims `must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part'" because claims "are part of `a fully integrated written instrument.'" Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979, 978 (Fed.Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996)). Here, the specification refers repeatedly to the foot, podiatrists, podiatry, toes, standing, and plantar abnormalities, never to any other parts of the body. As a result, it does not alter my conclusion that the preamble language along with the prosecution history creates a claim limitation for foot-related uses.
Because Beekley sells its markers only for mammography, not for foot x-rays, there is no infringement as I construe the patent's claims.
Solstice extended its focus from podiatry into the mammography marker market in 2008 with its Solstice scar markers. Solstice Corp. Annual Sales Jan. 1996-Dec. 2009 (Docket Item 161-4) attached as Ex. 20 to Swift Aff. Beekley has counterclaimed that the Solstice scar markers infringe claims 21, 23, 24 and 28 of Beekley's U.S. Patent No. 36,461 for a "Radiology Marker System and Dispenser." U.S. Patent No. 36,461 (the '461 patent) (Docket Item No. 110-10) (Third Counterclaim). Solstice asks for summary judgment that the scar markers do not infringe.
Claim 21 of the '461 patent, the claim in question,
Id. at col. 5 ll. 48-58. Solstice asks me to construe the terms "wire" and "covering" before rendering summary judgment, and Beekley adds "tape." Def.'s Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. For Summ. J. at 6 (Docket Item 153). All are "commonly understood words" under Phillips. I have already found in the '106 patent that the widely accepted meaning of the term "tape" is a narrow flexible strip or band. That construction of "tape" is equally applicable to the '461 patent. The widely accepted meaning of "wire" is a solid thin thread or rod made of metal,
The Solstice scar markers do not contain a wire as such. Instead, currently they have a series of markings formed from a radiopaque ink. A very fine metal powder (calcium carbonate or metal particles, Statement of Material Facts ("S.M.F.") ¶¶ 30-31 (Docket Item 110-1)),
The current dashed markings are not a "wire." This component of the accused product is not a solid metal form in the shape of a thin bendable thread or rod. The previous extruded compound, although continuous, was also not a wire. It was not made of metal. Moreover, both versions of the Solstice scar markers lack a covering; no covering is applied to the dashed marking or the extruded compound. S.M.F. ¶¶ 30, 31. (Beekley denies this assertion on the basis that the meaning of "covering" is a question of law. However, it admits that its Rule 30(b)(6) deponent could not identify a cover on the current version. Def.'s Statement of Additional Facts ("S.A.F.") ¶ 30. (Docket Item 154).)
Beekley's technical expert, Dr. Cronin, declares that Solstice's scar markers include a component that is "wirelike." S.M.F. ¶ 96. He also asserts that the radiopaque ink (in the case of Solstice's current product) or the extruded compound (in the case of Solstice's prior product) constitutes a covering. Id. I will consider those assertions under the Doctrine of Equivalents analysis. But as for literal infringement, I conclude that the Solstice scar markers lack a wire, or a covering thereon, and cannot satisfy the wire-and-covering limitation of the claims of the '461 patent.
If there is no literal infringement, infringement can nevertheless occur under the doctrine of equivalents if "the accused product contain[s] each limitation of the claim or its equivalent." Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Arrow Commc'n Labs., Inc., 305 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed.Cir.2002); Riles v. Shell Exploration and Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302,
Beekley argues that there is a jury question whether the Solstice scar markers infringe its '461 patent under the doctrine of equivalents, because the Solstice scar markers perform substantially the same function, in substantially the same way, to achieve substantially the same result, as each limitation of claim 21. Def.'s Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. For Summ. J. at 10. Solstice disagrees. The issue once again is the wire-and-covering. Beekley says that the ink or the extruded compound in Solstice's radiopaque markers amounts to both the bendable wire and the covering. Solstice responds that this locution vitiates either the "wire" or the "covering" limitation, because if the ink or rubber-like compound is the "wire," then the Solstice products do not meet the "covering" limitation, and if the ink or rubber-like compound is the covering, then there is no "wire." See Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1160 (Fed.Cir.1998) ("If a theory of equivalence would vitiate a claim limitation, . . . then there can be no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents as a matter of law."); Cooper Cameron Corp. v. Kvaerner Oilfield Prods., Inc., 291 F.3d 1317, 1321-22 (Fed.Cir.2002). Thus, Solstice argues that Beekley cannot satisfy the "all-limitations rule" and that the Solstice markers escape infringement because they are missing one of the '461 patent's claim limitations.
There is, however, an important qualification to the all-limitations rule. According to the Federal Circuit:
Eagle Comtronics, Inc., 305 F.3d at 1317 (emphasis added).
I conclude that Beekley has submitted enough to avoid summary judgment on this issue. As set forth in the '461 patent and in the report of Beekley's expert Dr. Cronin, a radiologist who regularly
Beekley asserts that the Solstice markers perform substantially the same functions, in substantially the same way, to achieve substantially the same result, by using a "wirelike component." S.A.F. ¶ 33. The "wirelike component" of the Solstice markers, it says, includes a material that is opaque to imaging radiation and therefore forms a thin line on the radiograph. S.A.F. ¶ 34. The "wirelike component" is flexible, allowing the marker to be manually bent to follow a scar or other desired line or feature on the subject's skin, just as Beekley's covered wire can be bent. S.A.F. ¶ 33. In both the first and second Solstice scar markers, the viscoelastic polymer or ink covers or coats the material that is opaque to imaging radiation. Expert Rpt. of Edward Cronin ¶ 46 (Docket Item 110-9) attached as Ex. H to Pls.' Mot. For Summ. J.
Finally, Solstice argues that applying the doctrine of equivalents to its use of radiopaque ink "would be an impermissible encompassing of the prior art" because an earlier Duska patent already disclosed a series of radiopaque markings in a dashed line of ink or paint on a tape. Pls.' Mot. For Summ. J. at 20. It is true that "a patentee should not be able to obtain, under the doctrine of equivalents, coverage which he could not lawfully have obtained from the PTO by literal claims," and that just as "prior art always limits what an inventor could have claimed, it limits the range of permissible equivalents of a claim." Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed.Cir.1990), overruled on other grounds by Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 113 S.Ct. 1967, 124 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993). But the focus is on the invention as a whole, not the individual limitations: "Nothing is taken from the `public domain' when the issue of equivalency is directed to a limitation only, in contrast to the entirety of the claimed invention." Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1261 (Fed.Cir.1989). Indeed, "[a] claim to a mechanical device usually recites a combination of several elements, most or all of which may be separately known. That an element of an accused device already existed does not bar equivalency as to that element." Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Mfg. Co., 221 F.3d 1318, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2000) (emphasis added). That is the case here. The Duska prior art of radiopaque ink is not alone enough to avoid application of the doctrine of equivalents.
Beekley has made federal false patent marking, false advertising and trademark infringement claims, and state deceptive practices claims in its counterclaims against Solstice. I conclude that only one of them survives summary judgment, and only barely. I deal with it first.
In its Fourth Counterclaim, Beekley alleges that, through its advertising, Solstice falsely marked its mammography scar markers as patented under the Solstice '106 patent, a violation of 35 U.S.C. § 292. Am. Answer and Countercls. ¶¶ 22-26 (Docket Item 42).
Solstice admits that the '106 patent does not cover its scar markers. DeSena Dep. at 176, Nov. 6, 2009 (Docket Item 155-2) attached as Ex. 2 to Swift Aff. But for some time, the Solstice webpage advertising scar markers contained a reference to "U.S. Patent #5,193,106" near an image of and information about the Solstice scar marker. Solstice Scar Marker internet webpage dated Oct. 5, 2009 (Docket Item 110-16) attached as Ex. O to Pls.' Statement of Undisputed Facts. After Beekley filed its counterclaim alleging that the Solstice website misstated that the mammography scar marker was covered by the '106 patent, Solstice removed that reference from its website on October 6, 2009. Id. dated Oct. 6, 2009.
A Solstice employee produced the Solstice website under inventor DeSena's direction. DeSena testified that he was responsible for the content of the website and reviewed the website content. DeSena Dep. at 175-77. DeSena tasked the assigned employee with placing the '106 patent number on the webpages of mammography mole and lesion markers,
"A party asserting false marking must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused party did not have a reasonable belief that the articles were properly marked." Forest Group, 590 F.3d at 1300 (citing Clontech Labs. Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1352-53 (Fed.Cir.2005)). Solstice concedes that element. It is undisputed that the Solstice scar markers were falsely marked as subject to patent on the webpage and that there was no basis for so marking them.
I conclude that the remaining question—whether Solstice or DeSena intended to deceive—is a question of fact for the factfinder. Intent to deceive is a state of mind where a party makes a misrepresentation with knowledge of its falsity. Clontech Labs., 406 F.3d at 1352. It arises when "a party acts with sufficient knowledge that what it is saying is not so and consequently that the recipient of its saying will be misled into thinking that the statement is true." Id. (quoting Seven Cases of Eckman's Alterative v. United States, 239 U.S. 510, 517-18, 36 S.Ct. 190, 60 L.Ed. 411 (1916)). "Intent to deceive. . . is established in law by objective criteria." Id. Thus, "`the fact of misrepresentation coupled with proof that the party making it had knowledge of its falsity is enough to warrant drawing the inference that there was a fraudulent intent.'" Id. (quoting Norton v. Curtiss, 57 C.C.P.A. 1384, 433 F.2d 779, 795-96 (Cust. & Pat. App.1970)). Here, a factfinder might believe DeSena's explanation of innocent mistake. Or it might not. Accordingly, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Solstice falsely marked its mammography scar markers with the '106 patent number with the intent to deceive the public. (I am assuming without deciding that liability is a jury issue; the penalty, on the other hand, appears to be a decision for the judge according to the Federal Circuit. Forest Group, 590 F.3d at 1304.)
I do wonder whether this claim is worth Beekley's effort. Under the statute, the penalty for a violation is a "fine" of "not more than $500," and half of any recovery Beekley obtains goes to the United States Treasury. See 35 U.S.C. § 292(b). Whether the alleged false marking, if proved, would permit Beekley to recover for more than a single act of false marking is unclear. Although I have not found any modern cases dealing with fines for false marking in connection with website advertising, the Federal Circuit has recently held that the false marking statute requires courts to impose penalties for false marking on a per article basis. Forest Group, 590 F.3d at 1301. It is difficult to apply the "per article" rule to website advertising where as here no individual article is marked falsely. The previous precedent was London v. Everett H. Dunbar Corp., 179 F. 506, 508 (1st Cir.1910) and it allowed only a single fine for the decision to mark falsely. But Forest Group observed that both the statutory language and the underlying policy rationale have changed since London. It also disapproved "time-based" approaches (per day, per week, per month) that trial courts had been using, 590 F.3d at 1302, insisting instead on its per article standard. Under Forest Group, a district court has wide discretion: "By allowing a range of penalties, the statute provides district courts the discretion to strike a balance between encouraging enforcement of an important public policy and imposing disproportionately large penalties for small, inexpensive items produced in large quantities. In the case of inexpensive mass-produced articles, a court has the discretion to determine
In its Sixth Counterclaim, Beekley alleges that Solstice engaged in false advertising in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) by distributing false and/or misleading statements "that Solstice mammography markers are comparable to Beekley's mammography markers." Am. Answer and Countercls. ¶ 37.
Discovery and the summary judgment papers have limited the dispute to four advertisements: the "Solstice Price Challenge" on the Solstice website advertisement (Docket Item 157-1) attached as Ex. 7 to Swift Aff.; the "Five products, one low price. Inventory made simple!," print advertisement (Docket Item 157-2) attached as Ex. 8 to Swift Aff.; the "Xact™ mammography markers-Five premium products, one low price! Inventory made simple!," print advertisement (Docket Item 157-3) attached as Ex. 9 to Swift Aff.; and a Solstice March 12, 2007 "Company Profile" distribution to "Xact® Imaging Marker Distributors," company profile (Docket Item 157-4) attached as Ex. 10 to Swift Aff. There are four
In fact, the materials in question do not make the statements Beekley describes; the characterizations are Beekley's view of how consumers would read the advertising. On the Solstice Price Challenge website, a consumer is invited to choose a manufacturer and its product, then the website calculates comparative pricing between that manufacturer (such as Beekley) and a Solstice product. The second advertisement lists Solstice markers in juxtaposition
"`Puffery' is exaggerated advertising or unspecified boasting, characterized by vague and subjective statements, upon which no reasonable buyer would rely." Butcher Co., Inc. v. Bouthot, 2001 WL 263313, at *1 (D.Me. March 16, 2001) (citing Clorox Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Commercial Co., 228 F.3d 24, 38-39 (1st Cir.2000) and 4 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 27:38). Puffery is not actionable. On the other hand, a claim that "is specific and measurable" is actionable. Clorox, 228 F.3d at 38. In Butcher, I ruled that statements there that products were "comparable" were "vague and subjective, not specific and measurable, and . . . therefore not actionable." Butcher, 2001 WL 263313, at *1. In 2001, I quoted a dictionary definition of "comparable" as meaning "capable of or suitable for comparison" and "similar," "like <fabrics of [comparable] quality>." Id. The same definition appears on Merriam-Webster's current online dictionary. I conclude once again that it is puffery to say that a competitor's products are "comparable."
It is true that earlier I denied Solstice's motion to dismiss this counterclaim for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). My reason was that in the absence of a factual record, I would not rule as a matter of law that a claim that a product was "comparable" to another product must always be puffery.
But now the facts have been developed, and it is apparent that Solstice's statements about comparability, express or implied, are not specific and measurable. Beekley provides substantial argument about differences between these two competitors' products, and why Beekley products are superior in a variety of ways. If accurate, they should be effective in persuading hospitals and medical practitioners to purchase Beekley products in place of Solstice products. But they do not show that Solstice's express or implied statements as a competitor that its products are "comparable" are anything more than puffery—vague and subjective statements, upon which no reasonable buyer would rely. Instead, Beekley's interpretation of how the word comparable can be used would essentially remove it from competitors' advertising vocabulary.
And if the statements and their implications of comparability are not puffery, I conclude that no reasonable jury could find that they are literally false. Without proof of literal falsity, Beekley must provide evidence of likely consumer deception. Cashmere & Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst. v. Saks Fifth Ave., 284 F.3d 302, 311 (1st Cir.2002). Consumer deception is established when the advertisement "conveys a misleading message to the viewing public." Clorox, 228 F.3d at 33 (citing Sandoz Pharms. Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 222, 228-29 (3d Cir.1990)).
Solstice sells a two-tone
Id.
"To succeed on a claim of trademark infringement, a plaintiff must establish (1) that its mark is entitled to trademark protection, and (2) that the allegedly infringing use is likely to cause consumer confusion." Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.2008). Solstice moves for summary judgment on Beekley's trademark infringement claim. Solstice asserts that (1) Beekley cannot trademark the color pink, and (2) Beekley cannot establish a likelihood of confusion.
On the first requirement, it is well established that colors can be entitled to trademark protection. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 166, 115 S.Ct. 1300, 131 L.Ed.2d 248 (1995) (finding color can meet requirements for trademark when it serves no function other than to distinguish a firm's goods and identify their source). But this protection is subject to eight defects or defenses enumerated in 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) and a separate defect of genericism, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3). With respect to Beekley's trademark claim of the color pink, Solstice asserts functionality and genericism (Solstice says that the mark is "debilitatingly weak" or "essentially . . . generic") as objections to protectability. Pls.' Mot. For Summ. J. at 32, 33.
The functionality defense prevents manufacturers from monopolizing useful product features under the guise of trademark law. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164-65, 115 S.Ct. 1300. A product feature is functional and cannot serve as a trademark "if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article." Id. at 165, 115 S.Ct. 1300 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850, n. 10, 102 S.Ct. 2182, 72 L.Ed.2d 606 (1982)). In cases of aesthetic functionality, courts consider whether "exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage." TrafFix Devices Inc. v. Marketing Displays Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32, 121 S.Ct. 1255, 149 L.Ed.2d 164 (2001) (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165, 115 S.Ct. 1300). However, the feature need not be a competitive necessity. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32-33, 121 S.Ct. 1255.
Solstice asserts that the color pink is functional and thus not entitled to trademark protection. Beekley's pink skin markers, Solstice contends, serve "the utilitarian purpose of blending well with the natural color of human skin." Pls.' Mot. For Summ. J. at 33. Although skin markers need not blend with skin to perform all their utilitarian functions, Solstice claims that discreetly colored medical products serve a function that more colorful ones do not. To support this argument Solstice relies on In re Ferris Corp., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587, 1588 (Oct. 6, 2000), where a trademark application was filed to register the color pink for, inter alia, "surgical and post-surgical wound dressings." In Ferris, the Examining Attorney, comparing surgical wound dressings to adhesive
I cannot conclude on the summary judgment that Beekley's mark is functional. Blending mammography markers with patients' skin has not been a goal or consideration in Beekley's design. S.A.F. ¶ 97. In fact, the color pink is not visible on a mammogram and plays no role in the functioning of the marker. S.A.F. ¶ 100. Unlike the pink bandages in Ferris, imaging markers are applied only temporarily to the skin of a breast during a mammogram. S.A.F. ¶ 98. Dr. DeSena states in a conclusory manner that "the fact that [the color pink marker] blends in with the skin color is perhaps comforting to the patient." DeSena Dep. at 73-74; S.M.F ¶ 44. But there is no showing that Beekley's color pink markers blend with any skin color.
Further, there is no evidence in the record that any of Beekley's competitors use the color pink for blending purposes. To the contrary, the evidence shows that competitors do not use the color pink, or any other color, for the purpose of blending mammography markers with the skin. S.A.F. ¶ 99.
The presumption of federal trademark validity may be overcome if a challenger proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a mark has become generic. Colt Defense LLC v. Bushmaster Firearms, Inc., 486 F.3d 701, 705 (1st Cir. 2007). When, in the public's mind, a trademark stops identifying the particular source of a product and instead identifies a class of product or service, regardless of source, that mark has become generic and is lost as an enforceable trademark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3). Solstice asserts that the color pink has become a generic indicator for goods or services in the field of breast cancer research, awareness, detection, and treatment. The color pink, Solstice claims, is pervasive among goods and services associated with breast cancer or women's health issues. On this record, I find that Solstice does not present sufficient evidence to establish that a jury would have to find that the color pink has become generic.
In order to establish that pink has become generic, Solstice must (1) identify the class of products to which it applies; (2) identify the relevant purchasing public; and (3) prove that the primary significance of pink to the relevant public is to identify the class of products to which it applies Colt Defense LLC v. Bushmaster Firearms, Inc., 2005 WL 2293909, at *20 (D.Me.2005) (quoting Glover v. Ampak, Inc., 74 F.3d 57, 59 (4th Cir.1996)). To become generic, pink's primary significance must be its indication of the nature or class of the product or service, rather than an indication of source. See Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir.2007); Creative Gifts, Inc. v. UFO, 235 F.3d 540, 544 (10th Cir.2000);
Although Solstice asserts that the class of products here is goods and services whose purchase will either support a breast-cancer-related non-profit organization or be used in connection with breast cancer detection or treatment, the relevant class of goods and services is identified in the mark's certificate of registration. See Magic Wand, Inc. v. RDB, Inc., 940 F.2d 638, 640 (Fed.Cir.1991) (citing Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston Computer Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed.Cir.1990)). Here, that is "identification markers placed on the skin for use in medical imaging." The Color Pink Trademark Reg. No. 2,708,429. Thus, in order to prove that pink has become generic, Solstice must establish that the primary significance of the color pink, when applied to mammography-related identification markers for skin, is to identify that class of products, rather than Beekley as a source. Solstice alleges that "the color pink has essentially become a generic indicator" because "many companies own trademarks that use the color pink or the word `pink' to identify goods or services concerning breast cancer specifically or female health issues generally." Pls. Mot. for Summ. J. at 25-26. Although Solstice offers examples of many uses of pink in connection with breast cancer treatment, prevention and related activities, Solstice has offered no evidence that consumers have come to view pink as a generic indicator that goods or services marked with that color are related to those activities, or that imaging markers of that color would be seen as necessarily mammography-related.
Solstice has not presented evidence that would require a jury to find that pink has become a generic mark with respect to breast treatment activities.
Because a jury could find Beekley's trademark of pink a protectable trademark, I turn to the second requirement, likelihood of confusion, an essential element of trademark infringement. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1); Boston Duck Tours, 531 F.3d at 12 (under § 1114(1)); Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1209 (1st Cir. 1983) (under § 1125(a)). Likelihood of confusion means "more than a theoretical possibility of confusion." Boston Duck Tours, 531 F.3d at 12 (quoting Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr.,
In the First Circuit, likelihood of confusion is assessed by considering eight factors set out in Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 487 (1st Cir.1981): "[1] the similarity of the marks; [2] the similarity of the goods; [3] the relationship between the parties' channels of trade; [4] the relationship between the parties' advertising; [5] the classes of prospective purchasers; [6] evidence of actual confusion; [7] the defendant's intent in adopting its mark; and [8] the strength of the plaintiff's mark." But in the final analysis, the issue is likelihood of confusion. No single factor is determinative. Astra, 718 F.2d at 1205. In addition, "any other factor that has a tendency to influence the impression conveyed to prospective purchasers by the allegedly infringing conduct may be weighed by the judge or jury in gauging the likelihood of confusion." Winship Green, 103 F.3d at 201.
I proceed to analyze the eight enumerated factors. This is a factual inquiry, but "summary judgment is appropriate if, taking the facts before the court and all reasonable inferences therefrom most favorably to [the mark's owner], no reasonable jury could find [in its favor]." CMM Cable Rep., Inc. v. Ocean Coast Properties, Inc., 888 F.Supp. 192 (D.Me.1995) (citing Astra, 718 F.2d at 1204-09 (1st Cir.1983)); see also Xtreme Lashes, LLC v. Xtended Beauty, Inc., 576 F.3d 221, 227 (5th Cir. 2009).
When comparing marks, "similarity is determined on the basis of the total effect of the designation, rather than a comparison of individual features." Boston Duck Tours, 531 F.3d at 29 (quoting Pignons, 657 F.2d at 487); Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed.Cir. 2000). The degree of similarity between two marks is determined by analyzing their sight, sound, and meaning. Id. at 24. Under certain circumstances, otherwise "similar marks are not likely to be confused if they are used in conjunction with clearly displayed names, logos or other source-identifying designations of the manufacturer." Winship Green, 103 F.3d at 204; Astra, 718 F.2d at 1205.
The trademark of Beekley's '429 registration "consists of the color pink applied to the front face of a pressure-sensitive adhesive backing used for attaching the marker to a patient's skin and forming a part of the goods. . . ." The Color Pink Trademark Reg. No. 2,708,429. The particular pink color is not specified. The mark has no particular shape. Id. Thus, it is somewhat difficult to "compare the marks." The record does contain a number of Beekley product samples that contain the color pink to a greater or lesser degree.
In 2005, Solstice introduced the M15S nipple marker. S.M.F. ¶ 42. Solstice's M15S marker bears a two-tone pink color
A reasonable jury would have to find that the total effect of the appearance of Solstice's M15S marker is very different from any Beekley use of pink that is in the record. Moreover, the pink portion of Solstice's two-tone, generally rectangular, M15S prominently displays Solstice's own trademark, Xact®. S.M.F. ¶ 43; see Winship Green, 103 F.3d at 204; Astra, 718 F.2d at 1205. The marks are not similar. Confusion is unlikely.
The goods in question here are very similar; both parties are selling skin identification markers that are placed on the skin of the breast for a mammography examination. This cuts in favor of likelihood of confusion.
The parties agree that they are direct competitors and that their channels of trade, advertising, and prospective purchasers for the products at issue overlap. Pls.' Mot. For Summ. J. at 9, 30; see also S.A.F. ¶ 116. Skin imaging marker customers and prospective customers are hospitals and imaging centers. S.M.F. ¶ 62. An initial decision to purchase skin markers typically involves multiple phone calls, product sampling, and feedback from technicians and radiologists. S.M.F. ¶¶ 47, 63-64. Thus, although there is a high degree of correlation between the parties' channels of trade and prospective purchasers, the sophisticated nature of skin marker purchasers coupled with the practice of sampling and testing the skin markers prior to making an initial purchasing decision, makes confusion unlikely. Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co. Ltd., 412 F.3d 373, 390 (2d Cir.2005) ("The appropriate level of customer care and sophistication can be proven by inferences drawn by a judge based on the nature of the product or its price.").
Solstice has sold its M15S markers since 2005. Yet Beekley agrees that it has no evidence of any customer actually being confused. (It states that because of the number of M15S markers sold by Solstice, "there has been little chance for actual confusion." Def.'s Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. For Summ. J. at 27.) Although not essential to finding likelihood of confusion, evidence of actual confusion is "often deemed the best evidence of possible future confusion." Boston Duck Tours, 531 F.3d at 25 (quoting Attrezzi, LLC v. Maytag Corp., 436 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir.2006)). In Pignons the court held that absent evidence of actual confusion, "when the marks have been in the same market, side by side, for a substantial period of time, there is a strong presumption that there is little likelihood of confusion." Pignons, 657 F.2d at 490. Thus, in the absence of evidence of actual confusion, there is a "strong presumption" in favor of Solstice that confusion is unlikely.
Solstice contends that it had no wrongful intent when it began selling the M15S marker. Solstice explains that its skin markers are marketed in a variety of colors to differentiate part numbers, e.g., "the smaller BB versus the larger BB." S.M.F. ¶ 41. Before marketing the M15S marker, Solstice states that there was no formal evaluation of the color pink; rather, Dr. DeSena thought it was "a good color for a mammography marker" because, for example, the color pink is "very prevalent" in
But Beekley asserts that Solstice copied its mammography marker when it designed its M15S marker. In May 1999, Solstice purchased two boxes of mammography "nipple" markers from Beekley. S.A.F. ¶ 118. One box (order code 110) contained Beekley's N-Spot markers, and the other box (order code 101) contained Beekley's X-Spot markers. S.A.F. ¶ 118. The first box of markers used Beekley's pink color for which registration issued in April 2003; the other box of markers included Beekley's X-Spot Mark and the markers were colored blue. S.A.F. ¶ 118. When Solstice entered the mammography marker field several years later, it introduced the M15S with the two-toned pink color. Beekley argues that this evidence supports a finding that Solstice copied the color pink trademark from the markers it purchased from Beekley.
I conclude that there are issues of fact as to what Solstice's intent was when introducing the M15S marker. On this summary judgment motion, I will assume that the jury would find this factor favorably to Beekley.
The "strength" of a mark denotes the mark's placement on the spectrum of distinctiveness. It ranges from "descriptive" of the product at issue (relatively weak) to "arbitrary" (relatively strong). McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition at § 11:83. Strength is an issue of fact. Equine Techs., Inc. v. Equitechnology, Inc., 68 F.3d 542, 544, n. 2 (1st Cir. 1995). "Various factors are relevant in ascertaining the strength of a trademark, including the length of time the mark has been used, the trademark holder's renown in the industry, the potency of the mark in the product field (as measured by the number of similar registered marks), and the trademark holder's efforts to promote and protect the mark." Borinquen Biscuit Corp., 443 F.3d at 121 (internal citations omitted); see also Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 21, cmt. i (1995) ("[s]uch classifications [of a term on the spectrum of distinctiveness] are not conclusive of `strength,' however, since the issue ultimately depends on the degree to which the designation is associated by prospective purchasers with a particular source").
Beekley is the market leader in mammography skin markers. S.A.F. ¶ 47.
On this record, Beekley's pink is at neither the descriptive nor the arbitrary end of the distinctiveness scale. I conclude that a factfinder could not find pink to be either a strong or a weak mark.
In sum, the marks are not similar, Beekley's mark is not strong, the purchasers are sophisticated, they engage in careful scrutiny and testing before their initial purchase, and there is no evidence of confusion. All these factors demonstrate that the likelihood of confusion is nil. The arguably contrary factors—that Solstice may have had a bad motive, that the mark is not weak, and that the parties are competing in the same channels with similar products for sale—are not enough to create a factual issue over likelihood of confusion. Solstice is entitled to summary judgment that its M15S does not infringe Beekley's mark.
Beekley's Seventh Counterclaim alleges that Solstice has violated the Maine Deceptive Trade Practices Act by falsely advertising on its website that its mammography scar markers are covered by the '106 patent and by selling markers that use Beekley's trademarked color pink, which will confuse the relevant public. See 10 M.R.S.A. § 1213. Because of my ruling on the trademark infringement counterclaim based on the color pink mark, see supra Section C on trademark infringement, only the false patent marking claim remains.
In that connection, the Federal Circuit has held that a false patent marking claim can proceed under state unfair competition law if, but only if, the claim alleges bad faith
However, I conclude that Beekley's UDTPA claim cannot survive because there is no case or controversy. The UDTPA is limited to equitable relief; no damages can be awarded. See 10 M.R.S.A. § 1213; J.S. McCarthy Co., Inc. v. Brausse Diecutting & Converting, 340 F.Supp.2d 54 (D.Me.2004). Here, the record shows that DeSena removed the offending website reference approximately one month after the counterclaim was filed. Compare Answer and Countercls. (Docket Item 15) filed on Sept. 3, 2009 with Solstice Scar Marker internet webpage dated Oct. 6, 2009 (Docket Item 110-16) attached as Ex. O to Pls.' Statement of
Solstice's motion to exclude the testimony of Beekley's Martha Flannery is
Solstice's motion to exclude the testimony of Beekley's Olga Glynos is
Both experts are qualified to give the testimony they propose to offer. The role of counsel in preparing their reports is not enough to exclude their testimony, but can certainly be used in cross-examination. The experts' testimony may not be sufficient on the damage issues, but it is relevant.
The defendant's motion for summary judgment on the complaint is
What remains for trial are:
1. Infringement of the '461 patent by the doctrine of equivalents.
2. False patent marking of the '106 patent on Solstice's website under 35 U.S.C. § 292.
Id. (emphasis added).
In plain language a "marker device" means a device for marking used in x-ray examination.
The plain language meaning of "tape" is a narrow flexible strip or band. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary at 2339 (2002) ("narrow strip of cloth"). Although tape can have adhesive applied to one or both sides, that characteristic is not integral to tape.
"Perforations" are a series of holes that facilitate tearing or separation, and a "plurality of sets of perforations incorporated into said tape" means two or more sets of holes incorporated into the tape to facilitate separation of individual segments of the tape. '106 patent at col. 6 ll. 39-40.
"Radiopaque" means "being opaque to X rays or other forms of radiation." Webster's Third New International Dictionary at 1873. "Opaque" means "impervious to the rays of visible light: not transparent or translucent," or "impervious to forms of radiant energy other than visible light." Id. at 1579. Solstice says that radiopaque can nevertheless mean partially translucent on a radiograph or x-ray because there are degrees of radiopacity. If Solstice had meant to teach a partially radiopaque material, it could and should have said so in the patent.
With respect to the allegations that Solstice displays on its website a radiographic image of a see-through mole marker when in fact it does not sell such a marker, Beekley raised this issue for the first time in the affidavit of Martha Flannery and its supplemental response to interrogatory 10 filed with Beekley's opposition to Solstice's motion for summary judgment. See Flannery Aff. (Apr. 16, 2010) ¶ 40 (Docket Item 165) and Def.'s First Supplemental Objections and Responses to Pls.' First Set of Interrogs. (No. 10) at 3-5 (Docket Item 164-1) attached as Ex. 31 to Swift Aff. This disclosure after the close of discovery and after Solstice filed its motion for summary judgment is untimely. Beekley was specifically asked in interrogatory 23 to state the factual basis for the false advertising claim and its response did not mention the presence of a see-through marker. See Def.'s Second Am. Objection and Responses to Pls.' Second Set of Interrogs. (Nos. 12-26) at 11-13 (Docket Item 110-25) attached as Ex. X to Pls.' Mot. for Summ. J. I do not consider it.
Beekley's untimely attempt to amend its counterclaims via supplemental interrogatory responses served after the close of discovery violates Rule 15 and this Court's Scheduling Order regarding discovery. Scheduling Order at 2 (Docket Item 18). See Net 2 Press, Inc. v. 58 Dix Avenue Corp., 266 F.Supp.2d 146, 161 (D.Me.2003) (supplemental interrogatory responses "should not be allowed after the filing of dispositive motions and on the eve of trial in the absence of extraordinary circumstances"). Beekley's additional claims are not properly part of the Maine UDTPA count.
