ORDER ON PHILIP MORRIS USA INC.' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ON PLAINTIFFS' UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIMS AND OTHER REQUESTS FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF

JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR., Chief Judge.

In this multi-district litigation, Philip Morris USA Inc. (PM) moves for judgment on the pleadings against the Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claims on the ground that unjust enrichment sounds in equity and the Plaintiffs have adequate remedies at law, and as regards the Mississippi claim, PM says it is entitled to judgment because the state of Mississippi does not recognize a stand-alone cause of action for unjust enrichment. The Court denies PM's primary motion because it is premature and its Mississippi motion because it is wrong.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

On March 29, 2010, Philip Morris (PM) moved for judgment on the pleadings on the Plaintiffs' claims for unjust enrichment and requests for restitution, disgorgement, and injunctions, contending that they are barred because the Plaintiffs have adequate remedies at law. PM's Mot. for J. on the Pleadings on Plaintiffs' Unjust Enrichment Claims and Other Requests for Equitable Relief (Docket # 185) (PM's Mot.).1 PM separately seeks judgment on the pleadings on Mirick, a Mississippi case that asserts a single count of unjust enrichment, arguing that Mississippi does not recognize unjust enrichment as an independent cause of action. Id. On May 3, 2010, the Plaintiffs' responded. Plaintiffs' Opp'n to PM's Mot. for J. on the Pleadings on Plaintiffs' Unjust Enrichment Claims and Other Requests for Equitable Relief (Docket # 205) (Pls.' Resp.). PM replied on June 17, 2010. PM's Reply in Support of Mot. for J. on the Pleadings on Plaintiffs' Unjust Enrichment Claims and Other Requests for Equitable Relief (Docket # 220) (PM's Reply). The Court held oral argument on July 21, 2010.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Judgment on the Pleadings

A party may move for judgment on the pleadings "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).2 "The standard for evaluating a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that for deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion." Pasdon v. City of Peabody, 417 F.3d 225, 226 (1st Cir.2005). Courts must accept "all of the nonmovant's well-pleaded factual averments as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor." Id. (quoting Rivera-Gomez v. de Castro, 843 F.2d 631, 635 (1st Cir.1988)). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).

B. Unjust Enrichment, Restitution, Disgorgement, and Injunctions

1. The Parties' Positions

a. PM

PM makes a three-part argument for why the Plaintiffs can neither assert unjust enrichment claims nor seek restitution, disgorgement, and injunctive relief. PM's Reply at 1. First, PM argues that under the state law of the jurisdictions at issue, equitable claims and remedies are "barred where Plaintiffs have adequate remedies at law." PM's Mot. at 4-10 (citing cases from all 11 jurisdictions). PM contends this limitation on equitable relief is necessary to "prevent the circumvention of an applicable legal claim through the use of a more general unjust enrichment claim." Id. (quoting Wahlcometroflex, Inc. v. Baldwin, 2010 ME 26, ¶ 21, 991 A.2d 44).

Second, PM contends this bar applies to the Plaintiffs because their "own pleadings reflect that they have adequate remedies at law." Id. at 10 (pointing to the Plaintiffs' request for "both equitable relief and claims at law for damages under state consumer protection statutes"). At oral argument, PM pressed how the Plaintiffs had "not identified anything that makes the remedy [at law] incomplete." Tr. 23:9-10 (Docket # 231). Although the Plaintiffs have given "an amorphous statement that they didn't like recent Maine decisions [interpreting the Maine consumer protection statute]," PM contends that the adequacy of legal remedies turns on their existence, id. 23:7-9; mere lack of success is not "a basis for equitable intervention." PM's Mot. at 10 (quoting Zeigler v. Zeigler, 365 Pa.Super. 545, 530 A.2d 445, 448 (Pa.Super.Ct.1987)). Similarly, PM argues that the failure of some of the Plaintiffs to assert legal remedies does not render the remedies inadequate, only unasserted: for the three cases that assert only unjust enrichment, PM says the Court must assess the adequacy of the legal remedies the Plaintiffs could have brought. Id. at 11.

Third, PM argues that under state law, the Plaintiffs' claims for relief "are considered equitable." PM's Reply at 5 n.6 (citing cases that "confirm that unjust enrichment claims are considered equitable under the relevant state laws"). PM contends that federal, not state law governs because whether a claimant may bring an unjust enrichment claim is a matter of substantive law. Id. at 3 (citing Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938) for proposition that federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law). Although acknowledging that Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 83 S.Ct. 609, 9 L.Ed.2d 691 (1963) held that federal law determines whether an action is legal or equitable for purposes of deciding jury trial rights, PM argues that this exception is limited to the Seventh Amendment context. Id. (stating that Simler is only applicable when deciding "whether a right to jury trial is indicated") (quoting Simler, 372 U.S. at 222, 83 S.Ct. 609) (emphasis added by PM). PM states that the United States District Court erred in Dastgheib v. Genentech, Inc., 457 F.Supp.2d 536, 542 (E.D.Pa.2006) when it applied Simler to a motion to dismiss a claim of unjust enrichment. Id. at 4. Finally, PM rejects the Plaintiffs' argument that equitable remedies become legal in nature when authorized by state statute. Id. at 5. PM argues that not only have the Plaintiffs failed to support their theory with case law but cases "repeatedly describe these statutory remedies as `equitable."' Id. (citing, for example, Grisham v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc., 40 Cal.4th 623, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 735, 151 P.3d 1151, 1153 n. 2 (2007)).

In support of its conclusion, PM relies heavily on Curtis v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., No-27-CV-01-18042 (Minn.Dist.Ct. Dec. 4, 2009) (order granting motion for judgment on the pleadings), in which a state court granted a similar motion by PM and dismissed the smokers' claim for unjust enrichment. PM's Mot. at 3. As in Curtis, PM concludes that the "state laws at issue preclude equitable relief" because the "plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law." Id. at 4.

b. The Plaintiffs

The Plaintiffs disagree with PM's premise: that unjust enrichment claims and requests for restitution, disgorgement, and injunctive relief sound in equity, not at law. Pls.' Resp. at 3. Although recognizing that "the substantive dimension of the claim asserted finds its source in state law," the Plaintiffs contend that the characterization of the unjust enrichment claim as legal or equitable "must be made by recourse to federal law." Id. at 3 (quoting Simler, 372 U.S. at 222, 83 S.Ct. 609). The Plaintiffs apply the two-part test used by federal courts to determine if a claim is equitable or legal. Id. (citing Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry (Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers), 494 U.S. 558, 565, 110 S.Ct. 1339, 108 L.Ed.2d 519 (1990)). First, they compare the action at issue "to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the court of law and equity," id. (quoting Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, 494 U.S. at 565, 110 S.Ct. 1339), and conclude that their "unjust enrichment claims are most closely tied to the action of assumpsit, and sound in law." Id. at 4-5 (citing the analysis and conclusion from Dastgheib, 457 F.Supp.2d at 542). Second, the Plaintiffs "examine the remedy sought," id. at 3 (quoting Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, 494 U.S. at 565, 110 S.Ct. 1339), and determine that although restitution and disgorgement can be either equitable or legal, here they are legal because the money sought "cannot be traced directly to any one fund or property." Id. at 7. The Plaintiffs conclude that their "unjust enrichment claims sound at law" pursuant to federal law and they distinguish Curtis as based on Minnesota state law. Id. at 8.

Finally, the Plaintiffs argue that the traditionally equitable remedies of restitution, disgorgement, and injunctive relief become legal in nature when authorized by state statute. Id. at 8. Because "the relevant statutes at issue here" authorize these remedies, the Plaintiffs conclude that the Court should treat them as "legal in nature." Id. at 8-10 (citing statutory language from the New York, Illinois, and California consumer protection laws that authorize both legal and equitable remedies).

At oral argument, the Plaintiffs made three new arguments. First, the Plaintiffs argued that regardless of whether Simler applied, the states use the same analysis "when determining whether something is legal or equitable." Tr. 18:23-19:2.3 Although acknowledging that "many of the states refer[] to unjust enrichment as equitable," the Plaintiffs stated that this language "simply refers to the fact that unjust enrichment is found upon principles of fairness, which it is." Id. 19:6-12. Instead, the Plaintiffs urged the Court to follow the editorial comments in the draft version of the Restatement and hold that "unjust enrichment can sound at law, in equity, or both." Id. 19:12-15. Second, the Plaintiffs "dispute that there are adequate remedies at law." Id. 20:13-14. Giving Maine as an example, the Plaintiffs argued that their decision to seek only unjust enrichment and "not to proceed with the Maine Consumer Protection Act claim" proved that the Plaintiffs did not have an adequate remedy at law. Id. 20:16-21:3. Third, the Plaintiffs concluded that because Rule 8 and the First Circuit recognize "that plaintiffs may plead alternative theories of relief," id. 18:12-21 (citing Dopp v. HTP Corp., 947 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1991)), it is inappropriate to dismiss their unjust enrichment claims "at this point in time." Id. 24:20-23.4

2. Legal or Equitable

a. Unjust Enrichment

In a diversity case, the sufficiency of the unjust enrichment claims is a question of substantive law governed by the law of the forum state. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78, 58 S.Ct. 817 (holding that for federal courts sitting in diversity, state law governs substantive rules of state common law); Cabán Hernández v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir.2007) (describing how "a federal court sitting in diversity is bound to apply state substantive law"); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Keebler Co., No. 89 C 8405, 1990 WL 93324, at *1 (N.D.Ill. June 20, 1990) (stating that the sufficiency of plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim is an issue of state substantive law).5 Furthermore, under state law an "adequate remedy at law" is a defense to claims in equity.6

Acknowledging these principles, the Plaintiffs argue that "whether a claim sounds at law or in equity" is a question of federal law and applying federal law, that unjust enrichment is a legal, not equitable claim. Pls.' Resp. at 3 (citing Simler, 372 U.S. at 222, 83 S.Ct. 609). The Court does not agree, however, that Simler stands for the proposition that in the usual case federal law controls whether a claim sounds in equity or law. It is true the United States Supreme Court in Simler concluded that "the characterization of that state-created claim as legal or equitable for purposes of whether a right to jury trial is indicated must be made by recourse to federal law." Simler, 372 U.S. at 222, 83 S.Ct. 609. However, the Supreme Court was addressing whether federal courts sitting in diversity should use state or federal law to characterize a claim to decide "whether a claimant has a right to a jury trial." Id. at 221, 83 S.Ct. 609.7 Noting that "[t]he federal policy favoring jury trials is of historic and continuing strength," the Simler Court emphasized that "[o]nly through a holding that the jury trial right is to be determined according to federal law can the uniformity in its exercise which is demanded by the Seventh Amendment be achieved." Id. at 222, 83 S.Ct. 609. Thus, the Court restricted its holding to determining "whether a right to jury trial is indicated." Id. On its face, Simler appears limited to the Seventh Amendment context. See Arrowsmith v. United Press Intern., 320 F.2d 219, 230 (2d Cir.1963) (finding Simler inapplicable to service of process question because decision driven by the Seventh Amendment).

The Court recognizes that the district court in Dastgheib read Simler more broadly and applied the two-part federal test to determine whether a state claim for unjust enrichment sounded in equity or law. Dastgheib, 457 F.Supp.2d at 539. In Dastgheib, the defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim on the ground that it was equitable and he had an adequate remedy at law. Id. The federal district court, quoting Simler, acknowledged that state law governed the "substantive dimension of the claim" but stated that federal law determined "the characterization of that state-created claim as legal or equitable." Id. (quoting Simler, 372 U.S. at 222, 83 S.Ct. 609). However, the district court did not address whether Simler extends beyond the Seventh Amendment context and its holding is at odds with other federal courts that have decided similar motions. See, e.g., In re Flash Memory Antitrust Litig., 643 F.Supp.2d 1133, 1163 (N.D.Cal.2009) (accepting the defendants' argument that state law determines whether unjust enrichment claims are barred).8

b. Restitution, Disgorgement, Injunctions

Again, the Plaintiffs focus on the character of the remedy, appearing to concede that "lack of an otherwise adequate remedy" is necessary before courts can grant equitable relief. Compute-A-Call, Inc. v. Tolleson, 285 Ark. 355, 687 S.W.2d 129, 130 (1985).9 However, the Plaintiffs provide no support for their assertion that the authorization of equitable remedies by state statutes converts traditionally equitable claims into claims that are "legal in nature." Pls.' Resp. at 8. Instead, state courts consistently refer to equitable remedies sought pursuant to state statutes as "equitable relief." Gaidon v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 255 A.D.2d 101, 102, 679 N.Y.S.2d 611 (N.Y.App.Div.1998) (referring to "plaintiffs' claims for equitable relief" under the statute at issue in Tang); State v. Excel Mgm't, Servs., Inc., 111 Wis.2d 479, 331 N.W.2d 312, 315 (1983) (noting that the plaintiff "requested equitable relief" under the Wisconsin statute at issue in Nikolic). The Court does not accept the Plaintiffs' unsupported contention that because a state statute refers to an otherwise equitable remedy, the remedy necessarily becomes a remedy at law.10

3. Adequate Remedy at Law

a. Unjust Enrichment

In general, a party is allowed to "state as many separate claims or defenses as it has, regardless of consistency." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(3). Although an adequate remedy at law might prevent plaintiffs from eventually prevailing on equitable claims, nothing prevents the plaintiffs from pleading both types of causes of action. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. It's Just Lunch, Int'l, No. 07 Civ. 9227(SHS)(KNF), 2010 WL 685009, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2010) (denying motion to dismiss unjust enrichment claim because enforceable contract not yet proven and the federal rules allow plaintiffs to plead alternative and inconsistent claims); So. Wine and Spirits of Nev. v. Mountain Valley Spring Co., LLC, 2008 WL 2186176, at *2 (W.D.Ark. May 23, 2008) (denying motion to dismiss unjust enrichment claim because federal rules allow plaintiffs to plead regardless of consistency); GMAC Commercial Mortg. Corp. v. Gleichman, 84 F.Supp.2d 127, 136-37 (D.Me.1999) (denying motion to dismiss state unjust enrichment claim because the federal rules allow plaintiffs to plead alternative forms of relief). In general, courts cannot determine the adequacy of a legal remedy from the pleadings. See, e.g., Weydert Homes, Inc. v. Kammes, 395 Ill.App.3d 512, 334 Ill.Dec. 467, 917 N.E.2d 64, 73 (Ill.App.Ct.2009) (overturning trial court's dismissal of an unjust enrichment claim as premature because could not tell from the pleadings whether a binding contract existed).

The possible exception is when the legal cause of action provides an exclusive remedy. In such situations, courts may dismiss claims of unjust enrichment because the legal cause of action precludes parallel equitable claims. See, e.g., Frein v. Windsor Weeping Mary, LP, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2009 Ark.App. 774 (Ark.Ct. App.2009) (affirming dismissal of unjust enrichment claim because valid contract meant that breach of contract claim provided exclusive remedy); Springfield Heating and Air Conditioning, Inc. v. 3947-55 King Drive at Oakwood, LLC, 387 Ill.App.3d 906, 327 Ill.Dec. 245, 901 N.E.2d 978, 985-86 (Ill.App.Ct.2009) (upholding dismissal of unjust enrichment claim because state Mechanics' Lien Act provided exclusive remedy); Batt v. City and County of San Francisco, 155 Cal.App.4th 65, 65 Cal.Rptr.3d 716, 721-22 (Cal.Ct.App. 2007) (denying equitable claims because administrative tax refund action was exclusive remedy); Myskina v. Conde Nast Publ'ns, Inc., 386 F.Supp.2d 409, 420 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (granting summary judgment because state privacy statute provided an exclusive remedy, precluding separate common law causes of action). Even in this context, however, courts deny motions to dismiss when there is a question whether the exclusive remedy applies. See, e.g., Gleichman, 84 F.Supp.2d at 136-37 (refusing to dismiss an unjust enrichment claim even though two separate counts alleged breach of contract); June Roberts Agency, Inc. v. Venture Props., Inc., 676 A.2d 46, 49 n. 1 (Me.1996) (stating that although "the existence of a contract precludes recovery on a theory of unjust enrichment because unjust enrichment describes recovery for the value of the benefit retained when there is no contractual relationship," a plaintiff is "not precluded from pleading both theories because a factfinder may find that no contract exists and may still award damages on the theory of unjust enrichment"). Here, PM does not assert that state legislatures intended state consumer protection laws to provide exclusive remedies to consumers.11

Instead, PM presses that the existence of any legal remedy constitutes a sufficiently adequate remedy to justify dismissal. Pointing to the outcome in Curtis, the Minnesota district court case, PM argues that state consumer protection statutes provide the Plaintiffs with a sufficiently adequate remedy to preclude unjust enrichment claims. PM's Mot. at 10 (Curtis, No-27-CV-01-18042 at 2). The district court in Curtis granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings because it concluded that the Minnesota consumer protection statutes "provided adequate legal remedies and precluded an unjust enrichment claim." Curtis, No-27-CV-01-18042 at 2. As a general proposition, the Court has no quarrel with the Curtis Court's conclusion that if there is an adequate remedy at law, an equitable remedy is precluded. Where the Court and the district court in Curtis part ways is whether the determination can be made at this stage in the proceedings.

At oral argument, PM further defined what constitutes an adequate remedy. Rejecting the Plaintiffs' argument that the adequacy of a legal remedy turns on whether the Plaintiffs can recover under it, PM described equity as a "gap filler" that "steps in" only "where the law has not provided a remedy." Tr. 15:20-22. PM contends that the Plaintiffs "have not identified anything that makes the remedy [at law] incomplete." Id. 23:9-10. Rather, PM argues that the Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claims track their consumer protection claims: both allege that consumers "went out and bought a product, it wasn't what it was supposed to be, and as a result suffered an economic loss." Id. 23:11-13.

PM's argument inverts the presumption that state legal remedies are not considered exclusive remedies. Absent specific legislative intent to the contrary, "[l]egislatures are deemed to draft legislation against the backdrop of the common law" and state statutes are interpreted not to displace state common law causes of action. See, e.g., Maietta Constr., Inc. v. Wainwright, 2004 ME 53, ¶ 10, 847 A.2d 1169, 1174. At this stage, the Plaintiffs may assert multiple and duplicative legal and equitable claims for relief. See, e.g., Levine v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 682 F.Supp.2d 442, 468-69 (E.D.Pa.2010) (denying motion to dismiss unjust enrichment claim because the state statute "does not provide an exclusive statutory remedy" and plaintiff can plead unjust enrichment in the alternative); In re Wal-Mart Wage and Hour Employment Practices Litig., 490 F.Supp.2d 1091, 1121 (D.Nev.2007) (denying dismissal of unjust enrichment claims because Maine has not addressed whether the remedy provided by wage and hour statute is an adequate legal remedy and it is too early in the proceedings for the Court to decide) (applying Maine law).

b. Restitution, Disgorgement, and Injunctive Relief

PM's motion fares even worse in relation to the Plaintiffs' request for restitution, disgorgement, and injunctive relief. Money damages are not the Plaintiffs' exclusive remedy: state consumer protection statutes specifically contemplate that plaintiffs will seek both legal and equitable remedies. See, e.g., N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 (authorizing persons to bring an action to enjoin "such unlawful act or practice, an action to recover his actual damages or fifty dollars, whichever is greater, or both such actions"). PM cites no cases to the contrary.12 Even so, PM may ultimately be proven correct and the Plaintiffs may be unable to recover in equity what they recover at law; nevertheless, the Court cannot make this determination on the pleadings. See, e.g., Klayman v. Judicial Watch, Inc., Civil Action No. 06-670 (CKK), 2007 WL 140978, at *15 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2007) (denying motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' equitable remedies because unable to conclude at this stage of the proceedings whether available).

C. Whether Unjust Enrichment is a Cause of Action in Mississippi

For its conclusion that Mississippi does not allow unjust enrichment as an independent cause of action, PM cites a string of federal district courts sitting in diversity, including two Mississippi federal district courts. PM's Reply at 6. (Cruz v. Lawson Software, Inc., Civil No. 08-5900 (MJD/JSM), 2010 WL 890038, at *6 (D.Minn. Jan. 5, 2010); In re Potash Antitrust Litig. (Potash Antitrust), 667 F.Supp.2d 907, 948 (N.D.Ill.2009); Cole v. Chevron USA, Inc., 554 F.Supp.2d 655, 671 (S.D.Miss.2007); Coleman v. Conseco, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d 804, 813 (S.D.Miss.2002), partially abrogated on other grounds by Sweeney v. Sherwin Williams Co., 304 F.Supp.2d 868 (S.D.Miss.2004)).

The view that unjust enrichment is a theory of recovery, not an independent cause of action, can be traced to Coleman:

Coleman, 238 F.Supp.2d at 813 (brackets in the original).13 The other district courts simply carried Coleman's analysis forward.14

Contrary to Coleman and its federal progeny, however, there is a substantial body of Mississippi case law that treats unjust enrichment as a separate cause of action. In Koval v. Koval, the Supreme Court of Mississippi stated that "[t]he facts of the case at bar lend themselves to a recovery by the plaintiffs under the theory of unjust enrichment." 576 So.2d 134, 137 (Miss.1991). Quoting Hans v. Hans, 482 So.2d 1117, 1122 (Miss.1986), the Koval Court described the theory:

Id. at 136. Although quoting Estate of Johnson for the proposition that "[u]njust enrichment is an equitable remedy closely associated with `implied contracts' and trusts," the Koval Court appears to have interpreted the use of the term "remedy" broadly. Id. (quoting Estate of Johnson, 513 So.2d at 926). In other words, Mississippi courts describe unjust enrichment as an "equitable remedy" to mean an equitable solution that encompasses a cause of action, not merely a type of recovery. Thus, in Milliken & Michaels, Inc. v. Fred Netterville Lumber Co., the Supreme Court of Mississippi noted that the plaintiff "laments that [the defendant] is unjustly enriched," which seems to describe a cause of action, and affirmed a lower court determination that money paid to another by mistake is subject to repayment on the theory of unjust enrichment. 676 So.2d 266, 269 (Miss.1996); see also Prism Marketing Co., Inc. v. Casino Factory Shoppes, LLC, No. 2:08CV163-SA-SAA, 2009 WL 4348952, at *5 (N.D.Miss. Nov. 30, 2009) (holding that the plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claims survived the defendant's motion for summary judgment); Blades v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., Civil Action No. 1:06CV1000-LG-JMR, 2007 WL 2746678, at *5 (S.D.Miss. Sept. 17, 2007) (holding that Mississippi courts recognize the existence of an unjust enrichment theory of recovery); Dunn v. Dunn, 853 So.2d 1150, 1153-54 (Miss.2003) (affirming lower court's holding that the defendant had been unjustly enriched); Manning v. Tanner, 594 So.2d 1164, 1169 (Miss.1992) (upholding recovery under the theory of unjust enrichment, stating that "the chancellor's finding of unjust enrichment is well supported by the law").

To the extent there is any lingering doubt, the Supreme Court of Mississippi in Owens Corning v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. described the requirements for an "action for unjust enrichment":

868 So.2d 331, 342 (Miss.2004).15 The view that unjust enrichment is a cause of action distinct from restitution is echoed in Omnibank, in which the Supreme Court of Mississippi described unjust enrichment as a cause of action distinct from restitution:

607 So.2d at 92-93; see In re Worldcom, Inc., 06 Cv. 2134(BSJ), 2010 WL 334980, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2010) (stating the elements of a claim for unjust enrichment under Mississippi law); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 671 F.Supp.2d 397, 431 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (stating that "causation is an essential element of the State's fraud, negligence, and unjust enrichment claims under Mississippi common law").16

The Court concludes that unjust enrichment is a separate cause of action under Mississippi state law.

III. CONCLUSION

The Court DENIES PM's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Plaintiffs' Unjust Enrichment Claims and Other Requests for Equitable Relief (Docket # 185).

SO ORDERED.