NANCY TORRESEN, District Judge.
Defendants Consigli Construction Co. (
Maverick alleges that in September of 2010 it entered into a subcontract with general contractor Consigli in which Maverick agreed to perform certain construction work at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (the "
The Defendants have moved to stay this litigation and compel arbitration pursuant to Article 17 of the contract, (the "
Subcontract, p. 5 of 29 (Doc. #14-1).
The Plaintiff counters that the Arbitration Clause is unenforceable because it is illusory and unsupported by adequate consideration. Next the Plaintiff argues that because Consigli takes the position that cost overruns relating to equipment rates must be decided by the U.S. Navy, those disputes fall outside the scope of the Arbitration Clause. Finally, the Plaintiff argues that Consigli's surety, FIC, has not agreed to be bound by any decision of the arbitrator, and thus litigation against FIC should not be stayed.
The parties agree that the Arbitration Clause is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act ("
The First Circuit has conveniently set forth several basic arbitration principles that have been developed by the Supreme Court. Municipality of San Juan v. Corporación Para El Fomento Económico De La Ciudad Capital, 415 F.3d 145, 149 (1st Cir.2005).
Id.
An arbitration clause, like the one at issue, which defines its scope to include "[a]ll claims, disputes and other matters in questions arising out of, or relating to, this Agreement or the breach thereof" is "facially broad in scope." Winterwood Farm, LLC v. JER, Inc., 327 F.Supp.2d 34, 39 (D.Me.2004). "The existence of a broad agreement to arbitrate creates a presumption of arbitrability which is only overcome if it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute." MSAD No. 68 v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 222 F.Supp.2d 50, 55 (D.Me.2002) (quoting Smith/Enron Cogeneration Ltd. P'ship. v. Smith Cogeneration Int'l, Inc., 198 F.3d 88, 99 (2nd Cir.1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 815, 121 S.Ct. 51, 148 L.Ed.2d 20 (2000) (citing WorldCrisa Corp. v. Armstrong, 129 F.3d 71, 74 (2nd Cir. 1997))).
Maverick claims that the Arbitration Clause is unenforceable because it is illusory. Specifically, Maverick argues that: (1) the arbitration clause does not bind Consigli to the results of arbitration; (2) the arbitration clause allows Consigli alone to switch to the State courts at any stage of the arbitration; and (3) the unilateral nature of the arbitration clause makes it unenforceable for lack of mutuality or consideration. Since Maverick's illusoriness arguments challenge the validity of the arbitration agreement and not its scope, the Court applies ordinary rules of contract construction under applicable state law. See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d at 35. Maine state law governs the parties' contract in this case.
With respect to Maverick's first argument, the Arbitration Clause incorporates by reference the AAA arbitration rules for the construction industry. These rules state that parties who submit to arbitration must consent to entry of judgment upon the arbitration award in any federal or state court having jurisdiction of the matter. See AAA Construction Industry Arbitration Rule 51(c). Even though Consigli has the option to choose arbitration under the contract, in so choosing, it submits to the binding effects of such arbitration. Accordingly, Consigli will be bound by the results of arbitration.
Second, Maverick argues that Consigli may elect to arbitrate but may change its mind at any time after an election to arbitrate and bring the case to State court.
Maverick's third illusoriness argument relates to the fact that the Arbitration Clause is unilateral, i.e. one in which Consigli alone has the option to choose litigation or arbitration and in which Maverick is required to submit to Consigli's election. Maine law has not yet definitively addressed the validity of unilateral arbitration clauses. Such clauses are viewed by some courts with disfavor. See e.g. DiMercurio v. Sphere Drake Ins., 202 F.3d 71, 81 (1st Cir.2000) ("We adhere to our view that one-sided agreements to arbitrate are not favored.") Despite this, however, the Court thinks it unlikely that Maine will hold that such clauses are generally void for lack of mutuality or consideration.
The Plaintiff cites Snow v. BE & K Constr., Co., 126 F.Supp.2d 5, 15 (D.Me. 2001)
Maverick also relies on Holm Development, a case decided under Arizona law. This case held that an arbitration clause had to be separated from the rest of the contract, and mutuality of obligation of the arbitration clause, i.e. a requirement that both parties be bound to arbitrate in the same manner, was necessary. Holm Development, 795 P.2d at 1312. Without mutuality, the Holm Development court concluded, the clause lacked consideration and was not enforceable. Id. at 1313.
Holm Development, perhaps mindful of the pro-arbitration purpose articulated in Prima Paint, pointed out that the unilateral arbitration clause in the case before it did "not promote the public policy favoring arbitration." Holm Development, 795 P.2d at 1313. The court in Holm Development may have been motivated by the portion of the arbitration clause that allowed the defendant to change its mind and switch to or from arbitration at any time prior to final judgment.
It is possible that the disfavor with which many courts view unilateral arbitration clauses is more accurately tied to the inequity of providing an economically more powerful party with the additional advantage of choosing the forum it deems more likely to promote its goals in any given
In this case, Maverick does not contend that the Arbitration Clause is unconscionable, only that it is illusory because Consigli provided no consideration for it. On this argument, the Court finds it likely that Maine's Law Court will agree with those courts that have found that, where a contract as a whole is otherwise supported by consideration on both sides, a unilateral arbitration provision will not be found invalid for lack of consideration. See Stenzel v. Dell, Inc., 870 A.2d 133, 143-44 (Me.2005) (under Texas law unilateral arbitration clause was not unconscionable because the underlying contract was supported by adequate consideration). See also e.g. Motsinger v. Lithia Rose-FT, Inc., 211 Or.App. 610, 156 P.3d 156, 163-67 (2007) (reviewing cases and concluding that unilateral arbitration clauses are not per se invalid for lack of mutuality or consideration.)
Maverick also claims that approximately 90% of its claims involve overages arising out of delays occasioned by the Navy, and thus they do not fall within the scope of the Arbitration Clause. It points to pre-suit correspondence between the parties in which Consigli asserted that Maverick's claims for payment could not be addressed until Maverick separated its claims for overages from its claims for completed or partially completed work under the contract so that the overages could be referred to the Navy for review. The parties refer to Maverick's overage claims as "pass-through" claims because they are, at least according to Consigli, supposed to pass through Consigli to the Navy.
Whether, however, any of Maverick's claims pass through to the Navy is beside the point. Maverick's suit is against Consigli, not the Navy.
The arbitrator will determine the validity and effect of any limiting provisions and will decide the value of any recovery against Consigli. If the arbitrator determines that certain of Maverick's claims are not arbitrable, the Subcontract suggests that the General Contract Documents contain a separate procedure for submission of claims against the Navy. See Contract Article 10. ("The Subcontractor shall have no claim for extra or additional compensation or for any damage allegedly sustained or for any changes or modifications to its work unless it shall have first complied with all the applicable terms and provisions in the General Contract Documents pertaining to submission of claims, changes, modifications, and damages.")
Maverick asks the Court to refrain from staying its claim against Maverick's surety, FIC, because FIC has not agreed to be bound by the results of any arbitration between Maverick and Consigli. However, Consigli and FIC both assert that FIC's liability is coextensive with Consigli's liability. Defendants' Reply In Support of Motion to Compel Arbitration, p. 6 (Doc. #20). The majority of federal courts that have held that an arbitration award binds a Miller Act surety. See e.g. U.S. f/u/b/o WFI Georgia, Inc. v. Gray Ins. Co., 701 F.Supp.2d 1320, 1327-29 (N.D.Ga.2010) (discussing cases.)
Consigli has elected to arbitrate its dispute with Maverick and will be bound by the results of that arbitration. Judgment upon the award may be entered in this Court. The Court accepts FIC's representation that its liability is coextensive with Consigli's. Maverick will not need to relitigate its claims against FIC following arbitration with Consigli. It would be duplicative and risk inconsistent adjudications to allow Maverick to pursue its Miller Act claim against FIC in this Court simultaneously
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants' motion to stay this suit and compel arbitration is
It is further
Id. at 13. Because the Company could unilaterally discontinue the Employee Solution Program at any time, its promise was illusory, and it therefore could not constitute consideration. Id. 14-16.
Hans Smit, The Unilateral Arbitration Clause: A Comparative Analysis, 20 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 391, 401 (2009). See also, Christopher R. Drahozal, Nonmutual Agreements to Arbitrate, 27 J. Corp. L. 537, 538-39 (2002).
Article 15 provides:
Article 16 (the Convenience Termination article) places additional substantive and procedural limitations on Maverick's payment claims against both Consigli and the Navy.