NANCY TORRESEN, Chief District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Dennis Shipman, Michael Tausek, Rodney Bouffard, and Joseph Fitzpatrick's motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 27). For the reasons stated below, the Defendants' motion is
The Plaintiff's Amended Complaint stems from an incident that occurred while Williams was incarcerated at the Maine State Prison (the "
On January 6, 2013, Williams was transferred from the MSP to the Maine Correctional Center (the "
The Plaintiff's Amended Complaint sets forth eight separate claims.
The State has filed a motion to dismiss all claims against Defendants Shipman, Tausek, Bouffard, and Fitzpatrick. As grounds, the State claims that: (1) the Amended Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to establish supervisory liability for Defendants Bouffard, Tausek, and Fitzpatrick for the alleged assault on the Plaintiff; (2) the Plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive relief; (3) the Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief against Defendants Tausek and Bouffard was mooted by his transfer to MCC; (4) the Amended Complaint alleges insufficient facts to support a claim of retaliation by Defendant Shipman; (5) the claim against Defendant Shipman in his personal capacity is barred because the Plaintiff does not allege that he suffered any physical injury as a result of Defendant Shipman's actions; and (6) the punitive damages claims against Defendants Shipman, Tausek, Bouffard and Fitzpatrick are barred by 18 U.S.C. § 3626 of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (the "
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" and that "each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (d)(1). A defendant may challenge a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" for falling short of this Rule 8 standard. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Following Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the First Circuit has instructed:
Cardigan Mountain Sch. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 82, 84 (1st Cir. 2015) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Rule 8 pleading standard "does not require `detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
It is well settled that "[g]overnment officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior." Id. at 676. "Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Id. "[A] supervisor may not be held liable for the constitutional violations committed by his or her subordinates, unless there is an affirmative link between the behavior of a subordinate and the action or inaction of his supervisor . . . such that the supervisor's conduct led inexorably to the constitutional violation." Soto-Torres v. Fraticelli, 654 F.3d 153, 158 (1st Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
"Where the claim is invidious discrimination . . . the plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory purpose." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff "must plead sufficient factual matter to show that [the defendants] adopted and implemented the detention policies at issue . . . for the purpose of discriminating on account of race. . . ." Id. at 677. The Supreme Court in Iqbal rejected the argument that "a supervisor's mere knowledge of his subordinate's discriminatory purpose amounts to the supervisor's violating the Constitution." Id.
The First Circuit has repeatedly applied Iqbal to affirm the dismissal of complaints which do nothing more than parrot the standard for supervisory liability in the § 1983 context. E.g., Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 49-50 (1st Cir. 2009) (complaint's allegations that administrative defendants were "responsible for ensuring that the correctional officers under their command followed practices and procedures [that] would respect the rights and ensure the bodily integrity of Plaintiff" rejected as mere legal conclusion); Feliciano-Hernandez v. Pereira-Castillo, 663 F.3d 527, 534 (1st Cir. 2011) (allegations that the defendants "failed in their duty to assure adequate monitoring, disciplining, evaluating, training and supervising any and all personnel under their charge" were merely asserting legal conclusions.); Soto-Torres, 654 F.3d at 159 (assertions that defendant "`was the officer in charge during the incident" and "participated in or directed the constitutional violations alleged herein, or knew of the violation[s] and failed to act to prevent them" were "plainly insufficient" to support a theory of supervisory liability post-Iqbal).
The State asserts that the Amended Complaint contains insufficient factual allegations to state a claim for relief based on supervisory liability against Defendants Bouffard, Tausek, and Fitzpatrick. Only Count Three-A involves Defendants Bouffard, Tausek, and Fitzpatrick, and Count Three-A is the only count which does not assert a claim for monetary damages.
In Count Three-A, the Plaintiff claims that his right to equal protection of the laws was denied because of his race. He asserts that he and other individuals of color have been singled out for disparate disciplinary treatment by Captain Cutler and other correctional officers. The Amended Complaint asserts the following:
The allegations summarized above are sufficient to establish that Defendants Fitzpatrick, Bouffard and Tausek were aware of complaints at the MSP that corrections officers were dispensing disparate disciplinary treatment based on race, but it does nothing to establish that the official Defendants shared the purpose of their subordinates. As Iqbal made clear, a complaint must plausibly allege that the official Defendants acted or omitted action with the purpose of discriminating against inmates based on their color.
The remainder of the allegations in Count Three-A assert that:
As the First Circuit has instructed, however, allegations like these that merely parrot legal conclusions, are to be set aside in a post-Iqbal world. Because the Plaintiff has failed to allege that the official Defendants shared the discriminatory animus of their subordinates, and because there is insufficient factual support to establish the necessary affirmative link between the behavior of a subordinate and the action or inaction of the supervisor, Count Three-A fails to state a claim against Defendants Fitzpatrick, Bouffard and Tausek.
The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Shipman placed him on the "Watch List" at the MCC in retaliation for filing a grievance against Captain Cutler. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37, 39. The Plaintiff further alleges that because he was on the "Watch List" he was subjected to heightened security measures including increased searches and interference with his mail. Am. Compl. ¶ 31. The Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Shipman denied his grievance about being placed on the "Watch List" as untimely because he had filed a grievance against Captain Cutler. Am. Compl. ¶ 36. The Plaintiff contends that his placement on the "Watch List" and the denial of his grievance pertaining to the "Watch List" violated his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
The State moves to dismiss the Counts against Defendant Shipman on the grounds that the Amended Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to support the claim. The State also argues that claims against Defendant Shipman in his personal capacity are barred under the PLRA because the Plaintiff failed to allege facts showing that he suffered any physical injury as a result of Defendant Shipman's actions. Finally, the State argues that punitive damages against Defendant Shipman are also barred by the PLRA.
The State concedes that an inmate's right to file a grievance over prison conditions is protected by the First Amendment. Mot. to Dismiss 9 (citing Brown v. Corsini, 657 F.Supp.2d 296 (D. Mass. 2009)). In order to establish a claim for retaliation based on the exercise of rights protected by the First Amendment, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to make out a claim that he engaged in protected activity; that he was subjected to adverse action; that the state took the adverse action; and that there is a causal link between the protected conduct and the adverse action. Hannon v. Beard, 645 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2011). An adverse action in a First Amendment retaliation case is one that "viewed objectively . . . would have a chilling effect on [the plaintiff's] exercise of First Amendment rights," Barton v. Clancy, 632 F.3d 9, 29 & n.19 (1st Cir. 2011), or that "would deter a reasonably hardy person from exercising his or her constitutional rights." D.B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 43 n.11 (1st Cir. 2012). The State argues that the adverse action alleged by the Plaintiff was not "sufficiently severe to deter a prisoner of ordinary firmness from the exercise of his constitutional right to complain about conditions of confinement." Mot. to Dismiss 10. I disagree. Accepting as true the allegations in the Amended Complaint, I find it plausible that being subjected to increased searches and interference with mail might deter a reasonably hearty inmate from exercising his constitutional rights.
The PLRA section on "Suits by Prisoners" contains a subsection labeled "Limitation on recovery." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). That subsection instructs: "[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act." Id. The scope of this limitation is the subject of a circuit split, specifically "on whether § 1997e(e) applies to bar compensatory damages only (leaving the availability to recover nominal or punitive damages), or whether the statutory provision applies to constitutional claims at all." Cryer v. Spencer, 934 F.Supp.2d 323, 336 (D. Mass. 2013) (collecting cases). The First Circuit has not weighed in directly, but has permitted a prisoner's First Amendment § 1983 claim to proceed without an allegation of physical injury where he requested nominal and punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages. Kuperman v. Wrenn, 645 F.3d 69, 73 n.5 (1st Cir. 2011). Courts in this district have followed Kuperman's forecasting. See, e.g., Robinson v. Landry, No. 2:15-cv-58-DBH, 2015 WL 4077297, at *2 (D. Me. July 6, 2015) (dismissing § 1983 First Amendment claim where prisoner sought only monetary damages for anxiety and emotional distress without alleging any physical injury); Ayotte v. Barnhart, 973 F.Supp.2d 70, 93 (D. Me. 2013) (declining to grant state's summary judgment motion on § 1983 First Amendment claim where prisoner sought both compensatory damages without physical injury and punitive damages).
In his First Amendment retaliation claim articulated in Count Two of his Amended Complaint, Williams requests: (1) "judgment against the Defendants in the amount of $300,000"; (2) an injunction against Shipman from committing "future retaliatory actions against those who have asserted their constitutional rights"; (3) punitive damages; (4) attorneys' fees; (5) interest; (6) costs and "such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper." Am. Compl. ¶ 41. I interpret Williams's closing catch-all request to include nominal damages.
At this point in the litigation, I need not decide whether § 1997e(e) precludes compensatory damages for Williams's § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim. In addition to his request for $300,000 in compensatory damages, Williams has also requested punitive and nominal damages. Am. Compl. ¶ 41. Following Kuperman, his request for putative and nominal damages "keep[s] his claim[] alive." 645 F.3d at 69 n.5. Through a Rule 12(b)(6) lens, the State has not shown that Williams has failed to "state a claim upon which relief can be granted."
The PLRA includes requirements for courts granting prospective relief in civil cases involving prison conditions. Such relief "shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). "The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right." Id. The court shall further "give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief." Id. "Prospective relief" in this context is "all relief other than compensatory monetary damages." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(7).
The State points to this part of the PLRA as a reason to bar Williams's claim for punitive damages. Mot. to Dismiss 12-13. Section 3626(a)(1)(A) dictates the standard courts must follow when deciding whether to grant or approve prospective relief. It is too early to evaluate how that standard will apply in this case, and certainly too early to say that I would be unable to grant or approve relief that meets § 3626(a)(1)(A)'s requirements. Right now, this case consists of allegations; there has been no finding of liability (or even any discovery). Section 3626(a)(1)(A) does not provide a basis for dismissal.
For the reasons stated above, Defendants Rodney Bouffard, Michael Tausek, Joseph Fitzpatrick, and Dennis Shipman's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 27) is
SO ORDERED.
