JOHN C. NIVISON, Magistrate Judge.
In this action, Plaintiff Robert McKenney alleges that Defendants, three correctional officers at the Two Bridges Regional Jail in Wiscasset, violated his right to due process in connection with disciplinary matters and that they falsely charged him with criminal conduct while he was serving a sentence at the jail.
The matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 17). Plaintiff, who is no longer incarcerated, did not file an opposition to the motion. Following a review of the pleadings and summary judgment filings, and after consideration of Defendants' arguments, I recommend the Court grant Defendants' motion as to Plaintiff's federal claims, and dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff's state law claims.
Plaintiff's claims arise as the result of disciplinary charges instituted against him while he was an inmate at the Two Bridges Regional Jail. As a consequence of the charges, Plaintiff was placed in segregated confinement and he was classified as maximum security for the duration of his time in segregation. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants required him to spend "months in 23-[hour] lockdown for nothing." (Complaint at 3, ¶ V, ECF No. 1.) He also asserts that he wrote "numerous grievances" that were "ignored." (Id. at 2, ¶ 2.C.)
Plaintiff was incarcerated at Two Bridges Regional Jail from August 1, 2014, through July 11, 2015, pursuant to a judgment of conviction on a theft charge. (Defendants' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 1, ECF No. 18.) Defendant Sgt. Kyle Canada is the assistant support services supervisor at Two Bridges Regional Jail. (Id. ¶ 2.) Defendant Paul Rubashkin is the special projects officer at Two Bridges Regional Jail and a Lincoln County deputy sheriff. His responsibilities include the investigation and initiation of criminal matters. (Id. ¶ 3.) Defendant Captain James Bailey is currently the corrections captain at the jail, which position is second in command at the jail. (Id. ¶ 4.)
On October 16, 2014, Officer Major summoned Defendant Rubashkin to Officer Major's office, where he was searching incoming mail. Officer Major showed Rubashkin a photo that had been mailed to Plaintiff. The photo had an abnormal bulge in the back of the paper that was orange in color. Defendant Rubashkin peeled back the back of the photo and found an approximately 2 mg portion of a Suboxone strip. (Id. ¶ 5.) Defendant Rubashkin checked the return address, but found no record of the person whose name was listed. (Id. ¶ 6.) After discovering the Suboxone, Defendant Rubashkin listened to recordings of phone calls between Plaintiff and his girlfriend. (Id. ¶ 7.) Defendant Rubashkin learned that beginning on October 12, 2014, Plaintiff discussed with his girlfriend her sending Suboxone to the jail, and in subsequent calls he asked her if she had sent Suboxone. (Id. ¶ 8.)
On October 16, 2014, after the Suboxone was detected, Plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation. (Id. ¶ 9.) On October 17, 2014, Defendant Rubashkin went to Plaintiff's cell to issue him a summons for trafficking in prison contraband. Plaintiff refused to sign the summons, and Defendant Rubashkin summoned him for refusing to sign a uniform summons and complaint. (Id. ¶ 10.)
On October 21, 2014, Plaintiff requested to be present for an upcoming classification hearing. (Id. ¶ 11.) At the classification review the next day, Plaintiff stated multiple times that he knew he would be found guilty of the alleged rule violations and that officials might as well classify him as maximum security. (Id. ¶ 13.)
As part of its deliberations, the classification committee also considered that Plaintiff had a violent history at Two Bridges Regional Jail, had made violent threats toward staff members, had previous prison drug trafficking charges, had current prison drug trafficking charges, and was believed to have fashioned weapons during his current incarceration. (Id. ¶ 14.) The committee reclassified Plaintiff to maximum security. (Id. ¶ 15.)
On October 23, 2014, Lieutenant Colbry and Sergeant Wardwell conducted a disciplinary hearing regarding the incident. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 18.) Plaintiff was present at the hearing and pled not guilty. (Id. ¶ 17.) Officers Colbry and Wardwell found Plaintiff guilty and, as a sanction, imposed ten days of disciplinary segregation. (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff remained on maximum security until he was reclassified to medium security on December 2, 2014, for good behavior.
On January 28, 2015, because Plaintiff plead to other charges, the Assistant District Attorney dismissed the criminal charges against Plaintiff for trafficking in prison contraband and failure to sign the uniform summons.
On March 26, 2015,
On April 9, 2015, Plaintiff was charged with a major infraction for fighting, lying and for conduct which disrupts. (Id. ¶ 26.) Sergeant Grantham, Corporal Rogers, and Officer Major conducted Plaintiff's disciplinary hearing on April 11, 2015. (Id. ¶ 27.) Plaintiff was present at the hearing and pled not guilty. (Id. ¶ 28.) The officers dismissed the charges of lying and conduct which disrupts, but found Plaintiff guilty of fighting, for which they imposed a sanction of ten days disciplinary segregation. (Id. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff was advised of his right to appeal, but declined. (Id. ¶ 30.)
In accordance with the sanction, Plaintiff was in disciplinary segregation from April 11, 2015, through April 21, 2015.
The grievance procedure for the Two Bridges Regional Jail provides that an inmate can initiate a grievance for, inter alia, an alleged violation of civil, constitutional, or statutory rights. (Id. ¶ 34.) An inmate must first file a level one grievance. (Id. ¶ 35.) If an inmate is not satisfied with the response to a level one grievance, the inmate may file a level two grievance.
During Plaintiff's incarceration at Two Bridges Regional Jail in 2014 and 2015, the only level two grievance Plaintiff filed involved the cost of making photocopies.
An inmate may appeal from the decision of a disciplinary hearing officer to the Correctional Administrator or designee within ten days of the disciplinary hearing. To appeal from a disciplinary hearing decision, the inmate must submit an appeal of disciplinary hearing decision form. (Id. ¶ 39.) The decision of the Correctional Administrator is final. (Id. ¶ 40.)
Plaintiff did not appeal from any decisions issued after the disciplinary hearings to which he was a party during his incarceration at the Two Bridges Regional Jail in 2014 and 2015. (Id. ¶ 41.)
An inmate may appeal from his initial classification assignment or reclassification to a higher custody level by submitting a written request on an inmate request form within five days of the decision. (Id. ¶ 42.) Plaintiff requested a review of his initial classification to maximum security on August 2, 2014. Plaintiff filed his request on August 3, and on August 4, Plaintiff's classification status was changed to medium. (Id. ¶ 43.) Plaintiff did not appeal from his [other]
Defendant Bailey was not involved in the classification or reclassification decisions involving Plaintiff and he did not review the decisions. In addition, Defendant Bailey was not involved in Plaintiff's disciplinary hearings or the criminal charges asserted against Plaintiff. At the time of the incidents described in the complaint, Defendant Bailey had no responsibility for the review of disciplinary decisions; thus, he did not review Plaintiff's disciplinary proceedings. (Id. ¶ 4.)
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "After the moving party has presented evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment, `the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, with respect to each issue on which he has the burden of proof, to demonstrate that a trier of fact reasonably could find in his favor.'" Woodward v. Emulex Corp., 714 F.3d 632, 637 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 158 (1st Cir. 1998)).
A court reviews the factual record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, resolving evidentiary conflicts and drawing reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. Perry v. Roy, 782 F.3d 73, 77 (1st Cir. 2015). If a court's review of the record reveals evidence sufficient to support findings in favor of the non-moving party on one or more of his claims, a trial-worthy controversy exists and summary judgment must be denied as to any supported claim. Id. ("The district court's role is limited to assessing whether there exists evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Unsupported claims are properly dismissed. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986) ("One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.").
Through their motion for summary judgment, Defendants assert that Plaintiff's claims are barred because Plaintiff failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies. (Motion at 2-3.) Alternatively, Defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's due process theories because the sanctions imposed on Plaintiff (i.e., periods of confinement in segregation) were not atypical and significant hardships. (Id. at 3-4, 7-8.) Defendants otherwise argue that any state law claim of malicious prosecution is within the discretionary function immunity under the Maine Tort Claims Act, and that given the absence of liability for any of the other Defendants, and given the lack of evidence of deliberate indifference, any supervisory liability theory asserted against Defendant Bailey fails. (Id. at 5-7, 8-9.)
Federal law requires a prisoner to exhaust the available administrative remedies before initiating a lawsuit based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) ("There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA [Prison Litigation Reform Act] and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.")
The Supreme Court has held that § 1997e(a) requires "proper exhaustion" of a prisoner's administrative remedies. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006). "Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings." Id. at 90-91. "Compliance with prison grievance procedures . . . is all that is required . . . to `properly exhaust.'" Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. "[I]t is the prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion." Id.
A defendant may raise the § 1997e exhaustion requirement as an affirmative defense. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007); see also Ramos v. Patnaude, 640 F.3d 485, 488 (1st Cir. 2011) ("The Supreme Court made it plain . . . that exhaustion under § 1997e(a) is not a jurisdictional condition, and has held it to be an affirmative defense." (citing Jones, 549 U.S. at 212)). Because failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense rather than a jurisdictional issue, initially, Defendants bear the burden of proof. Jones, 549 U.S. at 216. To satisfy that burden, Defendants must establish "that there was an available administrative remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy." Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Scott v. Albino, 135 S.Ct. 403 (2014).
Defendants have established that administrative remedies were available to Plaintiff, including a level two grievance process administered at the Two Bridges Regional Jail.
Although Plaintiff asserted in his verified complaint that he wrote numerous grievances that were ignored, particularly given the record evidence to the contrary, Plaintiff's general assertion does not establish that Plaintiff filed any level two grievances. Furthermore, the record lacks any evidence that the level two process was otherwise unavailable to Plaintiff. Even if the Court construes Plaintiff's complaint to establish for summary judgment purposes that Defendants ignored one or more of Plaintiff's level one grievances, Plaintiff is not relieved of his obligation to exhaust the level two grievances. In other words, Plaintiff must exhaust all "available" remedies. Johnson v. Thyng, 369 Fed. App'x 144, 147 (1st Cir. 2010) ("The emerging case law rejects [the] theory that an optional level of administrative review need not be exhausted for purposes of PLRA.").
Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including Plaintiff's claims that Defendants violated procedural due process in connection with his disciplinary proceedings, and his claim that Defendant Bailey denied him access to the law library,
The record reveals that Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal from one of the two decisions by which he was classified as maximum security. Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff's appeal exhausted the only available administrative remedy for that classification decision, see Bean v. Barnhart, No. 1:13-cv-00196-NT, 2015 WL 3935777, at *6 (June 26, 2015) (Order on Defendants' Failure to Exhaust Defense at 13-14, ECF No. 69), Plaintiff nevertheless cannot prevail on a constitutional claim.
First, a prisoner does not have a constitutional right to a particular classification. "[W]hile persons imprisoned for crime enjoy many protections of the Constitution, it is also clear that imprisonment carries with it the circumscription or loss of many significant rights." Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524 (1984). "[A] prisoner has no constitutional right to be incarcerated in a particular prison or to be held in a specific security classification." Williams v. Lindamood, 526 Fed. App'x 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 577 (6th Cir. 2005)); see also Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 2007).
Because Plaintiff has no absolute right to a certain classification, unless his classification constitutes an "atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life," Plaintiff does not have an actionable claim based on any alleged procedural irregularities or misapplication of state law classification standards. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). In other words, the law does not recognize a constitutional liberty interest unless the conditions imposed present an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.
Defendants argue that the record does not support a finding that Plaintiff's time in segregation constitutes an atypical and significant hardship. (Motion at 4 (Rubashkin), 7-8 (Canada).) Additionally, Defendants contend the record lacks evidence of deliberate indifference on the part of Defendant Bailey in his supervisory capacity. (Motion at 8-9.)
Although in his verified complaint Plaintiff alleges that he spent seven weeks in segregation,
The issue is whether the record can support a finding that the conditions of Plaintiff's segregation could be considered an atypical and significant hardship. Plaintiff, who has the burden to establish a factual basis for his claim, has failed to allege or otherwise provide record evidence from which a fact finder could conclude that his time in segregation was atypical or a significant hardship. In fact, Plaintiff has presented no evidence of the conditions of segregation or how the segregation conditions might differ from the conditions for the general population at the jail. Plaintiff thus cannot prevail on a claim based on his reclassification.
Defendants construe Plaintiff's complaint to assert a claim of malicious prosecution based on Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant Rubashkin regarding the summonses issued to Plaintiff for trafficking and for failing to sign the trafficking summons. Defendants maintain that summary judgment is appropriate because the decisions were discretionary functions for which Defendant Rubashkin is immune under the Maine Tort Claims Act. (Motion at 5-7.)
To the extent Plaintiff has attempted to assert or has asserted a state law claim against one or more of the Defendants, his state law claims are not within the original jurisdiction of this Court. Because Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's federal claims, and because dismissal of the federal claims would occur well in advance of trial, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims and dismiss any state law claims without prejudice. 28 U.S.C § 1367(c)(3); Shuper v. Tri-Cty. Mental Health Servs., No. 2:14-CV-00476-GZS, 2014 WL 6893852, at *3 (D. Me. Dec. 4, 2014), appeal dismissed (1st Cir. May 4, 2015) (citing Keenan v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 632 F.Supp.2d 63, 72 (D. Me. 2009)).
Based on the foregoing analysis, I recommend the Court grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 17) on Plaintiff's federal claims, and enter judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff's federal claims. I further recommend the Court dismiss Plaintiff's state claims without prejudice.
The Court, however, "may not automatically grant a motion for summary judgment simply because the opposing party failed to comply with a local rule requiring a response within a certain number of days." NEPSK, Inc. v. Town of Houlton, 283 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 2002). Instead, the Court must assess whether the movant has shown "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In particular, when the Court has before it a verified complaint, the Court may consider the statements contained therein when assessing whether a genuine issue of fact exists for trial. Clarke v. Blais, 473 F.Supp.2d 124, 128 (D. Me. 2007).
The facts set forth herein are derived principally from Defendants' Statement of Material Facts (ECF No. 18), but also include references to Plaintiff's verified complaint.
