GEORGE Z. SINGAL, District Judge.
Before the Court is the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Town of Bar Harbor (ECF No. 55) (the "Motion for Summary Judgment"). For the reasons explained herein, the Court GRANTS IN PART Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and DISMISSES the remaining claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Generally, a party is entitled to summary judgment if, on the record before the Court, it appears "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact."
The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.
Once the moving party has made this preliminary showing, the nonmoving party must "produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form, to establish the presence of a trialworthy issue."
For the purposes of this Order, the Court draws the factual narrative that follows from the stipulation of facts agreed to by the parties (ECF No. 53) ("SOF"), the statement of material facts provided by Defendant Town of Bar Harbor (the "Town" or "Defendant") (ECF No. 56) ("DSMF"), the statement of material facts provided by Plaintiff Nathan Young ("Young" or "Plaintiff"), which includes responses to Defendant's statement of material facts (ECF No. 60) ("PSMF") and Defendant's responses to Plaintiff's statement of material facts (ECF No. 64) ("DRSMF"). However, the Court limits its factual recitation to those facts that are relevant to the discussion section that follows.
Young was the Chief of Police of the Town for 23 years. (SOF at PageID # 973.) Young most recently served as Chief of Police pursuant to an employment agreement with the Town that commenced on July 1, 2012, with a stated three-year term (the "Employment Agreement"). (ECF No. 52-1 at PageID # 435.) Under the Employment Agreement, the Town was permitted to terminate Young's employment only for cause, in compliance with the requirements of 30-A M.R.S.A. § 2671(1). (
In February of 2013, Young spoke with the Town Manager, Dana Reed ("Reed") and self-reported a problem with excessive drinking. In response, Reed explained that certain employee assistance plan ("EAP") services were available to Young. (DRSMF at PageID # 1116.) The parties agree that at no time while he served as Chief of Police was Young's ability to perform his duties affected or impaired by his consumption of alcohol. (SOF at PageID # 973.)
In the spring of 2013, a number of the members of the Town's council (the "Town Council") expressed to Reed that they were concerned about Young's behavior and problems in his personal life. (PSMF at PageID # 1084; DRSMF at PageID # 1116.) According to Reed, the concerns raised by members of the Town Council at this time related to rumors about a domestic disturbance involving Young and his wife. (Reed Dep. (ECF No. 52-2) at PageID # 470.) The five members of the Town Council who told Reed about concerns or rumors they had heard about Young later voted to uphold Reed's decision to terminate Young's employment. (PSMF at PageID # 1087; DRSMF at PageID # 1118.) In May of 2013, Town Council member David Bowden allegedly told Christopher Walsh, then a member of the Town Council, that Young needed to go, in connection with allegations that Young had engaged in an extramarital affair with another employee of the Town. (DRSMF at PageID #s 1120-21.) Also in May of 2013, Reed allegedly told Young he had enough votes on the Town Council to remove Young. (Young Dep. (ECF No. 52-1) at PageID # 325.)
Walsh has stated that Young told him in May of 2013 that he was an alcoholic, but that the conversation concerned Young's off-duty drinking, and not his work and job performance. (Walsh Dep. (ECF No. 52-4) at PageID #s 802-03.) According to Walsh, he told Reed about this conversation.
On September 25, 2013, at approximately 11:30 P.M., the Town's police department received a call reporting that a vehicle was parked in the parking lot of Town Hill Market in the Town, and that there appeared to be a man slumped over in the driver's seat of the vehicle. (SOF at PageID #s 973-74.) Officer Judson Cake ("Cake") and Officer Larry Fickett ("Fickett"), each police officers of the Town's police department, were patrolling together and responded to the call. (SOF at PageID # 974.) Cake and Fickett observed a vehicle in the parking lot, which Fickett recognized as belonging to Young. (
Cake and Fickett both exited their car and approached Young's vehicle.
When Cake identified Fickett as the other on-duty officer present, Young made a negative remark about Fickett. (
After leaving the scene, Fickett called the Town's police station and spoke with Officer Eric McLaughlin. (SOF at PageID # 974.) After conversing with Officer McLaughlin, Cake and Fickett returned to the Town Hill Market parking lot, but observed that Young's vehicle was no longer in the parking lot. (
On October 1, 2013, Reed met with Young and informed him that Young would be placed on administrative leave, pending an investigation into the incident at the Town Hill Market parking lot. (SOF at PageID # 975.) Reed then retained Jonathan Goodman to conduct the investigation. (
On December 24, 2013, attorney Goodman issued a report on his investigation. (SOF at PageID # 975.) Goodman concluded that Young had been intoxicated at the time that he interacted with Cake and Fickett on September 25, 2013 and that Young was "hostile toward the officers, which dissuaded them from taking appropriate action . . . ." (Goodman Dep. (ECF No. 52-10) at PageID # 962.) On January 15, 2014, Reed sent Young a copy of the report and informed him that based on the contents of the report, and on Young's conduct during his administrative leave, he was contemplating taking disciplinary action against Young, up to and including a potential termination of Young's employment. (SOF at PageID #s 975-76.) Following a meeting with Young on January 20, 2014, Reed terminated Young's employment on January 22, 2014 and advised him of his right to appeal the termination to the Town Council. (SOF at PageID # 976.)
Young appealed the termination decision and requested a public hearing. (
Young brought suit against Defendant by filing a complaint in the Superior Court of the State of Maine, Hancock County. (ECF No. 3-3.) After Defendant removed the case to this Court on April 8, 2014, Plaintiff amended his complaint (ECF No. 23) (the "Complaint"), ultimately asserting seven claims against Defendant. Defendant brought a motion to dismiss certain of Plaintiff's claims, and this Court granted that motion in part and denied it in part. As a result of the order on the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 39), Count I and one of the claims asserted under Count V of the Complaint have been dismissed. Defendant has now moved for summary judgment on the remaining six counts of the Complaint.
The Court first evaluates Plaintiff's claims arising under federal law: his claim for disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et. seq. (the "ADA") (Count V) and his claim for a violation of the FMLA (Count VII).
A claim for disability discrimination under the ADA requires that a plaintiff show that "he (1) has a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (2) is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations; and (3) was subject to an adverse employment action based in whole or part on his disability."
Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that his alcoholism
Plaintiff must show that his condition constituted an impairment, that the life activity or activities Plaintiff asserts have been substantially limited constitute "major life activities," and that such life activity or life activities have in fact been substantially limited.
Proceeding to the second point of inquiry, the Court considers whether Plaintiff has identified in the record an impairment of major life activities, such as "[c]aring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, sitting, reaching, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, interacting with others, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). Notably, Plaintiff has not identified a single particular impaired activity that he asserts is a major life activity. Rather, he argues that he "would not have sought treatment by enrolling in a rehabilitation program in October 2013 had [Plaintiff] felt that his life activities were not substantially limited." (Pl.'s Opp. at PageID # 1059.) However, Plaintiff is incorrect to assume that enrollment in an alcohol abuse treatment program, alone, provides implicit evidence that major life activities have been impaired.
Moreover, for purposes of the pending Motion for Summary Judgment, the parties have stipulated that "[d]uring the time that [Plaintiff] served as police chief, his ability to perform his duties was never affected or impaired by his consumption of alcohol." (SOF at PageID # 973.) The Court must thus conclude that Plaintiff's alcoholism did not impair the substantial life function of working. No other life activity has been put forth by Plaintiff as a particular life activity that is substantially impaired. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy all of the elements of the disability determination, i.e., an impairment to a major life activity that is substantial.
To qualify as "disabled" under § 12102(1)(B), which defines a disability as having a record of a disability, a plaintiff must show that he has been classified (or misclassified) as having an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity.
Plaintiff has asserted that Town Council member Walsh spoke to Reed in the spring of 2013 about Young's drinking. Defendant disputes that such a discussion took place. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court assumes that Plaintiff could establish at trial that this discussion did occur and that such an unrecorded, undocumented conversation would constitute or give rise to a "record" in connection with the Town's employment of Young. Nonetheless, the discussion described by Walsh did not concern the impairment of a substantial life function. In fact, Walsh expressly stated that this conversation did not concern Young's ability to work or to continue serving as Chief of Police. Likewise, assuming Plaintiff could establish that at least one member of the Town Council stated that "[Young] has got to go" in the spring of 2013 and that Reed stated at that time that he had enough votes on the Town Council to remove Young from his position as Chief of Police,
Finally, Plaintiff, relying on the same facts just discussed, asserts that he was regarded by Defendant as disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Currently, under the ADA, "An individual meets the requirement of `being regarded as having [an impairment that can support a disability discrimination claim]' if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to [a prohibited action] because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A).
Plaintiff points to the same evidence offered as a purported record of Plaintiff's disability to support the proposition that Defendant was aware of his impairment and regarded him as impaired. However, it is not sufficient that the management of the Town may have had knowledge that Young drank alcohol during his off-duty time, or even that such consumption was arguably excessive in some cases.
First, while the record reflects that Reed and Young discussed Young's drinking in February of 2013, Reed's explanation of the Town's EAP-related services does not constitute a perception by the Town that Young was an alcoholic who was physically or mentally impaired as a result. Notably, as discussed above, no evidence exists in the record to support that any documentation was made of Young's drinking, or any related substance abuse condition, by the Town.
Furthermore, Defendant's allegations that Town Council members expressed concerns about Plaintiff in the spring of 2013, taken as true, do not support the conclusion that the Town regarded Young as impaired. The statements include opposition to Young's continued service as Chief of Police and questions about his personal life and conduct. Plaintiff has identified no statements where Reed or Town Council members identified Young as an alcoholic in Town Council meetings or in the records of the Town.
Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he was actually disabled under the ADA, because he has not presented this Court with a genuine factual dispute as to whether Young experienced a substantial limitation to any major life activity as a result of the impairment of being an alcoholic. He has also adduced no facts to demonstrate that the Town arguably had a record of Young having such a limitation. Finally, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Defendant regarded Plaintiff as impaired. Therefore, on this record, there is no genuine disputed issue of material fact. The Court concludes that Plaintiff cannot establish that he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA.
In its Motion, Defendant argues that, even if Young was disabled, the Town did not take an adverse employment action against Plaintiff on account of his disability. For the reasons explained below, the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff was not subjected to an adverse employment action because of his alcoholism. Therefore, even if, on the record before the Court, Plaintiff was deemed disabled under the ADA, Defendant would still be entitled to summary judgment in its favor on Count V.
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant "terminated [Plaintiff] because of his disabilities." (Compl. ¶ 81.) Framed in terms of the applicable analytical framework, Plaintiff would assert that he has made a prima facie showing that Plaintiff, a disabled employee, was subjected to the adverse employment action of termination because of his disability.
The Court nonetheless assumes that Plaintiff has met the minimum standard of a prima facie showing of a disability discrimination claim.
There are two flaws in Plaintiff's argument that prevent Plaintiff from making the necessary showing, under the burden-shifting framework, that the record could support his claim for disability discrimination. First, while Plaintiff contends that the conclusions reached by the independent investigator and accepted by Reed and a majority of the Town Council were in fact incorrect, he has not explained why the Town Council would not have been justified in accepting those conclusions, or why claiming to accept those conclusions should be characterized as subterfuge. To the extent that Young's interactions with Fickett and Cake while Young was offduty may have been influenced by Young's consumption of alcohol, the Court notes that an employer "may hold an employee who . . . is an alcoholic to the same qualification standards for employment or job performance and behavior that such entity holds other employees, even if any unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to the . . . alcoholism of such employee." 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4).
More fundamentally, Plaintiff has focused his efforts on attacking the fairness of the Town Council's decision-making process, but has not identified any facts which, if credited, would support the conclusion that discrimination against Young based on his disability was the actual basis for the Town's termination of Young's employment. Plaintiff makes great efforts to document, in a disputed factual account, the Town Council members who expressed concerns about, or opposition to, Young's employment as Chief of Police prior to the events of September 25, 2013. Plaintiff's factual assertions might support a conclusion that personal conflicts with Young existed prior to September 25, 2013, when the events occurred that are ostensibly at the center of the Town's disciplinary proceedings against Young. However, such conflicts and any related personal animus have not been shown by Plaintiff to have resulted from Young's alleged status as a person disabled by his alcoholism. The ADA does not protect a disabled person from adverse employment actions based on animus, but rather from "discriminatory animus."
Simply put, the Court concludes that the current record does not present a trialworthy issue as to the causal connection between Plaintiff's alleged disability and the termination of his employment. Assuming Plaintiff could meet the prima facie standard, the Court alternatively concludes that Plaintiff has failed to present evidence that makes a trialworthy issue of his contention that Defendant's stated reasons for the termination were pretext, and that the termination was a discriminatory action against Young for being an alcoholic.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant retaliated against him for his decision to seek and take leave under the FMLA by terminating his employment with the Town. "[T]o make out a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that: 1) he availed himself of a protected right under the FMLA, 2) he was adversely affected by an employment decision, and 3) there was a causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action."
As in the ADA disability discrimination analysis, the burden-shifting framework applies to an FMLA retaliation claim where the plaintiff has not identified direct evidence of retaliation.
Given that Plaintiff's proffered evidence does not stand for the proposition that the Town was influenced by the fact that Plaintiff took an FMLA leave in reaching its decision to terminate his employment, it is doubtful that Plaintiff can satisfy this first step of a prima facie showing in the burden-shifting analysis. Even if he could be said to meet that standard, however, Plaintiff has identified its non-retaliatory, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating Plaintiff's employment, and Plaintiff has not shown evidence of pretext that could meet his burden of proving retaliation.
Plaintiff has not identified any facts tending to suggest that the Town Council's decision to terminate Young's employment was caused or influenced by his decision to take medical leave. To the contrary, Plaintiff relies upon statements that he regards as evidence of a longstanding desire by certain Town Council Members to fire Young, a desire that Plaintiff suggests existed prior not only to his FMLA leave, but also to the incident on September 25, 2013, and Young's ensuing suspension. Because the record contains no credible evidence that Young's medical leave caused the Town to terminate his employment, the Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to Count VII.
Plaintiff's remaining claims are his claim for review of the Town's decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment under Maine Rule 80B (Count II), his claim of breach of contract (Count III), and his claim of violation of Maine's Freedom of Access Act, 1 M.R.S.A. § 404 (Count IV). The claims focus on the contractual and procedural aspects of Plaintiff's employment and termination of Plaintiff by a municipal entity. While the Motion for Summary Judgment presents arguments in favor of dismissal of each of these three state claims, the Court has determined as a matter of comity that those arguments are best examined by the state court now that Plaintiff's discrimination and retaliation claims are resolved. As a general matter, when a federal court sitting in subject matter jurisdiction grants summary judgment in favor of a defendant on all federal claims, it should simply dismiss any pendent state claims to allow the plaintiff to refile them in state court.
For the reasons just stated, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 55) on Counts V-VII and DISMISSES Counts II-IV WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED.
