JOHN C. NIVISON, Magistrate Judge.
In this action, Plaintiff, an inmate at the Maine State Prison, alleges, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that Defendants have acted, and continue to act, with deliberate indifference toward his serious medical condition. The matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's motions for a physical examination (ECF Nos. 19, 46), which motions are construed requests for preliminary injunctive relief.
Plaintiff alleges that he has developed a condition on his skull, which condition he describes as an anomaly, and that he has experienced headaches, vertigo, and visual difficulties. Plaintiff contends Defendants have denied Plaintiff's request for a referral to outside providers and have not properly assessed Plaintiff to rule out certain disease processes.
Through his motions for physical examination, Plaintiff requests x-ray studies of his skull, a metabolic panel, renal function panel, endocrine study, and other studies. Plaintiff asserts that he is willing to pay for the studies, if they are obtained from outside providers. Plaintiff requests, in the alternative, that Defendants conduct the studies, provided that Plaintiff set parameters for the studies and that the x-rays are reviewed by an outside provider. (See, ECF Nos. 19, 32, 46.)
As referenced above, because Plaintiff asks to the Court to direct a certain aspect of Plaintiff's medical treatment, Plaintiff's motions for physical examination are construed as motions for injunctive relief.
When evaluating a request for injunctive relief, courts "must consider (1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the potential for irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) the balance of relevant impositions, i.e., the hardship to the nonmovant if enjoined as contrasted with the hardship to the movant if no injunction issues; and (4) the effect (if any) of the court's ruling on the public interest."
Plaintiff's claim arises under the Eighth Amendment, made actionable by the civil rights act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In its final clause, the Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Based on this prohibition, "courts have derived the principles that govern the permissible conditions under which prisoners are held and that establish the medical treatment those prisoners must be afforded." Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 82 (1st Cir. —) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). To succeed on a claim of inadequate or delayed medical care, Plaintiff must demonstrate that Defendants have acted with "deliberate indifference" toward "a substantial risk of serious harm to health," Coscia v. Town of Pembroke, 659 F.3d 37, 39 (1st Cir. 2011), or "serious medical need[]," Feeney v. Corr. Med. Servs., 464 F.3d 158, 161 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-106 (1976)). To carry his burden, Plaintiff must satisfy both an objective and a subjective standard. Leavitt v. Corr. Med. Servs., 645 F.3d 484, 497 (1st Cir. 2011).
The objective standard focuses on the seriousness of the risk of harm to the inmate's health. For a medical condition to be objectively "serious," there must be "a sufficiently substantial `risk of serious damage to [the inmate's] future health.'" Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)). A medical need is serious if it has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment, or is so obvious that even a lay person would recognize a need for medical intervention. Leavitt, 645 F.3d at 497; Gaudreault v. Mun. of Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 956 (1991).
The subjective standard involves the culpability of the defendant. To establish liability, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant possessed a culpable state of mind amounting to "deliberate indifference to an inmate's health or safety." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (internal quotation marks omitted). Deliberate indifference is akin to criminal recklessness, "requiring actual knowledge of impending harm, easily preventable." Feeney, 464 F.3d at 162 (quoting Watson v. Caton, 984 F.2d 537, 540 (1st Cir. 1993)). The focus of the deliberate indifference analysis "is on what the jailers knew and what they did in response." Burrell v. Hampshire Cnty., 307 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2002). In other words, the subjective standard focuses on whether the Defendants had a "purposeful intent" to neglect Plaintiff's serious medical needs. Perry v. Roy, 782 F.3d 73, 79 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105). A showing of such an intent requires evidence that the alleged absence or inadequacy of treatment was intentional. Id. (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105 (holding that "an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care" is not a constitutional violation), and Watson, 984 F.2d at 540 ("The courts have consistently refused . . . to conclude that simple medical malpractice rises to the level of cruel and unusual punishment.")). "The typical example of a case of deliberative indifference would be one in which treatment is denied in order to punish the inmate." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Deliberate indifference thus must be based on much more than ordinary negligence. The First Circuit has explained:
Torraco v. Maloney, 923 F.2d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 1991).
The Court considered a similar motion by Plaintiff in the matter of Gladu v. Correct Care Solutions, et al., No. 2:15-cv-00384-JAW. In that action, Plaintiff alleged that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs, and, by motion, asked the Court to direct the defendants to provide certain treatment and to refer Plaintiff to an outside specialist. In particular, Plaintiff sought treatment for "a `skull anomaly' that could suggest a `skull base tumor.'" (May 31, 2017, Recommended Decision, ECF No. 405 at 3.) Upon review of the record in the prior action, I wrote:
(Id. at 4 - 5, citing ECF No. 388-1.) Given the record evidence, I recommended the Court deny Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief.
The record evidence in this case reveals that Plaintiff's complaint is part of a continuing disagreement between Plaintiff and Defendants regarding Plaintiff's medical treatment, including the assessment of the "skull anomaly" that was the subject of a request for injunctive relief in the prior action. The record evidence, including the medical records included as exhibits to Plaintiff's motions, does not support a finding that Plaintiff is likely to prevail on his deliberate indifference claim. In fact, Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence to support a negligence finding.
Because Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he is likely to prevail on his claim, Plaintiff is not entitled to the injunctive relief he requests. That is, because Plaintiff has not established the "sine qua non" of the proof necessary for preliminary injunctive relief, Plaintiff's request for the Court to intervene in his medical care must fail. New Comm Wireless Servs., Inc., 287 F.3d at 9 (1st Cir. 2002). The denial of the motions is also consistent with the view that "judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration." Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982).
Based on the foregoing analysis, I deny Plaintiff's Motion to Admit Treatises (ECF No. 23) and Motion for Expedited Ruling. (ECF No. 30.) I also recommend the Court deny Plaintiff's Motions for Physical Examination. (ECF Nos. 19, 46.)