MARILYN J. KELLY, C.J.
In these consolidated cases, we must determine the proper interpretation of the venue statute
Plaintiffs filed their suits in Wayne County, alleging that defendant terminated their employment in violation of the CRA. The Court of Appeals, relying on its decision in Barnes v. Int'l Business Machines Corp.,
We disagree with the Barnes decision and overrule it.
Plaintiffs are African-Americans formerly employed by defendant. They worked for defendant at banking centers in Wayne County. On or around May 17, 2007, defendant terminated their employment for alleged misconduct. Plaintiff Sharon Champion learned of her dismissal through a telephone call from defendant's office in Oakland County to her home in Wayne County. The parties dispute where plaintiff Brandon Brightwell received notice of his dismissal.
Plaintiffs filed separate lawsuits in Wayne County, each alleging that defendant had terminated their employment for reasons of racial discrimination in violation of the CRA.
Andrzejewski averred in his affidavit that he was personally involved in the final decisions to terminate plaintiffs' employment and that those decisions were made in the Southfield regional office. Defendant claimed that because it made the decisions in Oakland County, venue was proper only there. Both trial courts declined to change venue. Defendant sought interlocutory appeals in both cases.
The Court of Appeals granted both applications for leave to appeal, consolidated the appeals, and reversed the trial courts' rulings in a divided decision. Relying on Barnes, the lead opinion concluded that "the appropriate venue for a CRA cause of action ... depends on where the defendant's violation occurred, not where the plaintiff was injured."
The Court of Appeals concurrence agreed that "venue is appropriate where the CRA was violated through the use of improper characteristics in making an employment decision."
An appellate court uses the clearly erroneous standard to review a trial court's ruling on a motion to change venue.
The relevant statutory provision, MCL 37.2801, provides in part:
As always, our analysis begins with the language of the statute.
These cases involve only the first clause of subsection (2), which makes venue proper "in the circuit court for the county where the alleged violation occurred."
The question of where venue properly lies for a lawsuit brought under the CRA turns on the meaning of the phrase "where the alleged violation occurred" found in MCL 37.2801(2). "Violation" is defined in part as "1. the act of violating or the state of being violated. 2. a breach or infringement, as of a law or promise."
An employer shall not do any of the following:
A "violation" of MCL 37.2202, therefore, is equally dependent on an adverse employment action (in these cases the act of "discharg[ing]") and an improper motive for taking that action (a decision to discriminate "because of" a protected status). We believe it logically follows that a violation of the CRA "occur[s]" when the discriminatory decision is made and adverse employment actions are implemented.
Thus, we agree with Judge WHITE's concurrence in Barnes, which is also consistent with other courts' interpretations of similar venue provisions. The majority in Barnes erred by restricting what constitutes a violation of the CRA to "adverse employment decisions."
We overrule Barnes because it restricted the analysis of a violation of the CRA to the adverse employment decision. Barnes is inconsistent with MCL 37.2202(1)(a) and the meaning of "violation" and "occurred" in MCL 37.2801.
However, this determination does not fully resolve the issue before us. A remaining question is: What specific actions constitute the unlawful discharge that establishes the CRA violation? Venue in these cases was clearly proper in Oakland County because it is undisputed that defendant resides in Oakland County. However, plaintiffs filed suit in Wayne County. The Court of Appeals determined that the trial courts erred by denying defendant's motions to change venue to Oakland County because venue did not properly lie in Wayne County. Therefore, we must determine whether a CRA violation occurred in Wayne County that would provide a basis for venue in that location as well.
Defendant asserts that, even if Barnes is overruled, venue is proper only in Oakland County because that is where defendant completed several actions necessary to effectuate each plaintiff's discharge. For example, it removed plaintiffs from its payroll system at its Oakland County office. Plaintiffs counter that the only action that was relevant was the communication of the discharge decisions to them.
We reject both parties' arguments. It would be arbitrary to consider any of the suggested actions entirely dispositive of where the CRA violation occurred. Discrimination claims often involve numerous actions concerning employers' practices.
Finally, under this approach, defendants could unilaterally control venue by completing administrative tasks related to terminating a plaintiff's employment in their choice of locales. Or they could order an employee to report to a location in the venue they desire and fire the employee there. We believe these are not results that the Legislature intended in enacting the CRA.
We conclude that the adverse employment actions in these cases occurred where plaintiffs' place of employment was located.
As Judge WHITE observed, it is also at this point that the allegedly unlawful discharge is fully "implemented and the discrimination is inflicted."
The concurrence/dissent erroneously limits the occurrence of a violation solely to the place where a discriminatory decision is communicated to an employee. In doing so, it attaches too much significance to where the disclosure of the allegedly discriminatory discharge occurs. Indeed, the essence of the concurrence/dissent's conclusion is found in its statement that "it can only be the actual communication, which itself implements a discriminatory
The concurrence/dissent offers no persuasive analysis to support its conclusion that the CRA violation must occur where the discharge is communicated. The right being violated under the CRA is not the right to be free from communication of adverse employment actions. Rather, it is the right to be free from actions that actually separate the employee from gainful employment for discriminatory reasons.
It is true that the actus reus and mens rea of a CRA violation converge when a defendant communicates a discriminatory decision to an employee. But while that convergence causes the CRA violation, it does not settle the issue of what constitutes discharging the employee: the communication of the discriminatory decision or removing the employee's right to work at his or her place of employment.
The concurrence/dissent's definition of "discharge" provides greater support for our interpretation.
The concurrence/dissent's determination of when a CRA violation occurs leads it to assert that the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius undermines our conclusion.
Moreover, the last portion of the provision furnishing a basis for venue in MCL 37.2801(2) is explicitly tied to locations over which the employer has exclusive control; specifically, it provides for proper venue in "the county where the person against whom the civil complaint is filed resides or has his principal place of business." Presumably, if the Legislature had also intended that "where the alleged violation occurred" be a place over which a defendant had full control, it would have said so.
The Legislature certainly could have provided venue in "the county where the person against whom the civil complaint is filed resides, has its principal place of business, or communicates the alleged violation to the employee." It did not do so. This omission suggests that the phrase "where the alleged violation occurred" was not similarly meant to be limited to locations subject to a defendant's exclusive control.
Finally, our analysis avoids the arbitrariness of the approaches suggested by the parties and accepted by the concurrence/dissent. Employers and employees generally both have some influence in determining where an employment relationship is formulated. "Venue rules traditionally have served to ensure that proceedings are held in the most convenient forum,"
We again reject the dissent's assertion that our decision is policy driven and that our analysis is merely justification for a predetermined interpretation. In fact, our decision is reasonably derived from the language of the statute. This decision invokes at least the following exercises in statutory interpretation: (1) an attempt to reasonably comprehend the meaning of "violation," "occurred," and "discharge" in the CRA, (2) an attempt to reasonably comprehend the meaning of these terms in the context of MCL 37.2801(2) as a whole, (3) an attempt to assess where the actus reus and the mens rea of the statute converge, (4) an attempt to compare the language of MCL 37.2801(2) with that of its predecessor statute, (5) an assessment of the relevance of traditional maxims of statutory construction, in this case expressio unius est exclusio alterius, (6) an attempt to assess alternative meanings of the relevant statutory terms, including those adopted by the concurrence/dissent, in light of the overall purposes of the statute, and (7) an attempt to compare and contrast the caselaw of other states construing similar language. That we additionally point out that our interpretation results in a considerably more convenient forum than that of the dissent does not detract from the focus of our interpretative approach.
Plaintiffs both worked for defendant in Wayne County. Because adverse employment actions—the severance of plaintiffs' employment relationships—took place in Wayne County, the CRA violations occurred in Wayne County. Thus, venue properly lay in Wayne County under MCL 37.2801(2). Therefore, the Court of Appeals incorrectly held that the trial courts clearly erred by denying defendant's motion to change venue to Oakland County.
We conclude that, under MCL 37.2801(2), a violation of the CRA occurs when the alleged discriminatory decision is made and the allegedly adverse employment
We further conclude that the CRA violation in a case alleging discharge from employment is the severance of the employment relationship. The decisions and actions constituting that violation are implemented, and therefore occur, when the employee is no longer entitled to enter the workplace and perform the responsibilities of employment.
In these cases, each plaintiffs employment relationship with defendant was based and severed in Wayne County. Thus, defendant's alleged violations of the CRA occurred in Wayne County. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand these cases to the Wayne Circuit Court for further proceedings there on plaintiffs' claims.
MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, MARKMAN, and HATHAWAY, JJ., concurred with MARILYN J. KELLY, C.J.
YOUNG, J., (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur with the majority to the extent that it reverses the judgment of the Court of Appeals and instead holds that venue is proper under the Civil Rights Act (CRA) in the places where the allegedly discriminatory decision was made and implemented. I dissent, however, from the majority's analysis regarding when this implementation occurs. In order to justify its interpretation that venue is always proper at an employee's place of work, the majority holds that a violation of the CRA has not occurred at the moment when an employer communicates a discriminatory employment decision to an employee. This conclusion is contrary to the basic principle that the CRA violation occurs with the convergence of a prohibited act and a discriminatory intent. In light of that principle, I believe that the communication of the discriminatory decision is itself the CRA violation. Thus, once an adverse employment action is actually communicated, a violation has occurred and the plaintiff's claim becomes actionable, thereby making venue proper under the plain language of the CRA only in those places where the violation occurred. I also dissent from the majority's related holding that where an employee physically works provides an independently proper place of venue, even when a violation of the CRA did not occur in that location. While the location of employment may present a convenient or logical forum, because it is not necessarily where a statutory violation occurs for the purposes of the CRA's venue provision, I dissent from the portion of the majority's opinion manufacturing it as a proper venue.
The venue provision within the CRA provides, in relevant part: "An action commenced pursuant to [MCL 37.2801(1)] may be brought in the circuit court for the county where the alleged violation occurred, or for the county where the person against whom the civil complaint is filed resides or has his principal place of business."
Our interpretation of this statute is governed by clear and uncontroversial rules of statutory construction. "In interpreting statutory language, this Court's primary goal is to give effect to the Legislature's intent. If the Legislature has clearly expressed its intent in the language of the statute, that statute must be enforced as written, free of any `contrary judicial gloss.'"
The language of the CRA clearly requires that a defendant commit an actus reus (an adverse employment action, such as a "discharge") with a specific mens rea (a discriminatory intent) in order to violate its provisions. Moreover, a violation of the CRA only occurs when an improper discriminatory intent is actually communicated within the context of the adverse employment action.
The majority disagrees with this straightforward understanding and application of the CRA's venue provision, although it cannot explain why the convergence of the mens rea and actus reus does not equate with a statutory violation— here, two discharges. The majority confusingly explains that "it is not the communication of the discharge that violates the
I think that scarcely one in a thousand people would believe that a person is not "discharged" from employment at the moment an employer says to the employee: "You're fired." Yet in the context of discriminatory discharges under the CRA, the majority holds otherwise. The majority thus believes that the communication or implementation of a discriminatory decision only causes a future violation of the CRA at some later, indeterminate time (when an employee is actually prevented from returning to the workplace or performing his work duties) and is not itself the actual violation of the CRA. I fail to see how this can be true. An employer who tells an employee that he is fired actually severs the employment relationship at that time; if he also communicates a discriminatory intent to the employee at this time, he has violated the CRA. Such a convergence is more than a mere discriminatory statement devoid of meaning or consequence until some later time. The majority fails to understand that the issue of when a person is fired is inextricably linked to where the person is fired, given that the location(s) at the time the discharge occurs establish the statutory venue.
The majority's analysis on this point is also internally inconsistent. If the communication terminating employment only caused a later violation that occurred at the employee's place of work, then only the place of employment could ever be the locus of the violation that establishes venue under the CRA. However, the majority opinion also holds that a violation may occur elsewhere at some place other than the place of employment. Under the majority's theory, why would the place where the communication is received, if it is not the place of actual employment, ever be a proper venue if it were not the place where the actus reus and mens rea converge to cause the violation? The majority cannot explain this anomaly.
Similarly, the majority opinion additionally provides that the "adverse employment actions in these cases occurred where the plaintiffs' place of employment was located"
The majority's position is further undermined by the fact that the CRA explicitly makes the defendant's place of business a proper venue, while at the same time it says nothing about plaintiffs place of employment. The CRA's venue provision provides that a CRA action "may be brought in the circuit court for the county where ... the person against whom the civil complaint is filed resides or has his principal place of business."
That the majority is expanding the scope of the CRA is further underscored when considering potential violations that are not discriminatory discharges, but are nonetheless CRA violations that will therefore be implicated by this decision. As previously noted, the CRA prohibits discriminatory "fail[ures] or refus[als] to hire or recruit" and other unnamed types of general employment discrimination against a person.
Finally, the majority notes several policy considerations supporting its position, but I believe that each is unavailing to displace the clear language of the statute. The majority argues that its additional rule creates another convenient forum and that it also prevents an employer from controlling the place of venue by choosing where he fires an employee. First, the resort to "convenience" as a justification for the rule in this case conflates forum non conveniens theory with the statutory venue provision.
For these reasons, I would restrict venue solely to the place of the violation, as defined by where the mens rea and actus reus converge, in accordance with the clear terms of the statute. To the extent that the majority interprets this state's civil rights laws in a way that prevents a putative plaintiff's claims from becoming actionable the moment a violation of the CRA occurs, I dissent.
CORRIGAN, J., concurred with YOUNG, J.
WEAVER, J., (dissenting).
I dissent. I would not have granted leave to appeal in this case because I am not persuaded that the Court of Appeals erred or that there was any material injustice.
However, Gross interpreted the tort venue provision, MCL 600.1629, which was added as part of the tort reforms enacted in 1986. One of the Legislature's explicit goals was to reduce forum-shopping by plaintiffs. Gross, 448 Mich. at 157-158, 528 N.W.2d 707. By contrast, MCL 37.2801 has not been amended since it was enacted as part of the CRA in 1976. Thus, we find wanting Barnes's determination that Gross's reasoning was applicable to discrimination cases. On the contrary, much more persuasive reasons exist to interpret the CRA venue provision as we do today.
The CRA prohibits discrimination in a variety of employment decisions, so this right implicitly includes the right to retain employment free from discrimination based on a protected status.
Therefore, an interpretation of MCL 37.2801(2) resulting in an outcome such as the one posited in the concurrence/dissent's hypothetical example, post at 604 n. 12, does indeed find support in the statutory language. The concurrence/dissent's argument on this point is essentially that our approach would lead to inappropriate venues. It is in effect a policy argument asserting that the concurrence/dissent's approach is a preferable one; it is not an argument that the statutory language provides greater support for its approach.
Thus, because the disagreement between the majority and the concurrence/dissent does not relate to the timing of when a discharge occurs, the concurrence/dissent misses the mark with several of its criticisms of our analysis. Post at 602, 602-03 & n. 7, 605-06. This misunderstanding of our approach is particularly evident in the last sentence of the concurrence/dissent. We do not "interpret[] this state's civil rights laws in a way that prevents a putative plaintiff's claims from becoming actionable the moment a violation of the CRA occurs...." Post at 607. The pertinent question and point of disagreement between this opinion and the concurrence/dissent is where, not when, the violation is actionable.
Undoubtedly, as the concurrence/dissent observes, the venue provision in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(3), provides for venue in more locations than does MCL 37.2801(2). But that fact fails to undermine our interpretation of the statutory language. It is guesswork to conclude that "the Michigan Legislature declined to adopt comparable language when it crafted Michigan's CRA." Post at 605-06. The precursor of MCL 37.2801, enacted before Title VII, contained similar language allowing venue in "the county wherein the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice is alleged to have occurred...." Former MCL 37.4, repealed by 1976 PA 453. One could just as easily surmise that the Legislature recycled that language when it crafted MCL 37.2801. Again, absent clear indications of the Legislature's intent, this is an exercise in futility.
Whether our construction of MCL 37.2801(2) would render some provisions of Title VII "redundant" or "surplusage," post at 605-06 n. 18, is irrelevant. The language of the CRA venue provision, as illustrated by the concurrence/dissent, is quite different from that used in Title VII.
Second, as the United States Supreme Court has observed, proper application of the canon requires the "essential extrastatutory ingredient of an expression-exclusion demonstration, the series of terms from which an omission bespeaks a negative implication. The canon depends on identifying a series of two or more terms or things that should be understood to go hand in hand." Chevron USA Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 80-81, 122 S.Ct. 2045, 153 L.Ed.2d 82 (2002). Here, the provisions establishing venue where a defendant "resides" or has its "principal place of business" refer to fixed and readily ascertainable locations. By contrast, where "the alleged [CRA] violation occurred" is a more amorphous concept that does not go hand in hand with the others.
Consider the example of an employee who works for her employer exclusively in Wayne County. Under the concurrence/dissent's approach, venue for a discriminatory discharge case would not be proper in Wayne County if the employer invited her to lunch in Windsor, Canada to tell her she was discharged. Similarly, the employee might attend a work retreat in the Upper Peninsula at her employer's request and be informed there that she was discharged. The concurrence/dissent would find venue proper in the Upper Peninsula rather than in Wayne County, notwithstanding that the Upper Peninsula may have no other connection to either the employer or the employee.
Moreover, the "parallel venue provisions" found in MCL 600.1629 that the concurrence/dissent cites are inapposite to MCL 37.2801(2). MCL 600.1629(1)(b) merely refers to a plaintiff's residence or place of business as an alternative venue to be invoked if venue cannot be established under MCL 600.1629(1)(a). MCL 37.2801 contains no such alternative venue provision.
To advance its argument, the majority erroneously relies on this dissent's definition of "discharge," which again is commonly defined as "to relieve of obligation, responsibility"; "to relieve or deprive of office, employment, etc.; dismiss from service." Ante at 598 & n. 37. For our purposes, the relevant words here are the verbs "relieve," "deprive," and "dismiss" because they add context to the statutory verb "discharge," which is the prohibited
Additionally, I do not subscribe, as the majority curiously implies, to the view that venue is limited to the places over which defendant has exclusive control. See ante at 599. This is an altogether odd argument that, to the best of my knowledge, has not been advanced by any party or justice, and certainly not by me, as such a construction would be contrary to the language of the statute. Indeed, my construction of the statute permits what the wording explicitly provides: venue is proper in the place of the violation (here, a discharge), regardless under whose control that place falls. Accordingly, venue exists where the Legislature has stated that venue should exist, and "our judicial role `precludes imposing different policy choices than those selected by the Legislature....'" Robertson v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 465 Mich. 732, 759, 641 N.W.2d 567 (2002), quoting People v. Sobczak-Obetts, 463 Mich. 687, 694, 625 N.W.2d 764 (2001).
Moreover, the mere fact that one can conceive of an exceptional hypothetical case does not mean that we should rewrite the general rule contrary to the plain meaning of the statute. I note that most cases will likely not implicate the distinction drawn between these opinions because many, if not most, employment violations occur at a person's place of employment. Thus, my interpretation of the venue provision does not lead to a situation that is contrary to common sense, that would deprive the parties of a convenient forum, or that will work a hardship against prosecuting potential CRA violations.
