ZAHRA, J.
We granted leave in these cases to address the question whether a person injured while driving a motor vehicle that the person had taken contrary to the express prohibition of the owner may avail himself or herself of personal protection insurance benefits (commonly known as "PIP benefits") under the no-fault act,
We hold that any person who takes a vehicle contrary to a provision of the Michigan Penal Code
In reaching this conclusion, we consider and reject two distinct legal theories that the respective panels of the Court of Appeals applied in concluding that the PIP claimants are not excluded from receiving benefits by MCL 500.3113(a). In Spectrum Health Hospitals v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. of Michigan (Docket No. 142874), we examine the "chain of permissive use" theory, which the Court of Appeals initially adopted in Bronson Methodist Hospital v. Forshee.
In Progressive Marathon Insurance Co. v. DeYoung (Docket No. 143330), we examine the "family joyriding exception" to MCL 500.3113(a). This theory, first articulated in Justice LEVIN's plurality opinion in Priesman v. Meridian Mutual Insurance Co.,
Therefore, in both Spectrum Health (Docket No. 142874) and Progressive (Docket No. 143330), we reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals and remand these cases to their respective circuit courts for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
PIP claimant Craig Smith, Jr. (Craig Jr.), was injured in a single-car accident that occurred while he was driving a vehicle owned by his father, Craig Smith, Sr. (Craig Sr.), and insured by Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Michigan and Farm Bureau General Insurance Company of Michigan (collectively "Farm Bureau"). Craig Sr. had forbidden Craig Jr. to operate the vehicle because he had no valid driver's license. Craig Jr. acknowledged that he knew he was forbidden to operate the vehicle. Craig Sr. entrusted the vehicle to Craig Jr.'s girlfriend, Kathleen Chirco, to enable Craig Jr. and Kathleen to perform landscaping services. Nevertheless, Craig Sr. instructed Kathleen, in Craig Jr.'s presence, that she was not to allow Craig Jr. to drive it. That night, Craig Jr. began drinking and asked Kathleen for the keys to Craig Sr.'s vehicle. Although she initially resisted, Kathleen eventually gave him the keys, and he later crashed the vehicle into a tree. Craig Jr. pleaded no contest to operating while intoxicated causing serious injury, MCL 257.625, and was sentenced to a minimum of 2½ years in prison.
Spectrum Health Hospitals, which rendered care to Craig Jr., brought suit against Farm Bureau to recover payment for those services and subsequently moved for summary disposition. Farm Bureau opposed Spectrum Health's motion and took the position that Craig Jr. was not entitled to PIP benefits because the vehicle he was using had been taken unlawfully. The circuit court granted summary disposition in favor of Spectrum Health, ruling that Kathleen had been empowered to permit Craig Jr. to operate the vehicle. The Court of Appeals affirmed, applying the chain-of-permissive-use theory from Bronson to conclude that Craig Jr. had not taken the vehicle unlawfully.
This Court granted Farm Bureau's application for leave to appeal, requesting the parties to address
By age 26, Ryan DeYoung had accumulated three drunk-driving convictions, which resulted in the repeated loss of his valid driver's license beginning at age 17. Ryan's wife, Nicole DeYoung, owned and insured the family's four vehicles with Progressive Marathon Insurance Company. Ryan was a named excluded driver on the Progressive policy. As a result, Nicole expressly prohibited Ryan from driving the vehicles, including the 2001 Oldsmobile Bravada that she used as her principal vehicle. On the night of September 17, 2008, Ryan came home intoxicated and without his house key. He banged on the window of their home. Nicole rose from her bed, admitted him, and, perceiving his intoxicated state, went back to bed. Ryan took the key to the Bravada out of Nicole's purse and then took the vehicle, contrary to Nicole's standing instructions and without her permission.
Within 20 minutes of taking Nicole's vehicle, Ryan was badly injured in a single-car accident. He incurred bills of more than $53,000 at Spectrum Health Hospitals and another $232,000 at Mary Free Bed Rehabilitation Hospital. Progressive denied PIP benefits, arguing that Ryan had been injured while using a vehicle that he had unlawfully taken. It commenced a declaratory action against Ryan and Nicole on this basis. Spectrum Health and Mary Free Bed intervened as cross-plaintiffs to recover payment from Progressive for the outstanding bills. Spectrum Health and Mary Free Bed also filed a claim with the Michigan Assigned Claims Facility, which designated Citizens Insurance Company of America to respond to Ryan's claim. Citizens also denied coverage, and Progressive named Citizens as a cross-defendant in this lawsuit.
Progressive moved for summary disposition, contending that at the time of the accident Ryan was using a motor vehicle that he had taken unlawfully and without a reasonable belief that he was entitled to do so, which precluded him from receiving PIP benefits under MCL 500.3113(a). The circuit court granted summary disposition to both Progressive and Citizens, ruling that although the Court of Appeals decisions recognizing and applying the family-joyriding exception were binding precedent, none had extended the exception to a case in which the family member was a named excluded driver on the underlying no-fault policy. The circuit court concluded that "[t]o further extend the `joyriding' exception so as to overturn excluded driver provisions is to increase the risk in all such policies, and may result in good drivers with uninsurable family members (due to excessive risk associated with poor driving records) becoming uninsurable themselves." The circuit court concluded that it would "not engage in such rewriting of private contracts."
The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that it had no alternative but to follow the binding precedent of prior Court of Appeals decisions recognizing and applying the family-joyriding exception to the disqualification from coverage of MCL 500.3113(a).
These cases involve the interpretation of MCL 500.3113(a). Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law that this Court reviews de novo.
A circuit court's decision on a motion for summary disposition is also reviewed de novo.
MCL 500.3113 excludes certain people from entitlement to PIP benefits. It states in relevant part:
Each of these cases involves a Court of Appeals decision not to apply the PIP benefits exclusion in MCL 500.3113(a) to the underlying claimant. In Spectrum Health, the Court of Appeals applied the chain-of-permissive-use theory articulated in Bronson
In determining the Legislature's intended meaning of the phrase "taken unlawfully," we must accord the phrase its plain and ordinary meaning, and we may consult dictionary definitions because the no-fault act does not define the phrase.
The Michigan Penal Code contains several statutes that prohibit "takings," including two that prohibit "joyriding," MCL 750.413 and MCL 750.414. MCL 750.413 states that "[a]ny person who shall, wilfully and without authority, take possession of and drive or take away ... any motor vehicle, belonging to another, shall be guilty of a felony...." Similarly, MCL 750.414 provides in pertinent part that "[a]ny person who takes or uses without authority any motor vehicle without intent to steal the same, or who is a party to such unauthorized taking or using, is guilty of a misdemeanor...."
Because a taking does not have to be larcenous to be unlawful, the phrase "taken unlawfully" in MCL 500.3113(a) applies to anyone who takes a vehicle without the authority of the owner, regardless of whether that person intended to steal
In Spectrum Health, the Court of Appeals applied the "chain of permissive use" theory from Bronson to allow the injured claimant to recover PIP benefits. In Bronson, the injured claimant, Mark Forshee, was drinking beer and taking controlled substances with three friends, Thomas Pefley, William Morrow, and Brian Antles.
Later that night, another police officer saw the car speeding and signaled the driver to stop.
The Bronson Court reversed and concluded that Forshee was entitled to recover PIP benefits. After observing the lack of caselaw interpreting the "unlawful taking" language in MCL 500.3113(a), the Bronson Court turned for "guidance [to] the decisions that have construed whether a vehicle was taken with consent for purposes of the owner's liability statute, MCL 257.401."
While Bronson recognized that MCL 500.3113(a) "is not concerned with placing the liability of [sic] the proper party, but, rather, with precluding the receipt of [PIP] benefits by someone who has unlawfully taken an automobile,"
We hold that the Bronson Court's "chain of permissive use" theory is inconsistent with the statutory language of the no-fault act. In articulating its theory, Bronson first looked to another statutory scheme, the owner's liability statute, to interpret the meaning of MCL 500.3113(a). However, the first step of statutory interpretation is to review the language of the statute at issue, not that of another statute. Indeed, the relevant phrase in MCL 500.3113(a) that we must interpret, "taken unlawfully," does not appear in the owner's liability statute that Bronson considered analogous.
The owner's liability statute, MCL 257.401, differs from the no-fault act in several important respects.
Not only did the Bronson Court err by analogizing the owner's liability statute to the no-fault act, it erroneously applied this Court's caselaw interpreting the owner's liability statute. Cowan indeed articulated a broad conception of consent in attempting to interpret the broad language in the owner's liability statute.
Furthermore, in Bieszck v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., this Court held that a rental contract forbidding anyone under age 25 from operating the rented vehicle conclusively rebutted the presumption that the 21-year-old driver was operating the vehicle with the owner's express or implied consent.
For all these reasons, we believe that the "chain of permissive use" theory set forth in Bronson does not faithfully apply the standard articulated in MCL 500.3113(a) to determine whether the claimant "had taken [the vehicle] unlawfully." Therefore, we overrule Bronson to the extent it is inconsistent with the plain meaning of MCL 500.3113(a). In examining whether a taking is unlawful within the meaning of MCL 500.3113(a), it is irrelevant whether the taking would have subjected the vehicle's owner to vicarious liability under MCL 257.401. What is relevant to this determination is whether the taking was "without authority" within the meaning of MCL 750.413 or MCL 750.414. If so, then the taking was "unlawful" within the meaning of MCL 500.3113(a).
Spectrum Health argues that Craig Jr. did not unlawfully take the vehicle because Kathleen had given him permission to take it. We disagree because a taking does not have to be forcible to be unlawful. Given the undisputed fact that Craig Jr. took the vehicle contrary to the express prohibition of the vehicle's owner (his father), Spectrum Health provides no legal support for its conclusion that Craig Jr.'s actions did not violate MCL 750.414. Accordingly, the circuit court and Court of Appeals erred by granting Spectrum Health's motion for summary disposition because MCL 500.3113(a) precludes PIP benefits in this case.
In Progressive, the Court of Appeals applied the "family joyriding" exception, first articulated in Justice LEVIN's plurality opinion in Priesman,
This Court granted leave to appeal,
The plurality opinion then looked to the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act (UMVARA) and explained that the UMVARA "excepts from coverage a `converter' — a person who steals — unless covered under a no-fault policy issued to the converter or a spouse or other relative in the same household."
The plurality, however, did not specifically define the phrase "taken unlawfully" as pertaining exclusively to thieves, but concluded instead that the phrase did not include joyriding teenage family members, stating:
Subsequent Court of Appeals panels interpreted this "family joyriding" exception. In Butterworth, the Court examined Priesman and MCL 500.3113(a) to determine whether that provision applied to an adult family member who did not live with his parents.
Later, the Court of Appeals in Mester declined "to extend the Priesman holding to apply to anyone who is merely joyriding."
Finally, in Roberts, an inebriated 12-year-old, Kyle Roberts, was injured while
As stated, Justice LEVIN's plurality opinion in Priesman is the only instance in which this Court addressed the "taken unlawfully" language in MCL 500.3113(a). It is axiomatic that the first step of statutory interpretation is to review the language of the statute itself. Yet Priesman relied more on the language of the UMVARA and its commentary to interpret MCL 500.3113(a) than on the actual text of MCL 500.3113(a) enacted by the Legislature.
This Court has previously expressed disapproval of relying on model acts to interpret existing statutes rather than on the clear language of the actual statutes at issue. In Jarrad v. Integon National Insurance Co.,
The Spencer Court held in this regard that
The plurality opinion in Priesman appears to have embraced the erroneous method of statutory interpretation advanced by the Court of Appeals in Spencer and subsequently rejected by this Court in Jarrad.
We conclude that the family-joyriding exception is not supported by the text of MCL 500.3113(a). Unlike the plurality opinion in Priesman, our decision is not based on the presumed driving habits of legislators or their families, and we certainly will not speculate whether, "sitting at a drafting session,"
"If the language of the statute is unambiguous, the Legislature must have intended the meaning clearly expressed, and the statute must be enforced as written. No further judicial construction is required or
The plurality decision in Priesman demonstrates the ramifications of decisions that stray from the statutory text.
Priesman was not a majority opinion of the Court. As a result, the principles of stare decisis do not apply to Priesman:
Thus, Justice LEVIN's plurality opinion Priesman only bound the parties before it and does not bind this Court's decision. Likewise, Butterworth, Mester, Allen, and Roberts are Court of Appeals decisions, and, as such, are not binding precedent in this Court.
"`The general principle is that a decision of a court of supreme jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former decision is bad law, but that it never was the law.'"
Spectrum Health and Mary Free Bed claim that this opinion should only apply prospectively. They maintain that insurance companies set their premiums to reflect the family-joyriding exception and that it is the medical providers and insureds who will suffer the consequences of this opinion. Justice CAVANAGH similarly claims there is an expectation that family members who drive a family vehicle without express permission will be covered. However, it is undisputed that there is no contractual right to have insurance companies provide PIP benefits to operators in these cases.
Our decision today applies the plain language of MCL 500.3113(a), which excludes from receiving PIP benefits someone who "was using a motor vehicle or motorcycle which he or she had taken unlawfully, unless the person reasonably believed that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle."
Therefore, any person who takes a vehicle contrary to a provision of the Michigan Penal Code — including MCL 750.413 and MCL 750.414, informally known as the "joyriding" statutes — has taken the vehicle unlawfully within the meaning of MCL 500.3113(a).
We overrule Bronson's "chain of permissive use" theory, which incorporated concepts from the owner's liability statute, as inconsistent with MCL 500.3113(a). The owner's liability statute establishes an owner's civil liability for injury caused by the negligent operation of his or her vehicle whenever the vehicle was "being driven" with the owner's "express or implied knowledge or consent." Because its focus on the unlawful nature of the taking involves the driver's authority to take the vehicle, MCL 500.3113(a) is not analogous to the owner's liability statute.
Because the legality of the taking does not turn on whether the driver intended to steal the car, MCL 500.3113(a) applies equally to joyriders. Moreover, because MCL 500.3113 refers to "a person," the Legislature clearly and plainly intended to exclude from receiving PIP benefits even a relative who took a vehicle unlawfully. Therefore, we disavow Justice LEVIN's plurality opinion in Priesman and overrule its Court of Appeals progeny as inconsistent with MCL 500.3113(a).
Accordingly, in both Spectrum Health (Docket No. 142874) and Progressive (Docket No. 143330), we reverse the Court of Appeals' judgments and remand these cases to the respective circuit courts for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to reject the well-established caselaw interpreting the availability of personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under MCL 500.3113(a). Instead, I would reaffirm the "chain of permissive use" doctrine as well as the interpretation of MCL 500.3113(a) from Priesman v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 441 Mich. 60, 490 N.W.2d 314 (1992). Because the Court of Appeals panels in these cases correctly applied these principles, I would affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment in both cases.
Under MCL 500.3113(a), an injured person is barred from recovering PIP benefits if the injured person "was using a motor vehicle or motorcycle which he or she had taken unlawfully...." (Emphasis added.) In Priesman, the lead opinion held that the insured's teenage son, who drove his mother's vehicle without express permission, had not taken the vehicle unlawfully for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a). Priesman's analysis formally became part of Michigan's caselaw when it was adopted by the Court of Appeals in Butterworth Hosp. v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 225 Mich.App. 244, 570 N.W.2d 304 (1997). Thus, in accordance with MCR 7.215(J)(1),
The majority now reverses the Court of Appeals in Progressive and discards Priesman and its progeny, claiming that Priesman erroneously interpreted MCL 500.3113(a). The majority's reading of Priesman is flawed, however. To begin with, the majority inaccurately claims that Priesman "stray[ed] from" and is thus entirely divorced from the statutory language in MCL 500.3113(a). Ante at 135. Rather, like the majority opinion in this case, Priesman focused on the requirement that the vehicle be "taken unlawfully" in order to trigger the exclusion under MCL 500.3113(a).
Priesman gave meaning to this phrase by reviewing the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act (UMVARA). Contrary to the majority's claims, consideration of the UMVARA was an entirely logical approach to determining the legislative intent behind MCL 500.3113(a) because, as the lead opinion in Priesman explained, MCL 500.3113(a) was modeled after a provision in the UMVARA. Accordingly, an obvious method for determining the legislative intent behind MCL 500.3113(a) and the plain meaning of the words used was to determine what the Legislature intended to accomplish by modifying the language of the model provision from which MCL 500.3113(a) was ultimately crafted. Thus, the majority is incorrect when it implies that Priesman "rel[ied] on [a] model act[] ... rather than the clear language of [the] actual statute at issue." Ante at 132. Rather, to define the critical phrase used in the statute[], Priesman merely considered the modifications that the Legislature made to the model act
Priesman specifically focused on the fact that the UMVARA "except[ed] from coverage a `converter' — a person who steals — unless covered under a no-fault policy issued to the converter or a spouse or other relative in the same household." Priesman, 441 Mich. at 66, 490 N.W.2d 314. Priesman concluded that
Accordingly, Priesman definitively concluded that the phrase "taken unlawfully" included car thieves but not those who simply drive a vehicle without express permission and without the intent to steal the vehicle. Priesman also concluded that "in substituting `taken unlawfully' for `converts,' the Legislature did not intend any substantial difference in scope or meaning from the prototypical UMVARA concept excepting thieves from no-fault coverage...." Id. at 67-68, 490 N.W.2d 314.
In summary, Priesman closely considered the critical phrase within MCL 500.3113(a) — "taken unlawfully" — and merely acted to define that phrase, which the majority admits is not defined in the statute. Moreover, Priesman considered a logical source for that definition, given the legislative process that created MCL 500.3113(a). Accordingly, it appears that the majority's true disagreement with Priesman is that Priesman simply defined the phrase "taken unlawfully" more narrowly than the majority would like. This is not a sufficient justification for the
The majority also argues that it is proper to consider the Michigan Penal Code, MCL 750.1 et seq., to give meaning to the phrase "taken unlawfully." Ironically, this approach runs afoul of the majority's conclusion that Priesman erred because it considered sources other than the statutory text at issue. Other than the majority's strained exaggeration of its carefully selected dictionary definitions, there is no indication that it is proper to resort to the Penal Code to give meaning to a specific phrase in the no-fault act. It is axiomatic, however, that "[w]hen considering the correct interpretation, the statute must be read as a whole" and that "[i]ndividual words and phrases, while important, should be read in the context of the entire legislative scheme." Mich. Props., LLC v. Meridian Twp., 491 Mich. 518, 528, 817 N.W.2d 548 (2012) (emphasis added, citations omitted). Accordingly, while the majority is apparently compelled by a dictionary to look outside the no-fault act, I am compelled by the canons of statutory interpretation to conclude that Priesman wisely recognized that MCL 500.3113(a) must be considered within the full context of the no-fault act and that Priesman, therefore, correctly concluded that the Legislature's intent to provide broad accessibility to benefits informed the proper interpretation of MCL 500.3113(a). Priesman, 441 Mich. at 64-66, 490 N.W.2d 314.
The majority ignores the legislative intent to provide broad accessibility to benefits by conflating the concept of providing PIP benefits to a person who made a poor decision with that of endorsing that person's conduct. See ante at 133-34 n. 89 (implying that Priesman condones or encourages a person's decision to joyride). Priesman no more condoned or encouraged this conduct than the no-fault act condones or encourages any other irresponsible conduct that results in an automobile accident. Nevertheless, a person who causes an accident by texting, fiddling with the radio, or simply daydreaming while driving is generally entitled to PIP benefits. Accordingly, if the majority truly believes that Priesman would "serve to entice" joyriders, ante at 134 n. 89, the majority must also believe that the no-fault act entices other types of irresponsible conduct that is likely to cause automobile accidents. Moreover, I seriously doubt that the average would-be joyrider pauses to consider the availability of PIP coverage when deciding to go for a spin in another person's car.
The majority also relies heavily on the Court of Appeals' opinions in Butterworth, 225 Mich.App. 244, 570 N.W.2d 304, and Mester v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 235 Mich.App. 84, 596 N.W.2d 205 (1999), to support its mischaracterization and dismissal of Priesman's analysis. Although those opinions reached the right result under Priesman's analysis, they also improperly interpreted Priesman. Specifically, Butterworth stated that MCL 500.3113(a) "does not apply to cases where the person taking the vehicle unlawfully is
These statements in Butterworth and Mester are erroneous because Priesman accurately interpreted the phrase "taken unlawfully" as including only car thieves. Accordingly, Butterworth and Mester incorrectly concluded that Priesman "exempts" a person who "takes the vehicle unlawfully." Instead, Priesman held that a vehicle that was driven without express permission does not meet the definition of one that was "taken unlawfully" under MCL 500.3113(a). Moreover, the majority in Butterworth rejected Judge HOEKSTRA's concurring opinion, in which he argued that a person's familial relationship to the owner of a car is irrelevant when applying Priesman. Judge HOEKSTRA concluded that nothing in Priesman supported the Butterworth majority's conclusion; rather, Judge HOEKSTRA determined that Priesman stood for the proposition that "the legislators intended to except from [PIP] benefits only persons injured while driving a car they intended to steal...." Butterworth, 225 Mich.App. at 253, 570 N.W.2d 304 (HOEKSTRA, J., concurring).
Judge HOEKSTRA was correct in his interpretation of Priesman's holding. Specifically, Priesman expressly stated that "[t]he legislative purpose ... was thus to except from no-fault coverage thieves while driving stolen vehicles...." Priesman, 441 Mich. at 67, 490 N.W.2d 314 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Judge HOEKSTRA accurately concluded that Priesman's discussion of the family relationship at issue in that case "was merely part of the factual basis of the case and did not establish a limiting parameter for interpreting the Court's remaining discussion." Butterworth, 225 Mich.App. at 253, 570 N.W.2d 304 (HOEKSTRA, J., concurring). Thus, I would reject Butterworth and Mester to the extent that those opinions are inconsistent with the proper interpretation of Priesman. Additionally, I would clarify this area of law by eliminating the misleading label "family joyriding exception." There is no "exception"; rather, Priesman simply applied the rules of statutory interpretation to give meaning to the phrase "taken unlawfully" as it is used in MCL 500.3113(a).
Finally, although the principles of stare decisis do not apply to Priesman because it is a plurality opinion, it should not go unnoticed that the Court of Appeals adopted Priesman's holding and those Court of Appeals opinions have been binding law for the last 15 years.
Accordingly, I see no reason to reject Priesman. I would instead affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Progressive and uphold Priesman's interpretation of MCL 500.3113(a). Additionally, I agree with Justice HATHAWAY's conclusion that the Court of Appeals in Spectrum Health did not clearly err by holding that Craig Smith, Jr., did not unlawfully take the vehicle. Thus, I would also affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Spectrum Health.
MARILYN KELLY J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.
HATHAWAY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J., with respect to Progressive only.
HATHAWAY, J. (dissenting).
I fully join Justice CAVANAGH's dissenting opinion with respect to today's decision in Progressive Marathon Insurance Company v. DeYoung. I write separately to address the majority's decision in Spectrum Health Hospitals v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Michigan, in which the majority rejects and discards the "chain of permissive use" theory. I am not persuaded that this theory should be discarded. It is a well-reasoned and well-established doctrine that has been part of this state's jurisprudence for decades.
As the language of the statute provides, MCL 500.3113(a) generally precludes an injured person from recovering personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under a policy associated with a vehicle if that person had taken the vehicle unlawfully. The question before us in Spectrum involves determining whether the PIP claimant's taking of the vehicle in question was unlawful under this provision.
Because the no-fault act does not define "taken unlawfully," courts have looked beyond the words of the statute to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. In giving this phrase meaning, our courts have developed the doctrine known as the chain-of-permissive-use theory. I would affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment in Spectrum Health
The chain-of-permissive-use theory was first recognized in Bronson Methodist Hospital v. Forshee.
The unanimous panel in Bronson noted that there was no caselaw that specifically defined "taken unlawfully" as that phrase is used in the no-fault act.
In Cowan, the owner of the vehicle loaned it to an acquaintance with the express direction to not let anyone else use it. Nevertheless, the acquaintance let her son use the car, and he was involved in an accident. This Court determined that the owner of the vehicle was liable under the owner's liability statute, based on a broad
The Court of Appeals in Bronson found this Court's interpretation of the owner's liability statute persuasive and applied the same analysis and reasoning to the unlawful-taking provision contained within the no-fault act. As such, Bronson held that when an owner of a vehicle gives permission to an intermediate user to take the vehicle, the intermediate user then has the authority to give permission to a subsequent user to take that vehicle. Therefore, the subsequent user in Bronson had lawfully taken the vehicle with the consent of the owner under the no-fault act.
In Spectrum Health, the Court of Appeals correctly applied the chain-of-permissive-use theory to the facts before it. Plaintiff, Spectrum Health Hospitals, seeks to recover the cost of care that it provided to Craig Smith Jr. from the insurer of a truck owned by Craig Smith Jr.'s father, Craig Smith Sr. Craig Sr.'s truck was insured by defendants Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Michigan and Farm Bureau General Insurance Company of Michigan (collectively "Farm Bureau"). Farm Bureau claims that Craig Jr. is excluded from coverage under MCL 500.3113(a) because he had taken his father's truck unlawfully. Craig Sr. had loaned the truck to Craig Jr.'s girlfriend with instructions not to let Craig Jr. drive it. However, Craig Jr.'s girlfriend did allow him to drive it, and he was involved in an accident. Spectrum Health treated Craig Jr. and brought the instant suit to recover PIP benefits associated with his care. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that Craig Jr. was not excluded from coverage under the chain-of-permissive-use theory because Craig Sr. had turned control of the truck over to Craig Jr.'s girlfriend, and she in turn gave Craig Jr. permission to use the truck. The majority's decision overrules the Court of Appeals and discards the well-established chain-of-permissive-use theory.
I disagree with the majority because the Court of Appeals correctly applied Bronson and the chain-of-permissive-use theory based on Cowan. I find that the Bronson analysis was a well-reasoned interpretation of the phrase "taken unlawfully" in its context within MCL 500.3113(a). It is reasonable to assume that the Legislature intended "taken unlawfully" to be applied in terms of consent of the owner, and this Court in Cowan properly defined what the consent of an owner includes. The majority's opinion simply substitutes its own definition of "taken unlawfully" for the well-established definition set forth in Bronson. However, the definition in Bronson was consistent with the policy of this state under the no-fault act that "`persons who suffer loss due to the tragedy of automobile accidents in this state shall have a source and a means of recovery.'"
The majority criticizes Bronson for looking outside the text of the no-fault act in order to determine the meaning of "taken unlawfully." The majority expresses concern that Bronson relied on the meaning of an owner's "consent," a term found only in one unrelated provision of the no-fault act. See MCL 500.3116(3). However, the majority uses the same approach in reaching its definition of "taken unlawfully." Specifically, the majority looks outside the text of MCL 500.3113(a) and relies on the word "authority," which is also found only in one unrelated provision of the no-fault act. See MCL 500.3104(1). In its search for the meaning of "taken unlawfully," the majority looks to the dictionary for the definitions of "unlawful" and "take." From the dictionary definitions, the majority concludes that "taken unlawfully" refers to a criminal act. Then, just as the panel did in Bronson, the majority seeks guidance from a statute governing another area of law, and it turns to MCL 750.414, a statute that places criminal liability on a person who "takes or uses without authority any motor vehicle without intent to steal the same...." The majority focuses on the word "authority" in the criminal statute despite the fact that "authority" is not found in the relevant provision of the no-fault act. It then concludes that if a person takes a vehicle against the express wishes of the owner, he or she has taken the vehicle without the owner's "authority" and has done so unlawfully under the no-fault act. Thus, like Bronson's reliance on "consent" from the owner's liability statute, the majority relies on an owner's "authority" under another area of law. Given that the majority engages in the same "outside the text of the statute" analysis, its criticisms of Bronson fall flat.
I disagree with the majority's interpretation of "taken unlawfully." Its interpretation precludes a class of injured parties from recovering PIP benefits even when a party was given permission to take a car by an intermediate user. The Bronson interpretation is the better interpretation because it was more consistent with the purpose of the no-fault act to provide a source and means of recovery to persons injured in auto accidents. The majority's interpretation conflicts with that purpose. Moreover, the idea that the consent of an owner can be passed down through a chain of permissive users is well established in the law, and I see no reason to depart from it.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Spectrum Health because it correctly applied the well-reasoned and well-established chain-of-permissive-use theory.
MARILYN KELLY, J., concurred with hathaway, J.
Justice HATHAWAY's dissenting opinion claims that this interpretation "precludes a class of injured parties from recovering PIP benefits even when a party was given permission to take a car by an intermediate user." Post at 144. This is incorrect because we are only interpreting the phrase "taken unlawfully" in MCL 500.3113(a). An end user who takes a vehicle without authority can still recover PIP benefits as long as he or she "reasonably believed that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle." MCL 500.3113(a).
The third case, Donajkowski v. Alpena Power Co., 460 Mich. 243, 596 N.W.2d 574 (1999), is clearly distinguishable. This Court recognized that Michigan common law prohibited an intentional tortfeasor from seeking contribution. Id. at 249, 596 N.W.2d 574. The Legislature enacted a contribution statute, MCL 600.2925a(1), which provided in part that "`when 2 or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to a person or property or for the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them....'" Id. at 247, 596 N.W.2d 574. This Court properly concluded that the Legislature did not intend any limitation or prohibition concerning intentional tortfeasors. Id. at 250, 596 N.W.2d 574. Indeed, the statute refers to liability "in tort" including "wrongful death," which obviously may include an intentional tort. This Court only noted that MCL 600.2925a(1) "was based upon the model contribution act that itself retained the prohibition recognized in our common law...." Id. at 257 n. 14, 596 N.W.2d 574. The Court simply pointed out that "[t]he fact that our Legislature did not include this restriction in adopting its version of the model contribution act is significant to any good-faith effort to give meaning to the Legislature's intent." Id. Donajkowski relied on the absence of language in MCL 600.2925a(1) because it differed from the Michigan common-law rule. That the model contribution act included this common-law distinction merely supported the Court's conclusion. Donajkowski is clearly distinguishable because the enacted statutory language at issue here is different from that of the UMVARA, not omitted.
More important is that in none of these cases did this Court find that the model act provides more guidance than the actual text of the enacted statute. In this case, the language of the relevant statute differs from the corresponding provision of the model act, yet Justice CAVANAGH still holds the belief that "`the Legislature did not intend any substantial difference in scope or meaning from the prototypical UMVARA concept excepting thieves from no-fault coverage....'" Post at 138, quoting Priesman, 441 Mich. at 67-68, 490 N.W.2d 314. There is a very substantial difference between language that excludes only car thieves from receiving PIP benefits and language that excludes all persons who have unlawfully taken vehicles from receiving PIP benefits.
Some 20 years after Priesman, Justice CAVANAGH still seeks to insert into Michigan Law the UMVARA provision that "except[ed] from coverage a `converter' — a person who steals — unless covered under a no-fault policy issued to the converter or a spouse or other relative in the same household." Priesman, 441 Mich. at 66, 490 N.W.2d 314 (opinion by LEVIN, J.) (emphasis omitted). He admits as much by endorsing Priesman's attempt to "g[i]ve meaning" to the statute's language by "consider[ing] the modifications that the Legislature made to the model act that was the starting point for the statute that was eventually enacted." Post at 137-38. Contrary to Justice CAVANAGH's assertion, our "true disagreement with Priesman is [not] that Priesman simply defined the phrase `taken unlawfully' more narrowly than ... [we] would like." Post at 138. Our disagreement is that Priesman did not consider the statute as the starting point; rather, it first considered the UMVARA, then concluded that the Legislature intended to exclude "only car thieves" from receiving PIP benefits. Of course, the Legislature clearly could have readily excluded "only car thieves" and indeed could have simply adopted the UMVARA language and excluded "converters." Instead, the Legislature decided to except from PIP benefits persons who have "unlawfully taken" the vehicle. Rather than accepting this Legislative decision, Justice CAVANAGH prefers an interpretation in which any person can take and use any other person's vehicle with or without the owner's permission at any time for whatever reason as long as the person merely intends to return the vehicle at some later point in time. This interpretation is not grounded in the text of MCL 500.3113(a) and would, in fact, serve to entice uninsured persons to unlawfully take vehicles for joyrides.
Furthermore, the majority misinterprets my discussion of the reliance interests related to Priesman and its progeny to the extent that the majority reads my analysis to argue that the majority decision in this case should have prospective effect only. Rather, I discuss the reliance interests at issue to further explain why I disagree with the majority's decision to discard 15 years of binding caselaw. Specifically, not only do I believe that Priesman is a proper interpretation of the statute, but because insureds and insurers have relied on that interpretation and conformed their conduct accordingly, I believe any disturbance of those reliance interests is unwarranted.
