PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of three counts of stealing or retaining a financial transaction device without consent, MCL 750.157n(1). She was sentenced to one year of probation. Defendant appeals as of right, and we affirm.
Carla Sledge, Wayne County's chief financial officer, contacted the Wayne County Sheriff's Department after learning that several high-ranking employees were the victims of identity theft. Specifically, the credit card information for several employees was now being mailed to the same address. With regard to Sledge, an individual named Terry Lewis had attempted to change the mailing address and approved users for her credit card. Detective Eric Catner investigated the case and found that Terry Lewis had attempted to change the account information of other employees who worked in the financial offices of Wayne County government. When Lewis was located, he identified DeJuan Whitehead as the source of the personal identification information belonging to Wayne County employees. Whitehead reportedly obtained the information from a female employee who worked for Wayne County. Through the use of the "auto track" system, Detective Catner learned that, at one time, Whitehead lived with defendant. The auto track system reveals connections between individuals using references, mailing addresses, credit applications, and other information.
As a result of the investigation, a search warrant was executed at defendant's residence in Oakland County. Under some clothing, a blue notebook was recovered from a dresser in defendant's bedroom. The blue notebook contained "post-it" self-stick notes with personal information relating to four Wayne County employees written on them. A dietician employed by the county identified a post-it note containing her social security number, driver's license number, date of birth, phone number, and bank account number. She had provided bank account information to allow her checks to be deposited directly in her bank account. The dietician did not know defendant and never authorized her to have this information. A former summer law clerk identified a post-it note containing her social security number, date of birth, and driver's license number. She did not know defendant and did not authorize her to have this information. An assistant prosecuting attorney identified a post-it note containing her social security number, driver's license number, date of birth, home address, telephone numbers, and bank account number. The bank account number was provided to the county to allow for direct deposits. The prosecutor did not know defendant and did not authorize
Wayne County employees testified that a recently enacted federal law required that the government protect the social security numbers of employees. Thereafter, employees were given identification numbers when hired and were identified by this number. Additionally, payroll department employees had no use for all of the information found on the post-it notes. Specifically, the payroll department did not maintain records containing driver's license numbers. The human resources department would maintain records containing driver's license numbers. An employee's work password limited their access to information dealing with their department.
Defendant testified that she was assigned to the management and budget office, but worked in payroll when necessary. She testified that she was not assigned a password to access the payroll division information, rather payroll employee Alyse Cade would log onto the system under her identification and allow defendant to work under her password. Defendant testified that Cade had to leave early one day and needed to lock up all of the forms. Therefore, defendant wrote all of the information that she may need for data entry on post-it notes and placed it in a notebook she used at work.
Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions for stealing or retaining a financial transaction device without consent, MCL 750.157n(1), or, in the alternative, that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. We disagree. MCL 750.157n(1) provides:
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed de novo. People v. Martin, 271 Mich.App. 280, 340, 721 N.W.2d 815 (2006). When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, this Court reviews the record in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich.App. 656, 677, 765 N.W.2d 44 (2009). Appellate review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is deferential. People v. Nowack, 462 Mich. 392, 400, 614 N.W.2d 78 (2000). The reviewing court must draw all reasonable inferences and examine credibility issues in support of the jury verdict. Id. When assessing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, the trier of fact, not the appellate court, determines what inferences may be fairly drawn from the evidence and the weight to be accorded those inferences. People v. Hardiman, 466 Mich. 417, 428, 646 N.W.2d 158 (2002). This Court must not interfere with the jury's role as the sole judge of the facts when reviewing the evidence. People v. Meshell, 265 Mich.App. 616, 619, 696 N.W.2d 754 (2005).
Statutory construction issues present questions of law subject to review de novo. People v. Keller, 479 Mich. 467, 473-474, 739 N.W.2d 505 (2007). When the manifest intention of the Legislature is derived from the language of a clear statute, nothing will be read into the clear statute. Bay Co. Prosecutor v. Nugent, 276 Mich.App. 183, 189, 740 N.W.2d 678 (2007). The Legislature is presumed to intend the meaning it plainly expressed. People v. Petty, 469 Mich. 108, 114, 665 N.W.2d 443 (2003), and courts may not speculate as to the intent of the Legislature beyond the language plainly expressed in the statute. People v. Hock Shop, Inc., 261 Mich.App. 521, 528, 681 N.W.2d 669 (2004). The function of a reviewing court resolving disputed interpretations of statutory language is to effectuate the legislative intent. People v. Valentin, 457 Mich. 1, 5, 577 N.W.2d 73 (1998). When the statutory language is clear, the courts must enforce the statute as written. Id. The application of the law to the facts is reviewed de
Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict her because she did not have a physical card belonging to any of the complainants. That is, she merely "innocently possessed some personal information/account numbers." Defendant argues that the possession of another's "social security number alone does not qualify as a `financial transaction device,'" and that defendant did not use the information found on the post-it notes to "access a proprietary account." Defendant posits that when an intent to defraud has not been shown to exist, there has been no violation of the statute and insufficient evidence to convict has been presented. We disagree.
Review of the plain language of the statute at issue reveals that defendant was not required to possess the physical cards that allow access to proprietary accounts and the complainants did not need to suffer an actual loss to support the convictions. As previously stated, MCL 750.157m(f)(v) addresses the conduct at issue by providing:
MCL 750.157m(f)(v) does not require actual physical possession of identification numbers that can be used to access a proprietary account, and an attempt to access a proprietary account need not occur.
Defendant contends that her possession of the information was inadvertent and innocent, and therefore, there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions. We disagree. Although defendant testified that she copied the information in the course of her employment, payroll employee Cade contradicted defendant's testimony. Cade testified that she did not allow defendant to access the programs through the use of her password, and the information copied by defendant was not necessary to complete direct deposits. Additionally, other employees testified that the information compiled by defendant was not gathered in one location and was not necessary for the completion of defendant's work. Although defendant testified that she gathered the information in the course of her employment and innocently took the information home, the jury rejected the credibility of those assertions. Nowack, 462 Mich. at 400, 614 N.W.2d 78. Therefore, the challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions is without merit.
Next, defendant challenges the constitutionality of the statute as vague and overbroad both on its face and as applied to defendant. We disagree. Statutes are presumed to be constitutional. People v. Harper, 479 Mich. 599, 621, 739 N.W.2d 523 (2007). To overcome this presumption, the unconstitutionality must be readily apparent. In re McEvoy, 267 Mich.App. 55, 68, 704 N.W.2d 78 (2005). "The party challenging a statute's constitutionality cannot merely claim unconstitutionality, but has the burden of proving its invalidity." Id. "The presumption of constitutionality may justify a narrow construction or even a construction against the natural interpretation of the statutory language." People v. Lueth, 253 Mich.App. 670, 675, 660 N.W.2d 322 (2002). In People v. Hrlic, 277 Mich.App. 260, 263, 744 N.W.2d 221 (2007), this Court delineated the rules applicable to a statute challenged as unconstitutionally vague:
A defendant may not challenge a statute as unconstitutionally vague when the defendant's own conduct is fairly within the constitutional scope of the statute. People v. Hill, 269 Mich.App. 505, 525, 715 N.W.2d 301 (2006). The fact that a hypothetical may be posed that would cast doubt upon the statute does not render it unconstitutionally vague. People v. Derror, 475 Mich. 316, 337, 715 N.W.2d 822 (2006). Rather, the analysis must center on whether the statute, as applied to the actions of the individual defendant, is constitutional. Id.
The statute at issue, MCL 750.157n(1) criminalizes the knowing retention and possession of a financial transaction device without the consent of the deviceholder. A financial transaction device refers to any record or copy of an account number or personal identification number that can be used to access money, credit, a deposit account, or any other thing of value. MCL 750.157m(f)(v)(A) and (C). In the present case, defendant copied account numbers belonging to the complainants and had that information in her personal possession without their consent. Defendant was entitled to access some of the information in the course of her employment, but nonetheless, took the information to her home. The jury rejected defendant's testimony that her possession of the information was inadvertent and the result of a mistake. Although the monetary and credit accounts of the complainants had not yet been compromised, the statute at issue punishes retention or possession of a financial transaction device that can be used to access proprietary accounts. Accordingly, defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of the statute with regard to her conduct is without merit.
Defendant argues that she was wrongfully convicted because the action was tried in Wayne County, but the evidence introduced at trial was recovered in Oakland County. We disagree. "A trial court's determination regarding the existence of venue in a criminal prosecution is reviewed de novo." People v. Fisher, 220 Mich.App. 133, 145, 559 N.W.2d 318 (1996).
Generally, a defendant must be tried in the county where the crime is committed. People v. Jendrzejewski, 455 Mich. 495, 499, 566 N.W.2d 530 (1997). Jurisdiction addresses the judicial power to hear and determine a criminal prosecution whereas venue relates to and defines
"Whenever a felony consists or is the culmination of 2 or more acts done in the perpetration thereof, said felony may be prosecuted in any county in which any 1 of said acts was committed." MCL 762.8. When applying MCL 762.8, the location of the commission of an act is not limited to the place of the defendant's physical presence. Fisher, 220 Mich.App. at 151-152, 559 N.W.2d 318. Rather, when an act has effects elsewhere that are essential to the offense, the offense is effectively committed in the place where the act has its effects. Id. Although evidence was retrieved from defendant's Oakland County residence, the personal information was taken in the course of defendant's employment in Wayne County. Contrary to the argument raised by the defense, the date of the offense as stated in the information is not the test for determining venue. Accordingly, this claim of error is without merit.
Defendant asserts that her convictions must be reversed or vacated because the trial court improperly admitted other prior bad acts evidence that was more prejudicial than probative particularly when other persons committed the improper acts. We disagree. A trial court's decision to admit evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. Katt, 468 Mich. 272, 278, 662 N.W.2d 12 (2003). When the decision to admit evidence involves a preliminary question of law, such as whether an evidentiary rule precludes admission of the evidence, this issue of law is reviewed de novo. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court selects an outcome that falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. People v. Babcock, 469 Mich. 247, 269, 666 N.W.2d 231 (2003).
Defendant's assertion of error is simply without merit. The prosecution did not seek permission to present other acts evidence in accordance with MRE 404(b). Rather, the evidence was offered to show that the investigation was initiated by the report of identity theft of a number of Wayne County employees and how investigators came to focus on defendant. It is proper to provide background information to the jury to allow them to examine the full transaction. "The more the jurors kn[ow] about the full transaction, the better equipped they [are] to perform their sworn duty." People v. Sholl, 453 Mich. 730, 742, 556 N.W.2d 851 (1996).
Evidence of other criminal acts is admissible when it explains the circumstances of
Lastly, defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress evidence because the search warrant lacked probable cause and the affidavit contained false information. We disagree. On appeal, the trial court's findings of fact on a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed for clear error, but the trial court's ultimate decision on the motion is reviewed de novo. People v. Williams, 472 Mich. 308, 313, 696 N.W.2d 636 (2005). "A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." People v. Lanzo Constr. Co., 272 Mich.App. 470, 473, 726 N.W.2d 746 (2006).
A search warrant may only be issued upon a showing of probable cause. U.S. Const., Am. IV; Const. 1963, art. 1, § 11; MCL 780.651(1). Probable cause for issuance of a search warrant exists if there is a substantial basis for inferring a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime exists in the location to be searched. People v. Unger, 278 Mich.App. 210, 244, 749 N.W.2d 272 (2008). When reviewing a magistrate's decision to issue a search warrant, this Court must examine the search warrant and underlying affidavit in a common-sense and realistic manner. People v. Darwich, 226 Mich.App. 635, 636-637, 575 N.W.2d 44 (1997). Under the totality of the circumstances, this Court must then determine whether a reasonably cautious person could have concluded that there was a substantial basis for the magistrate's finding of probable cause. Id. at 637, 575 N.W.2d 44. When a person of reasonable caution would conclude that contraband or evidence of criminal conduct will be found in the place to be searched, probable cause for a search exists. Id.
Defendant contends that probable cause was lacking because defendant's name was never mentioned in the search warrant, there was no nexus to defendant's home, the search warrant contained untrue statements, and the information was stale.
Review of the search warrant and affidavit in a common-sense and realistic manner, Darwich, 226 Mich.App. at 636-637, 575 N.W.2d 44, reveals that the trial court did not err by denying the motion to suppress. Review of the affidavit reveals that the detective set forth the reason for the investigation into identity theft, the complaint from a county official regarding employee targets of identify theft, the initial person suspected in the crimes, and the information provided by the first suspect regarding associates. Defendant contends that deliberate falsehoods were placed into the affidavit. Specifically, it was asserted that the county employee allegedly involved in the crimes was the aunt of a suspect. However, the detective deliberately omitted this information and merely indicated that a female employee was involved. Defendant also asserts that the specific county building involved was never delineated, but the detective chose the building located on Randolph Street. When questioned regarding these challenges, the detective testified that defendant
Affirmed.
