PER CURIAM.
In this case brought under the no-fault motor vehicle insurance act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., plaintiff, TBCI, P.C., a healthcare provider, appeals as of right the trial court's order dismissing its complaint that sought to recover first-party benefits. We affirm.
On February 6, 2006, Eric Afful was allegedly injured in an automobile accident. As a result, Afful claimed to have received attendant-care services as well as other medical treatment. However, Afful's no-fault insurer, defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, refused to pay Afful's claims for the services, contending the claims he submitted were fraudulent. Thus, Afful sued defendant in a separate litigation in the Wayne Circuit Court.
Accordingly, a judgment of no cause of action was entered against Afful on June 3, 2008.
Plaintiff also allegedly provided Afful with therapeutic and rehabilitative services for his injuries from the accident. Defendant also refused to pay for these services, and plaintiff brought the present suit against defendant for payment. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that defendant owed it approximately $35,000 for the services plaintiff had provided Afful. Plaintiff's complaint, filed in February 2007, alleged that defendant had breached the insurance policy and that its failure to pay the claim had violated the no-fault act. At the time of the trial in the Wayne Circuit Court, the present matter was pending in the Oakland Circuit Court.
After the judgment was entered in the Wayne Circuit Court case, defendant in the present matter moved for summary disposition. It argued that the Wayne Circuit Court's judgment barred plaintiff's claim under the doctrine of res judicata. Defendant contended that once the jury found that Afful had committed fraud, there was no longer any coverage under the policy and, consequently, plaintiff's claim failed. Plaintiff responded, in part, that the present claim was "an independent cause of action" involving a claim of services that "was not adjudicated in the Wayne County action." The trial court agreed with defendant, finding that the core issue—whether there was coverage for Afful's claims—was common between the two suits and that the decision of the jury in the Wayne Circuit Court action, combined with the clear language of the policy, decided the issue in defendant's favor. The court reasoned:
Thus, the trial court granted summary disposition for defendant and dismissed the action. This appeal followed.
This Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition. Spiek v. Dep't of Transp., 456 Mich. 331, 337, 572 N.W.2d 201 (1998). Further, questions concerning the correct interpretation and application of an insurance contract are reviewed de novo, Cohen v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 463 Mich. 525, 528, 620 N.W.2d 840 (2001), as are questions concerning a trial court's decision on the applicability of res judicata, Begin v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 284 Mich.App. 581, 598, 773 N.W.2d 271 (2009).
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by interpreting the policy's exclusionary language in such a way that it voided all coverage under the policy, including mandatory coverage for personal protection insurance benefits. In plaintiff's view, this interpretation of the policy conflicted with the no-fault act's mandatory-coverage requirement, and it should have been declared void as against public policy. Plaintiff also contends that the language of the provision is ambiguous. We disagree. In our opinion, it is unnecessary for us to reach the substance of plaintiff's arguments because its claim was barred by res judicata.
"The doctrine of res judicata is intended to relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and encourage reliance on adjudication, that is, to foster the finality of litigation." Id. at 599, 773 N.W.2d 271. Accordingly, "[r]es judicata bars a subsequent action between the same parties when the evidence or essential facts are identical." Eaton Co. Bd. of Co. Rd. Comm'rs v. Schultz, 205 Mich.App. 371, 375, 521 N.W.2d 847 (1994). It is applicable when "the first action was decided on its merits, the second action was or could have been resolved in the first action, and both actions involve the same parties or their privies." Solution Source, Inc. v. LPR Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 252 Mich.App. 368, 376, 652 N.W.2d 474 (2002) (citation omitted). For the doctrine to apply, the judgment in the first case must have been final. Richards v. Tibaldi, 272 Mich.App. 522, 531, 726 N.W.2d 770 (2006).
Here, there is no serious dispute whether the judgment in the first case was a final judgment on the merits. The jury determined that Afful had submitted a fraudulent claim for benefits, and a judgment pursuant to the verdict was entered on June 3, 2008. Further, there is no question whether plaintiff's claims were, or could have been, resolved in the first lawsuit. This is because the essential evidence presented in the first case sustained dismissal of both actions. See Eaton Co. Rd. Comm'rs, 205 Mich.App. at 375, 521 N.W.2d 847.
Affirmed.