CAVANAGH, J.

Respondent, the city of Detroit, appeals as of right an order of the Michigan Tax Tribunal granting petitioner's motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm.

Petitioner, Lafarge Midwest, Inc., was responsible for the payment of ad valorem property taxes on three parcels of land that are the site of its cement plant, which is located within the Delray Renaissance Zone in Detroit. In 2005, 2006, and 2007 petitioner's real property tax bills included a school debt service tax of 13 mills, consistent with the school district electors' approval of $116,156,390 in school building and site bonds. The 13-mill property tax was levied by the Detroit Public School District for retirement of bonded debt. Petitioner filed a petition with the Michigan Tax Tribunal, challenging the tax on the ground that the property was subject to the Michigan renaissance zone act (RZA), MCL 125.2681 et seq., and exempt from this school debt service tax.

Subsequently, petitioner moved for summary disposition, arguing that the property was exempt from the school debt service tax because none of the exceptions to the general exemption set forth in MCL 211.7ff applied to the property. First, petitioner argued, the tax levied was not a special assessment under the exception set forth in MCL 211.7ff(2)(a). Second, because the school debt service tax was not levied by a "local governmental unit," i.e., a county, city, village, or township, the exception to the general exemption set forth in MCL 211.7ff(2)(b) did not apply. Third, the tax was not levied pursuant to any of the Revised School Code sections listed under the exception set forth in MCL 211.7ff(2)(c). And, fourth, a casino was not being operated on the property, so the exception set forth under MCL 211.7ff(3) did not apply.

More particularly, with regard to the second exception to the exemption, petitioner argued that a "school district" is not considered a "local governmental unit" under the definition provided in the RZA, MCL 125.2683(g).1 And contrary to respondent's anticipated claim, the definition of "local governmental unit" provided in the General Property Tax Act was inapplicable to this case involving the RZA. In support of its position, petitioner cited the case of Kinder Morgan Mich., LLC v. City of Jackson, 277 Mich.App. 159, 166, 744 N.W.2d 184 (2007), which held that MCL 211.7ff must be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes of the RZA—securing tax relief for properties located in renaissance zones. Accordingly, petitioner argued, because the debt obligations were approved by school district electors and not electors "of the local governmental unit," this exception to the general exemption did not apply. Thus, petitioner's property was exempt from the tax, and it was entitled to a refund of the overpaid tax as well as an order granting summary disposition in its favor.

In response to petitioner's motion for summary disposition, the city argued that MCL 211.7ff(2)(b) actually contains two separate and independent clauses. The statute provides that property in a renaissance zone is not exempt from the collection of "[a]d valorem property taxes specifically levied for the payment of principal and interest of obligations approved by the electors or obligations pledging the unlimited taxing power of the local governmental unit." MCL 211.7ff(2)(b). At issue in the Kinder case was the second clause, not the first clause, and because the first clause was at issue in this case, Kinder provides no guidance. The city claimed that the tax was levied "to satisfy the indebtedness of the School District of the City of Detroit." Thus, the fact that the school district is not a "local governmental unit" as that term is defined in the RZA is irrelevant; the tax was levied for the repayment of principal and interest of obligations approved by the electors. The city argued that if the "Legislature [had] intended for the limiting term `local governmental unit' to apply to both clauses of MCL 211.7ff(2)(b) it could have easily done so by the simple placement of a couple of commas." Accordingly, the city requested that the tribunal deny petitioner's motion for summary disposition and enter a judgment in the city's favor.

The Tax Tribunal agreed with petitioner, holding that the definition of "local governmental unit" does not include school districts and that the city of "stance of the Legislature's intent [is] unconvincing." The tribunal concluded that, in light of the clear definition of "local governmental unit," as well as the mandate to read the property tax act in conjunction with the RZA, a clerical error or mutual mistake of fact existed and resulted in an error on petitioner's tax bills. Accordingly, petitioner's motion for summary disposition was granted, and the city was ordered to remove the school debt tax from the taxes charged to the property and refund any overpaid taxes. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the city argues that the general exemption set forth in MCL 211.7ff(1) did not apply to petitioner's property; rather, the exception to that exemption set forth in MCL 211.7ff(2)(b) applied because the tax at issue was approved by the school district electors for payment of school debt principal and interest. We disagree.

In the absence of fraud, our review of the Tax Tribunal's decision is limited to determining whether the tribunal misapplied the law or adopted a wrong principle. Wexford Med. Group v. City of Cadillac, 474 Mich. 192, 201, 713 N.W.2d 734 (2006). The tribunal's interpretation of a statute, however, presents a question of law that is reviewed de novo on appeal. Pittsfield Charter Twp. v. Washtenaw Co., 468 Mich. 702, 707, 664 N.W.2d 193 (2003).

MCL 125.2682 of the RZA provides:

In accord, MCL 125.2689(2)(a) of the RZA states that, except as provided in MCL 125.2690, property in a renaissance zone is exempt from the collection of taxes under MCL 211.7ff of the General Property Tax Act. And MCL 211.7ff provides in part as follows:

The dispute between the parties came to be centered on the interpretation of MCL 211.7ff(2)(b). The City argues that this exception to the general exemption applied to petitioner's property because the taxes were "levied for the payment of principal and interest of obligations approved by the electors." The taxes were not levied for "obligations pledging the unlimited taxing power of the local governmental unit." The city argues that the statute details two separate debt obligations that are excepted from the exemption and that the modifier phrase "of the local governmental unit" only applies—consistently with the the last antecedent—to second type of debt obligation for which taxes may be levied, not the first type of debt obligation, which is the one at issue here. In contrast, petitioner argues that the phrase "of the local governmental unit" applies and modifies both types of debt obligations, consistently with the plain language and purpose of the RZA. Thus, petitioner argues, because the statute itself requires a different interpretation than would be accorded by the application of the rule of the last antecedent, that rule does not apply. See Sun Valley Foods Co. v. Ward, 460 Mich. 230, 237, 596 N.W.2d 119 (1999).

The primary goal in construing a statute is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Murphy v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 447 Mich. 93, 98, 523 N.W.2d 310 (1994). The first criterion in determining intent is the specific language of the statute. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Mich. Catastrophic Claims Ass'n (On Rehearing), 484 Mich. 1, 13, 795 N.W.2d 101 243 (2009). The fair and natural import of the terms employed, in view of the subject matter of the law, governs. People v. McGraw, 484 Mich. 120, 124, 771 N.W.2d 655 (2009). If the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language is clear, i.e., unambiguous, the Legislative intent is clear. Nastal v. Henderson & Assoc. Investigations, Inc., 471 Mich. 712, 720, 691 N.W.2d 1 (2005); Lansing Mayor v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 470 Mich. 154, 157, 680 N.W.2d 840 (2004). In such a case, the Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning it plainly expressed; thus, no further judicial construction is required or permitted, and the statute must be enforced as written. Nastal, 471 Mich. at 720, 691 N.W.2d 1.

With regard to the issue of statutory ambiguity, the Lansing Mayor Court held that "a provision of the law is ambiguous only if it `irreconcilably conflict[s]' with another provision, Klapp v. United Ins. Group Agency, Inc., 468 Mich. 459, 467, 663 N.W.2d 447 (2003), or when it is equally susceptible to more than a single meaning." Lansing Mayor, 470 Mich, at 166, 680 N.W.2d 840 (first alternation in Lansing Mayor). When is a provision equally susceptible to more than a single meaning? The Lansing Mayor Court held that a "reasonable disagreement" is not the standard for identifying ambiguity. Id. at 168, 680 N.W.2d 840. That is, "[a] provision is not ambiguous just because `reasonable minds can differ regarding' the meaning of the provision." People v. Gardner, 482 Mich. 41, 50 n. 12, 753 N.W.2d 78 (2008), quoting Lansing Mayor, 470 Mich, at 165, 680 N.W.2d 840. The Lansing Mayor Court concluded that "a finding of ambiguity is to be reached only after `all other conventional means of [] interpretation' have been applied and found wanting." Lansing Mayor, 470 Mich. at 165, 680 N.W.2d 840, quoting Klapp, 468 Mich, at 474, 663 N.W.2d 447 (alteration in Lansing Mayor). That is, "ambiguity is a finding of last resort." Lansing Mayor, 470 Mich. at 165 n. 6, 680 N.W.2d 840.

The provision at issue in this case is MCL 211.7ff(2)(b), which provides,

According to the city, the phrase should be read as follows: "Ad valorem property taxes specifically levied for the payment of principal and interest of [ (1) ] obligations approved by the electors or [(2)] obligations pledging the unlimited taxing power of the local governmental unit." Thus the phrase "principal and interest of" would apply to both types of obligations, but the phrase "of the local governmental unit" would apply only to the second type of obligation, in accordance with the rule of the last antecedent. However, the statutory provision could also be read in the following manner: "Ad valorem property taxes specifically levied for the payment of [(1) ] principal and interest of obligations approved by the electors or [(2)] obligations pledging the unlimited taxing power of the local governmental unit." Thus the phrase "principal and interest of" would only apply to obligations approved by the electors and not the obligations pledging the unlimited taxing power of the local governmental unit. In Kinder, 277 Mich.App. at 168-169, 744 N.W.2d 184, the respondent, the city of Jackson, made such an argument. In this case, the city of Detroit declines to take that position, claiming that the phrase "principal and interest of" "clearly" applies to both obligations, although it fails to identify why this interpretation is "clearly" accurate.

Petitioner offers the following construction of the statutory provision: "Ad valorem property taxes specifically levied for the payment of principal and interest of [(1) ] obligations approved by the electors or [ (2) ] obligations pledging the unlimited taxing power[,] of the local governmental unit." The phrase "principal and interest of" would apply to both types of obligations, and the phrase "of the local governmental unit" would apply to both types of obligations. It follows, then, that another possible construction of the statutory provision is "Ad valorem property taxes specifically levied for the payment of [ (1) ] principal and interest of obligations approved by the electors or [(2) ] obligations pledging the unlimited taxing power[,] of the local governmental unit." The phrase "principal and interest of" would only apply to obligations approved by the electors and not obligations pledging the unlimited taxing power, and the phrase "of the local governmental unit" would apply to both types of obligations.

As set forth earlier, to construe a statute we must first examine its language, according every word and phrase its plain and ordinary meaning and considering the grammatical context. MCL.3a; United States Fidelity, 484 Mich. at 13, 795 N.W.2d 101. First, we turn to the phrase "principal and interest of." The issue whether this phrase applies only to "obligations approved by the electors" or whether it also applies to "obligations pledging the unlimited taxing power of the local governmental unit" has not been raised in this case. This issue was raised in Kinder, but the Kinder Court was not required to construe the provision on the facts of that case. Kinder, 277 Mich.App. at 168-169, 744 N.W.2d 184. Because this issue was not raised by the parties, we need not construe this statutory language but will assume for purposes of this case that the phrase applies to both obligations.

Next, we consider whether the phrase "of the local governmental unit" applies to "obligations approved by the electors," as held by the Tax Tribunal. Guidance is gleaned from the statutory language. The Legislature used the word "the" with respect to "electors." "The" is a definite article that, when used especially before a noun—like "electors"—has a specifying or particularizing effect. See Robinson v. City of Lansing, 486 Mich. 1, 14, 782 N.W.2d 171 (2010). Following the rationale of Robinson, because MCL 211.7ff(2)(b) refers to "the electors," we must determine to which "specific or particular" electors it refers.2 If the provision had simply said "electors," it might have referred to electors generally, as the dissent opines. However, because the phrase "of the local governmental unit" is within the same statutory provision, we conclude that "the electors" must be the electors of the local governmental unit. This interpretation recognizes that the legislature is presumed to be familiar with the rules of statutory construction, as well as the rules of grammar. See In re Messer Trust, 457 Mich. 371, 380, 579 N.W.2d 73 (1998); Greater Bethesda Healing Springs Ministry v. Evangel Builders & Constr. Mgrs, LLC, 282 Mich.App. 410, 414, 766 N.W.2d 874 (2009). This construction is also in compliance with the mandate to "`give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute and avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.'" Klapp, 468 Mich. at 468, 663 N.W.2d 447, quoting State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 466 Mich. 142, 146, 644 N.W.2d 715 (2002). The dissent's interpretation of the provision ignores, and thereby renders surplusage or nugatory, Accordingly, we also reject the dissent's claim that "[n]othing in the plain language of MCL 211.7ff(2)(b) specifies or limits which `electors' must approve the obligation."

The city argues that, under the rule of the last antecedent, the modifying clause "of the local governmental unit" should only apply to the antecedent "obligations pledging the unlimited taxing power" and not to "obligations approved by the electors." Clearly, the rule of the last antecedent does not apply when its application results in a construction that is contrary to the plain language of the statute. See Sun Valley Foods, 460 Mich. at 237, 596 N.W.2d 119. As discussed earlier, the statutory provision itself refers to "the electors," not merely "electors" in general.

Further, as our Supreme Court noted in Robinson, 486 Mich. at 15, 782 N.W.2d 171, "to discern the Legislature's intent, statutory provisions are not to be read in isolation; rather, context matters, and thus statutory provisions are to be read as a whole." Therefore, we turn to MCL 211.7ff(2), which provides in relevant part:

The statute clearly states that the exemption does not apply to "[a] special assessment levied by the local tax collecting unit," or to "[a]d valorem property taxes levied for payment of . . . obligations pledging the unlimited taxing power of the local governmental unit." MCL 211.7ff(2)(a) and (b) (emphasis added). It would be inherently inconsistent to construe the statute so as to require the payment of ad valorem property taxes levied for obligations approved by any group of "electors" rather than, consistent with the statutory language and overall scheme, just "the electors" of the local governmental unit. This construction (1) complies with the mandate that "[e]ffect is to be given to every provision, and the whole statute is to be considered in order to achieve a harmonious and consistent result," Ferguson v. Pioneer State Mut. Ins. Co., 273 Mich.App. 47, 52, 731 N.W.2d 94 (2006), and (2) recognizes the fact that the Legislature is under no "obligation to cumbersomely repeat language that is sufficiently incorporated into a statute by the use of such terms as `the,' `such,' and `that,' Robinson, 486 Mich. at 17, 782 N.W.2d 171.

In summary, we agree with the Tax Tribunal's conclusion, albeit for different reasons, that the levy of the tax on petitioner's property was improper in that the taxes were not levied for the payment of "obligations approved by the electors" within the meaning of MCL 211.7ff(2)(b). After applying conventional means of statutory interpretation, we conclude that the phrase "of the local governmental unit" clearly applies to both the "obligations approved by the electors" and the "obligations pledging the unlimited taxing power." There is no ambiguity. Thus, the Tax Tribunal properly granted petitioner's motion for summary disposition, and properly ordered the removal of the school debt service taxes from the taxes charged to petitioner's property, as well as a refund of any overpaid taxes.

Affirmed.

JANSEN, P.J., concurred.

K.F. KELLY, J. (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority's interpretation of the phrase "of the local government unit" in MCL 211.7ff(2)(b) as applying to both "obligations approved by the electors" and "obligations pledging the unlimited taxing power." Despite its conclusion that the provision is unambiguous, the majority reads additional terms into MCL 211.7ff(2)(b) and, thus, its holding is contrary to the plain language of the statute and also to the rules of statutory construction. In my view, the language of MCL 211.7ff(2)(b) is clear and unambiguous, and judicial construction of its language is not permitted. I would apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the provision to the circumstances at issue and reverse the Tax Tribunal's decision that respondent improperly assessed the tax.

This Court reviews the Tax Tribunal's interpretation of a statute de novo. See Pittsfield Charter Twp. v. Washtenaw Co., 468 Mich. 702, 707, 664 N.W.2d 193 (2003). When interpreting the meaning of a statute, this Court's goal is to determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent. The first step is to review the language used. Institute in Basic Life Principles, Inc. v. Watersmeet Twp. (After Remand), 217 Mich.App. 7, 12, 551 N.W.2d 199 (1996). The Legislature is presumed to intend the meaning that is plainly expressed by the words written. Id. If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, then judicial construction is not necessary, nor is it even permitted, Mt. Pleasant v. State Tax Comm., 477 Mich. 50, 53, 729 N.W.2d 833 (2007), and this Court must apply as written the language of the statute to the facts at issue, People v. Barbee, 470 Mich. 283, 286, 681 N.W.2d 348 (2004), even if it results in an absurd outcome, Decker v. Flood, 248 Mich.App. 75, 84, 638 N.W.2d 163 (2001). A statutory provision "is ambiguous only if it `irreconcilably conflict[s]' with another provision or when it is equally susceptible to more than a single meaning." Lansing Mayor v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 470 Mich. 154, 166, 680 N.W.2d 840 (2004) (citation omitted; alteration in original). Further, I must emphasize that the reason for these well-established rules of statutory interpretation is to ensure that the courts of this state adhere to their judicial role of applying the law and do not overstep their bounds by acting in a legislative capacity. In other words, the rules of statutory interpretation necessarily mandate judicial restraint in order to ensure the integrity of the separate branches of government. "[I]n our democracy, a legislature is free to make inefficacious or even unwise policy choices. The correction of these policy choices is not a judicial function as long as the legislative choices do not offend the constitution." Decker, 248 Mich.App. at 84, 638 N.W.2d 163 (citation and quotation marks omitted; alteration in original).

The facts of this matter are not in dispute. Rather, the central issue is a question of law: Whether petitioner is subject to ad valorem tax liability under the language of MCL 211.7ff(2)(b). The Tax Tribunal answered this question in the negative, determining that the Legislature's intent under the Michigan Renaissance Zone Act (RZA), MCL 125.2681 et seq., directed this result.

The Legislature enacted the RZA to assist "local governmental units in encouraging economic development" by permitting the creation of renaissance zones within which entities would be provided temporary relief from certain taxes. MCL 125.2682. Consistent with this purpose, MCL 125.2689(2)(a) of the RZA provides, in part, that "property located in a renaissance zone is exempt from the collection of taxes under . . . [s]ection 7ff of the general property tax act [ (GPTA) ], 1893 PA 206, MCL 211.7ff." And consistent with this mandate, MCL 211.7ff(1) provides an exemption from taxation under the GPTA:

Subsection 2 of MCL 211.7ff provides a list of exceptions to this exemption:

In other words, under these limited circumstances the exemption from taxation under the GPTA, which is mandated by the RZA, does not apply and an entity will be subject to tax liability.

The only exception to the exemption that is at issue here is MCL 211.7ff(2)(b). Under this provision, an entity with real or personal property in a renaissance zone will be subject to an ad valorem property tax that was "specifically levied for the payment of principal and interest of [ (1) ] obligations approved by the electors or [ (2) ] obligations pledging the unlimited taxing power of the local governmental unit." Id. plain reading of this provision's terms reveals no ambiguity. Reasonable minds cannot differ in the conclusion that this provision provides an exception to the RZA exemption if an ad valorem tax is levied for obligations approved by the electors or for obligations pledging the unlimited taxing power of the local governmental unit. Simply put, an ad valorem tax will be applicable if either of these two types of obligations exist.

Despite its conclusion that MCL 211.7ff(2)(b) is unambiguous, the majority somehow concludes that the exception to the exemption found in it only applies if an ad valorem tax is levied for obligations approved by the electors of a local governmental unit or obligations pledging the unlimited taxing power of the local governmental unit. This construction bends the rules of statutory interpretation and adds additional language to the statute. Nothing in the plain language of MCL 211.7ff(2)(b) specifies or limits which "electors" must approve the obligation. The majority's conclusion that the electors must be "of the local governmental unit," which by definition does not include school boards1 (and would mean that the exception language would not apply), is contrary to the plain language of the provision. The phrase "of the local governmental unit" only refers to the immediately antecedent phrase, i.e., "obligations pledging the unlimited taxing power." Nothing in the grammatical structure of MCL 211.7ff(2)(b) suggests that "of the local governmental unit" also applies to the phrase "obligations approved by the electors." This construction comports with the common grammatical rule of construction, and a common understanding of the English language, "that a modifying clause will be construed to modify only the last antecedent unless some language in the statute requires a different interpretation." People v. Small, 467 Mich. 259, 263 & n. 4, 650 N.W.2d 328 (2002) (noting that "[u]nless set off by commas, a modifying word or phrase, where no contrary intention appears, refers solely to the last antecedent"). "[T]he statutory language must be read and understood in its grammatical context." People v. Jackson, 487 Mich. 783, 791, 790 N.W.2d 340 (2010). The majority's interpretation ignores this grammatical rule by adding a comma before the modifying phrase "of a governmental unit" and thereby reading an otherwise nonexistent limitation into the statute—that "obligations approved by electors" means obligations approved by electors of a local governmental unit, which only includes counties, cities, villages, or townships. "[A court] cannot read restrictions or limitations into a statute that plainly contains none." Rusnak v. Walker, 273 Mich.App. 299, 305, 729 N.W.2d 542 (2006).

The majority further justifies its interpretation by opining that the failure to add the phrase "of a governmental unit" after "obligations approved by the electors" renders the term "the," as used before "electors," nugatory. It is true that the article "the" is a definite article that may have a specifying effect in some contexts. However, it does not follow that the term "the" is necessarily rendered surplusage if the phrase "obligations approved by the electors" is not read to mean "obligations approved by the electors [of the local governmental unit]." I would note that the article "the" may also be used to designate a noun "as being used generically," Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997),2 and that that is how the Legislature used the term "the" here. The majority, however, defines the term "the" to require that the particular electors be defined and then goes a step further to conclude that those electors must be "of the local governmental unit." This is not what the provision states.

I agree with the majority that statutory provisions must not be read in isolation, but in the context of the statutory scheme as a whole. See Robinson, 486 Mich. at 15, 782 N.W.2d 171. However, nothing in the language of MCL 211.7ff(2) renders my interpretation "inherently inconsistent" with the statutory language or the overall scheme of the statute, as the majority asserts. As previously stated, MCL 211.7ff(2) provides a list of exceptions to the RZA exemption:

The majority implies that because the statute's "exemption does not apply to `[a] special assessment levied by the local tax collecting unit' or to `[a]d valorem property taxes levied for payment of . . . obligations pledging the unlimited taxing power of the local governmental unit," it must also follow that the ad valorem tax levied under MCL 211.7ff(2)(b) for obligations approved by the electors must be approved by "`the electors' of the local governmental unit" [rather than] "any group of `electors'. This position is logically untenable; it is based on erroneous deductive reasoning in regard to the relationship between subdivisions (a) and (b) of MCL 211.7ff(2). Moreover, I would also point out that the Legislature's inclusion in subdivision (c) of MCL 211.7ff(2) of an exception to the RZA exemption for taxes levied under the Revised School Code does not mandate the conclusion that MCL 211.7ff(2)(b) must be construed to preclude an ad valorem tax levied for an obligation approved by electors who happen to be a particular school district's electors. And it must be noted that a school district can encompass more than one discrete local governmental unit or only part of one or more local governmental units. Had the Legislature wished to preclude such an outcome, it could have included the language "of a local governmental unit." after the phrase "obligations approved by the electors." It chose not to do so. The majority has otherwise failed to explain what inherent inconsistency arises within the statutory scheme if MCL 211.7ff(2)(b) is given its plain and ordinary meaning, i.e., the RZA exemption is inapplicable if an ad valorem tax is levied for obligations approved by the electors or for obligations pledging the unlimited taxing power of the local government unit.

For the foregoing reasons, I disagree with the majority's construction of MCL 211.7ff(2)(b), which impermissibly interprets that unambiguous provision and concludes that "the phrase `of the local governmental unit' clearly applies to both the `obligations approved by the electors' and the `obligations pledging the unlimited taxing power.'" Under the circumstances of this case, an ad valorem tax was levied that was a school debt service tax of 13 mills as a result of the school district electors' approval of $116,156,390 in bonds. This was an "obligation[ ] approved by the electors," and therefore petitioner is subject to taxation under MCL 211.7ff(2)(b). Petitioner cannot avail itself of the RZA's exemption because the factual circumstances fall within the exception to the exemption. I would conclude, then, that the taxes were properly levied against petitioner. I would reverse the decision of the Tax Tribunal.