PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs, the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America and UAW Local 6888 (collectively, the Union), appeal the circuit court order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants, Central Michigan University Trustees and Central Michigan University President (collectively, the CMU officials), under MCR 2.116(C)(10) and MCR 2.116(C)(5).
On December 4, 2008, the CMU Board of Trustees adopted the political candidacy of employees policy (candidacy policy), which provides, in part:
The candidacy policy also includes an introductory paragraph encouraging employees'
On March 15, 2009, the president of CMU issued a draft of procedures and guidelines (draft procedures) pertaining to the candidacy policy. The draft procedures required employees to discuss their desire to be a candidate for office with their supervisor and applicable vice president at least 60 days before filing for candidacy. The draft procedures further provided that the vice president or provost must be convinced that no substantial conflict of interest or conflict of commitment would be involved in becoming a candidate. The vice president or provost also had to gain the president's support before issuing a statement to the relevant personnel office. The draft procedures similarly required an elected or appointed employee to discuss with his or her supervisor and applicable vice president or provost, within 20 days of election or appointment, how the employee's election or appointment would not interfere with normal work responsibilities. The vice president or provost had to be convinced that there was no substantial conflict of commitment or conflict of interest and also gain the president's support before issuing a statement to the relevant personnel office. The draft procedures further provided that if the vice president or provost was not convinced that there was no conflict of interest or conflict of commitment, the employee could suggest an alternative or reduced work assignment or take an unpaid leave of absence to eliminate any conflict. The draft procedures stated that any employee who did not follow the procedures was subject to discipline, including discharge.
The Union filed suit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief preventing the CMU officials from applying the candidacy policy and the draft procedures. The Union alleged that the candidacy policy and draft procedures placed requirements and conditions on employees that violated their rights to run for office under the Act. Both parties moved for summary disposition.
The Union argued that the Act barred the CMU officials from interfering with university employees' off-duty political conduct and that the candidacy policy placed conditions on employees' ability to run for office when there was no conflict with work. The CMU officials responded that the candidacy policy properly regulated employees' work conduct and was consistent with the Act.
The CMU officials argued that there was no case for the trial court to decide because the University had not applied the candidacy policy to any employees. The Union responded that they did not lack standing because there was an actual controversy given that the candidacy policy threatened to harm employees represented by the Union.
The trial court granted the CMU officials' motion for summary disposition according to MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact) and MCR 2.116(C)(5) (lack of standing to sue). With respect to MCR 2.116(C)(10), the trial court concluded that the candidacy policy and draft procedures did not violate the Act because they were a permissible mechanism to ensure that university employees adhered to the Act by regulating only political activities that interfered with work. The trial court also found that the CMU officials did not regulate political content, activity, or views of employees and provided discipline only for violating the candidacy policy and the procedures. With respect to MCR 2.116(C)(5), the trial court concluded that the Union's members had suffered no particular injury because the candidacy policy adhered to the Act and because no one had attempted to become a
The Union now appeals.
The Union argues that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition in favor of the CMU officials under MCR 2.116(C)(5) on the basis of lack of standing to sue. "`In reviewing a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(5), this Court must consider the pleadings, depositions, admissions, affidavits, and other documentary evidence submitted by the parties.'"
The trial court found that the Union's members suffered no injury because none of the Union's members had attempted to become a candidate for public office since the University implemented the candidacy policy and because the University had not implemented the draft procedures. The trial court concluded that it was unlikely to redress any speculative injury because it found that the policy was legal. In so holding, the trial court relied on the principles set forth in Nat'l Wildlife Federation v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co.
The Supreme Court held:
In so stating, the Supreme Court overruled Nat'l Wildlife Federation and its progeny. Therefore, under the current approach, it is sufficient to establish standing to seek a declaratory judgment when a litigant meets the requirements of MCR 2.605.
MCR 2.605(A)(1) provides:
MCR 2.605 does not limit or expand the subject-matter jurisdiction of the courts, but instead incorporates the doctrines of standing, ripeness, and mootness.
At the outset, we conclude that the trial court was correct by determining that the Union did not have standing to the extent that it challenged the draft procedures. Guidance on the future implications of the draft procedures would be speculative and hypothetical because those procedures were still in draft form and the University had not yet implemented them.
Turning to the candidacy policy, it is true that the Union's members had suffered no injury because no university employee had attempted to become a candidate since the University adopted the policy in December 2008.
There is an actual controversy between the parties because the CMU officials promulgated a policy that is allegedly at odds with a state statute. And although no university employee has yet sought to run for office, it is appropriate for the Union to seek an adjudication of its members' rights and responsibilities before the candidacy policy causes actual injury or ripens into a violation of the law by interfering with the employees' ability to engage in offduty political activity.
Moreover, applying the principles announced in Lansing Sch. Ed. Ass'n, the Union has standing because the university employees have a special and substantial interest in ensuring that the CMU officials' policies do not violate their statutory rights under the Act, and that interest is different from any rights or interests of the public at large.
Thus, we conclude that the trial court erred by finding that the Union had not presented an actual controversy and by determining that the Union did not have standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the university employees' rights under the candidacy policy.
The Union argues that the trial court erred by granting the CMU officials' motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). When reviewing a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the court considers the affidavits, depositions, pleadings, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
MCL 15.403 of the Act provides, in relevant part:
The activities permitted in MCL 15.403 "shall not be actively engaged in by a public employee during those hours when that person is being compensated for the performance of that person's duties as a public employee."
The language of the Act is unambiguous.
Given our conclusion that the Union did not have standing to challenge the draft procedures, we need not address the Union's claims regarding the implications of those procedures. Thus, we focus our analysis on the legitimacy of the candidacy policy.
The Union argues that the candidacy policy violated the Act because it interferes with its members' ability to engage in political activities during nonwork hours. More specifically, the Union asserts that the candidacy policy violates the Act because it requires an employee to provide advance notice and engage in advance discussion with two levels of superiors when seeking to participate in political office. Those superiors must then attest that the political activity will not present a conflict of interest or interfere with employment. The candidacy policy further provides that failure to demonstrate that political candidacy activities will not interfere with university activities could affect the employee's job status.
The Michigan Supreme Court has recognized a public employer's
But public employers may not regulate the off-duty political activity of their employees in any way that preemptively conflicts with the Act.
The trial court found that the candidacy policy did not violate the Act because it does "not restrict an employee's rights to engage in political activity and do[es] not hinge in any way on the political content or position an employee purports, nor do[es][it] provide a blanket ban on an
The candidacy policy specifically requires that "appropriate arrangements have been made to ensure that their candidacy in no way will interfere with the full performance of their university work and that their candidacy will pose no conflict with professional standards or ethics." The candidacy policy does not curtail activities outside work and does not potentially curtail any work responsibility that was affected by activity outside work. The assurances that the policy requires are not whether or how an employee will seek political office. Rather, the assurances are that this activity will not interfere with work. Additionally, any discipline or leave of absence that a candidate/employee could be assessed would be in response to political activities at work, rather than offduty political pursuits. An employer may prohibit political activity during work hours when the employer compensates the employee and that compensation is for the performance of the employee's duties as a public employee.
Because the trial courts' properly determined that the CMU officials' candidacy policy did not violate the Act, it correctly denied declaratory and injunctive relief.
We reverse in part and affirm in part. We do not retain jurisdiction.
WHITBECK, P.J., and MURRAY and DONOFRIO, JJ., concurred.
