PER CURIAM.
We granted defendant's delayed application for leave to appeal the sentences of 18 to 30 years and 18 to 48 months imposed following his plea-based convictions of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, and felonious assault, MCL 750.82, respectively. The only question is whether the trial court properly assessed 50 points for offense variable (OV) 7, MCL 777.37 (aggravated physical abuse). Fifty points can be assessed under OV 7 for "sadism, torture, or excessive brutality or conduct designed to substantially increase the fear and anxiety a victim suffered...." MCL 777.37(1)(a). The prosecution does not contend that defendant's actions amounted to sadism, torture, or excessive brutality and instead contends that defendant's conduct was designed to substantially increase the fear and anxiety a victim suffered.
Defendant's conduct was reprehensible, and his actions were undoubtedly designed to cause fear and anxiety in his victims, as is the conduct in all armed robberies. However, because OV 7, by its own terms, is to be scored at 50 points only for conduct "designed to substantially increase the fear and anxiety" of a victim, we conclude that zero points should have been assessed for OV 7. We therefore vacate defendant's sentences and remand for resentencing.
Defendant robbed a gas station/party store. He entered the gas station carrying an airsoft
Defendant pleaded guilty to charges of
This Court reviews a trial court's scoring of the sentencing guidelines to determine whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion and whether the record evidence adequately supports a particular score. People v. Lechleitner, 291 Mich.App. 56, 62, 804 N.W.2d 345 (2010). To the extent that a scoring issue calls for statutory interpretation, review is de novo. Id.
MCL 777.37(1)(a) provides that 50 points must be assessed for OV 7 if "[a] victim was treated with sadism, torture, or excessive brutality or conduct designed to substantially increase the fear and anxiety a victim suffered during the offense." Defendant argues that the trial court erred by assessing 50 points for OV 7 because his conduct did not fall within the statute.
"Sadism" is defined by the statute as "conduct that subjects a victim to extreme or prolonged pain or humiliation and is inflicted to produce suffering or for the offender's gratification." MCL 777.37(3). Defendant's conduct does not meet the definition of "sadism" because no evidence showed that the victims were subjected to extreme or prolonged pain or humiliation. No evidence showed that the victims were subjected to torture. "Torture" is not defined by statute; therefore, this Court may consult a dictionary to determine its ordinary meaning. People v. Peals, 476 Mich. 636, 641, 720 N.W.2d 196 (2006). Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2d ed., 1997) defines "torture" as "the act of inflicting excruciating pain, as punishment or revenge, as a means of getting a confession or information, or for sheer cruelty." No evidence showed that defendant inflicted excruciating pain on the victims.
Similarly, there is no evidence that defendant used excessive brutality. "Excessive" and "brutality" are not defined in MCL 777.37. Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2d ed., 1997) defines "excessive" as "going beyond the usual, necessary, or proper limit or degree[.]" "Brutality" is defined as "the quality of being brutal[.]" Id. "Brutal," in turn, is defined as "savage; cruel; inhuman" or "harsh; severe[.]" Id. Thus, excessive brutality means savagery or cruelty beyond even the "usual" brutality of a crime. Defendant struck each victim once in the head, but there is no evidence that either clerk was injured. This behavior, while certainly illegal and reprehensible, was not savage or inhuman in comparison with behavior that has occurred during other armed robberies or felonious assaults.
The prosecution argues, however, that defendant's conduct was "designed to substantially increase the fear and anxiety a victim suffered during the offense." "Substantial" means "of ample or considerable amount, quantity, size, etc." Id. "Ample,"
Further, circumstances inherently present in the crime must be discounted for purposes of scoring an OV. Id. at 326, 810 N.W.2d 588. For example, "[t]ransportation to a place of greater danger is appropriately scored under OV 8 [MCL 777.38], but must be given a score of zero points when ... the sentencing offense is kidnapping." Id. Armed robbery requires the use of a dangerous weapon during a robbery. MCL 750.529. A robbery occurs when, in the course of a larceny, the defendant "uses force or violence against any person who is present, or ... assaults or puts the person in fear...." MCL 750.530(1). As noted by the Hunt Court, the use of a weapon is inherent in a felonious assault. See Hunt, 290 Mich.App. at 326, 810 N.W.2d 588; MCL 750.82(1). Therefore, the presence of a weapon and the use of a certain amount of force or intimidation must be discounted for purposes of OV 7. All such crimes against a person involve the infliction of a certain amount of fear and anxiety. OV 7 is designed to respond to particularly heinous instances in which the criminal acted to increase that fear by a substantial or considerable amount.
While defendant may have used more violence than would be strictly necessary to complete an armed robbery, it cannot be said that his conduct was "designed to substantially increase the fear and anxiety" beyond the fear and anxiety that occurs in most armed robberies. The plain language of OV 7 reveals that it was meant to be scored in particularly egregious cases involving torture, brutality, or similar conduct designed to substantially increase the victim's fear, not in every case in which some fear-producing action beyond the bare minimum necessary to commit the crime was undertaken.
The trial court erred by assessing 50 points for OV 7. Defendant is entitled to resentencing because the proper guidelines score results in a different recommended minimum-sentence range. People v. Francisco, 474 Mich. 82, 89-90, 711 N.W.2d 44 (2006).
Vacated and remanded for resentencing. We do not retain jurisdiction.
BECKERING, P.J., and OWENS and SHAPIRO, JJ., concurred.