PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals by right a judgment of no cause of action in this medical malpractice case, asserting that certain evidentiary rulings resulted in the denial of a fair trial. Specifically, plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its discretion by not admitting as an exhibit for impeachment purposes an affidavit of a nonparty doctor-witness and by excluding presuit correspondence concerning the affidavit between plaintiff's attorney and a representative of the witness's insurer. We conclude the trial court abused its discretion and that the error was not harmless. We reverse and remand.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's decedent, Barbara Johnson, a horse owner, was severely bitten in the face by one of her mares while assisting in the birth of a foal. Although the bite resulted in deep gashes below her right eye and along her jaw that caused heavy bleeding, Mrs. Johnson managed to call for an ambulance and also called her daughter. The decedent was transported to the emergency room (ER) of the defendant hospital, arriving at about 2:38 p.m., according to the emergency medical services report. Defendant, Robert F. Kowalski, M.D., the physician on duty in the ER at the time, assessed Mrs. Johnson at about 2:45 p.m., finding that she was alert and oriented. There was bleeding into her mouth, but her airway was open and being maintained by the suctioning of blood as needed.

Dr. Kowalski testified that between 2:50 and 2:52 p.m., he requested the assistance of an ENT1 and an anesthesiologist "STAT" to help manage Mrs. Johnson's airway and that a medical helicopter be summoned to transport her to a larger hospital with better trauma treatment capability. Dr. Charles Urse, an anesthesiologist, responded, and shortly thereafter Dr. Lisa Jacobson, an ENT specialist, also responded to the "STAT" call for assistance. Both Drs. Kowalski and Urse testified in their pretrial depositions and at trial that Mrs. Johnson had been relatively stable when they were at her bedside discussing the best medical procedure to maintain the patency of her airway. About 3:00 p.m., Dr. Kowalski was called away to another emergency room patient who had gone into cardiac arrest. Thereafter, at about 3:05 p.m., Mrs. Johnson began having more serious difficulty breathing, crying out that she could not breathe. Dr. Urse administered medications and attempted to orally intubate Mrs. Johnson, but the amount of blood in her mouth and throat made it impossible. Dr. Urse, with Dr. Jacobson's assistance, performed a cricothyroidotomy to ventilate the patient's lungs by inserting breathing tubes directly through her throat. The procedure was only partially successful, and Mrs. Johnson suffered a cardiac arrest. She was resuscitated and placed on life support, but she had sustained permanent brain damage. Five days later, she was removed from life support and died.

Plaintiff's theory of the case was that when Dr. Kowalski left Mrs. Johnson to attend the other patient, Dr. Urse was not present and assistance was not summoned until after Mrs. Johnson's condition suddenly deteriorated. Plaintiff contended that Dr. Kowalski was negligent by failing to immediately intubate Mrs. Johnson before being called away to the other patient and leaving Mrs. Johnson unattended. According to plaintiff's theory, Dr. Urse had not arrived until after the patient's fatal deterioration began at about 3:05 p.m. Dr. Urse then took steps to intubate Mrs. Johnson, but blood in her mouth and throat prevented him from completing the procedure. Dr. Urse then performed a cricothyroidotomy with Dr. Jacobson's assistance. This too was not completely successful because Mrs. Johnson went into cardiac arrest and suffered loss of oxygen to the brain. Plaintiff's counsel formed this theory of the case during the presuit notice-of-intent period, MCL 600.2912b, apparently on the basis of his review of the medical records.

Plaintiff's counsel named Dr. Urse as a potential defendant in plaintiff's notice of intent, MCL 600.2912b, but did not name him in the complaint. On July 26, 2007, counsel wrote to Nancy A. Croze, a claims representative for Dr. Urse's liability insurer, American Physicians Assurance Corporation, advising her that on the basis of his understanding of the facts, Dr. Kowalski bore sole responsibility for the medical accident. After setting forth his understanding of the facts of the case, plaintiff's counsel indicated that he was planning to file a lawsuit only against Dr. Kowalski, assuming that his information was accurate. Counsel stated in his letter that he needed "some kind of verification perhaps in the form of an affidavit by Dr. Urse" that would confirm his understanding of the facts and that counsel "could draft such an affidavit."

Following the July 26, 2007, letter and other communications with plaintiff's counsel, which included e-mails, Croze wrote to counsel on August 15, 2007, enclosing Dr. Urse's August 9, 2007, affidavit. Croze stated in her letter: "I am confident that this document will meet your needs as you assess your intentions for pursuit of the case."

In pertinent part, two paragraphs of the affidavit stated:

At trial and in his deposition 18 months earlier, Dr. Urse testified contrary to plaintiff's theory of the case that he was, in fact, at Mrs. Johnson's bedside discussing treatment options with Dr. Kowalski while the patient was stable and before Dr. Kowalski was called away. Dr. Urse further testified that his one-page progress note did not include the events preceding the patient's acute deterioration and that he signed his affidavit believing that the information desired was the time frame it took for him to arrive at the ER after receiving the stat page. He testified that he never saw the correspondence between plaintiff's counsel and Croze.

Two weeks before trial, the trial court heard and granted defendant's motion for a protective order regarding plaintiff's effort to subpoena Croze and her file. During the hearing, the court suggested, without deciding, that the Urse affidavit could arguably be used at trial as a prior inconsistent statement to impeach Dr. Urse's testimony.

On the first day of trial, after a jury had been selected and sworn, plaintiff's counsel sought a ruling from the court on the admissibility and use of Dr. Urse's affidavit and the correspondence between plaintiff's counsel and Croze. Counsel argued that plaintiff's "whole case rest[ed] upon the medical records which contradict the testimony" of Drs. Urse and Kowalski that they were both present with Mrs. Johnson before the onset of fatal respiratory distress. Plaintiff's counsel agreed that use of the affidavit would be limited to impeaching the anticipated trial testimony of Dr. Urse and that the letters were intended only to provide context for the affidavit. With respect to the letters, the court ruled that it would not permit reference to them in opening statements but would not preclude their use at trial "if a proper foundation is laid" that Dr. Urse "in fact reviewed those letters and was in some way endorsing the facts that are contained therein at the time he executed the affidavit." Regarding the affidavit, the court ruled that it was hearsay and could not be used until Dr. Urse testified in a contrary manner. Nonetheless, defense counsel did not object to plaintiff's counsel's request to refer to the affidavit in his opening statement, without showing it, by saying "that [Dr. Urse] signed something which I believe is contrary to his testimony." In his opening statement, plaintiff's counsel stated:

Dr. Urse testified at trial as discussed already. When asked, Dr. Urse recalled having signed his affidavit and he brought a copy to the trial. When plaintiff's counsel sought to display the affidavit to the jury, defense counsel objected that it was hearsay. Plaintiff argued that it was a prior inconsistent statement. The trial court suggested that counsel needed to lay a better foundation. When plaintiff's counsel asked Dr. Urse if his one-page progress note reflected the treatment he provided, Urse answered, "Yeah, it's a summary of events that occurred starting when she started to have respiratory distress" and "a summary of what had occurred that I thought was important." Dr. Urse identified a copy of the affidavit, identified his signature, and agreed that the affidavit was a notarized statement given under oath. Dr. Urse was asked to and read aloud ¶ 4 of the affidavit. At this point, the trial court suggested that the affidavit be marked, and it was marked as Exhibit 17. In an effort to establish the affidavit as a prior inconsistent statement, plaintiff's counsel asked Dr. Urse about ¶ 5 of the affidavit and about the content of his progress note. Counsel moved for the admission of Exhibit 17, but the trial court ruled that it had not heard any testimony from Dr. Urse that was inconsistent with his affidavit.

On further cross-examination, Dr. Urse acknowledged that his progress note did not state all that he had done or all that occurred and that he had not thought it important to indicate that he had conferred with Dr. Kowalski regarding treatment options. He also admitted that he reviewed plaintiff's notice of intent and that he talked to a "legal representative" before signing the affidavit. But Dr. Urse denied ever seeing the correspondence at issue and explained that "I thought that when I filled out the affidavit, that you were asking me about when I got contacted and how long it took me to get down to the ER, that was my understanding, and that's what I wrote." Plaintiff's counsel noted that he did not ask that the affidavit be prepared, to which Dr. Urse replied, "[T]hat's what my legal representative said and I read it and I said that is what happened and I signed it."

The trial court ruled as follows regarding Exhibit 17:

After the trial court's ruling, plaintiff's counsel was allowed to require Dr. Urse to again read into the record ¶ 5 of his affidavit, which states: "That my findings and treatment are summarized in my hand-written progress note contained in the medical record."

Near the close of the proofs, plaintiff's counsel again sought to admit as rebuttal exhibits Dr. Urse's affidavit, counsel's July 26, 2007, letter, and Croze's August 15, 2007, letter. The trial court reasoned that there was no evidence that Dr. Urse knew of the letters or that he was responding in the affidavit to what plaintiff's counsel thought the facts were at the time he wrote his letter. The trial court also noted that the content of the affidavit was not contrary to Dr. Urse's testimony, either at trial or in his deposition. Therefore, the trial court ruled:

When queried by plaintiff's counsel regarding referring to the affidavit in his closing argument, the trial court advised:

Following the trial court's advice, and as he did in his opening statement, plaintiff's counsel argued that the defense in this case was fabricated, that Dr. Urse's affidavit indicated that there was no meeting between Dr. Urse and Dr. Kowalski, and that Dr. Urse did not come to Mrs. Johnson's room between 2:53 and 3:00 p.m. as the two doctors testified.

The trial court instructed the jury regarding a prior inconsistent statement of a witness according to M. Civ. JI. 3.15 as follows:

As noted already, the jury returned a verdict of no cause of action. Plaintiff now appeals by right.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court's decision regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Craig v. Oakwood Hosp., 471 Mich. 67, 76, 684 N.W.2d 296 (2004). But questions of law underlying a trial court's evidentiary decision, such as the construction of a constitutional provision, rule of evidence, court rule, or statute, are reviewed de novo. Barnett v. Hidalgo, 478 Mich. 151, 159, 732 N.W.2d 472 (2007); Waknin v. Chamberlain, 467 Mich. 329, 332, 653 N.W.2d 176 (2002). Even if a trial court's decision regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence is an abuse of discretion because it is outside the range of principled outcomes, reversal is not warranted unless a substantial right of a party is affected, MRE 103(a), or it affirmatively appears that failure to grant relief is inconsistent with substantial justice, MCR 2.613(A). Lewis v. LeGrow, 258 Mich.App. 175, 200, 670 N.W.2d 675 (2003).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not admitting Dr. Urse's affidavit in evidence as Exhibit 17. Plaintiff further argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to admit the letters exchanged between plaintiff's counsel and the insurance claims representative, Croze. Plaintiff contends that when read together, the contents of the documents diverge from the testimony of the witness and therefore constitute prior inconsistent statements. Because they are inconsistent, plaintiff argues, the trial court should have admitted them for impeachment purposes.2 We agree.

A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY EXCLUDING THE AFFIDAVIT

The trial court's ruling on the affidavit was ambiguous at best. MRE 613(b) provides:

MRE 613(b) recognizes that a prior inconsistent statement of a witness is admissible to impeach the credibility of a witness. Merrow v. Bofferding, 458 Mich. 617, 631, 581 N.W.2d 696 (1998); Gilchrist v. Gilchrist, 333 Mich. 275, 280, 52 N.W.2d 531 (1952). If admitted, a prior inconsistent statement of a witness is not regarded as coming within the rule excluding hearsay, MRE 802, because it is not offered as substantive evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted, MRE 801(c), but is only offered to test the credibility of the witness's testimony in court. Merrow, 458 Mich. at 631, 581 N.W.2d 696; People v. Steele, 283 Mich.App. 472, 487, 769 N.W.2d 256 (2009). But a party seeking to impeach a witness with a prior inconsistent statement must satisfy the foundational criteria provided for in MRE 613(b). Barnett, 478 Mich. at 165, 732 N.W.2d 472; People v. Jenkins, 450 Mich. 249, 256, 537 N.W.2d 828 (1995). One criterion for admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement, not disputed here, is that the witness actually made the prior statement. Merrow, 458 Mich. at 631-632, 581 N.W.2d 696. Another criterion for admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement under MRE 613 is that the prior out-of-court statement of the witness was in fact inconsistent with the witness's testimony in court. Barnett, 478 Mich. at 165, 732 N.W.2d 472; Gilchrist, 333 Mich. at 280, 52 N.W.2d 531.

The Michigan Rules of Evidence do not expressly prescribe a test for inconsistency. McCormick, Evidence (6th ed.) § 34, pp. 151-152 sets forth the prevailing view:

In this case, the trial court twice — once when plaintiff moved to admit the affidavit during her case-in-chief and once when counsel proffered the affidavit as rebuttal evidence — stated its belief that Dr. Urse's affidavit was not inconsistent with his trial testimony. If that were so, the affidavit would be irrelevant to the witness's credibility and inadmissible hearsay for any other purpose. Consequently, if indeed there were no inconsistency between the affidavit and Dr. Urse's testimony, neither the affidavit nor its contents should have been admitted.

Nonetheless, the trial court obviously determined that even if the court did not, a reasonable jury might indeed perceive an inconsistency. The trial court allowed plaintiff's counsel the opportunity to cross-examine the witness on the affidavit. The trial court actually allowed the witness to read the affidavit to the jury, which, of course, is the same as admitting it. People v. Rodgers, 388 Mich. 513, 519, 201 N.W.2d 621 (1972). In reaching the decision to admit the contents of the affidavit by means of its being read, but not the document itself, the trial court stated on the record its belief that MRE 613 applied: "The [affidavit] has been used for the extent it was able to for purposes of impeachment. MRE 613 permits that and I permitted you to do that." Thereafter, the trial court allowed plaintiff's counsel to discuss the contents of the "inadmissible" affidavit during closing argument. Finally, the trial court actually instructed the jury regarding prior inconsistent statements. M. Civ. JI. 3.15.

The only conclusion to be drawn is that the trial court determined that although the court was not convinced, a jury could reasonably find that the affidavit was in fact inconsistent with the witness' testimony, and the court left it for the jury to decide. In this sense, the court's decision was correct. But unless the affidavit were to be deemed collateral, the court clearly erred by refusing to admit the document itself.

The contents of the affidavit were clearly not about a collateral issue. As the trial court itself acknowledged, plaintiff's entire theory of the case was premised on the fact that the affidavit and medical records told the "true story" and that Dr. Urse "changed his position regarding what happened."

In Osberry v. Watters, 7 Mich.App. 258, 262, 151 N.W.2d 372 (1967), the Court adopted Professor Wigmore's test to determine what extrinsic evidence is admissible for impeachment purposes:

The facts contained in the affidavit that set forth Dr. Urse's activities leading up to Mrs. Johnson's rapid deterioration, independently of their tendency to impeach the witness, are relevant to the case. Not only "could" they "have been shown in evidence," they were shown into evidence by both parties to the suit. The affidavit was not collateral and therefore should have been admitted.

Of course, if our ruling ended here, the failure to admit the actual document would be harmless inasmuch as the trial court allowed the contents of the affidavit into evidence, allowed plaintiff's counsel to discuss its contents during closing argument, and instructed the jury to consider whether the affidavit contradicted Dr. Urse's testimony. The more difficult question involves the e-mail between plaintiff's counsel and the claims representative, Croze.

B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF THE E-MAIL

With respect to the e-mail, the question presented is a simple one of logical relevance. Logical relevance is the foundation for admissibility. People v. VanderVliet, 444 Mich. 52, 60-61, 508 N.W.2d 114 (1993). Logical relevance is defined by MRE 401 and MRE 402.

As defined by MRE 401, "relevant evidence" is evidence that has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." MRE 402 provides: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Michigan, these rules, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."

Plaintiff sought to impeach the credibility of Dr. Urse not only by introducing Dr. Urse's own prior and arguably inconsistent statement (the affidavit), but also by introducing communications between plaintiff's counsel and Ms. Croze for Dr. Urse's insurer. Plaintiff contends that the credibility of Dr. Urse's testimony can only be properly judged by viewing it in context. In effect, plaintiff argues, the e-mail explains the affidavit's contents and why they are inconsistent with Dr. Urse's trial testimony. If Dr. Urse was aware of the substance of the e-mail exchanged between Croze and plaintiff's counsel, the jury might have concluded that the phrasing of the affidavit was a deliberate attempt to obfuscate the central issue of the case. Similarly, even if Dr. Urse was unaware of the e-mail exchange, if the affidavit was nonetheless prepared by his insurer and he signed it at his insurer's direction, his testimony, while honest, might nonetheless lack credibility because the witness himself was misled and therefore the accuracy of both his affidavit and his trial testimony are suspect.

In a trial, the credibility of a witness is almost always relevant. People v. Layher, 464 Mich. 756, 761-764, 631 N.W.2d 281 (2001), citing with approval United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 105 S.Ct. 465, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984). The jury, as the finder of fact and judge of credibility, "has historically been entitled to assess all evidence which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a witness' testimony." Abel, 469 U.S. at 52, 105 S.Ct. 465. Moreover, inasmuch as the questions posed to Dr. Urse arose during cross-examination, "[t]here is `a general canon that on cross-examination the range of evidence that may be elicited for any purpose of discrediting is to be very liberal.'" Wilson v. Stilwill, 411 Mich. 587, 599, 309 N.W.2d 898 (1981), quoting 3A Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn rev), § 944, p. 778.

Thus any evidence that Dr. Urse knew the contents of the e-mail, or was himself misled by his insurer, is clearly relevant and admissible to impeach his trial testimony. On this score, we have here a classic case of "[w]hen the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact...." MRE 104(b). In such a case, "the court shall admit [the evidence] upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition." Id. The relevancy of the e-mail exchanged between Croze and plaintiff's counsel are relevant for the reasons set forth earlier, but only if Dr. Urse was aware of the e-mail, or if not, was kept in the dark by his insurer.

It appears from the record that the trial court found "no evidence" that Dr. Urse knew of the e-mail. But the court apparently erred by deciding the question under subpart (a) of MRE 104, and not according to subpart (b). The standard for screening evidence under subpart (b) is quite low.

MRE 104(b) is identical to its federal counterpart. In VanderVliet, 444 Mich. at 68, 508 N.W.2d 114, our Supreme Court, in deciding the applicable standard for MRE 104(b), specifically adopted the United States Supreme Court's holding in Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988). In Huddleston, the government had charged the defendant with receiving stolen property and attempted to introduce evidence, pursuant to FRE 404(b), that the defendant had in the past received stolen television sets. The defendant denied ever having dealt with stolen televisions sets. Quoting Huddleston, our Supreme Court held:

As stated, as long as some rational jury could resolve the issue in favor of admissibility, the court must let the jury weigh the disputed facts. Specifically, the court must allow the jurors to assess the credibility of the evidence presented by the parties.

The sum of the evidentiary presentation in this case could lead a rational jury to find that Dr. Urse, either wittingly or unwittingly, participated in an effort to "sandbag" the plaintiff. It is impossible to ignore the timing and the substance of the e-mail between plaintiff's counsel and Croze.

As noted, plaintiff's counsel named Dr. Urse as a potential defendant in plaintiff's notice of intent, MCL 600.2912b. But on July 26, 2007, counsel wrote Croze and indicated that on the basis of his reading of the medical records, Dr. Kowalski bore sole responsibility for the medical accident because Dr. Kowalski failed to summon Dr. Urse in a timely fashion. After setting forth his understanding of the facts of the case, an understanding he gleaned from the medical records, plaintiff's counsel indicated that he was planning to file a lawsuit only against Dr. Kowalski, assuming that his information was accurate. Counsel stated in his letter that he needed "some kind of verification perhaps in the form of an affidavit by Dr. Urse" that would confirm his understanding of the facts and that counsel "could draft such an affidavit." (Emphasis added.)

Dr. Urse testified that he was shown the plaintiff's notice of intent, together with the proposed affidavit by a "legal representative." He then signed the affidavit.

On August 15, 2007, Croze sent the affidavit to plaintiff's counsel with the disarming note stating, "I am confident that this document will meet your needs as you assess your intentions for pursuit of the case." (Emphasis added.)

When viewed together, the sum of this evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Dr. Urse's trial testimony differed markedly from his affidavit.

C. THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRORS WERE NOT HARMLESS

Because the improperly excluded evidence may have affected the jury's determination regarding the credibility of Dr. Urse, a critical witness, the error cannot be considered harmless. See Powell v. St. John Hosp., 241 Mich.App. 64, 72-75, 614 N.W.2d 666 (2000).

We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. Plaintiff may tax costs under MCR 7.219 as the prevailing party.

MARKEY, P.J., and SERVITTO and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ., concurred.