PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court's orders denying its motion for case-evaluation sanctions and the assessment of debris-removal expenses. Because plaintiff did not obtain a "verdict" entitling it to case-evaluation sanctions under MCR 2.403(O)(2)(c) and it waived its claim for debris-removal expenses, we affirm.
This case arises out of a fire that occurred on plaintiff's property in Detroit on May 27, 2007. Plaintiff filed a claim with defendant, its fire-insurance carrier, which defendant denied on the basis that the
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erroneously denied its request for case-evaluation sanctions because it obtained a "verdict" within the meaning of MCR 2.403(O)(2)(c), which entitled it to actual costs. A trial court's decision whether to impose case-evaluation sanctions is a question of law subject to review de novo on appeal. Cusumano v. Velger, 264 Mich.App. 234, 235, 690 N.W.2d 309 (2004). Likewise, the interpretation of a court rule is a question of law that we review de novo on appeal. Jerico Constr., Inc. v. Quadrants, Inc., 257 Mich.App. 22, 28, 666 N.W.2d 310 (2003).
The underlying purpose of case evaluation is "`to encourage settlement and deter protracted litigation by placing the burden of litigation costs'" on the party that rejected the case evaluation and required the case to proceed to trial. Id. at 32, 666 N.W.2d 310, quoting Broadway Coney Island, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. (Amended Opinion), 217 Mich.App. 109, 114, 550 N.W.2d 838 (1996). MCR 2.403(O) provides, in relevant part:
"In applying MCR 2.403(O)(2), this Court has consistently rejected attempts to expand or read additional meaning into the rule that is not expressly stated." Jerico Constr., Inc., 257 Mich.App. at 30, 666 N.W.2d 310. This Court has expressly warned against "impermissibly expand[ing], by judicial fiat, the specific and precisely worded definition of `verdict' to include any order ending any part of a case by whatever method, thereby rendering the limiting language of MCR 2.403(O)(2)(a)-(c) nugatory." Id. at 31-32, 666 N.W.2d 310.
This Court has recognized that the appraisal process mandated by statute
In this case, the parties participated in case evaluation, which resulted in an
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred by denying its request for debris-removal expenses. "Judicial review of an appraisal award is limited to instances of `bad faith, fraud, misconduct, or manifest mistake.'" Angott v. Chubb Group of Ins. Com., 270 Mich.App. 465, 473, 717 N.W.2d 341 (2006), quoting Kwaiser, 190 Mich.App. at 486, 476 N.W.2d 467. Further, "[t]he question of what constitutes a waiver is a question of law" that we review de novo. Angott, 270 Mich.App. at 469-470, 717 N.W.2d 341 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Issues involving an insurance policy's coverage are generally for the court to determine, and "[t]he appraisal process cannot legally settle coverage issues...." Kwaiser, 190 Mich.App. at 486-487, 476 N.W.2d 467. "Where the parties cannot agree on coverage, a court is to determine coverage in a declaratory action before an appraisal of the damage to the property." Id. at 487, 476 N.W.2d 467. In Angott, 270 Mich.App. at 473-474, 717 N.W.2d 341, this Court held that the defendant insurer waived its coverage-based challenge and was bound by the appraisal award absent bad faith, fraud, misconduct, or manifest mistake when the parties stipulated to submit the plaintiff's claim for appraisal without first seeking court intervention to determine coverage issues.
Here, plaintiff erroneously characterizes its argument regarding debris-removal expenses as a coverage issue and contends that the trial court, rather than the appraisal panel, should have determined the issue. To the contrary, defendant did not assert that debris-removal expenses were not covered under the policy. Rather, it appears that the case proceeded through the appraisal process without plaintiff raising the issue of debris-removal expenses. In a letter accompanying the appraisal award, appraiser Richard Guider stated that "no allowance was made for debris removal, as no evidence ha[d] been presented that the insured incurred any debris removal expense." Thus, the appraisal panel would have addressed debris-removal expenses if plaintiff had submitted evidence showing that it had incurred debris-removal costs. While plaintiff contends that it did not incur such costs until after the appraisal proceedings, it is noteworthy that the appraisal award was issued on September 17, 2010, and the fire occurred on May 27, 2007. By submitting its case for appraisal and proceeding through the appraisal process without raising the issue of debris-removal expenses, plaintiff waived its claim for such expenses. See
Affirmed. Defendant, being the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
FORT HOOD, P.J., and KIRSTEN FRANK KELLY and DONOFRIO, JJ., concurred.
This Court reasoned in Saint George that the arbitration did not satisfy the "proceeds to trial" language and that merely confirming the arbitration award did not constitute a "verdict" because that interpretation ignored the requirement that the action proceed to trial. Id. at 283, 514 N.W.2d 516. The current version of MCR 2.403(O)(1) at issue in this case uses the phrase "proceeds to verdict" rather than "proceeds to trial." This Court in Saint George also reasoned, however, that "MCR 2.403 was designed to expedite and simplify the final settlement of cases to avoid a trial," and that the parties were attempting to effectuate that purpose by working "within the framework of arbitration and the arbitration award." Id. at 284, 514 N.W.2d 516. Cf. Cusumano, 264 Mich.App. at 238, 690 N.W.2d 309 (holding that case-evaluation sanctions were awardable following arbitration when the arbitration agreement provided that such sanctions shall apply).