PER CURIAM.

This action, brought under the Michigan Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (MUFTA), MCL 566.31 et seq., presents two legal questions. The first concerns the applicable statute of limitations. We affirm the circuit court's ruling that MUFTA's six-year limitations period bars plaintiff Bentley Terrance Dillard's fraudulent-transfer claims arising before June 23, 2005. The second issue is whether a debtor's transfer of assets for the purpose of paying the debtor's ordinary household expenses immunizes the transfers from challenge under the MUFTA. We hold that it does not, and reverse the circuit court's contrary ruling.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Bentley Terrace Dillard holds a substantial judgment against defendant Mark E. Schlussel (Mark), a Michigan attorney. Mark's debt stems from his failed investment in A Little More Red, an Arizona limited liability company formed in 2002. Mark and Dillard funded the company with a $500,000 line of credit, for which both pledged personal guarantees. True to its name, however, A Little More Red consistently leaked cash. During 2003 and 2004, Mark personally contributed $206,936.83 to keep the enterprise afloat. A Little More Red closed its doors at the end of 2004. Dillard paid off the entire line of credit and sued Mark for his share. In November 2008, a jury found in Dillard's favor and judgment entered against Mark. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed. Dillard v. Schlussel, memorandum opinion of the Arizona Court of Appeals, issued May 10, 2011 (Docket No. 1 CA-CV 10-0219), 2011 WL 1854978. In May 2009, the Oakland Circuit Court domesticated the Arizona judgment, which by then exceeded $500,000.

In March 2010, Mark sat for a creditor's examination. Relevant to the issues presented here, Mark testified that until March 2004, he owned a company called M & A Enterprises. Mark explained that "M & A Enterprises was a consulting company that I had[.] I was receiving salary. [T]hat company was the company that employed me ... when I rendered services to Detroit Medical Center." Mark's counsel explained in a subsequent letter written to Dillard's attorney that "while M & A did receive deposits, it had no assets, nor contracts, nor receivables; it was essentially a receptacle for whatever Mr. Schlussel could gather together to invest." In support of his application for A Little More Red's line of credit, Mark valued M & A at $100,000.

In March 2004, Mark conveyed M & A to his wife, defendant Rose Lynn Schlussel (Rose Lynn).1 Mark received no consideration from his wife for this transfer. Temporally, the transfer coincided with the period of A Little More Red's financial decline. By March 2004, A Little More Red had exhausted its line of credit and Schlussel had loaned the company more than $175,000.

During the continued creditor's exam in April 2010, Mark produced his tax returns for the years 2004 through 2008. The returns stated sizeable adjusted gross incomes for each year: $496,228 in 2004, $850,713 in 2005; $354,921 in 2006, $348,877 in 2007, and $427,959 in 2008. Mark claimed that none of the after-tax income earned during this five-year period remained available for collection because the Schlussels had spent it all.

Mark testified that his wife paid the couple's monthly expenses, which averaged approximately $18,000, with "[m]oney in her [personal] checking account." When asked where his wife got the money to pay the bills, Mark responded:

Dillard's counsel, David E. Plunkett, specifically inquired whether other "sources of funds" may have enhanced accounts owned by Rose Lynn, but was met with an objection by Mark's Counsel, Norman L. Lippitt, and Mark's refusal to answer:

Dillard filed this MUFTA action on June 23, 2011. Her first amended complaint avers that despite Mark's successful law practice and "substantial income," she has "been able to locate only approximately $2,000 in his accounts at various financial institutions and ... collected an additional approximately $5,000 through other collection efforts." The first amended complaint alleges that beginning in 2004, and continuing through 2009, Mark transferred large amounts of money to M & A accounts held by Rose Lynn. These transfers, the complaint asserted, were fraudulent. The first amended complaint further states that Mark fraudulently transferred the cash value of a Pacific Life insurance policy to Rose Lynn. Defendants' affirmative defenses to the first amended complaint include an allegation that Dillard's claims "are barred as any and all funds alleged to have constituted fraudulent transfers were used for customary living expenses."

Rose Lynn was deposed in March 2011. By then, Dillard had obtained some discovery regarding Rose Lynn's personally held accounts. Between November 2010 and March 2011, one such account received $26,000 in deposits from Mark. Rose Lynn explained, "It is my account and it's an account that I did receive funds from Mark that I did pay some of our living expenses from."2 Additionally, M & A was "receiving funds for a consulting fee that Mark was doing for a company in California...."

According to Rose Lynn, Mark stopped depositing his law firm draw checks into his checking account in 2010, after Dillard garnished that account. Instead, he endorsed checks made out to him to Rose Lynn. She then deposited the checks into her personal account, or accounts held by M & A:

Rose Lynn admitted that beginning in 2004, and continuing through 2010, she wrote $647,000 worth of checks to herself drawn on M & A accounts. The source of this money was Mark's law firm earnings. After depositing Mark's earnings in an M & A account, Rose Lynn wrote checks to herself or to Mark. According to a summary prepared by Dillard's counsel, between 2005 and 2007, Rose Lynn transferred $125,000 back to Mark using M & A as the conduit. Dillard contends that from 2004 through 2009, Rose Lynn deposited approximately $740,000 of Mark's law firm earnings into one account and an even greater amount (approximately $800,000) into another account, both held by M & A. Virtually all of that money was eventually distributed from the M & A accounts to Mark or Rose Lynn.3 Notably, defendants have not contested the amounts or the mechanism of these transfers.

The parties agree that during this time, M & A had no income other than Mark's consulting fees. The company performed no separate work, had no employees, and incurred no expenses. Rose Lynn gave no consideration for any of the checks endorsed to her. According to defendants, Rose Lynn used all the transferred money to pay the couple's substantial living expenses.

Dillard also unearthed evidence regarding the transfer of cash from a Pacific Life variable universal life insurance policy. The policy was owned by an entity called the M & A Enterprises LLC Defined Benefit Plan & Trust. Shortly before Mark's initial creditor's exam, the policy had a cash surrender value of approximately $50,000. Shortly after the creditor's exam, Mark obtained a $40,000 loan from the policy. Pacific Life made the check payable to the M & A Enterprises LLC Defined Benefit Plan & Trust. Mark requested reissuance of the check to Rose Lynn. Mark subsequently transferred the policy's ownership to his wife.4

Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing that challenges to transfers made before June 23, 2005, were barred by the period of limitations set forth in MCL 566.39.5 Dillard conceded that the statute prescribes a six-year limitations period, but argued that the Schlussels had fraudulently concealed the transfers, triggering the application of MCL 600.5855:

Defendants additionally sought summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) regarding the transfers falling within the statute of limitations, contending that Mark received "reasonably equivalent value" for the transfers in the form of his wife's payment of living and household expenses. According to defendants, the Schlussels' use of the money to pay their ordinary household expenses eliminates any claim under the MUFTA. Further, defendants argued, the loan of $40,000 from the Pacific Life insurance policy was "proper as a matter of law" and did not constitute a fraudulent transfer.

In support of defendants' motion for summary disposition, Rose Lynn submitted an affidavit averring that she always wrote the checks for the couple's household bills, and that "[f]or the last 25 years, our ordinary and customary living expenses, on an annual basis, have been in the range of $250,000-$275,000 per year." Rose Lynn admitted that she sometimes used her "own funds" to pay the expenses, and that when she did so, she "would repay [her]self from the monies Mark provided to [her] for this purpose when they became available."

The circuit court first addressed the applicable statute of limitations. The court found that the MUFTA "allows the discovery rule to extend the statute of limitations" if the "defendant ... actively concealed the fraudulent transfer." The circuit court determined:

Because Dillard's complaint was filed on June 23, 2011, claims based on transfers that occurred more than six years before that date were barred.

The court then granted summary disposition regarding the remaining transfers, premising its opinion on United States v. Goforth, 465 F.3d 730 (C.A.6, 2006). According to the court, that case stands for the proposition that funds transferred from Mark to Rose Lynn "are exempt from the MUFTA claims" because they "were used to pay household expenses." The court ruled, "The undisputed substantively admissible evidence supplied in this case demonstrates Rose used the funds, including those funds initially transferred by Mark to the corporate entity, to pay reasonable and ordinary household expenses."

The court also granted summary disposition in favor of defendants with regard to Dillard's claims relative to the Pacific Life policy, finding that because Mark did not own the policy when the loan was made, he bore no liability under the MUFTA arising from the transfer.

II. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

We first consider whether the statute of limitations bars Dillard's MUFTA claims involving transfers made more than six years before Dillard filed her complaint. Dillard argues that the discovery tolling provision embodied in MCL 600.5855 extends the period of limitations for an additional two years, because one or more defendants fraudulently concealed the existence of the transfers. We reject this argument for the simple reason that evidence of the transfers was available — and revealed — during the limitations period. In other words, no evidence supports fraudulent concealment.

Summary disposition may be granted under MCR 2.116(C)(7) when a claim is barred by the statute of limitations. We review de novo both a circuit court's decision regarding a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and questions of law. Kincaid v. Cardwell, 300 Mich.App. 513, 522, 834 N.W.2d 122 (2013).

Absent a fiduciary relationship, fraudulent concealment extends the applicable limitations period only when the defendant has made an affirmative act or representation. "The plaintiff must show that the defendant engaged in some arrangement or contrivance of an affirmative character designed to prevent subsequent discovery." The Meyer & Anna Prentis Family Foundation, Inc. v. Barbara Ann Karmanos Cancer Institute, 266 Mich.App. 39, 48, 698 N.W.2d 900 (2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Mere silence does not demonstrate fraudulent concealment and, "[i]f liability were discoverable from the outset, then MCL 600.5855 will not toll the applicable period of limitations." Id.

Dillard filed this action on June 23, 2011. Her complaint encompasses the March 2004 transfer of M & A to Rose Lynn, and all subsequent transfers made to Rose Lynn and M & A. However, the record belies any concealment of the transfer of M & A, or of any of the other transfers. Dillard domesticated the Arizona judgment in May 2009, well within the six-year statute of limitations period, and began obtaining discovery shortly thereafter. Dillard knew of M & A's existence when she and Mark applied for the ill-fated line of credit. Mark was not deposed until March 2010. No evidence supports that Dillard lacked the ability to depose him earlier, or that defendants attempted to hide Mark's transfer of M & A during that interim. Mark admitted to the M & A transfer during his exam. And while Mark resisted sharing information regarding his wife's bank accounts, Dillard has brought forward no evidence substantiating that during the years after she obtained a judgment against Mark, she was prevented from learning that Mark had transferred the company to his wife, or that checks written to him had been deposited in M & A accounts. To the contrary, the information emerged during the regular course of discovery. Accordingly, the circuit court properly granted summary disposition on the fraudulent-transfer claims that arose more than six years before Dillard filed her MUFTA complaint.

III. THE MUFTA CLAIMS

We now turn to the heart of Dillard's case on the merits: whether Mark and Rose Lynn fraudulently transferred assets in contravention of the MUFTA. Considerable record evidence supports that Mark transferred assets to Rose Lynn intending to hinder, delay, or defraud Dillard's collection of her judgment, establishing an actually fraudulent transfer under MCL 566.34. The evidence further substantiates constructive fraud under MCL 566.35(1). That the Schlussels used the transferred funds to pay their personal "living" expenses does not defeat Dillard's MUFTA claims.

We review do novo issues involving statutory interpretation or the propriety of summary disposition. Prins v. Mich. State Police, 291 Mich.App. 586, 589, 805 N.W.2d 619 (2011). When considering a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), a court must view the evidence submitted in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. West v. Gen. Motors Corp., 469 Mich. 177, 183, 665 N.W.2d 468 (2003). "Summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence submitted "might permit inferences contrary to the facts as asserted by the movant." Opdyke Investment Co. v. Norris Grain Co., 413 Mich. 354, 360, 320 N.W.2d 836 (1982). When entertaining a summary disposition motion under subrule (C)(10), the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence. Pioneer State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dells, 301 Mich.App. 368, 377, 836 N.W.2d 257 (2013).

Well-established principles also guide our statutory construction efforts. We begin by examining the specific statutory language under consideration, bearing in mind that

A brief overview of fraudulent-transfer law helps place the statutory provisions in context. "The modern law of fraudulent transfers had its origin in the Statute of 13 Elizabeth, which invalidated `covinous and fraudulent' transfers designed `to delay, hinder or defraud creditors and others.'" BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 540, 114 S.Ct. 1757, 128 L.Ed.2d 556 (1994) (citation omitted). The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, codifies the common law.6 The UFTA is "designed to prevent debtors from transferring their property in bad faith before creditors can reach it." BMG Music v. Martinez, 74 F.3d 87, 89 (C.A.5, 1996). The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has explained, "The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act reflects a strong desire to protect creditors and to allow for the smooth functioning of our credit-based society. It is a creditor-protection statute. Without such protection for creditors, `[c]reditors would generally be unwilling to assume the risk of the debtor's fraudulent transfers.'" Badger State Bank v. Taylor, 2004 WI 128, ¶ 41, 276 Wis.2d 312, 688 N.W.2d 439 (2004) (citations omitted) (alteration in original). Our Legislature enacted the MUFTA in 1998.

The MUFTA defines two species of fraudulent transfers. The first encompasses transfers made "[w]ith actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" a creditor and applies to transfers made either before or after the creditor's claim arose. MCL 566.34(1)(a). The second, commonly called "fraud in law" or constructive fraud, deems certain transactions fraudulent regardless of the creditor's ability to prove the debtor's actual intent. It applies only to transfers made after the creditor's claim arose. Three elements of proof are required: (1) that the creditor's claim arose before the transfer, (2) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent as a result of the transfer, and (3) the debtor did not receive "reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer...." MCL 566.35(1). Dillard's first amended complaint invoked both MCL 566.34(1)(a) and MCL 566.35(1). We turn to a closer examination of the statutory language governing each claim.

A. ACTUAL INTENT

Dillard contends that when Mark transferred his law firm draw checks to his wife, Mark harbored an "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" Dillard, evidenced by the couple's use of M & A as a receptacle for money that would otherwise have been available for Dillard's collection. The statutory language governing this claim provides:

Dillard relies on § 4(1)(a), asserting that Mark's transfers to Rose Lynn were made with "actual intent" to defraud Dillard as his judgment creditor.

Several important statutory definitions control our construction and application of this language. Under the MUFTA, Mark is the debtor, as he is "a person who is liable on a claim." MCL 566.31(f). The MUFTA defines a "transfer" as "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset," including "payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance." MCL 566.31(l). An asset is:

Here, the "property" involved consists of Mark's earnings. This property was not encumbered by a valid lien or held by the entireties. Nor do Mark's law firm earnings qualify as wholly exempt under MCL 600.6023, which sets forth a lengthy list of property of the debtor and the debtor's dependents "exempt from levy and sale under an execution[.]" Rather, federal law exempts from garnishment 75% of a debtor's weekly disposable income. 15 USC 1673(a)(1). We proceed to apply the plain language of the MUFTA's "actual intent" provision.

Under the framework set forth in MCL 566.34(1)(a), the debtor's state of mind in making a transfer determines whether a transfer qualifies as made with an actually fraudulent intent. But debtors rarely admit to having deliberately placed assets out of the reach of their creditors. In BFP, the United States Supreme Court explained that to facilitate proof of such intent,

"Badges of fraud are circumstances so frequently attending fraudulent transfers that an inference of fraud arises from them." In re Triple S Restaurants, Inc., 422 F.3d 405, 414 (C.A.6, 2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Our Supreme Court has approved the following description of the badges of fraud:

In MCL 566.34(2), the MUFTA sets forth a nonexclusive list of 11 factors that may be considered in determining a debtor's actual intent in making a transfer:

These factors correspond to the historical badges of fraud. "In determining actual intent under subsection (1)(a)," the statute instructs, "consideration may be given, among other factors, to whether 1 or more" of the enumerated factors occurred. MCL 566.34(2). Here, the confluence of several factors supports a strong inference of fraud.

Factor (a) supports an inference of fraudulent intent when a transfer is made to an insider. The MUFTA defines a spouse as an "insider." MCL 566.31(g) and (k). "A classic example of such transfers is a debtor spouse subject to a money judgment who `buries' the titles to the house, car, stocks, bank accounts, and other assets in the other spouse's name." Sullivan, Future Creditors and Fraudulent Transfers: When A Claimant Doesn't Have A Claim, When A Transfer Isn't A Transfer, When Fraud Doesn't Stay Fraudulent, and Other Important Limits to Fraudulent Transfers Law for the Asset Protection Planner, 22 Del J. Corp. L. 955, 961 (1997). John E. Sullivan III continues, "The obvious and transparent intent behind this ploy is to leave the judgment debtor with no assets in order to frustrate the creditor's collection efforts, while still allowing the debtor to retain the control, benefit, and use of the assets through the auspices of his or her spouse." Id.

Mark endorsed his law firm checks to an insider, who then deposited them in accounts owned by M & A, a company wholly owned by an insider. These transfers benefitted the Schlussels personally, while impairing Dillard's ability to collect her judgment. The evidence satisfies this badge of fraud.7

Factor (b) is satisfied by evidence that "[t]he debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the transfer." MCL 566.34(2)(b). Rose Lynn admitted to having written checks to Mark from the M & A account. Thus, Mark retained control of some of the money transferred to his wife, and then to M & A. "No effort to hinder or delay creditors is more severely condemned by the law than an attempt by a debtor to place his property where he can still enjoy it and at the same time require his creditors to remain unsatisfied." Bentley, 289 Mich. at 78, 286 N.W. 163. Though expressed well before our Legislature's enactment of the MUFTA, this sentiment resonates here and gives rise to a second badge of fraud.

The third factor, MCL 566.34(2)(c), applies when "[t]he transfer was ... concealed." By positioning Rose Lynn as the legal owner of M & A, Mark could conceal from Dillard the transfers of his law firm checks, which were deposited into M & A accounts. According to the Schlussels' testimony, this routing scheme was hatched precisely because Mark's bank accounts had been or were subject to garnishment.

Dillard filed the Arizona suit in 2005; consequently, evidence also supports the fourth factor, which provides that "[b]efore the transfer was made ... the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit." MCL 566.34(2)(d). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Dillard, Mark's debt arose even earlier than that.

Virtually every penny Mark earned was transferred to his wife, satisfying the fifth factor: "The transfer was of substantially all of the debtor's assets." MCL 566.34(2)(e).

Mark's conveyance of M & A Consulting to Rose Lynn for no value, followed by the couple's use of the corporation's bank account as the depository for Mark's earnings, substantiates that "[t]he debtor removed or concealed assets," satisfying MCL 566.34(2)(g), the sixth badge of fraud in this case. While we acknowledge that the conveyance occurred outside the statute of limitations look-back period, the Schlussels' employment of M & A as a conduit for cash both before and after the Arizona judgment evidences Mark's intent to hinder or delay Dillard's collection efforts.

MCL 566.34(2)(h) asks whether "[t]he value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred." Mark received no value for transferring his checks to Rose Lynn or for depositing them in the M & A accounts. For the reasons discussed later in this opinion, the "household expense" defense does not defeat this badge of fraud. But even assuming the transfers were intended as reasonably equivalent value in the form of payment for living expenses, eliminating this single badge of fraud would not erase the other badges of fraud or the otherwise well-supported inference that Mark devised the M & A deposit scheme to hinder, delay, or defraud Dillard.

Mark has admitted to being insolvent at the time Dillard demanded payment of the guaranty, satisfying MCL 566.34(2)(i) ("[t]he debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made") and (j) ("[t]he transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred").

Accordingly, the evidence supports the existence of at least 8 of the 11 factors that give rise to an inference of actual intent to defraud. These strands of direct and circumstantial evidence give rise to a prima facie case under MCL 566.34(1)(a). When Mark made most of the transfers, his financial situation was precarious at best and dreadful at worst. As of late 2004, his $250,000 share of the guaranty had been called and he apparently lacked the cash to pay it. In October 2005, Dillard filed suit, and by November 2008, a large judgment had entered against Mark. Beginning in March 2004, and continuing until some point in 2011, Mark purposefully endorsed all his law firm earnings checks to an insider for no consideration. The insider deposited the checks in accounts controlled only by the insider and which did not bear Mark's name. The Schlussels admitted to using the money for other expenses (in other words, to preferentially pay other creditors), and deliberately sheltering it from Dillard's collection. This evidence supports that Mark intended to "hinder, delay, or defraud" Dillard.

Defendants raise a single defense to Dillard's § 4(1)(a) case: Mark transferred his earnings to Rose Lynn, who then transferred them to M & A, as a mechanism for paying their ordinary household expenses. According to an affidavit signed by Rose Lynn, the sum ultimately expended on household expenses was "reasonable." The trial court found that this defense nullified Dillard's claim under § 4(1)(a).8

Three fundamental legal errors undercut the circuit court's ruling. First, once a creditor establishes the presence of multiple badges of fraud, he or she has established a fact question regarding actual intent. Second, by ignoring the factors supporting Mark's actual intent to fraudulently transfer his earnings and instead crediting the Schlussels' claim that they merely intended to pay expenses rather than to hinder Dillard's collection efforts, the circuit court invaded the province of the fact-finder.9 Third, "reasonably equivalent value" received by a transferee is not a defense to a claim brought under § 4(1)(a). Receipt of "reasonably equivalent value" might present an obstacle to avoidance of transfers challenged under § 4(1)(a), but it does not cleanse the transfers of their fraud. In other words, the consideration exchanged for an intentionally fraudulent transfer may limit the creditor's remedy, but it does not negate the fraudulent transfer claim itself.10 "[T]he determination that the transfer is fraudulent is conceptually distinct from the avoidance of the transfer, which is, in turn, separate and distinct from a recovery based upon the avoidance of a transfer." In re Cohen, 199 B.R. 709, 716 (9th Cir. BAP, 1996). And here, Rose Lynn exchanged no value for the transfers, completely defeating defendants' argument.

The plain text of MCL 566.34(1) ascribes relevancy to "reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer" only as to claims brought under § 4(1)(b), and not under § 4(1)(a). "Unlike constructively fraudulent transfers, the adequacy or equivalence of consideration provided for the actually fraudulent transfer is not material to the question whether the transfer is actually fraudulent." Cohen, 199 B.R. at 717. The South Dakota Supreme Court has clarified this point:

Rather, MCL 566.38(1) provides that "[a] transfer ... is not voidable under section 4(1)(a) against a person who took in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value ...." In other words, transferees who have exchanged reasonably equivalent value for a transfer are protected from the avoidance remedy — they can keep that which they paid for. This makes good sense. If Mark exchanged his law firm check for a car, the dealer who sold him the vehicle would not be subject to avoidance of the transfer, because the dealer gave value in exchange. In other words, the MUFTA protects good faith purchasers for value. But neither Rose Lynn nor M & A gave anything in exchange for the transfers, rendering § 8 inapplicable. Because the transfers of Mark's money were entirely gratuitous as to Rose Lynn and M & A, the Schlussels cannot avoid liability by interposing a "reasonably equivalent value" defense, and the circuit court erred by applying this remedy provision as a legal bar to Dillard's actual-intent claim.

Genuine issues of material fact exist concerning Mark's intent in transferring his law firm earnings to Rose Lynn. Summary disposition is inappropriate for deciding cases premised on intent, good faith, or reasonableness. Accordingly, the circuit court improperly granted summary disposition in defendant's favor on Dillard's § 4(1)(a) claim under MCR 2.116(C)(10).

B. CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD

Dillard's alternate fraudulent-conveyance claim arises under MCL 566.35(1), which provides:

This provision is concerned with the economic realities of a transfer rather than the transferor's intent.

The sole issue placed in dispute concerning Dillard's claim under § 5(1) is whether Rose Lynn provided reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the money transferred to her by her husband. The Schlussels equate "reasonably equivalent value" with their "ordinary" household expenses. According to defendants, because the Schlussels spent all the transferred money on their own household expenses, they were entitled to summary disposition of Dillard's constructive-fraud claim. This argument finds no support in caselaw, or in the logic or language of the MUFTA.

Under the plain language of MCL 566.35, a transfer is constructively fraudulent if the debtor did not receive a "reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer" and was insolvent at the time. Under the MUFTA,

The commentary to the uniform act provides:

"An unperformed promise to provide support is the only consideration that does not constitute value as a matter of law." Schaefer v. GRD Investments LLC, 331 B.R. 401, 419 (Bankr.N.D.Iowa, 2005). Indirect, noneconomic benefits that preserve a family relationship do not provide reasonably equivalent value. In re Bargfrede, 117 F.3d 1078, 1080 (C.A.8, 1997). Therefore, any promise made by Mark to support his wife, or to pay their joint household expenses, has no bearing here.

The first element under § 5(1) relates to timing. Dillard's claim potentially arose in 2004, when she demanded payment under the guaranty. This fact question must be resolved in the trial court. Indisputably, Dillard's claim arose before many of the transfers were made, fulfilling the first element. Mark's insolvency, the third element, also constitutes a question of fact. But Mark has admitted insolvency as of the date of the 2008 judgment, rendering many transfers actionable. The second element, whether Mark "made the transfer... without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer," is where the battle lines are drawn on appeal.

"Reasonably equivalent value" is a commercial concept. "The touchstone is whether the transaction conferred realizable commercial value on the debtor reasonably equivalent to the realizable commercial value of the assets transferred." Mellon Bank, NA v. Metro Communications, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 647 (C.A.3, 1991). This is not to say that the Schlussels' use of some of the transferred funds for reasonable and necessary household expenses is irrelevant. If Mark received property or secured a preexisting debt through the transfers, and if the value of the property or the preexisting obligations were reasonably equivalent to the amount transferred, Dillard's constructive-fraud claim might ultimately fail.

Record evidence substantiates that Mark received no contemporaneous value from Rose Lynn for the transfers made to her. Any "value" came later, indirectly, when Rose Lynn used the money to pay other creditors. However, "value" obtained from the checks down the road is simply inconsequential under the MUFTA. Judge Richard A. Posner has explained:

Defendants and the circuit court premise their contrary conclusion primarily on Goforth, 465 F.3d 730, a case brought under the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act (FDCPA), 28 USC 3001 et seq. Aside from the fact that Goforth is not binding on this Court, defendants and the circuit court have misread the case. Properly understood, Goforth supports that, at most, the Schlussels' household-expense claim creates a question of fact precluding summary disposition in favor of Dillard for the full amount of the transfers.

Like the MUFTA, the FDCPA addresses fraudulent transfers. The latter statute involves debts to the United States rather than to general creditors. The FDCPA provides for the avoidance of constructively fraudulent transfers, 28 USC 3304(a), and transfers made with actual intent to defraud, 28 USC 3304(b)(1)(A). In Goforth, the government contended that monthly payments from debtor George Gilley to his wife, Sheila Gilley, ranging from $1,800 to $2,000 and made over the course of a 19-year period, constituted fraudulent transfers under the FDCPA. Goforth, 465 F.3d at 732-733. The monthly payments ended four years before the government obtained judgment against George Gilley and his corporation. The district court entered summary disposition in favor of the government, finding the transfers constructively fraudulent. Id.

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Sheila Gilley's affidavit attesting that she used the monthly payments for routine living expenses created a fact question regarding whether George had received "reasonably equivalent value" for the money, thereby precluding summary judgment. Contrary to the Oakland Circuit Court's interpretation of the case, the Sixth Circuit did not grant summary judgment in Sheila's favor. Nor did the Sixth Circuit hold that payment of household expenses with fraudulently transferred funds constitutes a complete defense to a claim brought under the FDCPA. Rather, the Sixth Circuit simply held that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to the government without considering the merits of Sheila's "reasonably equivalent value" defense.

Aside from the fact that defendants have mischaracterized Goforth as creating a complete "living expenses" defense, common sense dictates that spending money on one's self or one's spouse does not automatically trump a fraudulent-transfer claim. If it did, the MUFTA would be a useless waste of ink and paper, as every debtor would simply transfer any cash in his or her possession to a covert account, spend it freely, and thereby avoid liability on a court-entered judgment. The Oakland Circuit Court's ruling would freely permit a debtor and his or her spouse to avoid liability for an otherwise fraudulent transfer simply by spending the money on themselves. Our Supreme Court long ago condemned this reasoning in a similar case, in which the creditor-plaintiffs claimed that the debtor-defendants had placed their property "under cover of the wife with intent to thereby keep the same away from the creditors of the husband." Morse v. Roach, 229 Mich. 538, 541, 201 N.W. 471 (1924). The Court affirmed judgment in the plaintiff's favor, concluding with this colorful language:

The MUFTA is similarly not so easily circumvented.

Federal law protects a judgment debtor from losing all ability to support himself and his family by allowing a creditor to garnish only up to 25% of the debtor's weekly disposable earnings. 15 USC 1673(a)(1). Looked at from the other direction, federal law permits a debtor to retain 75% of his or her weekly paycheck. Presumably, the law is intended to strike a balance by permitting a debtor to pay living expenses while also owning up to the financial consequences of a judgment. This exemption, blended into the MUFTA's definition of an "asset," inherently recognizes that "no man should be permitted to live at the same time in luxury and in debt." In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. 685, 693 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y., 1996) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Like the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, we "see no reason that the law of fraudulent transfer should permit an insolvent debtor to transfer his own funds out of the reach of his creditors — frustrating or delaying attempts to recover a debt — while still directing the use of those funds towards amenities of his choice." Cardiello v. Arbogast, 533 Fed.Appx. 150, 157 (C.A.3, 2013).

That said, we do not decide the question whether Mark received reasonably equivalent value for the transfers, and reserve it for the finder of fact. Whether the Schlussels used the transferred funds to pay reasonable expenses, including their taxes and the claims of other creditors (such as the holder of their mortgage and their utilities), and whether those expenditures constitute reasonably equivalent value for the transfers, must be decided after a trial.

On the basis of the same reasoning, we reverse the circuit court's ruling regarding the Pacific Life insurance policy. Record evidence supports that in March 2010, the "M & A Enterprises LLC Defined Benefit Plan & Trust" obtained a $40,000 loan against the policy. At that time, Mark was the only plan participant. He subsequently arranged to transfer this asset to Rose Lynn, and to transfer ownership of the life insurance policy to her as well. The circuit court erred by concluding that because the policy was "owned" by M & A at the time of the transfer, Mark's acts could not be considered fraudulent. On remand, the circuit court must determine whether the loan check issued by Pacific Life constituted Mark's "property," as that term is defined in MCL 566.31(j). If so, the trial court must address whether Mark transferred the property by applying MCL 566.31(l).

In summary, material questions of fact preclude summary disposition in this case, including Mark's intent under § 4(1)(a), see Szkrybalo v. Szkrybalo, 477 Mich. 1086, 729 N.W.2d 233 (2007), and whether any of the transfers to Rose Lynn and then to M & A were made for reasonably equivalent value. The presence of multiple badges of fraud establishes a prima facie case of fraudulent transfer that is not negated by the Schlussels' expenditure of the money on their "ordinary" household expenses. Nor does the Schlussels' expenditure of hundreds of thousands of dollars each year on themselves defeat Dillard's claim for constructive fraud. Viewed in the light most favorable to Dillard, record evidence supports that the Schlussels not only put their needs and wants ahead of ther creditor, but transferred assets intending to place those assets outside the creditor's reach.

We affirm the circuit court's ruling regarding the period of limitations, but reverse the circuit court's ruling that a debtor's transfer of assets for the purpose of paying the debtor's household expenses immunized the transfers from challenge under the MUFTA. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

BECKERING, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and GLEICHER, JJ., concurred.