PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals by right an April 19, 2016, circuit court order holding that pursuant to MCL 700.2803, respondent was not entitled to inherit from the decedent's estate. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.
The decedent, Maxine Hadley, who was respondent's mother, died on May 23, 2014 from carbon monoxide poisoning; the manner of death was listed as a homicide. Petitioner, Scott S. Hadley, the decedent's son, was granted letters of authority on August 27, 2014. The decedent's heirs were her two sons—respondent and petitioner.
Respondent was charged with first-degree arson and open murder in relation to the events that led to the decedent's death; following a preliminary examination, he was bound over for trial on those charges. Before trial, respondent pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter and second-degree arson. Respondent was sentenced to 20 to 60 years' imprisonment for arson and 15 to 30 years' imprisonment for involuntary manslaughter.
On November 11, 2015, petitioner filed a petition for a hearing to determine the applicability of MCL 700.2803, which, at the time of the hearing,
Petitioner noted respondent's aforementioned pleas in connection with his mother's death. Respondent answered, arguing that MCL 700.2803 is inapplicable in this case, since respondent was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, and there was no clear evidence that he feloniously and intentionally killed the decedent. Respondent also argued that MCL 700.2803(6) should not apply in this case because respondent was criminally convicted, and therefore the probate court was barred from making its own determination that respondent was criminally responsible for feloniously and intentionally killing the decedent.
Following a hearing where the court heard oral arguments, on April 19, 2016, the court issued an opinion and order, finding that pursuant to MCL 700.2803, respondent was not entitled to inherit from the decedent's estate. The court explained:
Finally, the court also noted that MCL 700.2803(5), established that "a killer or felon shall not profit from his or her wrong," supported the contention that respondent should not inherit as he "committed a felony which resulted in his mother's death." The court entered a written order on April 19, 2016. This appeal ensued.
Respondent argues that the probate court erred in finding that he feloniously and intentionally killed the decedent after he was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and second-degree arson.
We review de novo a probate court's interpretation and application of a statute, In re Temple Marital Trust, 278 Mich.App. 122, 128; 748 N.W.2d 265 (2008), while a trial court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Alan Custom Homes, Inc v Krol, 256 Mich.App. 505, 512; 667 N.W.2d 379 (2003). "A finding is clearly erroneous where, after reviewing the entire record, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id.
Resolution of the issues on appeal requires that we interpret the relevant statutory provisions. "When interpreting statutes, a court's primary goal is to determine and give meaning to the Legislature's intent." In re Nale Estate, 290 Mich.App. 704, 706-707; 803 N.W.2d 907 (2010) (citations omitted). "[C]ourts must first examine the language of the statute. If the intent of the Legislature is clearly expressed by the language, no further construction is warranted." Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich. 557, 562; 664 N.W.2d 151 (2003). "In construing a statute, the statutory provisions must be read in the context of the entire statute in order to produce a harmonious whole; courts must avoid a construction that would render statutory language nugatory." People v McLaughlin, 258 Mich.App. 635, 673; 672 N.W.2d 850 (2003).
MCL 700.2803, "sometimes referred to as a `slayer rule'" is part of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC), MCL 700.1101 et seq., and "is derived from the common-law rules that one who commits a murder cannot benefit by his or her criminal act and that no devisee can take under the will of a testator whose death has been caused by the criminal act of the devisee." In re Nale Estate, 290 Mich App at 707-708. At the time the probate court applied the statute in this case, MCL 700.2803 provided in relevant part as follows:
Reading the language of this statute as a whole indicates that subsections (1) and (6) operate together. Specifically, subsection (1) of the statue provides that an individual forfeits all benefits under EPIC when he or she "feloniously and intentionally kills" the decedent. Importantly, however, subsection 1 does not require that an individual be convicted of feloniously and intentionally killing an individual to fall within the purview of the statute. Instead, subsection (6) provides two methods to establish that an individual "feloniously and intentionally" killed the decedent. First, subsection (6) provides that "a judgment of conviction establishing criminal accountability for the felonious and intentional killing . . . conclusively establishes the convicted individual as the decedent's killer." This means that when there is a conviction establishing a felonious and intentional killing, that judgement is conclusive and no further fact finding is required. Subsection (6) provides the second means of establishing criminal accountability as follows:
The phrase "in the absence of a conviction" clearly indicates that when there is no conviction establishing that a person intentionally and feloniously killed the decedent, the probate court may, upon petition, nevertheless make a separate independent determination as to whether the individual feloniously and intentionally killed the decedent. This remains operative even in the event where a person, such as respondent in this case, was convicted of a lesser-included offense in relation to his or her conduct involving the decedent. Indeed, there is nothing in the language of subsection (6) that bars the probate court from making a finding regarding criminal accountability in the event that a person was convicted of a lesser-included non-intent offense such as involuntary manslaughter. Thus, in this case, although respondent was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and second-degree arson, and even though respondent's convictions did not conclusively establish an intentional and felonious killing, the probate court nevertheless could proceed to determine criminal accountability under the preponderance of the evidence standard.
Our reading of the statute is supported by reading the statutory text as a whole. Specifically, the Legislature provided that the probate court could find criminal accountability using a preponderance of the evidence standard, which requires a lesser standard of proof as compared to the burden in a criminal case, where guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v Green, 310 Mich.App. 249, 255; 871 N.W.2d 888 (2015) (in a criminal proceeding, a prosecutor must prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt). By directing the probate court to use the preponderance of the evidence standard, the Legislature clearly contemplated that, while there may not be sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction in a criminal proceeding, there may nevertheless be sufficient proof by a preponderance of the evidence that an individual intentionally and feloniously killed the decedent. In such cases, the Legislature intended that an individual forfeit all benefits under EPIC.
In addition, the language of subsection (5) supports a broad interpretation of subsection (6). Subsection (5) provides that "[a] killer's or felon's wrongful acquisition of property or interest not covered by this section shall be treated in accordance with the principle that a killer or felon cannot profit from his or her wrong" (emphasis added). This language illustrates that the principle underlying MCL 700.2803 as a whole is that "a killer or felon" should not profit from his or her wrongdoing. Thus, our reading of subsection (6) aligns subsection (5) and with the purpose of the statute as a whole in that it prevents an individual from profiting from his or her wrongdoing when a preponderance of the evidence supports that the individual feloniously and intentionally killed the decedent—irrespective of whether that individual was convicted of a lesser-included offense such as involuntary manslaughter.
In this case, respondent was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and second-degree arson. The elements of these crimes do not require proof of intent to kill. See e.g. People v Gillis, 474 Mich. 105, 138; 712 N.W.2d 419 (2006) (involuntary manslaughter is the unintentional killing of another "committed with a lesser mens rea of gross negligence or an intent to injure, and not malice"); MCL 750.73 ("a person who willfully or maliciously burns, damages, or destroys by fire or explosive a dwelling, regardless of whether it is occupied, unoccupied, or vacant at the time of the fire or explosion, or its contents, is guilty of second degree arson."). However, although there was no judgment of conviction conclusively establishing that respondent feloniously and intentionally killed the decedent, the probate court was not precluded from making factual findings independent of respondent's conviction.
Respondent argues that the probate court erred in finding that he feloniously and intentionally killed the decedent. Having reviewed the record, however, we cannot conclude that the probate court clearly erred in reaching this conclusion. Krol, 256 Mich App at 512.
The record indicates that at the preliminary examination, Matthew Bainter testified that he lived across the street from the decedent and respondent. Bainter explained that on the evening of May 23, 2014, he went over to the decedent's house and drank beer with the decedent and respondent. After a couple hours, respondent became upset when neither Bainter nor the decedent would go to the store to purchase more beer. Respondent went into the basement and was "ranting." Bainter testified that the decedent asked him to talk with respondent and Bainter went into the basement on four separate occasions to try and get respondent to come back upstairs. Respondent refused and was "ranting," throwing objects, and was angry. Bainter explained that respondent attempted to attach a nozzle on a propane tank and respondent stated that he was "going to burn his mother's face off." Respondent could not attach the nozzle so he started striking the propane tank onto the cement floor. Bainter tried to get respondent to stop, but respondent refused and continued to strike the propane tank on the floor. At that point, Bainter went upstairs and then heard and felt an explosion that "threw" him and the decedent into the living room. Bainter ultimately went outside and saw flames emanating from the basement and he could not convince the decedent to come outside with him. A fire investigator testified that the fire was caused by a propane tank that leaked and contacted a spark or a flame. The investigator testified that when he arrived at the scene, a deceased female was found at the bottom of the basement stairway. The autopsy listed the cause of death as a homicide.
In addition to the preliminary examination testimony, at a plea hearing, respondent admitted to the court that he lit a cigarette when he went into the basement. The probate court considered the preliminary examination testimony, considered the plea, and considered the death certificate. Given this record, the probate court could have concluded that a preponderance of the evidence supported that respondent intentionally and feloniously killed the decedent. Id.
Respondent argues that the probate court applied the wrong standard and never found that he "intentionally" killed the decedent. However, while the court's opinion and order was somewhat muddled and the court often repeated that respondent was "criminally accountable," a review of the opinion and order indicates that the court was aware of the appropriate standard and applied that standard. Specifically, the court indicated that this case involved a claim of "felonious and intentional killing of the decedent," and that, based on the evidence, "it is clear that [respondent] would be held criminally accountable for the felonious and intentional killing under the preponderance of the evidence standard," and that respondent was criminally accountable "for the `felonious and intentional killing' of his mother." Accordingly, the court applied the correct standard under MCL 700.2803(6) in finding that respondent feloniously and intentionally killed the decedent.
Finally, respondent cites the sentencing court's statements in his criminal case wherein the court stated, in part, that "I have no doubt that you didn't with premeditation or intent engage in the act that led to the unfortunate death of your mother. I just don't believe that you did." However, even if the sentencing court arrived at a different conclusion than the probate court, on appeal, our task is to determine whether the probate court's factual findings leave us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Krol, 256 Mich App at 512. We are not left with such a conviction and cannot conclude that the probate court's findings were clearly erroneous.
Affirmed. No costs awarded. MCR 7.219(A).
