OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

THOMAS L. LUDINGTON, District Judge.

This intellectual property dispute presents a somewhat unusual question of statutory interpretation: Is an "and" disjunctive? The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, creates a civil cause of action against a person who accesses a protected computer without authorization and causes "loss to 1 or more persons . . . aggregating at least $5,000 in value." 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I); id. § 1030(g) (creating private cause of action).

Plaintiff Dice Corporation alleges that one of its employees left, took a job with a competitor, Defendant Bold Technologies, and then accessed data on Plaintiff's computers. Plaintiff investigated, added security, and sued Defendant. Among its claims, Plaintiff asserted a violation of the Act. Defendant now moves to dismiss the claim, asserting that Plaintiff does not allege a "loss" within the meaning of the Act because it does not allege an "interruption of service." ECF No. 21. Plaintiff responds such an allegation is unnecessary as a particular "and" in the Act's definition of "loss" is disjunctive. In pertinent part, the Act provides that

18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11) (emphasis added). Under Plaintiff's interpretation, the "and" is disjunctive. Thus, the provision at issue should be read to convey: the term "loss" means any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of

[A] responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring

the data, program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and

Id. Under Defendant's interpretation, in contrast, the "and" is not disjunctive. Thus, the provision should be read as:

the term "loss" means any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of

Id. Since "because of interruption of service" modifies each of the foregoing clauses, Defendant contends, "loss" requires interruption of service.

Both parties' interpretations, it must be acknowledged, are reasonable. As yet no appellate court has expressly addressed the issue. See Cont'l Grp., Inc. v. KW Prop. Mgmt., 622 F.Supp.2d 1357, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2009). District courts, moreover, have reached different conclusions. Compare Quantlab Techs. Ltd. v. Godlevsky, 719 F.Supp.2d 766, 776 (S.D. Tex. 2010) ("[T]he term `loss' encompasses . . . two types of harm: costs to investigate and respond to a computer intrusion, and costs associated with a service interruption."), with Gen. Scientific Corp. v. SheerVision, No. 10-cv-13582, 2011 WL 3880489, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 2, 2011) (Rosen, C.J.) ("The CFAA only covers lost revenue if the loss occurred as a result of interrupted service."), and Cont'l Grp., 622 F. Supp. 2d at 1371 ("[A]ll loss must be as a result of `interruption of service.'").

The legislative history, however, suggests that Plaintiff has the better argument. As initially proposed, the bill that later became law provided:

Enhancement of Privacy and Public Safety in Cyberspace Act, S. 3083, 106th Cong. (2000), quoted in DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F.Supp.2d 497, 522 n.29 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Although this internal structure was omitted from the definition enacted the following year, it strongly suggests that the drafters did intend that "loss" embrace two types of injury. Colloquially, the "and" means "or." Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendant's motion.

I

Plaintiff, a Michigan corporation, provides security monitoring services, which involves remote monitoring of fire alarms, burglar alarms, and other security devices at client sites. Defendant, an Illinois corporation, is a competitor providing similar services. On May 27, 2011, one of Plaintiff's employees, Amy Condon, left Plaintiff's employment and joined Defendant's firm. Over the next two weeks, Plaintiff alleges, Ms. Condon accessed "servers located in [Plaintiff's] Bay City facility . . . that contained proprietary signal processing intelligence software." Second Am. Compl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 20. Over the following two weeks, Plaintiff further alleges, Ms. Condon accessed "servers located at client sites and initiated file transfers of proprietary signal processing intelligence software." Id.

In August 2011, Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant, asserting claims for violations of Michigan's Uniform Trade Secrets Act, conversion, and unjust enrichment. In October, Plaintiff filed its first amended complaint, adding claims for violations of the Act, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and copyright infringement.

In pertinent part, the claim for violation of the Act alleged simply that Plaintiff "has sustained damages as a result of [Defendant's] violation of this Act." First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 38-40, ECF No. 14. Defendant moved to dismiss the first amended complaint in part. Regarding the claimed violation of the act, Defendant asserted it should be dismissed "because [Plaintiff] alleges no facts showing that it sustained a `loss' within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11)." Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 3, ECF No. 17.

In November 2011, the Court entered a stipulated order permitting Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint. In pertinent part, the order permitted Plaintiff to revise its claimed losses under the Act. ECF No. 19. Plaintiff did so, alleging in pertinent part:

Second Am. Compl. ¶ 34. Defendant now moves to dismiss the claimed violation of the Act, again asserting it should be dismissed because it "lacks adequate factual allegations to demonstrate that [Plaintiff] sustained a covered `loss' within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11)." Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss Second Am. Compl. 1, ECF No. 21.

II

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) requires that a court dismiss a claim if it does not "state a claim upon which relief can be granted." To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

III

A

"The starting point for interpretation of a statute is the language of the statute itself." Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As the Supreme Court explains: "Our first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case. Our inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous." Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340-41 (1997). "If the language of the statute is clear, a court must give effect to this plain meaning." Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Roger Mills Music, Inc., 396 F.3d 762, 769 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal, Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 451 (2002)).

If the language of the statute is ambiguous, however, the court must consider "extrinsic material" to determine its meaning. Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 235 n.5 (1991) ("[W]e repeatedly have looked to legislative history and other extrinsic material when required to interpret a statute which is ambiguous."). "The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent." Hedgepeth v. Tennessee, 215 F.3d 608, 616 (6th Cir. 2000). Consequently, the Sixth Circuit instructs, in interpreting an ambiguous term "it is our duty to examine the legislative history in order to render an interpretation that gives effect to Congress's intent." United States v. Markwood, 48 F.3d 969, 975 n.7 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing In re Vause, 886 F.2d 794, 801 (6th Cir.1989)).1

In this case, as noted, the language of the statute does not unequivocally establish whether the "and" is disjunctive or not. One reasonable interpretation is:

the term "loss" means any reasonable cost to any victim, including

18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11). An equally reasonable interpretation, however, is:

In sum, as another district court observed when confronted with this issue, "reasonable minds surely can differ until the Court of Appeals decides the issue." Cont'l Grp., 622 F. Supp. 2d at 1371. Therefore, it is this Court's duty to consult the legislative history of the Act. Markwood, 48 F.3d at 975 n.7.

B

The Act, the "first Federal computer crime statute," S. Rep. 104-357, at 3 (1996), had its genesis in the enactment of "a massive omnibus crime bill known as the Comprehensive Crime Control Act [of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976]." Orin Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 1561, 1563 (2010).

Codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030, it criminalized "three specific [actions]: computer misuse to obtain national security secrets, computer misuse to obtain personal financial records, and hacking into U.S. government computers." Id. at 1564 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)-(3)).

Two years later, Congress formally introduced the Act with enactment of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213. Amending § 1030, Congress created three more computer crimes:

Kerr, supra, at 1565 (footnotes omitted). The legislative history explains that the amendments were necessary because of a "technological explosion," elaborating:

Eight years passed. In 1994, Congress enacted another omnibus crime bill, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796. Although better known for its provisions regarding a federal assault weapons ban, the bill also included the Computer Abuse Amendments Act, which added civil remedies for violations of the section. See generally Deborah F. Buckman, Validity, Construction, and Application of Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 174 A.L.R. Fed. 101 (2001) (observing that the Act "provided only criminal penalties until enactment of the Computer Abuse Amendments Act of 1994, which added the civil remedies, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(g)").

"Any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of the section," the new subsection (g) provided in pertinent part, "may maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief." 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (1994). The legislative history of an earlier draft of the Act explained: "This remedy [will] authorize private suits in an area that law enforcement has sometimes been reluctant to investigate or prosecute. Deterrence is another goal." S. Rep. 101-544, at 8 (1990).

In 1996, § 1030 was again amended as part of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-294, tit. II, 110 Stat. 3488, 3491. In pertinent part, it amended § 1030(a)(5) to create separate offenses for the unauthorized computer access. The legislative history explains:

S. Rep. 104-357, at 10-11 (1995).

In 2000, Senator Patrick Leahy "introduced a bill, the Enhancement of Privacy and Public Safety in Cyberspace Act in the Senate that expressly [sought] to clarify (1) what constitutes `loss,' and (2) that `loss' is subject to the $5,000 monetary threshold." In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F.Supp.2d 497, 522 n.29 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (internal citation omitted) (citing 146 Cong. Rec. S8823-01 (Sept. 20, 2000). As initially proposed, the bill provided:

Enhancement of Privacy and Public Safety in Cyberspace Act, S. 3083, 106th Cong. (2000), quoted in In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d at n.29; see also Nexans Wires S.A. v. Sark-USA, Inc., 319 F.Supp.2d 468, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (same).

The following year, these additions were adopted (with minor modifications) as part of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272. Section 814 of the act, titled "Deterrence and Prevention of Cyberterrorism," added the definition of "loss" at issue in this case, providing in pertinent part:

Id. (emphasis added). This definition has not been revised and is currently in force. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11).

Although the earlier draft's express separation of loss into two subdivisions — literally, subdivisions "A" and "B" — did not make it into the final bill, nothing suggests that this modification was intended to be substantive. Rather, although minor stylistic changes were made, in substance Senator Leahy's bill was adopted in full. And unlike the "committee reports," which are viewed with a particularly jaundiced eye by legislative history skeptics,2 this draft is integral to the legislation's history.

Turning to the committee reports, they likewise support the conclusion that "loss" does not require "interruption of service." From the beginning, for example, "the concept of `loss' embodied in this subsection" included "the costs of actual repairs." S. Rep. 99-432, at 10 (1986). With the amendments in 1996, Congress clarified that it sought to punish — and compensate the victim for — "the intentional act of trespass," with the legislative history explaining that the trespass "requires the system administrator to devote resources to resecuring the system. Thus, although there is arguably no `damage,' the victim does suffer `loss.' If the loss to the victim meets the required monetary threshold, the conduct should be criminal, and the victim should be entitled to relief." S. Rep. 104-357, at 10 (1995). Thus, from the beginning, "loss" has been defined broadly to include not only the harm the intruder directly inflicts, but also the costs the victim incurs in investigating and preventing future incursions.

"Interruption of service," in contrast, does not share this distinguished pedigree. It did not appear in either the legislative history or the proposed text of the Act itself until Senator Leahy's bifurcated definition of "loss" in 2000, quoted above — in which it is an alternative form of loss. This strongly suggests that the Act's definition of "loss" is disjunctive. The "and" means "or."

C

This conclusion, of course, does not square with a recent decision in General Scientific Corp. v. SheerVision, No. 10-cv-13582, 2011 WL 3880489 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 2, 2011), in which Chief Judge Rosen reached a different result, writing: "The CFAA only covers lost revenue if the loss occurred as a result of interrupted service." Id. at 4. Different interpretations of the same statute within the same district court are generally not preferred (except, perhaps, by courts of appeals, which were created in part to resolve such differences of opinion). Somewhat moderating this difference, however, are two significant factors. First, the interpretation in SheerVision was not essential to the disposition of the case — it was offered as an alternative rationale. In pertinent part, the court wrote:

SheerVision, 2011 WL 3880489, at *3-4 (internal citations omitted). Thus, the court first granted the motion to dismiss because the plaintiff had not pled sufficient factual matter to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, offering its interpretation only as an alternative rationale. But cf. McLellan v. Miss. Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919, 925 n.21 (5th Cir. 1977) ("It has long been settled that all alternative rationales for a given result have precedential value. `It does not make a reason given for a conclusion in a case obiter dictum, because it is only one of two reasons for the same conclusion.'" (quoting Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 340 (1928)).

Second, the parties did not brief, and so the court did not address, the legislative history of the Act. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Answer to Defendant Sheervision's Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support at 6-7, SheerVision, 2011 WL 3880489 (No. 10-cv-13582), ECF No. 14.

IV

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Defendant's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 21) is denied.

It is further ORDERED that the hearing on Defendant's motion scheduled for Tuesday, January 31, 2012, at 4:00 p.m. is cancelled because the parties' papers provide the necessary factual and legal information to decide the motion. See E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2).

It is further ORDERED that the parties are directed to appear as scheduled for the settlement conference on Tuesday, January 31, 2012, at 4:00 p.m.