LAWRENCE P. ZATKOFF, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Docket #2). Pro se Plaintiff filed a timely response to the motion. The time for Defendants to file a reply has expired. The Court finds that the facts and legal arguments pertinent to the motion are adequately presented in the parties' papers, and the decision process will not be aided by oral arguments. Therefore, pursuant to E.D. Mich. Local R. 7.1(f)(2), it is hereby ORDERED that the motion be resolved on the briefs submitted by the parties, without this Court entertaining oral arguments. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's cause of action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The present lawsuit, like one filed three months earlier in this Court (Case No. 11-13889), stems from events that began in 2006, when Plaintiff, proceeding in pro per (as he is now), filed a case in Oakland County against various defendants, including the Michigan Department of Human Services (the "DHS Case"). The DHS Case was assigned to the Honorable Edward Sosnick. After a period of discovery, Defendants filed motions for summary disposition that were granted by Judge Sosnick. In 2008, Plaintiff filed two lawsuits (the "2008 Lawsuits") based upon the substantive allegations in the DHS Case and the subsequent dismissal of the DHS Case by Judge Sosnick. After the entire Oakland County Circuit Court bench disqualified itself from the proceedings, the Honorable Diane Druzinski from the Macomb County Circuit Court was assigned to preside over the 2008 Lawsuits. Judge Druzinski granted the defendants' motions to dismiss and awarded sanctions against Plaintiff.
Plaintiff has since filed more than a dozen appeals to the Michigan Court of Appeals relating to the 2008 Lawsuits. Ultimately, the surviving appeals were consolidated and oral argument was heard by a panel of the Michigan Court of Appeals on September 8, 2011. On September 22, 2011, the Michigan Court of Appeals issued a decision affirming Judge Druzinski's dismissal of the 2008 Lawsuits and the sanctions awards. Plaintiff also has filed multiple appeals with the Michigan Supreme Court, including an application for leave to appeal the September 22, 2011, decision by the Michigan Court of Appeals.
On September 7, 2011, Plaintiff filed Case No. 11-13889 in this Court against the following individuals: (a) Michigan Court of Appeals Judge Deborah A. Servitto, (b) Michigan Supreme Court Justices Marilyn Kelly, Michael F. Cavanagh, Robert P. Young, Jr., Stephen J. Markman and Diane M. Hathaway, and (c) former Michigan Supreme Court Justices Maura D. Corrigan and Alton Thomas Davis. Plaintiff sued each of them for events that occurred while he or she served as an appellate court judge in the State of Michigan. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that the defendants in Case No. 11-13889 violated his federal constitutional rights to: (1) due process; (2) freedom of speech; (3) equal access to Court; and (4) equal protection. On October 28, 2011, after declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims, the Court held that Plaintiff's federal claims in Case No. 11-13889 were barred by judicial immunity and dismissed Case No. 11-13889, with prejudice.
In the present action, filed on December 29, 2011, Plaintiff alleges the following federal claims:
Plaintiff also set forth two state law claims (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress), both of which the Court dismissed without prejudice after declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
Plaintiff's claims in the instant case arise out of alleged actions taken by (or the inaction of) Defendant Corbin Davis (a Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court) and the remaining individual Defendants (all of whom are Michigan Supreme Court Justices) with respect to Plaintiff's appeal of the September 22, 2011, decision rendered by the Michigan Court of Appeals. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the individual Defendants failed to file a court pleading (his Reply Brief), despite their "express knowledge" of his pleading. In addition, Plaintiff claims that the Michigan Supreme Court itself is vicariously liable for the individual Defendants' alleged transgressions.
Defendants now move the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's cause of action based upon judicial immunity, quasi-judicial immunity, Eleventh Amendment immunity, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
A motion brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff's claims. The Court must accept as true all factual allegations in the pleadings, and any ambiguities must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See Jackson v. Richards Med. Co., 961 F.2d 575, 577-78 (6th Cir. 1992). While this standard is decidedly liberal, it requires more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions. See Advocacy Org. for Patients & Providers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 176 F.3d 315, 319 (6th Cir. 1999). A plaintiff must make "a showing, rather than a blanket assertion of entitlement to relief" and "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" so that the claim is "plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct." Id. at 556. See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 696-97 (2009).
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), this Court may only consider "the facts alleged in the pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the pleadings, and matters of which the [Court] may take judicial notice." 2 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 12.34[2] (3d ed. 2000). If, in deciding the motion, the Court considers matters outside the pleadings, the motion will be treated as one for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
The law is well-settled that judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from suit on claims for damages arising out of actions in their judicial capacity. See, e.g., Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991) (judge performing judicial functions is absolutely immune from suit seeking monetary damages even if he or she acted erroneously, corruptly or in excess of jurisdiction). See also Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 221 (6th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 12 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
In this action, all of Plaintiff's allegations against the Michigan Supreme Court Justice Defendants center on actions or omissions of the Justices conducted in their judicial capacities. As noted above, Plaintiff's claims against the Michigan Supreme Court Justice Defendants stem from their alleged knowledge of Plaintiff's Reply Brief and their alleged refusal to require Defendant Corbin Davis to file the Reply Brief. Thus, the alleged actions or omissions of the Michigan Supreme Court Justice Defendants are indisputably "function[s] normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties[.]" Id. Accordingly, the Court holds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to the Michigan Supreme Court Defendants.
Absolute judicial immunity has been extended to non-judicial officers who perform quasi-judicial functions. Bush v. Ranch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994). Quasi-judicial functions are tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial process that the person performing the tasks is considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune. Id. Because the filing of documents by a Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court is an integral part of the judicial process, that clerk is entitled to absolute immunity for his alleged refusal to file pleadings.
As Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant Corbin Davis stem from Defendant Corbin Davis' alleged refusal, while acting in his capacity as the Michigan Supreme Court Clerk, to file Plaintiff's Reply Brief in a state court action, the Court concludes that Defendant Corbin Davis is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity with respect to performing (or failing to perform) that function. Therefore, the Court holds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted as to Defendant Corbin Davis.
Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Michigan State Supreme Court are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The United States Constitution, Amendment XI, provides as follows:
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents a state (including its agencies) from being sued in federal court without its consent. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978). In order to assert Eleventh Amendment immunity, a state agency must show that it is an "arm of the state" based on the following factors: (1) the state's potential liability for a judgment against the entity; (2) the language by which state statutes and state courts refer to the entity and the degree of state control and veto power over the entity's actions; (3) whether state or local officials appoint the board members of the entity; and (4) whether the entity's functions fall within the traditional purview of state or local government. Pucci v. 19th District Court, et al., 628 F.3d 752 (6th Cir. 2010).
Various federal courts, including the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, have already considered the application of Eleventh Amendment immunity to Michigan state courts. These federal courts have determined that Michigan's courts are arms of the state and thus entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See e.g., Pucci, 628 F.3d at 760-764 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding that the Michigan Constitution vests the state judicial power in one court of justice under the control of the Michigan Supreme Court so that a district court is afforded Eleventh Amendment immunity as an arm of the State just as the Michigan Supreme Court would be); Borghese v. Autman, Case No. 09-cv-51, 2009 WL 3498798 at *1 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 26, 2009). Furthermore, like the State of Michigan, the Michigan Supreme Court is not a "person" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, it cannot be sued under § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
As the Michigan State Supreme Court did not consent to this suit, all claims against it are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted with respect to Defendant Michigan Supreme Court.
Defendants ask the Court to sanction Plaintiff for repeatedly filing frivolous lawsuits, as this was the third lawsuit Plaintiff filed against Michigan Supreme Court Justices in a four-month period.
The Court agrees that Plaintiff's frivolous lawsuits against judicial officers create an unwarranted burden and cost to the defendant judicial officers, specifically, and to the courts, generally. At this juncture, however, the Court will not impose monetary sanctions on Plaintiff, who has proceeded in pro per in each of the three cases brought against current and/or former Justices of the Supreme Court, nor will the Court require pre-screening of any lawsuit filed by Plaintiff. If Plaintiff files any additional meritless lawsuit(s) against current or former members of the Michigan Supreme Court (or any other court) based on actions or omissions of judicial officers while acting in their judicial capacity, however, the Court shall impose sanctions against Plaintiff. Such sanctions may include, but are not limited to:
Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Thus, any tort claim against the Supreme Court Justice Defendants is also barred by statutory governmental immunity.
