SCHEDULING ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S APRIL 20, 2012 MOTION TO DISMISS (Doc. Ent. 7)
PAUL J. KOMIVES, Magistrate Judge.
A. Background
1. The instant lawsuit concerns the property located at 13976 West Outer Drive, Redford, Michigan 48239.1 On May 23, 2007, Virginia Lee Marvin executed a quitclaim deed on the property to Michael A. Brown. Doc. Ent. 1-2 at 15-16. During May 2007, Michael A. Brown granted a mortgage on the property to Washington Mutual Bank in the amount of $71.250.00. Doc. Ent. 7-2.2
More than one year later, on September 25, 2008, the FDIC was appointed as a receiver for Washington Mutual Bank. Doc. Ent. 7-3. According to JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., "the FDIC-R in turn sold certain of [Washington Mutual Bank's] asserts to Chase — and Chase acquired [Washington Mutual Bank's] interest in the Note and Mortgage in this case — pursuant to a Purchase and Assumption Agreement." Doc. Ent. 7 at 14.
According to an "Independent Foreclosure Review" form, the property "is or was active in the foreclosure process between January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2010." Doc. Ent. 1-2 at 18-20. It appears that, at some point, Brown requested a modification of his loan. By a letter dated February 1, 2011, Chase gave Brown a final notice regarding Brown's request for a loan modification. Doc. Ent. 1-2 at 24.
2. Plaintiff Michael A. Brown originally filed this foreclosure case on or about February 29, 2012 in Wayne County Circuit Court (Case No. 12-002822-CH) against defendants (JPMorgan) Chase Bank, N.A. and Washington Mutual Bank with respect to the property located at 13976 West Outer Drive, Redford, Michigan 48239. The title of plaintiff's complaint mentions, among other things, mortgage assignment fraud, securities fraud and servicing fraud by Chase and Washington Mutual, violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act3 and Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2109 ("Recorded conveyances and instruments; certified copies"), as well as unjust enrichment and a demand for quiet title. Doc. Ent. 1-2 at 6-12.4 For example, Brown appears to take issue with the assignment of the mortgage from Washington Mutual Bank to Chase. Doc. Ent. 1-2 at 8 ¶ 11.
On March 30, 2012, defendant Chase removed the case to this Court. Doc. Ent. 1. In part, the removal was based upon plaintiff's purported assertion of "federal causes of action against the defendant arising out of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act[,] 15 U.S.C. § 1692[,][5] and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. [§]§ 2601 [-2617]." Doc. Ent. 1 ¶ 6 (citing Doc. Ent. 1-2 at 6-12 ¶¶ 5, 13).
Judge Lawson has referred this case to me for general case management. Doc. Ent. 5.
B. Pending Motion
On April 16, 2012, I entered an order (Doc. Ent. 6) granting defendant's motion (Doc. Ent. 4) to extend time to file a response to plaintiff's complaint. Currently before the Court is defendant Chase's April 20, 2012 motion to dismiss. Doc. Ent. 7. Therein, defendant Chase argues:
A. As a threshold matter, plaintiff's complaint fails to meet minimum pleading standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
B. The complaint fails to meet minimum pleading standards for fraud under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
C. The complaint should also be dismissed because any purported claim that plaintiff could be attempting to make is barred.
Doc. Ent. 7 at 16-17, 18-19, 19-27. Within the last of these arguments, Chase addresses Brown's allegations regarding (1) assignment of the mortgage, (2) Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS), (3) Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2109, (4) the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), (5) the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), (6) the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), (7) Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC), (8) unjust enrichment, and (9) quiet title. Doc. Ent. 7 at 9-27.
C. Discussion
1. On April 9, 2012, plaintiff filed a "response brief in opposition to defendants['] motion to dismiss," within which he presented a statement of questions:
Whether Plaintiffs were Pro Se litigants and should be allowed to amend their pleading in conformity to the Federal Court Rules[?]
Whether Plaintiffs have proper standing to raise Defendants['] lack of legitimate ownership interest in the indebtedness[?]
Whether Plaintiffs have evidence of Defendants['] violation of the [FDCPA], 15 [U.S.C.] § 1692[?]
Whether Plaintiffs can establish legal violations sufficient to demonstrate the need to QUIET TITLE[?]
Doc. Ent. 3 at 2. In the end, plaintiff Brown requests that the Court "deny Defendants['] motion to dismiss and allow Plaintiff to amend the complaint." Doc. Ent. 3 at 8.
The problem with this filing is three-fold. First, its April 9, 2012 filing (Doc. Ent. 3) predates the only pending motion to dismiss (Doc. Ent. 7), which was filed by defendant Chase on April 20, 2012. Second, as defendant Chase points out in its April 20, 2012 motion to dismiss, "Plaintiff appears to have filed a form document as the Response, as virtually the exact same document was also filed the same week by another Plaintiff in an entirely unrelated case." Doc. Ent. 7 at 15 n.4.6 For these reasons, plaintiff's April 9, 2012 filing (Doc. Ent. 3) does not specifically respond to the arguments posed by defendant Chase's pending motion to dismiss.
Third, to the extent plaintiff is seeking permission to amend his complaint (Doc. Ent. 1-2 at 6-12),7 his April 9, 2012 filing (Doc. Ent. 3) does not comply with E.D. Mich. LR 15.1 ("Form of a Motion to Amend and Its Supporting Documentation"), which states: "A party who moves to amend a pleading shall attach the proposed amended pleading to the motion. Any amendment to a pleading, whether filed as a matter of course or upon a motion to amend, must, except by leave of court, reproduce the entire pleading as amended, and may not incorporate any prior pleading by reference. Failure to comply with this Rule is not grounds for denial of the motion." Therefore, plaintiff's April 9, 2012 request (Doc. Ent. 3) for permission to amend his complaint (Doc. Ent. 1-2 at 6-12) will be denied without prejudice to renewal in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) and E.D. Mich. LR 15.1.
2. "A respondent opposing a motion must file a response, including a brief and supporting documents then available." E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(c)(1). Ordinarily a response to defendant Chase's April 20, 2012 motion to dismiss (Doc. Ent. 7) would be due on or about May 14, 2012. E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(e)(1)(B) ("A response to a dispositive motion must be filed within 21 days after service of the motion."), Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d).
However, upon consideration, plaintiff shall have up to and including Monday, July 2, 2012 by which to file a response to defendant Chase's April 20, 2012 motion to dismiss (Doc. Ent. 7).
D. Order
Accordingly, plaintiff's April 9, 2012 request (Doc. Ent. 3) for permission to amend his complaint (Doc. Ent. 1-2 at 6-12) is DENIED without prejudice to renewal in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) and E.D. Mich. LR 15.1.
Furthermore, plaintiff has up to and including Monday, July 2, 2012 by which to file a response to defendant Chase's April 20, 2012 motion to dismiss (Doc. Ent. 7). Any reply by defendant Chase shall be filed in accordance with E.D. Mich. LR 7.1. Thereafter, a report and recommendation will be issued on the papers without oral argument.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The attention of the parties is drawn to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), which provides a period of fourteen (14) days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order within which to file objections for consideration by the district judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
