DAVID M. LAWSON, District Judge.
Petitioner James Redmond, the former superintendent of the Oakland Intermediate School District (OISD), was convicted of the common law crime of misconduct in office as a result of selfdealing and other acts of misconduct. He also was convicted of violating Michigan Compiled Laws § 15.322, which prohibits contracts between public servants and the public entity of which the public servant is an officer or employee. The principal bases of the charges were agreements the petitioner made or arranged between OISD and the MINDS Institute, a nonprofit organization, when the petitioner chaired the MINDS Institute board of directors and simultaneously acted as OISD superintendent. He was sentenced to concurrent custody terms of six months and ninety days for these two convictions, but he has been on bond during his direct appeals and this ensuing habeas proceeding.
The parties do not contest the fact description made by the Michigan Court of Appeals on direct review, and in any event it is entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009). That court of appeals summarized the facts as follows:
People v. Redmond, No. 261458, 2006 WL 3298360, at *1-2 (Mich.Ct.App. Nov. 14, 2006) (footnotes omitted). The Oakland County, Michigan circuit court jury convicted the petitioner of misconduct in office, a common law offense preserved by Michigan Compiled Laws § 750.505, and of violating Michigan Compiled Law § 15.322, which prohibits contracts between public servants and the public entity of which the public servant is an officer or employee. The trial court sentenced him to six months imprisonment and three years probation for the misconduct in office charge, and 90 days imprisonment for violating section 15.322.
The petitioner then filed a direct appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals, in which he raised the following issues: (1) insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to present evidence at trial of improper severance agreements and vacation payout as theories under which defendant engaged in misconduct in office because the district court did not bind defendant over for trial on those two theories, and therefore the trial court lacked jurisdiction with respect to those
In his timely-filed habeas petition in this Court, the petitioner raises the following claims for relief:
Memorandum in Support of Ptn. at 10, 31, 33, 37, 45-46, 49.
On January 16, 2008, the petitioner filed an emergency motion for bond pending review of his petition for habeas corpus, which the Court granted on March 14, 2008. Thereafter, the parties filed their respective briefs.
The provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996), which govern this case, "circumscribe[d]" the standard of review federal courts must apply when considering an application for a writ of habeas corpus raising constitutional claims, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) permits a federal court to issue the writ only if the state court decision on a federal issue "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
The Supreme Court has explained the proper application of the "contrary to" clause as follows:
Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495.
The Supreme Court has held that a federal court should analyze a claim for habeas corpus relief under the "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(1) "when a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of this Court to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495. The Court has explained that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law. Under that language, "a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Williams, 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495. The Supreme Court has continued to emphasize the limited nature of this review. In its recent unanimous decision in Harrington v. Richter, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011), the Court reiterated that the AEDPA requires federal habeas courts to review state court decisions with "deference and latitude," and "[a] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as `fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Id. at 786 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004)). The Sixth Circuit observed recently that "[t]his is a very high standard, which the [Supreme] Court freely acknowledges." Peak v. Webb, 673 F.3d 465, 472 (6th Cir.2012). The court suggested that Richter holds that the review standard "is even more constricted than AEDPA's plain language already suggests." Ibid.
The distinction between mere error and an objectively unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent creates a substantially higher threshold for obtaining
The petitioner first argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions. "[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). The critical inquiry on habeas review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (internal citation and footnote omitted). In the habeas context, "[t]he Jackson standard must be applied `with explicit reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law.'" Brown v. Palmer, 441 F.3d 347, 351 (6th Cir.2006) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 2781). "A reviewing court does not reweigh the evidence or redetermine the credibility of the witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by the trial court." Matthews v. Abramajtys, 319 F.3d 780, 788 (6th Cir.2003) (citing Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434, 103 S.Ct. 843, 74 L.Ed.2d 646 (1983)). A habeas court must defer to the fact finder for its assessment of the credibility of witnesses. Id. at 788. "[A] reviewing court `faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume — even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record — that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.'" McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, ___, 130 S.Ct. 665, 673, 175 L.Ed.2d 582 (2010) (citations omitted). Accordingly, "[t]he mere existence of sufficient evidence to convict ... defeats a petitioner's claim." Id. at 788-89. The Court does not need to be convinced
"Two layers of deference apply to habeas claims challenging evidentiary sufficiency." McGuire v. Ohio, 619 F.3d 623, 631 (6th Cir.2010) (citing Brown v. Konteh, 567 F.3d 191, 204-05 (6th Cir.2009)). First, the Court "must determine whether, viewing the trial testimony and exhibits in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Brown, 567 F.3d at 205 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781). Second, if the Court were "to conclude that a rational trier of fact could not have found a petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, on habeas review, [the Court] must still defer to the state appellate court's sufficiency determination as long as it is not unreasonable." Ibid.
The Michigan Supreme Court has defined misconduct in office as "`corrupt behavior by an officer in the exercise of the duties of his office or while acting under color of his office.'" People v. Perkins, 468 Mich. 448, 456, 662 N.W.2d 727, 732 (2003) (quoting People v. Coutu, 459 Mich. 348, 354, 589 N.W.2d 458, 461 (1999)); see also People v. Hardrick, 258 Mich.App. 238, 244-45, 671 N.W.2d 548, 552 (2003). Simple nonfeasance, malfeasance, and misfeasance are not enough. Perkins, 468 Mich. at 456, 662 N.W.2d at 732. "In the case of malfeasance and misfeasance, the offender also must act with a corrupt intent, i.e., with a sense of depravity, perversion or taint." Ibid. (citations and quotations omitted).
People v. Coutu (On Remand), 235 Mich.App. 695, 706-07, 599 N.W.2d 556, 562 (1999) (citation omitted).
The prosecutor offered six instances of corrupt behavior to support the charge of misconduct in office: (1) embezzling money by directing the improper calculation of a per diem pay rate when he redeemed 30 days of vacation pay; (2) paying severance packages to employees the petitioner wanted to quietly separate without Board approval; (3) misrepresenting to the Michigan Department of Education that no one in the petitioner's family benefitted from his duality with the OISD and the MINDS Institute; (4) signing a contract with the MINDS Institute on behalf of the OISD at the same time the petitioner chairman MINDS Institute's board of directors; (5) misrepresenting or failing to inform OISD of his position at the MINDS Institute; and (6) authorizing payment of $397,220 by the OISD to the MINDS Institute without a proper contract modification. The State needed to prove only one of the factual predicates beyond a reasonable doubt to
The Michigan Court of Appeals reviewed the evidence and found it to be sufficient as to all six theories. That court found that the "[d]efendant committed acts of malfeasance or misfeasance under the color of his position as superintendent of the OISD, and this conduct was bad or offensive. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence that defendant's conduct was `tainted' and therefore corrupt." People v. Redmond, 2006 WL 3298360, at *2.
This Court has reviewed the record thoroughly and concludes that the state court's determination amounted to a reasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. There is evidence in the record from which a rational jury could conclude that the petitioner committed misconduct in office under each of the six theories advanced by the State. The Court will address each in turn.
The petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to demonstrate that he was not entitled to the additional $6,972.50 of vacation payout he required the financial services department to issue. He says that nothing in his contract limited the calculation of his per diem to his base pay divided by the number of business days. Rather, he relies on the Black's Law Dictionary definition of per diem — by the day; for each day — to suggest that he was entitled to include the non-base pay elements of his compensation package in valuing his 30 days of vacation. The State admits that neither the petitioner's contract nor OISD had a written definition of per diem. However, testimony offered at trial established that OISD's standard practice for per diem payouts was to use the base salary divided by the number of business days. The evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, demonstrates that the petitioner, under the color of his office, committed malfeasance by performing a discretionary act with corrupt motive — that despite legitimate doubts about his entitlement to the extra funds, he directed the payout — and the jury reasonably could have found that the petitioner's behavior was bad or offensive.
Mark Ratjer, OISD's assistant superintendent for resource management, testified that the per diem rate normally is "calculated using their base pay, base gross pay divided by the number of days," Trial Tr., Jan. 24, 2005 at 413-44, and that the per diem rate does not include the employee's tax sheltered annuity contributions (TSA), which is compensation deferred until retirement. Evidence was presented that showed the petitioner directed Ratjer and John Fitzgerald, director of financial services for OISD, to recalculate his cash payout for 30 days of vacation that he sold back to OISD based on a methodology that was not used for other employees. The petitioner directed Fitzgerald and Ratjer to include his TSA contributions, social security, medicare, and member investment plan contributions in his per diem rate, resulting in an additional $6,972.59 being paid out. Ratjer objected because he thought it was improper but relented because the petitioner, as the superintendent, had the final say. Ratjer testified that the petitioner's position was the sole reason his per diem was recalculated. Janet Thomas, an OISD board member, testified that the board did not approve the payment.
The Court finds that a reasonable jury could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt based on this theory. The appellate court's sufficiency determination was not unreasonable.
The petitioner argues that there is no evidence that he terminated William Lee's and Barbara Rebbeck's employment for perverse, depraved, or tainted motives. Rather, he argues, the evidence supports the opposite conclusion because the recommendations for non-renewals were made by other administrators and the petitioner did not prepare their severance packages, make the severance package offers, or sign the severance agreements on behalf of OISD. The State argues that it presented evidence to establish that the petitioner wanted to get rid of Lee and Rebbeck because they had opposed him, and that because he had no sufficient performance-related reason to present to the board of education for not renewing their contracts, the petitioner lied when he told Richard Simonson, OISD's deputy superintendent who signed the severance agreements, that the board had approved the agreements. The State argues that petitioner's decision to arrange for Lee's and Rebbeck's severance packages without the board of education's approval because he wanted to terminate their employment for crossing him constitutes malfeasance with corrupt intent.
The record evidence supports the States argument. Bill Lee, OISD's plant and facilities consultant, testified that he had several disagreements with the petitioner during his employment with OISD. One such disagreement was when Lee was asked by Dr. Robert Nugent, an assistant superintendent, at the petitioner's behest, to recalculate the square footage of the new OISD administration building that would be used for special education purposes to include common areas, corridors, meeting rooms, and storage areas. Lee testified that he was instructed to recalculate the square footage to "make sure that they were getting the maximum amount from special ed as far as being able to charge them in square footage-wise." Trial Tr., Jan. 20, 2005 at 99. Lee also testified that he disagreed with the petitioner's idea to build a new administration building on land that contained wetlands. Lee also testified that he was told that his contract would not be renewed due to a reorganization and not because of his performance, and that if he resigned he would receive a severance package. Lee's severance agreement, which Simonson signed, gave Lee $41,315.87 gross, resulting in a net check for $25,000.
Barbara Rebbeck, who was employed by OISD as a language arts consultant and director of the Oakland Writing Project, testified that in 1997, she, along with six other OISD employees, helped conduct a survey of OISD employees' views on the management of OISD and delivered results to the board of education that painted OISD's management in a negative light. Rebbeck also testified that after being told her employment contract would not be renewed, she signed a severance agreement that was not approved by the board of education. Rebbeck testified that she did not believe that any of the other survey conductors were terminated. John Fitzgerald testified that Rebbeck received $41,293.70 gross, resulting in a check for $25,000, for her severance package. Fitzgerald also testified that Ms. Rebbeck's severance was paid at the end of the fiscal year, after the final budget amendments had been made.
Dan Austin, the then-current deputy superintendent of OISD, testified that after being informed by Rick Simonson that Rebbeck's and Lee's contracts would not be renewed, he advised Simonson that there was not a sufficient record of deficient performance to place Lee and Rebbeck on the non-renewal list. Instead, Austin suggested that Rebbeck and Lee be
From that evidence, a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner arranged for the severance packages without board approval, which amounted to malfeasance, and he did so with a corrupt motive. But even if that conclusion is not compelled, the Court is satisfied that the state court's sufficiency determination was reasonable in light of Jackson v. Virginia.
In its audit of OISD for fiscal year 2000-2001, KPMG, the audit firm chosen by the board of education to conduct OISD's annual audit in 2001, included a footnote in its audit report that disclosed the petitioner's relationship with MINDS. In response, the Michigan Department of Education sent an inquiry to OISD asking for specific information regarding the OISD contracts with MINDS. The inquiry asked whether the petitioner or any of his relatives profited financially from the OISD-MINDS arrangement. The petitioner furnished an affidavit that was included in OISD's response, in which he answered the question in the negative despite the fact that his son had been hired by MINDS, LLC, a related company, in October 2000. The petitioner argues that his "no" response was true because his son, an entry level employee of MINDS, LLC, was not involved in either contract between OISD and MINDS Institute and did not profit from them. There is no proof, the petitioner argues, that his attempt to protect his son's privacy rose to the level of "corruption." The petitioner relies heavily on the fact that much of the digitization work was complete by August 2000, well before Marvin Sauer, chief financial officer of TLC Holding Group (TLC) (Minds's parent organization), knew that the petitioner's son was looking for work. The State contends that the evidence establishes that the petitioner, in the exercise of his duties, committed malfeasance by performing a discretionary act with a corrupt motive. It says that the petitioner provided a misleading and non-responsive answer to the Department's questions; a lie is enough to evince corrupt behavior; and even if a lie is not enough, the inferences arising from the direct and circumstantial evidence supported an argument that the petitioner lied to cover up the questionable circumstances surrounding his son's hiring and the depth of his personal involvement with the MINDS entities.
At trial, Sauer testified that he learned that the petitioner's son was available to be hired during a conversation he had with the petitioner and that he hired the petitioner's son to work at MINDS, LLC in October 2000, just months after OISD and the MINDS Institute entered into the digitization contract. Sauer further testified that he expected to enhance his relationship with the petitioner by employing the petitioner's son.
Mark Ratjer testified that the petitioner, despite Ratjer's advise, did not disclose his son's employment with MINDS, LLC in his answer and affidavit in response to the Michigan Department of Education's question
That evidence would permit a rational jury to conclude that the petitioner was engaged in self-dealing through his position at the OISD, and that he misused that position in a corrupt way by deriving a benefit for his son, which he concealed from the Michigan Department of Education. The Court finds, therefore, that a reasonable jury could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and that the state court's sufficiency determination was not unreasonable.
The petitioner argues that the evidence produced at trial overwhelmingly proved that his only purpose for signing the Subscriber and Content Agreements and for sitting on the board of directors of the MINDS Institute was to protect OISD's assets. Put more simply, he argues that the State failed to show that he entered the contracts for a corrupt purpose. The petitioner also argues that the evidence clearly showed that his presence on the MINDS Institute board of directors was as a representative of OISD. Further to that point, the petitioner argues that not one witness testified that he personally benefitted from his relationship with the MINDS Institute. The State counters that the petitioner acted wrongfully by entering into a contract on behalf of OISD with the MINDS Institute at the same time he was chairman of the board of the MINDS Institute in violation of Michigan Compiles Laws § 15.322, and that the jury reasonably could have found that the petitioner's behavior was bad or offensive.
Marvin Sauer testified that TLC served as an umbrella corporation to provide financial operations assistance to DataServ, which sells, installs, and maintains voice, video, and data equipment, and MINDS, LLC, which sells educational content to schools. The MINDS Institute, which was incorporated to gather the education content MINDS, LLC was to sell, was a separate organization that had a management agreement with TLC. The Michigan Court of Appeals summarized the companies' relationships.
Redmond, 2006 WL 3298360, at *1 n. 3. Sauer testified that the petitioner was one of the signatory incorporators of the MINDS Institute and eventually was made chairman of the board in May 2000. Sauer also testified that the petitioner did not receive any compensation for serving on the board of directors of the MINDS Institute. But Sauer said that in return for providing MINDS Institute with OISD's educational content, MINDS Institute would digitize the content and make it available to OISD schools for a yearly membership fee of $50,000, and that it was vital to have the petitioner on the board of the MINDS Institute because the petitioner would assist in acquiring and getting licensing for the educational content MINDS, LLC would sell and to get business.
Sauer testified that OISD and the MINDS Institute entered into the Subscriber Agreement and the Content Agreement on September 25, 2000. Karl Seiler,
The Court is left with little doubt that the petitioner violated the precepts of Michigan Compiled Laws § 15.322. While superintendent of OISD and chairman of the board of the MINDS Institute, the petitioner represented a party to a contract between the two entities. The only question left is whether sufficient evidence was offered to establish corrupt intent. Under Michigan law, "a corrupt intent can be shown where there is intentional or purposeful misbehavior or wrongful conduct pertaining to the requirements and duties of office by an officer." Coutu, 235 Mich.App. at 706, 599 N.W.2d at 562. There is sufficient evidence in the record that the petitioner's actions were intentional and that his dual role benefitted MINDS Institute's procurement of the contracts. The Court finds that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
The petitioner argues that his relationship with the MINDS Institute was disclosed as early as 1999. He argues that the evidence demonstrated that Carol Klenow, assistant superintendent of student performance, received a memorandum from Jan VanDam regarding MINDS in October 1999; the memorandum recalled a meeting between VanDam, Karl Seiler, and Sauer regarding a collaboration between DataServ and OISD; Diane Leitermann, an OISD trustee, confirmed that the memorandum was provided to OISD's board; and the petitioner spoke to the board on November 9, 1999 about DataServ, the offer to form a partnership, and the request that he serve as CEO of the project. The petitioner also argues that Rick Simonson testified that MINDS was discussed at OISD board meetings beginning in the winter of 1999; the need for the petitioner to sit on the MINDS board was one of the subjects discussed; there were frequent discussions about the petitioner's position with MINDS during the summer of 2000; at an OISD board meeting, VanDam presented the petitioner with an award that identified him as a founding board member of MINDS; and he recalled the petitioner disclosing his position with MINDS to the OISD board on more than one occasion. Additionally, the petitioner argues that he divulged his position on the MINDS Institute board to Carolyn Claerhout and Dennis Pollard when he sought a legal opinion as to the propriety of the MINDS Institute arrangement.
The State responds that the petitioner never affirmatively informed the OISD board that he was the chairman of the board for the MINDS Institute, and that the evidence supports an inference that petitioner did not inform the OISD board
The arguments raised by the parties plainly demonstrate that the fact question was vigorously contested at trial. However, the arguments the petitioner makes essentially are jury arguments. The evidence identified by the State permitted the jury to conclude that the petitioner committed misconduct by failing to disclose his position at MINDS Institute during the time when the lucrative contracts were negotiated and signed. In addition, Mark Ratjer testified that the petitioner was displeased that KPMG included a footnote in its 2001 audit report that disclosed the petitioner's relationship with the MINDS Institute. The petitioner also told Ratjer that he wanted to select a new auditing firm for the next fiscal year. Dianne Leitermann, an elected board member of the OISD in 2001, testified that in July 2001 at a board retreat, the petitioner presented information regarding the MINDS entities to the board and asked the board members what their thoughts were of his idea to sit on the board of the MINDS Institute, but he did not tell the board he had been serving as chairman of the board of the MINDS Institute for over a year. Leitermann testified that the petitioner did not inform the board that he was chairman of the board of the MINDS Institute at the retreat. Leitermann also testified that she did not know that the petitioner would serve on the board of the MINDS Institute when the board voted to join the MINDS Institute. Board member Janet Thomas testified similarly that although the OISD board often was presented with information about MINDS, they were never informed that the petitioner was chairman of the board.
The Court finds there is sufficient evidence in the record from which a reasonable juror could conclude that the petitioner did not inform the OISD board of his position with the MINDS Institute until KPMG included it in a footnote in the annual audit and that he did so with corrupt intent.
The final factual predicate underlying the misconduct in office charge was that the petitioner, with corrupt intent, illegally authorized an additional $397,220 payment to the MINDS Institute without a written contract modification. The petitioner argues that the uncontroverted evidence showed that the OISD board's June 25, 2001 consent agenda included approval of the payment to the MINDS Institute for digitization services and that the board meeting minutes reflected a purchase order for that amount. The petitioner further argues that Katrina Brunette, OISD's purchasing manager, testified that no written contract modification was required. The State argues that the evidence demonstrates that the petitioner used his position as superintendent of OISD to advance the interests of the MINDS Institutes through the use of irregular procedures to effect the additional payment of $397,220, and that when the petitioner learned that OISD had additional funds, he immediately suggested that most of it be used to pay MINDS more money.
Mark Ratjer testified that in May 2001, he reported to the petitioner that OISD
Katrina Brunette, OISD's purchasing manager, testified that contract amendments valued over $18,000 required the OISD department originating the contract to submit a contract amendment form to her office and then get approval from the board of education. She also testified that to get a contract modification on the board of education's consent agenda, the requesting department had to complete a board consent agenda form that included the name of the contractor, the dollar amount, the amount of the increase, the reason for the increase, the contract's time period, and the scope of services being provided. The $397,220 payment to the MINDS Institute was added to the board's consent agenda on June 25, 2011, just one day before the last board meeting of the fiscal year. Ms. Brunette testified that she was out of town on June 25 and the only way the $397,200 purchase order could have been added to the board's consent agenda that quickly was if the petitioner approved the addition himself.
The Court finds that a reasonable jury could have found the essential elements of the crime of misconduct in office beyond a reasonable doubt based on this theory of misconduct. Moreover, even if the Court did not find as much, the Court is satisfied that the appellate court's sufficiency determination was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.
Michigan Compiled Laws § 15.322 provides, in part:
Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.322. Violation of the statute is a misdemeanor. Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.327.
People v. Redmond, 2006 WL 3298360, at *2 (footnote omitted). In addition to the evidence reviewed by the Michigan Court of Appeals, Carol Klenow testified that the petitioner insisted that the MINDS Institute do all the work with respect to digitizing OISD's educational assets.
There is no question that the a reasonable jury could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The Michigan Court of Appeals reasonably applied Jackson v. Virginia when it concluded that the trial evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.
The petitioner's second claim is that the trial judge erred by refusing his request for a special verdict requiring jurors to specify the theory, or theories, of liability on which the misconduct in office conviction was premised. The petitioner argues that the sixth theory of liability for the misconduct in office charge — that the petitioner authorized payment of $397,000 to the MINDS Institute without a contract modification — was a legally insufficient basis on which to predicate criminal responsibility; therefore, his misconduct in office conviction must be set aside because the general verdict form did not reveal which theory the jury relied on to find petitioner guilty.
"A conviction based on a general verdict is subject to challenge if the jury was instructed on alternative theories of guilt and may have relied on an invalid one." Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 58, 129 S.Ct. 530, 172 L.Ed.2d 388 (2008). An alternative-theory error is harmless if the error "does not categorically vitiate all the jury's findings." Id. at 61, 129 S.Ct. 530 (quotations and alterations omitted). Although the Supreme Court "did not specifically identify the harmless-error standard that is applicable to alternative-theory errors," "it cited [] a string of cases that apply a common harmless-error standard to other types of instructional errors." United States v. Skilling (after remand), 638 F.3d 480, 481 (5th Cir.2011) (citing Pulido, 555 U.S. at 60-61, 129 S.Ct. 530 (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (omission of an element of an offense); California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 117 S.Ct. 337, 136 L.Ed.2d 266 (1996) (per curiam) (erroneous aider-and-abettor instruction); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987) (misstatement of an element of an offense); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986) (erroneous burden-shifting as to an element of an offense))). In Neder v. United States, the Court found that an error was harmless if a court, after a "thorough examination of the record," is able to "conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error." 527 U.S. at 19, 119 S.Ct. 1827. If the defendant "raised evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding," then the error was not harmless. Id.
As discussed above, the sixth factual predicate was legally sufficient to support a conviction for misconduct in office. However, there is some doubt whether the fourth factual predicate — engaging in the self-dealing contracts in violation of Michigan Compiles Laws § 15.322 — can support the conviction of that common law crime because a specific statute applies to the conduct called into question. See People v. Waterstone, 296 Mich.App. 121, 818 N.W.2d 432 (2012) (holding that Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.505 cannot be invoked as a basis to convict if the elements of the crime are the same as another statutory offense).
Nevertheless, even if that were the case, the petitioner never raised that argument, and it is abundantly clear from the record that the jury verdict would have been same absent the error. The petitioner has not raised any evidence to support a contrary finding, and the record evidence to support the other five grounds was sufficient.
Third, the petitioner claims that his due process rights were violated by the trial court's submission of the misconduct-in-office count to the jury because the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over two of the grounds included in that charge. The petitioner
The state district court plainly did not address all the State's theories of misconduct in office, as the Michigan Court of Appeals acknowledged. "In making its ruling, the district court stated that `[b]eing cognizant of the fact that this court sits not as the ultimate trier of fact, but rather as the examining magistrate, the Court finds that the People have met their burden of proof in at least one of the areas set forth.'" Redmond, 2006 WL 3298360, at *4. However, the court of appeals noted that the bind-over was proper because probable cause existed, and because the State offered evidence at the preliminary examination on those theories, the petitioner had notice of the charges. Ibid.
The question of the trial court's jurisdiction is a state law matter. "A federal court may not issue the writ on the basis of a perceived error of state law." Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41, 104 S.Ct. 871, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984). As a matter of federal law, the purpose of a preliminary examination is to determine whether probable cause exists to justify continued detention of a person charged by complaint or information. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 118, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). The abridgement of that right may undermine the validity of continued pretrial detention, but not the ensuing conviction. Under Michigan law, any error in the sufficiency of the proofs at preliminary examination is considered harmless if there is sufficient evidence to convict at trial. See People v. Hall, 435 Mich. 599, 602-03, 460 N.W.2d 520, 522 (1990). So it is under federal law as well. See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 73, 106 S.Ct. 938, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986). Moreover, there is no federal constitutional right to a preliminary examination. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 123 & 125 n. 26, 95 S.Ct. 854 (1975); Dillard v. Bomar, 342 F.2d 789, 790 (6th Cir.1965).
Of course, the petitioner was entitled to notice of the charges against him so he could prepare an adequate defense. Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201, 68 S.Ct. 514, 92 L.Ed. 644 (1948); see also Valentine v. Konteh, 395 F.3d 626, 631 (6th Cir.2005). But the petitioner does not allege that he was surprised by the inclusion of the two theories of misconduct at trial. The bind-over decision itself invokes a question of state law, which is not cognizable on habeas corpus review. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991); Dorchy v. Jones, 320 F.Supp.2d 564, 578-79 (E.D.Mich.2004) (denying habeas relief on petitioner's claim there was insufficient evidence to bind him over for trial). The petitioner has not identified any federal right that was abridged by the inclusion of those theories at the trial. He is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of this claim.
Fourth, the petitioner claims that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was violated when the trial court admitted into evidence an OISD school board resolution, identified as Exhibit 88, that contained the school board's reasons for terminating the petitioner's contract. The State argues that this Court may not reach this claim because it was procedurally defaulted.
Tr. Transcript, Vol. VI, Jan. 27, 2005, at 794-96.
After the defense rested, the Court led a discussion regarding jury instructions, during which defense counsel mentioned the Crawford challenge during a testy exchange with the trial judge:
Tr. Transcript, Vol. VII, Jan. 28, 2005, at 986-87.
After the case had been submitted to the jury, defense counsel moved to strike portions of Exhibit 88, and the following exchange took place:
Tr. Transcript, Vol. VII, Jan. 28, 2005, at 1173-75.
On direct appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals applied a plain-error standard to review the constitutional claim. The court reasoned that the petitioner, who had objected to admission based on hearsay grounds, had failed to preserve his constitutional claim by not making a contemporaneous objection on the constitutional ground. Redmond, 2006 WL 3298360, at *6. The court of appeals concluded that "reversal [was] not warranted based on [petitioner's] Sixth Amendment [claim] because admission of the resolution did not result in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant and did not affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings." Ibid. The respondent argues that failure to make a contemporaneous objection serves as an independent and adequate state law ground on which the state court properly denied relief, and that plain-error review does not constitute a waiver of state procedural default rules.
A procedural default is "a critical failure to comply with state procedural law." Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 89, 118 S.Ct. 478, 139 L.Ed.2d 444 (1997). Such a default may occur if the state prisoner fails to present an issue to a state appellate court at his only opportunity to do so, Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d 155, 160 (6th Cir.1994), or if he fails to comply with a state procedural rule that required him to have done something at trial to preserve his claimed error for appellate review, e.g., make a contemporaneous objection or file a motion for a directed verdict, see Simpson v. Sparkman, 94 F.3d 199, 202-03 (6th Cir. 1996).
The petitioner, citing People v. Jones, 468 Mich. 345, 354-55, 662 N.W.2d 376, 381 (2003) ("The purpose of requiring objections to be timely ... is to give the trial court an opportunity to correct the error.") and People v. Grant, 445 Mich. 535, 551, 520 N.W.2d 123, 130 (1994) ("[T]he United States Supreme Court has recognized the importance of an incentive for criminal defendants to raise objections at a time when the trial court has an opportunity to correct the error, which could thereby obviate the necessity of further legal proceedings and would be by far the best time to address a defendant's constitutional and nonconstitutional rights."), argues that his Crawford objection was timely because it was made as soon as the constitutional dimension of the error in admitting Exhibit 88 became apparent, before the damage had been wrought and at a time when the trial court still had a meaningful opportunity to prevent the harm which the objection sought to avoid. The petitioner has a point. The record suggests that the trial court did not
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI. "The Sixth Amendment's right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is ... a fundamental right and is made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment." Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). The rights of confrontation and cross-examination "have ancient roots" which the "Court has been zealous to protect ... from erosion." Id. at 404-05, 85 S.Ct. 1065 (internal quotation omitted). The right to a trial by jury is predicated upon the belief "`that the "evidence developed" against a defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the defendant's right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel.'" Id. at 405, 85 S.Ct. 1065 (quoting Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73, 85 S.Ct. 546, 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965)).
In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), the Supreme Court held that certain out-of-court statements are barred by the Confrontation Clause unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination, even if the trial court finds the statements to be otherwise reliable. 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The Supreme Court has held that the Confrontation Clause applies only to out-of-court statements that are "testimonial" in nature. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419-20, 127 S.Ct. 1173, 167 L.Ed.2d 1 (2007) (explaining that, under Crawford, the Confrontation Clause has no application to non-testimonial out-of-court statements); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006) ("It is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.").
The Crawford court did not define "testimonial," but it "provided examples of those statements at the core of the definition, including prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, previous trial, or grand jury proceeding, as well as responses made during police interrogations." United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 228 (2d Cir.2004); see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52, 124 S.Ct. 1354. In Davis v. Washington, the Court explained that "[s]tatements are... testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no ... ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266. Based on that
Exhibit 88 was a resolution by the OISD that set out the reasons for terminating the petitioner. The exhibit consists of recitals in which the board expressed its reasons that justified the firing, and the resolution of termination itself. The petitioner has not pointed to any feature of the resolution that suggests that its primary purpose was "to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution," Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266, or that a reasonable person in the positions of the board members "would anticipate [the board resolution] being used against the accused in investigating and prosecuting the crime," Johnson, 581 F.3d at 325. And even if that were a close question, which it very well may be, "there is a possibility for fairminded disagreement on the issue, and under clear, and increasingly strident, Supreme Court precedent, that is all that is required to [deny the writ]." Peak, 673 F.3d at 474 (footnote omitted). Admission of statements that cannot be deemed testimonial does not violate the Confrontation Clause. Michigan v. Bryant, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1155, 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011) ("Where no such primary purpose exists, the admissibility of a statement is the concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause.").
The petitioner has not identified a clear violation of the Confrontation Clause that warrants issuance of the writ. He is not entitled to relief on this claim.
The petitioner claims that his due process rights were violated by the trial court's instruction on the "corrupt intent" element of the misconduct-in-office charge because the court left out the words "depravity" and "perversion" from the jury instruction, leaving only the term "taint." The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the petitioner's claim.
People v. Redmond, 2006 WL 3298360, at *8-9.
The petitioner argues that "wrenching" the word "taint" from the Coutu formulation
The definition of elements of a crime under state law is left to state, not federal, courts. See Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76, 126 S.Ct. 602, 163 L.Ed.2d 407 (2005) ("We have repeatedly held that a state court's interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus" (citations omitted)). That is why, "[g]enerally speaking, a state court's interpretation of the propriety of a jury instruction under state law does not entitle a habeas claimant to relief." Rashad v. Lafler, 675 F.3d 564, 569 (6th Cir.2012) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991)). As the Sixth Circuit has explained, "[t]he exception is when the instruction is so flawed as a matter of state law as to `infect[] the entire trial' in such a way that the conviction violates federal due process." Ibid. (citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154, 97 S.Ct. 1730, 52 L.Ed.2d 203 (1977)). Other formulations of that test use even stronger language. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974) ("[I]t must be established not merely that the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even `universally condemned,' but that it violated some [constitutional] right...."). When assessing a potential due process violation, the jury instruction "`may not be judged in artificial isolation,' but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record." Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72, 112 S.Ct. 475 (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973)).
The petitioner's way around the language discouraging review by habeas courts of state court jury instructions is a due process argument that says either the petitioner did not have fair warning that his conduct was criminal, or that the jury was not given sufficient guidance by the court's corrupt intent instruction and therefore had to guess at the meaning of the criminal law. The petitioner did not raise that argument in the trial court, but the state court of appeals addressed it on the merits anyway. That court stated:
Redmond, 2006 WL 3298360, at *9.
The Court cannot say that the state court of appeals's treatment of the instructional issue amounted to an unreasonable application of federal law. The petitioner's argument presumably derives from a line of cases that proscribe criminal legislation that is vague. The twin evils of a vague criminal statute are the failure to provide fair notice "with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited," and the allowance or encouragement of "arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983). The petitioner does not argue a lack of fair notice, but he does contend that the instructions left the jury on its own to determine whether the petitioner had a corrupt intent. He cites Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974), where the Supreme Court invalidated a flag-misuse statute criminalized "treat[ing] contemptuously the flag of the United States," because the statutory language "fail[ed] to draw reasonably clear lines between the kinds of nonceremonial treatment that are criminal and those that are not." Id. at 574, 94 S.Ct. 1242.
The jury instruction in this case does not share the same flaws, however. Although defining "taint's" contextual partners — depravity and perversion — would have been preferable so as to give the jury a broader view of the intent element of this common law crime as contemplated by the state courts, the definition of "taint" as a trace of something bad or offensive, when read along with the requirement to find "intentional or purposeful misbehavior," was not unconstitutionally vague. The jury could not convict under the instructions unless it found that the petitioner intentionally engaged in misbehavior that was motivated by a trace of something bad or offensive. The state court's determination that a person of ordinary intelligence would understand what conduct was prohibited, and that the jury was not left to convict based only on its subjective assessment of the petitioner's motive, did not unreasonably apply federal law. See Belle Maer Harbor v. Charter Twp. of Harrison, 170 F.3d 553, 557 (6th Cir.1999) (citing
Lastly, the petitioner claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his closing arguments by stating that the petitioner had used his influence to obtain employment for his son and that the petitioner might work one day for the MINDS entities. The petitioner takes issue with the prosecutor's statements made during rebuttal:
Trial Tr., Jan. 28, 2005 at 1128. In response to the prosecutor's remarks, the following exchange occurred.
Id. at 1128-30.
The petitioner also takes issue with the prosecutor's statement that the petitioner likely was going to work for TLC after he left OISD. The prosecutor stated:
Trial Tr., Jan. 28, 2005 at 1138-41.
The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected this claim, stating:
People v. Redmond, 2006 WL 3298360, at *10-11.
It is well established that prosecutors must "`refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction.'" United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 7, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935)). However, "[c]laims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed deferentially on habeas review." Millender v. Adams, 376 F.3d 520, 528 (6th Cir.2004) (citing Bowling v. Parker, 344 F.3d 487, 512 (6th Cir.2003)). Prosecutorial misconduct will form the basis for a new trial and habeas relief only if the alleged misconduct "`so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.'" Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974)). "To constitute a denial of due process, the misconduct must be `so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.'" Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 529-30 (6th Cir.2000) (quoting Pritchett v. Pitcher, 117 F.3d 959, 964 (6th Cir.1997)). "The Court must examine `the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.'" Pritchett, 117 F.3d at 964 (quoting Serra v. Michigan Dep't of Corrs., 4 F.3d 1348, 1355 (6th Cir.1993)).
When assessing such a claim, the Court first considers whether the prosecutor's conduct or remarks were improper. Slagle v. Bagley, 457 F.3d 501, 515-16 (6th Cir.2006). If they were, the Court then must decide whether the improper acts were so flagrant as to warrant relief. Id. at 516. The Sixth Circuit applies a four-factor test to any inappropriate prosecutorial conduct to determine whether it was flagrant: "(1) whether the evidence against the defendant was strong, (2) whether the conduct of the prosecution tended to mislead the jury or prejudice the defendant; (3) whether the conduct or remarks were isolated or extensive; and (4) whether the remarks were made deliberately or accidentally." Id. (citation omitted).
The Court does not find improper the prosecutor's statements concerning the petitioner's son. Testimony offered at trial revealed that Marvin Sauer became aware that the petitioner's son was looking for a job through a conversation he had with the petitioner around the same time OISD contracted with the MINDS Institute to perform more than $500,000 worth of work. Sauer also testified that the position had been newly created. The prosecutor's statement regarding the petitioner using his influence to get his son a job was not improper because it was a reasonable inference drawn from Sauer's trial testimony and the petitioner's refusal to disclose his son's employment relationship. "A prosecutor has `leeway to argue reasonable inferences from the evidence' during closing arguments." United States v. Crosgrove, 637 F.3d 646, 664 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Byrd, 209 F.3d at 535).
The prosecutor's statement that the petitioner might work for TLC after leaving OISD is a different story. There was no testimony or evidence presented at trial that would allow a rational trier of
Trial Tr., Jan. 28, 2005 at 1146-47.
The Court finds that the Michigan Court of Appeals's decision with respect to the petitioner's prosecutorial misconduct claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.
The state courts' decisions in this case were not contrary to federal law, an unreasonable application of federal law, or an unreasonable determination of the facts. The petitioner has not established that his convictions or sentences were obtained in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Accordingly, it is