OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART, DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE

THOMAS L. LUDINGTON, District Judge.

Thomas and Melissa Goodell believe that CitiMortgage, Inc. (CMI) acted unlawfully when it foreclosed on their home mortgage. They filed a complaint on July 6, 2012, and the case has made its way through discovery since that time. Trial is set to commence on July 30, 2013. On June 18, 2013, CMI filed a motion in limine to preclude various categories of evidence from the trial. Based on what follows, CMI's motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

I

According to the Goodells' complaint,1 in 1995 they purchased the residence located at 2134 Linda Street in Saginaw, Michigan. After the purchase, CMI acquired an interest in the home mortgage. Then, in the fall of 2010, Thomas went off of work for surgery and remained off work for approximately three months. Because of these events, the Goodells allege, they fell behind in their mortgage payments.

Once they fell behind, Melissa contacted CMI to discuss the available options. The Goodells allege that in the spring of 2011, a CMI "representative instructed [Melissa] that if she would pay three hundred dollars ($300.00) per week [the Goodells] would become current on [their] mortgage." Pls.' Compl. ¶ 11. The Goodells subsequently "arranged to have the three hundred dollars ($300.00) per week automatically transferred from a checking account." Id. at ¶12.

In the summer of 2011, the Goodells noticed that CMI had stopped accepting the automatic transfers from their checking account. When Melissa contacted CMI, she was informed that she and Thomas "had gone ninety (90) days past due on the mortgage and that [CMI] intended on starting foreclosure proceedings." Id. at ¶ 15.

At some point in the ensuing months, CMI "through its representative, Sherelle Keeling, informed [the Goodells] of the paperwork necessary to begin negotiating a modification of the mortgage loan[.]" Id. at ¶ 18. So on September 15, 2011, Melissa informed Ms. Keeling "that she was in the process of obtaining the information requested[.]" Id. The Goodells allege that Melissa submitted the requested paperwork "at the end of the week of September 27, 2011," id. at ¶ 19 (although the email they cite in support indicates only that Melissa would be sending in the requested information, not that she already had).

On October 11, 2011, Ms. Keeling sent the following email to the Goodells:

Id. at ¶ 22 (citation omitted).

Despite this email, on or around October 24, 2011, the Goodells received a letter "stating that they had not been approved for remodification." Id. at ¶ 29. So Melissa wrote the following email:

Id. at ¶ 30 (citation omitted).

Ms. Keeling responded the same day, "If you would like to speak to my supervisor call in and request to speak with David shew in regards to Sherelle keeling. thanks. have a good day!" Pls.' Compl. Ex. B, at 34. Seven minutes later, she also wrote,

Id. at 35.

Around 1:00 p.m. on October 24, Melissa wrote this email to Ms. Keeling:

Id. at 40. Ms. Keeling responded that "David is out at lunch" and asked when she could contact Melissa by phone. Id. at 43. Melissa provided her number, and indicated she was available until 5:00 p.m. Id. at 46.

On November 8, 2011, Melissa again emailed Ms. Keeling. She wrote as follows:

Id. at 49.

It is unclear what contact the Goodells had with CMI from that point until December 9, 2011. On that date, Ms. Keeling sent the Goodells the following email:

Id. at 51. Melissa responded, "I will contact the accountant-for the business returns — you already have our personal tax returns. I am still trying to come up with the past due amount. You told me the foreclosure date is in January, is that still correct?" Id. at 50. Ms. Keeling wrote, "yes, the sale date is still 1/6/11 [sic], but you have been approved for the modification. The underwriter is just asking for those last documents." Id. Melissa wrote back, "okay — I will try to get them to you next week. Thanks Sherelle!" Id.

Ten days later, Melissa wrote this email:

Id. at 52. Ms. Keeling responded,

Id. Melissa wrote back that the documents "should be to you in about an hour." Id.

On December 21, 2011, Melissa wrote, "Hi Sherelle — I sent over the papers a couple of days ago-just making sure you got them. Thanks." Id. at 53. Ms. Keeling responded, "I just took a look at your account. I have not received any documents as of today." Id. The next morning, December 22, Melissa sent another email: "Here they are again." Id. In their complaint, the Goodells allege that they "also sent the document via electronic mail to Ms. Keeling on December 27, 29, and 30, 2011." Pls.' Compl. ¶ 44. There are no emails attached to the complaint substantiating the claim.

On January 3, 2012, Melissa wrote to Ms. Keeling, "Hi Sherelle — Hope you had a great holiday season! I haven't heard anything since I sent you the paperwork a couple weeks ago. Can you tell me what is happening? Thank you." Pls.' Compl. Ex. B, at 54. On January 5, Melissa wrote, "Hi Sherelle — You sent me an e-mail saying that I was approved for the remodification, that you just needed a couple more things. I sent the rest of the papers but I haven't heard anything from you since. Will you please let me know what is going on?" Id. at 56. On January 6, Melissa wrote, "Hi Sherelle — Still waiting to hear what is going on. Please let me know ASAP. Thanks." Id. at 59.

On January 9, 2012, Melissa wrote the following to Ms. Keeling:

Id. at 61-62. Melissa also wrote, "Sherelle — I can overnight $5,000.00 to you next week. Can I pay the $5,000.00 and have the remainder of what is due go on the remodification?" Id. at 61. Ms. Keeling finally responded:

Id.

In their complaint, the Goodells allege that CMI violated Michigan's Foreclosure of Mortgages by Advertisement Statute (FMA) (Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3201 et seq.) by failing to engage in the statutory loan modification process (Counts I and II). The Goodells also claim that the foreclosure was improper based on alleged agreements that they entered into with CMI—an alleged repayment plan that was supposed to bring their loan current and two alleged promises to modify their loan. The Goodells seek to enforce those promises under several different theories: fraud/misrepresentation (Count III), promissory estoppel (Count V),2 quiet title (Count VI), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VII).

Although CMI did not file any dispositive motions, now pending is its motion in limine to exclude three categories of evidence from trial.

II

Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, relevant evidence is admissible at trial unless the United States Constitution, a federal statute, the Rules of Evidence, or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court provide otherwise. Fed. R. Evid. 402. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Id. Evidence is "relevant" if it tends to make a material fact more or less probable. Fed. R. Evid. 401. Even if relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 403.

Although neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Federal Rules of Evidence expressly provide for the exclusion of evidence before trial, "[i]n general, federal district courts have the power to exclude evidence in limine pursuant to their inherent authority to manage trials." Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984). "The purpose of a motion in limine is to permit the Court to decide evidentiary issues in advance of trial in order to avoid delay and ensure an evenhanded and expeditious trial." Corporate Commc'n Servs. of Dayton, LLC v. MCI Commc'n Servs., Inc., No. 3:08-CV-046, 2010 WL 1445169, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 12, 2010). A court will generally not grant a motion in limine unless the moving party "meets its burden of showing that the evidence in question is clearly inadmissible." Id. (citing Indiana Ins. Co. v. Gen. Electric Co., 326 F.Supp.2d 844, 846 (N.D. Ohio 2004)). "If such a showing is not made, evidentiary rulings should be deferred and resolved in the context of trial." MCI Commc'n, 2010 WL 1445169, at *1. Further, the denial of a motion in limine "is warranted where the moving party seeks to argue the merits of its case and preclude the non-moving party from presenting its case." Lafrance v. Grand River Navigation Co., Inc., No. 08-13411, 2010 WL 3768328, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 21, 2010).

III

CMI requests that three categories of evidence be precluded from the upcoming trial. First, CMI asserts that the Goodells should be prevented from offering evidence "regarding alleged violations of the Michigan foreclosure by advertisement statute's loan modification process (M.C.L. 600.3205a and 600.3205b)[.]" Def.'s Mot. 1. Next, CMI requests that the Goodells be precluded from introducing any evidence "regarding any alleged oral agreement that Plaintiffs claim to have entered with CMI[.]" Id. Finally, CMI asks that the Goodells be foreclosed from offering evidence "regarding any damages[.]" Id. Each will be discussed below.

A

CMI first argues that the Goodells should not be allowed to offer evidence regarding violations of the FMA's notice or loan modification process because "CMI was not required to provide the notice under M.C.L. 600.3205a or to engage in the negotiations required under M.C.L. 600.3205b." Id. at 4. CMI is correct, and its motion will be granted on this issue.

The FMA establishes as follows:

Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3204(4). Section 600.3205a establishes that "before commencing a proceeding under this chapter to which section 3204(4) applies, the foreclosing party shall serve a written notice on the borrower that contains all of the following information[.]" Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3205a(1) (emphasis added). Further, § 600.3205b indicates that "[i]f a borrower wishes to participate in negotiations . . . within 30 days after the notice under section 3205a is mailed to the borrower, the borrower shall. . . ." Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3205b. From these provisions, it is apparent that §§ 600.3205a and 600.3205b do not apply unless § 600.3204(4) is applicable. Moreover, § 600.3204(4) does not apply unless a property is claimed as a principal residence exempt from tax under section 7cc of the general property tax act.

The Goodells admit that they "did not claim the subject property as a principal residence exempt from tax under section 7cc of the general property tax act." Pls.' Resp. 6 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), ECF No. 18. So while the Goodells offer to "stipulate and agree to not introduce evidence of" violations under§ 600.3204(4), they go on to "oppose any restriction on their ability to introduce evidence of Defendant's violations of other applicable provisions of the [FMA]." Id.

A careful reading of CMI's motion in limine indicates that it only wishes to exclude any mention "regarding an alleged violation of M.C.L. 600.3205a or 600.3205b by (i) failing to provide the required notice, or (ii) failing to engage in the required negotiations[.]" Def.'s Mot.

4. CMI has not requested that evidence concerning the legality of its conduct under other provisions of the FMA be excluded. Thus, the Goodells' oppose something that has not been requested.

Further, because the Goodells did not claim the subject property as a principal residence exempt from tax under section 7cc of the general property tax act, § 600.3204(4) was not triggered, and §§ 600.3205a and 600.3205b do not apply. Thus, any evidence concerning CMI's compliance with those provisions is irrelevant. CMI's motion to exclude any such evidence will be granted.

B

The second category of evidence CMI does not want included in this trial are alleged promises between the parties. Specifically, the alleged agreement that if the Goodells "would pay three hundred dollars ($300.00) per week Plaintiffs would become current in [their] mortgage," and CMI's alleged agreements "to modify [the Goodells'] loan." Def.'s Mot. 4 (citations omitted). As to the first alleged agreement, CMI's argument is sound—this evidence is irrelevant and will be excluded from trial. Evidence concerning the second agreement, however, will not be excluded at this point.

Michigan's statute of frauds related to financial institutions provides as follows:

Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132(2). CMI is a "financial institution" as used in this section. See § 566.132(3).

As the Michigan Court of Appeals recognized in Crown Tech. Park v. D&N Bank, FSB, 619 N.W.2d 66 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000), the relevant statute of frauds provision "states that a party is precluded from bringing a claim—no matter its label—against a financial institution to enforce the terms of an oral promise to waive a loan provision." Id. at 72. For any promise to have effect, noted in Michigan's statute of frauds and by the court in Crown, the promise or commitment must be "in writing and signed with an authorized signature by the financial institution[.]" Id. at 71 (emphasis in original); see also Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132(2).

Here, CMI wishes to exclude three specific communications between itself and the Goodells. As the Goodells establish in their response,

Pls.' Resp. 8.

1

Although noting the first communication was oral, the Goodells assert that CMI "has made no showing and has failed to argue that the representation or promises . . . falls within the three types of promises that the above statue of frauds covers." Id. But CMI did argue the oral promise is barred by the statute of frauds. After indicating the alleged promise "was not reduced to writing," CMI argues "that alleged agreement is not enforceable under the statute of frauds" and any mention "is irrelevant and should be excluded." Def.'s Mot. 8 (citation omitted).

Further, Michigan's statute of frauds establishes that an oral "promise or commitment to . . . make any other financial accommodation" is not enforceable. Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132(2)(a). The Goodells' claim that the oral representation concerning $300 per week "is not covered by the above statute of frauds," Pls.' Resp. 8, is mistaken. The promise involved a financial accommodation concerning their mortgage loan.

Recognizing their tenuous footing, the Goodells argue that partial performance may save them. "Generally, partial performance can remove a claim from the statue of frauds." Id. at 9 (citing Giordano v. Markovitz, 531 N.W.2d 815, 816 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995)). But the Goodells note that "Michigan courts have not yet analyzed whether the doctrine of partial performance can remove a case from the requirements of MCL § 566.132(2)." Pls.' Resp. 9. They cite to one federal district court case for that proposition, but the case does not establish that a party's partial performance renders the requirements of § 566.132(2) inapplicable. Instead, the case indicates that "the statute of frauds may apply" even though the plaintiffs indicated they partially performed. See Schuler v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., No. 11-11501, 2011 WL 2470125, at *4 (E.D. Mich. June 20, 2011). Thus, the Goodells attempt to rely on their partial performance to exempt them from the statute of frauds is not supported by any legal authority.

Section 566.132(2) applies to the oral communication that $300 per week would bring the Goodells current on their loan, any claim to enforce the promise is thus barred, and any reference to the promise is irrelevant in the upcoming trial. Accordingly, the evidence will not be permitted.

2

Next, CMI attempts to preclude the Goodells from offering evidence concerning its alleged agreements to modify their loan. Def.'s Mot. 8. Although CMI considers any such agreements one category of evidence, the Goodells indicate that they "relied upon two separate representations made by [CMI]." Pls.' Resp. 9 (emphasis added). They then cite to Ms. Keeling's October 11, 2011 and December 9, 2011 emails indicating their loan modification had "been approved." Id. at 9-10 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the two alleged agreements will be discussed separately.

The first alleged agreement—contained in the October 11, 2011 email—is as follows: "The modification has been approved, but the underwriter states she shows that you are self employed. The underwriter is requesting the bwrs personal and business 2010 tax returns and a Profit and loss statement. And corresponding business bank statements." Pls.' Compl. Ex. B, at 24.

CMI argues that "[a]lthough [the Goodells] were informed that they had been approved for a loan modification . . . the writing contained no material terms of the alleged agreement and is not, therefore, sufficient to form the basis of the contract." Def.'s Resp. 8 (citations omitted). CMI continues, "[b]ecause [the Goodells] fail to allege that the essential terms of the alleged loan modification were in a writing signed by CMI, any such agreement is unenforceable under the statute of frauds, and evidence of that alleged agreement should be excluded." Id.

But CMI misses the point. The Goodells are not attempting to enforce a contract, but promises that they relied upon. Indeed, the Goodells' promissory estoppel claim concerns an "equitable remedy" where a contract is implied by law. See Aero Taxi-Rockford v. General Motors Corp., No. 259565, 2006 WL 1479915, at *10 (Mich. Ct. App. May 30, 2006) ("the jury. . . can only consider promissory estoppel if it fails to find the existence of an express contract"); Indus. Maxifreight Servs., LLC v. Tenneco Auto. Operating Co., Inc., 182 F.Supp.2d 630, 634 (W.D. Mich. 2002) ("Promissory estoppel is an equitable remedy"). Such a promise need only be "actual, clear and definite" for a contract to be implied. Tenneco, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 634. So the fact that the email did not contain the agreement's terms, and therefore does not constitute a contract, is irrelevant.

The promise or commitment contained in Ms. Keeling's October 11, 2011 email was actual, clear, and definite. It indicated that the Goodells' loan modification had "been approved[.]" Pls.' Compl. Ex. B, at 24. Although the email also requested documents, the Goodells have provided evidence that those materials were provided in a timely fashion. So while it is true that the terms of a loan modification were never set forth, CMI made a definite and clear commitment to "modify" the Goodells' loan if they turned in the requested paperwork. The email is clearly in writing, and CMI does not contest the signature. Thus, CMI's alleged commitment or promise to modify the Goodells' loan was in writing and signed by CMI's agent. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 450.837(4) ("If a law requires a signature, an electronic signature satisfies the law."). The commitment or promise is not barred by the statute of frauds. Because the evidence is at least relevant to the Goodells' promissory estoppel claim (which does not require an express contract), the evidence will not be barred at this point.

The December 9, 2011 email contains the same language. See Pls.' Compl. Ex. B, at 50 ("you have been approved for the modification."). For the same reasons outlined above, evidence of this promise or commitment is not barred by the statute of frauds, it is at least relevant to the Goodells' promissory estoppel claim, and it will not be barred at this stage.3

C

Finally, CMI seeks to prevent the Goodells from presenting any evidence of damages because they failed to provide "`a computation of each category of damages claimed by the disclosing party' as required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii)." Def.'s Mot. 8. CMI's motion will be granted as it applies to economic damages, but the Goodells will not be foreclosed from presenting evidence of non-economic damages at trial.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) establishes that a party is required to disclose "a computation of each category of damages claimed by the disclosing party—who must also make available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 the documents or other evidentiary material . . . on which each computation is based[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii). Rule 26 also provides that "[a] party who has made a disclosure under Rule 26(a) . . . must supplement or correct its disclosure or response: (A) in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1). Notably, if a party does not disclose information that must be disclosed under Rule 26(a), "the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at hearing, or at trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or harmless." Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c); Dickenson v. Cardiac & Thoracic Surgery of E. Tenn., 388 F.3d 976, 983 (6th Cir. 2004). Further, unless non-disclosure was justified or harmless, "[t]he exclusion of non-disclosed evidence is automatic and mandatory." Dickenson, 388 F.3d at 983 (quoting Musser v. Gentiva Health Servs., 356 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2004)).

On September 10, 2012, the Goodells served their initial disclosures under Rule 26. Regarding damages, those disclosures indicated as follows:

Pls.' Rule 26 Disclosures 5, attached as Def.'s Mot. Ex. 4. It is clear that the Goodells were aware that their disclosures concerning economic damages were incomplete.

On February 8, 2013, CMI attempted to uncover more information about the Goodells' damages. On that date, CMI served the Goodells with Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents, and Requests for Admission. See Def.'s Disc. Req., attached as Def.'s Mot. Ex.

5. Relevant here, Interrogatory number 11 requested the following information:

Id. at 7. The Goodells responded that they were "in the process of determining the economic effect Defendant's wrongful actions have caused them and cannot fully answer this Interrogatory at this time. However, Plaintiffs will supplement this Answer with such information." Pls.' Resp. Disc. Req. 5, attached as Def.'s Mot. Ex. 1. CMI alleges that although the Goodells were "required to supplement their initial disclosures throughout the discovery process . . . [t]hey failed to do so." Def.'s Mot. 9. The Goodells do not contest the point.

Instead, they argue that their disclosures regarding non-economic damages were appropriate and their failure to supplement the disclosures regarding economic damages was harmless. See Pls.' Resp. 12-14. The Court agrees as to the non-economic damages, but not the economic damages.

As the Goodells correctly point out, the "computation" required under Rule 26(a) "does not mean that plaintiffs must identify a specific sum to compensate them for injuries that are difficult to categorize, like anxiety or mental distress. The amount of computation that should be awarded for such an injury may appropriately be left to the jury." Wolgast v. Richards, No. 05-10278, 2011 WL 3426187, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 5, 2011) (citation omitted). Regarding the Goodells' claims for non-economic damages (emotional distress, mental anguish, disruption of lifestyle, etc.), the Goodells appropriately indicated in their Rule 26 disclosures that they would rely on the jury to compute the appropriate award. There was no violation of the Goodells' Rule 26 obligation there. They can present evidence concerning non-economic damages at trial.

But the economic damages are not "difficult to categorize" in this case. In their complaint, the Goodells allege that "as a direct and proximate result of Defendant's unlawful actions, Plaintiff [sic] has suffered and continues to suffer severe economic damages, including but not limited to loss of their home, damage to their credit, and significant consequential expenses in relocating their family, if necessary." Pls.' Compl. ¶ 62 (emphasis added). In their Rule 26(a) disclosures, the Goodells established that they planned to engage an economic expert to calculate these economic losses, and would "supply a copy of the expert economist report upon its completion." Pls.' Rule 26 Disclosures 5. In their discovery responses, they indicated that they could not "fully answer" but that they would "supplement this Answer" at a later time. Pls.' Resp. Disc. Req. 5. They did not do either. No report was tendered, no supplemental information was provided (or, if there was, the Goodells do not deign to mention it in their responsive papers).

Instead, the Goodells argue that their failure to supplement is harmless because CMI "is well aware of the value of the home as Defendant had informed Plaintiff [sic] of the amount necessary to redeem the house." Pls.' Resp. 13. Even if this is rendered harmless the failure to supplement damage calculations related to the house (a proposition the Court does not accept), it would not relieve the Goodells from disclosing their intended recovery for damage to their credit, and any of the other losses that were not included in their complaint. Further, the amount to redeem the house is not synonymous with the damages the Goodells have suffered because of the loss of the home. The fact that Plaintiffs have not provided this information at any point is not harmless. CMI has no idea the total amount of damages the Goodells plan to request, and thus it has no ability to assess its exposure before trial or defend against the accuation at trial.

The Goodells rely on Clayman v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, 343 F.Supp.2d 1037 (D. Kan. 2004) and Santos v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, No. 07-11229, WL 2937778 (E.D. Mich. July 24, 2008) for the proposition that their failure to supplement was harmless. But neither case supports their argument. The court in Clayman determined that the plaintiff's "failure to compute damages was harmless as defendant knew what type of damages were being sought when served with the Complaint . . . and defendant received a computation of damages through plaintiff's statement of damages in the Pretrial Order." Clayman, 343 F. Supp. 2d at 1047 (emphasis added). The Goodells have provided no evidence that they ever provided any type of economic-damages computation to CMI.

Santos is similarly inapplicable. There, the court indicated that the plaintiffs' failure to put the defendant on notice of their claimed damages was harmless because, in part, "having participated in the arbitration proceeding with Plaintiffs in 2003 and reviewed their arbitration summary, Farmers has been adequately apprised of Plaintiffs' methods for calculating damages." Santos, No. 07-11229, WL 2937778, at *2. Again, in this case, the Goodells have never provided their method for calculating economic damages. Their failure under Rule 26 is not harmless, and any evidence of economic damages will not be allowed at trial. See Dickenson, 388 F.3d at 983 ("The exclusion of non-disclosed evidence is automatic and mandatory under Rule 37(c)(1) unless non-disclosure was justified or harmless." (citation omitted)).

IV

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that CMI's motion in limine, ECF No. 15, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

It is further ORDERED that the following categories of evidence are EXCLUDED from trial: evidence that CMI violated sections 600.3205a and 600.3205b of the FMA, evidence that CMI indicated that $300 per month would bring the Goodells current on their loan, and any evidence concerning economic damages suffered.

It is further ORDERED that the following categories of evidence are NOT EXCLUDED at this point: CMI's promises or commitments to modify the Goodells' loan and evidence regarding the non-economic damages they have suffered.