AVERN COHN, District Judge.
This is a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The claims arise out of an incident at Comerica Park where the plaintiff father inadvertently gave his 7-year-old plaintiff son a "Mike's Hard Lemonade," an alcoholic beverage, at a Tiger game. A series of events then took place which resulted in the plaintiff son being placed in foster care over a weekend.
Plaintiffs are Christopher Ratté and Claire Zimmerman, the plaintiff child's parents, and minor child Leo Ratté. Plaintiffs are suing:
Now before the Court is Hartsfield's motion to dismiss (Doc. 63). Also before the Court is defendants Corrigan's, Holbrook's and Turner-Royster's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 64). The Court heard oral argument on the motions on Wednesday, November 13, 2013.
At the hearing, the Court expressed its concern whether it has discretion to issue a declaratory judgment and required the parties to provide supplemental briefing on the matter. The parties have submitted their supplemental briefs (Docs. 84, 85). For the reasons stated on the record at the hearing, count I of the first amended complaint seeking a declaratory judgment against Corrigan is SEVERED from the remaining claims. The Court will issue a separate written decision relating to count I.
For the reasons that follow, Hartsfield's motion to dismiss is DENIED and Holbrook's and Turner-Royster's (the DHS defendants) motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The claims against the DHS defendants are DISMISSED. The case proceeds against Hartsfield in regards to counts II through IV.
On Saturday, April 5, 2008, Christopher Ratté (Ratté), a classical archeology professor at the University of Michigan, attended a Tigers game at Comerica Park with his seven year-old son Leo. Before arriving at their seats, Ratté purchased Leo a Mike's Hard Lemonade not knowing that it contained alcohol, believing it to be an ordinary lemonade. Ratté testified at his deposition that he would not have given
Ratté and Leo took the beverage with them to their seats at which time Leo drank some of it. After Leo drank some of the beverage, Ratté and Leo were approached by Sean Davidson (Davidson), a Comerica Park security person who observed Leo with the beverage. Davidson generated an incident report explaining what happened next. In the report, Davidson wrote:
Police officers and medical personnel were present at the sub-station. Leo was examined by two nurses. It was noted that Leo had nausea and urination, but that he was alert and awake, asking questions, and attentive.
After being examined by the nurses at the sub-station, Leo was taken to Children's Hospital by ambulance. Ratté originally objected to Leo being taken to the hospital, but he eventually consented. Ratté rode in the ambulance with Leo and the medical personnel. There were no police officers in the ambulance.
When the ambulance arrived at Children's Hospital, Leo was examined by a resident physician and Dr. Usha Sethuraman, the attending physician, while Ratté was present. In a medical report Sethuraman stated that Leo
Sethuraman's report noted that there was no trace of alcohol in Leo's blood.
Before Leo's blood test results were returned, Detroit Police Department Officer Celeste Reed (Reed) arrived at Children's Hospital. Reed says she observed Leo to be "flushed in the face" and "giggling." This was Reed's first contact with Leo and his parents as she was not at the ballpark. Reed in her deposition stated that she spoke with her sergeant, Richard Knox, and explained to him what she saw. Reed then left the hospital while Ratté and Leo were still there and drove to the DHS facility on 2929 Russell Street, which is also the Child Abuse Unit of the Detroit Police Department (the Russell Street facility). At the Russell Street facility, Reed filled out a Complaint and Request for Action
Reed did not return to Children's Hospital after completing and submitting the Complaint and Request for Action.
After the Complaint and Request for Action was submitted to DHS and the family court, Janet Williams (Williams), a DHS employee who is no longer a party to this action, prepared a Petition for Child Protective Proceedings
Subsequent to the family court receiving the Complaint and Request for Action and Petition for Child Protective Proceedings, and while Ratté and Leo were still at Children's Hospital,
The form order stated:
The form order also stated that a preliminary hearing was set to take place between April 5th and 11th, 2008.
After the form order was filed, two DHS employees who are not parties to this action drove to Children's Hospital in a van to pick up Leo and take him to the Russell Street facility. While Ratté was still present with Leo at the hospital, the DHS employees took custody of Leo, placed him in the van, and drove him to the Russell
Leo was taken inside the Russell Street facility and placed in a room with a television and a couch. He stayed in this room Saturday night and slept on the couch.
Plaintiffs say that at the hospital they were told by Reed and DHS employees who are not parties to this action that Leo would be placed with his aunt, Catherine Ratté (Catherine), a registered foster parent in Wisconsin, and her sister Felicity Ratté (Felicity) if they arrived at the Russell Street facility by Sunday morning. Catherine and Felicity drove to Michigan from Massachusetts and arrived at the Russell Street facility around 9:00 a.m.
However, when they arrived Catherine and Felicity were ultimately told by both Holbrook and Turner-Royster that Leo would not be released to their custody because they were from out of state and a comprehensive background check was required.
Some time before noon on Sunday morning, Leo was picked up from the Russell Street facility and taken to a foster home in Warren, Michigan. Leo remained in foster care all day Sunday and through the night.
The next morning, on Monday, April 7, 2008, a preliminary hearing was held before a referee of the family court. Leo was represented by a guardian ad litem. His parents were represented by separate counsel.
The referee issued an Order After Preliminary Hearing bearing Judge Hartsfield's signature which concluded that it was contrary to Leo's welfare to remain in the home with Ratté and Zimmerman because:
The referee determined that removal from the home was the only option that would adequately safeguard Leo from risk of harm. However, the referee added an additional condition that allowed Leo to be returned to his home as long as Ratté moved out of the home:
The referee adjourned the preliminary hearing until April 10, 2008 for further DHS investigation. At the continued preliminary hearing on April 10, 2008, it was determined that Leo could be returned his home with Ratté present. The Petition for Child Protective Proceedings was therefore dismissed.
This action was filed approximately three years later on March 24, 2011.
Hartsfield first moves to dismiss the first amended complaint against her based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This is a facial attack to the court's subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). A Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) motion seeks dismissal for a court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The motion may be based on either a facial attack or a factual attack on the allegations of the complaint. Tri-Corp Mgmt. Co. v. Praznik, 33 Fed. Appx. 742, 745 (6th Cir.2002). Where, as here, subject matter jurisdiction is facially attacked, the court must take all material allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. United States v. A.D. Roe. Co., 186 F.3d 717, 721-22 (6th Cir.1999).
Alternatively, Hartsfield moves to dismiss the first amended complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint's "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the allegations in the complaint are true." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). See also Ass'n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir.2007). The Court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Moreover, "[o]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Thus, "a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. In sum, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Hartsfield argues that the claims in the first amended complaint must be dismissed against her for four reasons: (1) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine strips the Court of its subject matter jurisdiction; (2) Hartsfield is absolutely immune; (3) to the extent that absolute immunity is inapplicable, qualified immunity bars plaintiffs' claims; and (4) the statute of limitations has run on plaintiffs' claims against Hartsfield. The Court discusses, and ultimately rejects, each of these arguments in turn.
Hartsfield argues that the true source of plaintiffs' alleged injuries is the state court form order bearing her signature initially removing Leo from his parents' custody. The Court disagrees. Plaintiffs are not challenging the form order or asking the Court to review it in any way. The "source of injury" alleged in
Next, Hartsfield argues that she is entitled to absolute judicial immunity. Because she was acting administratively, the Court disagrees.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that, "[a]lthough unfairness and injustice to a litigant may result on occasion," a "judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself." Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 10, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872) (internal quotation mark omitted)). To carry out their judicial actions without fear of personal consequences, judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from § 1983 civil suits requesting damages. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir.1997).
Absolute judicial immunity can only be overcome in two circumstances. First, "a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity." Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11, 112 S.Ct. 286 (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227-29, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 360, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978)). Second, "a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Id. at 12, 112 S.Ct. 286 (citations omitted).
Here, Hartsfield is not entitled to absolute judicial immunity because the acts complained of in the first amended complaint are not judicial acts. The Supreme Court has "made clear that whether an act by a judge is a `judicial' one relate[s] to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity." Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12, 112 S.Ct. 286 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 362, 98 S.Ct. 1099) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In other words, courts "look to the particular act's relation to a general function normally performed by a judge." Id. at 13, 112 S.Ct. 286.
Hartsfield argues that the nature of the act she performed which plaintiffs complain of — the signing of a piece of paper that eventually became an order — is a judicial action normally performed by a judge. Looking at the allegations in the first amended complaint, however, shows that Judge Hartsfield's alleged involvement in the scheme of things involved non judicial actions:
(Doc. 51 at 10).
It is not Hartsfield's actions in signing the form of order that plaintiffs complain about. Rather, it is Hartsfield's actions in putting in place a policy which allowed a pre-signed removal form to be filled in and docketed by non judicial personnel, without judicial review, for a petition submitted to the family court after normal business hours. These actions, if true, are administrative. Hartsfield essentially signed pieces of paper that had no vitality until a third party — in this case a probation officer — filled in certain information on the paper. At the time the form of order was signed by Hartsfield, there were no parties before the court nor were there any active child custody proceedings. Her actions therefore could not have been "judicial acts."
The central question in determining whether an act is "judicial" as opposed to "administrative" is whether the act resolves a dispute between the parties who have invoked the jurisdiction of the court. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988). In Morrison v. Lipscomb, 877 F.2d 463, 466 (6th Cir.1989), the Sixth Circuit explained that "simply because rule making and administrative authority has been delegated to the judiciary does not mean that acts pursuant to that authority are judicial." In Morrison, the Sixth Circuit held that a state court judge's issuance of a moratorium on the issuance of writs of restitution was a non judicial act because it was an order not connected to any particular litigation. Id. The Sixth Circuit stated:
Id.
Hartsfield's actions here are analogous to Shakoor's actions determined to be administrative in Morrison. Hartsfield's pre-signed "order" was not "connected to any particular litigation." Instead, a pre-signed paper when filled out by a probation officer and submitted to the family court after hours was used to deprive Leo and his parents from any meaningful judicial consideration in his removal proceedings. Hartsfield's act of signing the paper preceded any adjudication as there were no parties, proceedings, or live case or controversy at the time she signed the "order." No judicial act occurred until the probation officer filled in the pre-signed paper with case specific information. The pre-signed paper, therefore, was signed by Hartsfield in an administrative capacity
Hartsfield contends that, to the extent she is not absolutely immune, she is entitled to qualified immunity. She is mistaken.
When government officials perform discretionary functions, they are immune from suit through qualified immunity "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)).
Plaintiffs' first amended complaint, accepted as true, has alleged the violation of clearly established constitutional rigths. As another court has explained, "[t]he right to family integrity has been recognized as a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." O'Donnell v. Brown, 335 F.Supp.2d 787, 809-810 (W.D.Mich.2004) (citations omitted). This "fundamental constitutional right to family integrity extends to all family members, both parents and children." Id. at 820 (citations omitted). In addition, it is clearly established that a parent is entitled to a notice and hearing prior to the removal of his or her child, unless exigent circumstances exist. Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 809 F.Supp.2d 754, 791 (N.D.Ohio 2011) (citation omitted). The Sixth Circuit has also explained that removing a child from his or her parents implicates the Fourth Amendment rights of both the child and his or her parents. Pittman v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 640 F.3d 716 (2011). Accepting as true the allegations in plaintiffs' first amended complaint, they have stated violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The violations are clearly established.
As Plaintiffs state:
(Doc. 74 at 22-23, Pls.' Resp. Br.) (internal citation omitted).
Finally, Hartsfield argues that the claims against her are time-barred. Like her other arguments, this too lacks merit.
The parties agree that the statute of limitations under § 1983, which draws from Michigan's personal injury statute of limitations, is three years. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007); see also Bisco v. City of Flint, No. 12-15490, 2013 WL 5775522, at *4 (E.D.Mich. Oct. 25, 2013) ("In Michigan,
Generally, under federal law, the statute of limitations in a § 1983 action "commences to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action." Potts, 17 Fed.Appx. at 304 (citation and internal quotation mark omitted); Friedman v. Estate of Presser, 929 F.2d 1151, 1159 (6th Cir.1991). As another court in this district recently explained:
Bisco, 2013 WL 5775522, at *4; see also Hornback v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov't, 543 Fed.Appx. 499, 501-02 (6th Cir.2013).
Hartsfield contends that plaintiffs' claims accrued on April 5, 2008, when Leo was removed into the custody of DHS. Because Hartsfield was not named as a defendant until December 11, 2012 when the first amended complaint was filed, she argues that the claims against her are barred by the statute of limitation. She is wrong.
Plaintiffs were unaware of the practice and policy allegedly put in place by Hartsfield until taking the deposition of the probation officer who was working on April 5, 2008, Althea Alexander (Alexander). Alexander's deposition was taken on August 29, 2012. Therefore, plaintiffs, exercising reasonable diligence, did not have reason to discover the allegedly unconstitutional practice until taking Alexander's deposition. The first amended complaint was filed less than four months later. The statute of limitations does not apply to bar plaintiffs' claims.
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A moving party may meet that burden "by `showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
Revised Rule 56 expressly provides that:
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
The revised Rule also provides the consequences of failing to properly support or address a fact:
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). "The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3).
When the moving party has met its burden under Rule 56, "its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Ultimately a district court must determine whether the record as a whole presents a genuine issue of material fact, id. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, drawing "all justifiable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party," Hager v. Pike Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 286 F.3d 366, 370 (6th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiffs contend that Holbrook and Turner-Royster (the DHS defendants) are liable for their role as supervisors of DHS. Plaintiffs argue that there are circumstantial facts which suggest that the DHS defendants knew that Hartsfield's form order was not a valid order. In addition, plaintiffs say that the DHS defendants perpetrated Leo's improper removal by failing to exercise their discretion to allow Leo to be placed with his mother or his aunts. The DHS defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
As explained above, when government officials perform discretionary functions, they are immune from suit through qualified immunity "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). If qualified immunity is raised as a defense, "the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the officials are not entitled to qualified immunity." Silberstein v. City of Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 311 (6th Cir.2006).
Here, the DHS defendants were acting pursuant to a facially valid court order when Leo was brought to the Russell Street facility, and when they determined that Leo should be placed in a foster home
Plaintiffs contend that the DHS defendants knew that Hartsfield's form of order was invalid because they were DHS employees for over twenty years and must have had knowledge that the family court had a policy of entering orders without judicial review. In addition, plaintiffs say that the DHS defendants had full access to Leo's family and could have obtained more information. However, the DHS defendants testified at their depositions that they believed the form order to be valid. Plaintiffs' speculation that the DHS defendants should have known that the form of order was invalid because of their long tenure at DHS is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiffs have not proffered any evidence establishing that the DHS defendants knew the form of order to be invalid.
In addition, Plaintiffs argue that the DHS defendants could have released Leo to his mother or his aunts. Citing to DHS policy requiring a child to be placed with relatives whenever possible in order to keep the family together, plaintiffs contend the DHS defendants should have released Leo to his mother or to his aunts. However, the order specifically stated that Leo could not be placed in his home, which he shared with both his mother and his father. Moreover, the DHS defendants did not place Leo with his aunts because it was determined that a comprehensive background check was required as they were from out of state. Ultimately, the DHS defendants exercised discretion in placing Leo in a foster home until the preliminary hearing. They are protected by qualified immunity for their discretionary decision, even if the decision was wrong.
For the reasons stated above, Hartsfield's motion to dismiss was denied and the DHS defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted. All claims against Holbrook and Turner-Royster are DISMISSED. To the extent that Corrigan is sued for damages, the claims against her are DISMISSED. The case proceeds against Hartsfield. A separate decision relating to count I for declaratory judgment is forthcoming.
SO ORDERED.
Mich. S.F.A. B. An., S.B. 320 (Nov. 29, 2012).
