PAUL D. BORMAN, District Judge.
Petitioner Lloyd Blair filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner was convicted in the Oakland Circuit Court of second-degree murder, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.317, felon in possession of a firearm, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.224f, carrying a concealed weapon, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.227, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.227b. As a result of these convictions Petitioner was sentenced to 44-to-80 years for his second-degree murder conviction, 5-to-10 years for the felon-in-possession and carrying a concealed weapon conviction, and consecutive 2-year prison terms for the felony-firearm convictions.
The petition raises three claims: (1) insufficient evidence was presented at trial to support his conviction for second-degree murder; (2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on self-defense; and (3) the trial court erred in admitting recorded conversations between Petitioner and his girlfriend. The Court finds that none of the claims have merit. The petition will therefore be denied. The Court will also deny Petitioner a certificate of appealability and permission to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis.
This Court recites verbatim the relevant facts relied upon by the Michigan Court of Appeals, which are presumed correct on habeas review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6
People v. Blair, No. 298377, 2011 WL 4501909, at *1-2. (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2011).
Following his conviction and sentence, Blair filed a claim of appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals, raising the following claims:
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction in an unpublished opinion. Id. Petitioner subsequently filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, raising the same claims as in the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan Supreme Court denied the application because it was not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by the Court. People v. Blair, No. 144050 (Mich. Sup. Ct. March 5, 2012).
The provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996), which govern this case, "circumscribe[d]" the standard of review federal courts must apply when considering an application for a writ of habeas corpus raising constitutional claims, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003). As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) permits a federal court to issue the writ only if the state-court decision on a federal issue "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court," or it amounted to "an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1)-(2).
A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonable application" occurs when "a state court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not "issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 410-11.
The Supreme Court has explained that "[A] federal court's collateral review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federal system." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The "AEDPA thus imposes a `highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,'and `demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010)((quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7 (1997); Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)). "[A] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as `fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011)(citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has emphasized "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). Furthermore, pursuant to § 2254(d), "a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision" of the Supreme Court. Id.
Petitioner first asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction for second-degree murder. Specifically, he claims that the prosecutor failed to prove that the shooting resulted from adequate provocation, and therefore he should have been convicted of the lesser offense of manslaughter.
"[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). "After Winship the critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction" is
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979) (internal citation and footnote omitted) (emphases in original). This standard "must be applied with explicit reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law." Id. at 324 n.16.
"A sufficiency of the evidence claim is a `steep climb' . . . ." United States v. Ross, 703 F.3d 856, 882 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Stafford, 639 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 2011)). Federal courts
Moreland v. Bradshaw, 699 F.3d 908, 916-17 (6th Cir. 2012).
The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner's claim as follows:
Blair, 2011 WL 4501909, at *1-2.
The Michigan Court of Appeals determination that a rational trier of fact could conclude from the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the prosecution that Petitioner was guilty of second-degree murder and that there was not adequate provocation to reduce the offense to manslaughter was not unreasonable under the established standard. Viewed in favor of the prosecution, the evidence showed that Petitioner shot at the victim multiple times because the victim was trying to protect Petitioner's girlfriend. A reasonable jury could easily find that these circumstances did not constitute adequate provocation. "A reviewing court `faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume — even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record — that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.'" McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 132 (2010), (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326). According the state court's findings of fact a presumption of correctness, this Court concludes that the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision that sufficient evidence was presented to sustain Petitioner's conviction did not "result[] in a decision that . . . involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief with respect to this claim.
Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to habeas relief because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on self-defense in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and his Fourteenth Amendment due process right to present a defense.
In order for habeas relief to be warranted on the basis of incorrect jury instructions, a petitioner must show more than that the instructions are undesirable, erroneous or universally condemned. Rather, taken as a whole, they must be so infirm that they rendered the entire trial fundamentally unfair. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991). Additionally, the failure to give an instruction that is supported by the evidence does not automatically entitle a petitioner to habeas relief; the failure to instruct must have rendered the petitioner's trial fundamentally unfair. See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973); Daniels v. Lafler, 501 F.3d 735, 741 (6th Cir. 2007). State law instructional errors rarely form the basis for federal habeas corpus relief. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72. The failure to give a requested self-defense instruction does not deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to due process if the evidence produced during trial was insufficient to warrant such an instruction. Taylor v. Withrow, 288 F.3d 846, 851 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Gimotty v. Elo, 40 F. App'x 29, 33-34 (6th Cir. 2002).
The Michigan Court of Appeals specifically held in this case that there was not sufficient evidence to justify a self defense instruction: "Here, there was no evidence to support a self-defense instruction under established rules of procedure and evidence." Under Michigan law, the killing of another person in self-defense is justifiable homicide only if the defendant honestly and reasonably believes that his life is in imminent danger or that there is a threat of serious bodily harm. People v. Heflin, 434 Mich. 482, 502 (1990).
The state court reasonably determined that the facts of Petitioner's case did not support giving a self-defense instruction. Here, even if one overlooks the fact that Petitioner was the initial aggressor because he assaulted his girlfriend, there was absolutely no evidence presented at trial to show that Petitioner required deadly force to ward off the victim's defense of the girlfriend. Furthermore, the evidence showed that the victim retreated and Petitioner followed him and fired more shots at him as the victim fled down the street. The Michigan Court of Appeals' decision was therefore neither contrary to Supreme Court precedent nor an unreasonable application of federal law or the facts. The trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on self-defense did not violate Petitioner's right to a fair trial nor deprive him of the right to present a defense because there was insufficient evidence to warrant such an instruction.
Lastly, the Court notes that even if the trial court erred in failing to give the self-defense instruction, Petitioner is not entitled to relief. For purposes of federal habeas review, a constitutional error that implicates trial procedures is considered harmless if it did not have a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 117-18 (2007) (confirming that Brecht standard applies in "virtually all" habeas cases); O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 445 (1995) (habeas court should grant petition if it has "grave doubt" about whether trial error had substantial and injurious effect or influence upon the jury's verdict); Ruelas v. Wolfenbarger, 580 F.3d 403 (6th Cir. 2009) (ruling that Brecht is "always the test" in this circuit). Here, it is highly unlikely that the lack of a self-defense instruction affected the jury's verdict. The circumstances of the crime, and the strong evidence presented indicating that the shooting was not done in selfdefense provided significant evidence of Petitioner's guilt. Habeas relief is not warranted.
Petitioner's third claim concerns the admission at trial of recorded phone conversations between himself and his girlfriend while he was in jail awaiting trial. Petitioner argues that the recordings unfairly painted him in an poor light, rendering his trial unfair.
At trial the prosecutor moved to admit recordings of telephone conversations between Petitioner and his girlfriend while he was in jail awaiting trial. The prosecutor argued that the evidence was relevant because it showed a consciousness of guilt, and also that it was relevant to show his motive and intent. The court allowed most of the recordings to be admitted, but it excluded any mention by Petitioner regarding his potential sentence or his "bleak future" following a potential conviction. Petitioner specifically challenges the admission of his statements that he is a "jealous f**ker," and that he is a "street n***a."
The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the claim as follows:
Blair, 2011 WL 4501909, at 5-6.
The admission of this evidence did not violate any of Petitioner's clearly established constitutional rights. Alleged trial court errors in the application of state evidentiary law are generally not cognizable as grounds for federal habeas relief. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68 ("it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions"); Serra v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 4 F.3d 1348, 1354 (6th Cir. 1993). "Trial court errors in state procedure or evidentiary law do not rise to the level of federal constitutional claims warranting relief in a habeas action, unless the error renders the proceeding so fundamentally unfair as to deprive the petitioner of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment." McAdoo v. Elo, 365 F.3d 487, 494 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting McGuire, 502 U.S. at 69-70); see also Wynne v. Renico, 606 F.3d 867, 871 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Bey v. Bagley, 500 F.3d 514, 519-20 (6th Cir. 2007)); Bugh v. Mitchell, 329 F.3d 496, 512 (6th Cir. 2003).
Accordingly, to the extent that Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in admitting the disputed testimony under the Michigan Rules of Evidence, he merely alleges a state law violation which does not entitle him to federal habeas relief. See, e.g., Beach v. Moore, 343 F. App'x 7, 11 (6th Cir. 2009) (ruling that nothing in the text of Federal Rule of Evidence 410 or its Ohio counterpart refers to a constitutional right). State courts are the final arbiters of state law and the federal courts will not intervene in such matters. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); see also Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005).
For the reasons adequately explained by the Michigan Court of Appeals there was nothing fundamentally unfair about the admission of the tapes. Petitioner's statements could reasonably be viewed as being relevant to establishing his motive for the shooting. Petitioner does not point to any clearly established Supreme Court precedent that forbids as a matter of constitutional law the introduction of this type of evidence. Accordingly, Petitioner has not demonstrated entitlement to habeas relief based on this claim.
Before Petitioner may appeal this Court's dispositive decision, a certificate of appealability must issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A certificate of appealability may issue "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a court rejects a habeas claim on the merits, the substantial showing threshold is met if Petitioner demonstrates that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claim debatable or wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000). "A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). In applying that standard, a district court may not conduct a full merits review, but must limit its examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of Petitioner's claims. Id. at 336-37. "The district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant." Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 11(a), 28 U.S.C. foll.§ 2254.
Petitioner has not demonstrated a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, a certificate of appealability is not warranted in this case. The Court further concludes that Petitioner should not be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, as any appeal would be frivolous. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a).
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is DENIED.
