DAVID R. GRAND, District Judge.
Plaintiff Linda Tyler ("Tyler") brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g), challenging the final decision of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under the Social Security Act (the "Act"). Both parties have filed summary judgment motions [9, 13] which have been referred to this Court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B).
For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") conclusion that Tyler is not disabled under the Act. Accordingly, the Court recommends that the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment [13] be GRANTED, Tyler's Motion for Summary Judgment [9] be DENIED, and that, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §405(g), the ALJ's decision be AFFIRMED.
On February 15, 2011, Tyler filed applications for DIB and SSI, alleging a disability onset date of May 31, 2009. (Tr. 134-47). These applications were denied initially on May 25, 2011. (Tr. 73-80). Tyler filed a timely request for an administrative hearing, which was held on February 29, 2012, before ALJ Regina Sobrino. (Tr. 24-49). Tyler, who was represented by attorney Andrew Ferguson, testified at the hearing, as did vocational expert Stephanie Lorey. (Id.). On April 24, 2012, the ALJ issued a written decision finding that Tyler is not disabled. (Tr. 12-20). On June 29, 2013, the Appeals Council denied review. (Tr. 1-4). Tyler filed for judicial review of the final decision on July 29, 2013. (Doc. #1).
Under the Act, DIB and SSI are available only for those who have a "disability." See Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007). The Act defines "disability" as the:
42 U.S.C. §1382c(a)(3)(A). The Commissioner's regulations provide that a disability is to be determined through the application of a five-step sequential analysis:
Scheuneman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2011 WL 6937331, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 6, 2011) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520, 416.920); see also Heston v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 2001). "The burden of proof is on the claimant throughout the first four steps.... If the analysis reaches the fifth step without a finding that claimant is not disabled, the burden transfers to the [defendant]." Preslar v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 14 F.3d 1107, 1110 (6th Cir. 1994).
At the time of the administrative hearing, Tyler was 42 years old. (Tr. 28). She was 5'4" tall and weighed 235 pounds. (Tr. 38). She testified that she lived in an apartment with her adult son. (Id.). She completed high school but did not obtain a college degree. (Tr. 28-29). Tyler previously worked as a car wash attendant and a direct care worker; however, she stopped working in 2008 because of osteoarthritis in her legs and knees, carpal tunnel syndrome, and back pain. (Tr. 29, 38, 165).
Tyler testified that she sees a psychiatrist for depression and bipolar disorder. (Tr. 36). Tyler reported taking several medications, which make her drowsy "all day." (Tr. 33, 39, 167). She indicated that her conditions impede her ability to lift, squat, bend, stand, walk, kneel, climb stairs, complete tasks, concentrate, and get along with others. (Tr. 183). However, she is able to finish what she starts, follows written instructions well, and has no difficulty getting along with authority figures. (Tr. 183-84). She testified that three or four days a week, she stays in bed all day. (Tr. 34). She further indicated that her rotator cuffs are "messed up," and said that she has received cortisone shots in both shoulders. (Tr. 31-32). At the hearing, she testified that her osteoarthritis is so bad that her physician told her she must have both knees replaced within the next two years.
In an April 7, 2011 function report, Tyler indicated that she is able to prepare complete meals, perform indoor chores, drive, and go shopping. (Tr. 180-81). She reported having no problems with personal care, but said that she does have difficulty sleeping because her arms and legs are "always hurting." (Tr. 179). She reported being able to pay bills, count change, and handle a checking and savings account, and said she spends time with others "every day." (Tr. 181-82). At the February 29, 2012 administrative hearing, however, Tyler testified that she does not cook, clean, do laundry or yard work, or shop for groceries; rather, she said that her parents, son, or other relatives assist her with these tasks. (Tr. 34-35). She further testified that she never visits relatives or friends and has no hobbies. (Tr. 34).
Tyler also testified at the hearing that she can stand for ten or fifteen minutes and walk for only five minutes at a time. (Tr. 29). She testified that she has been using a cane (which she claims was prescribed by her primary care physician) every day for one or two months.
The Court has thoroughly reviewed Tyler's medical record. In lieu of summarizing Tyler's medical history here, the Court will make references and provide citations to the record as necessary in its discussion of the parties' arguments.
Following the five-step sequential analysis, the ALJ found that Tyler is not disabled under the Act. At Step One, the ALJ found that Tyler has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 31, 2009, her alleged onset date. (Tr. 14). At Step Two, the ALJ found that Tyler has the following severe impairments: degenerative joint disease, obesity, carpal tunnel syndrome, epilepsy, and depression. (Id.). At Step Three, the ALJ found that her impairments, whether considered alone or in combination, do not meet or medically equal a listed impairment. (Tr. 15-16).
The ALJ then assessed Tyler's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), concluding that she is capable of performing light work, with the following additional limitations: no climbing of ladders; occasional climbing of stairs, crouching, and stooping; no crawling; frequent handling, fingering, feeling, and reaching, with no reaching above shoulder level required; no exposure to hazards or vibration; no driving as a work duty; and simple, routine, low stress work (defined as no fast-paced work, no work that involves quotas, and no assembly line work). (Tr. 16-18).
At Step Four, the ALJ determined that Tyler is unable to perform her past relevant work. (Tr. 18). At Step Five, the ALJ concluded, based in part on vocational expert ("VE") testimony, that Tyler is capable of performing the light jobs of sorter (4,800 jobs in the lower peninsula of Michigan), cashier (21,500 jobs), and housekeeper (5,000 jobs). (Tr. 19-20). As a result, the ALJ concluded that Tyler is not disabled under the Act. (Tr. 20).
The District Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final administrative decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g). Judicial review under this statute is limited in that the court "must affirm the Commissioner's conclusions absent a determination that the Commissioner has failed to apply the correct legal standard or has made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record." Longworth v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted); Rabbers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 654 (6th Cir. 2009) ("[I]f an agency has failed to adhere to its own procedures, we will not remand for further administrative proceedings unless the claimant has been prejudiced on the merits or deprived of substantial rights because of the agency's procedural lapses.") (internal quotations omitted). Substantial evidence is "more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted). In deciding whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, the court does "not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence or decide questions of credibility." Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007); Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247 ("It is of course for the ALJ, and not the reviewing court, to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, including that of the claimant.").
When reviewing the Commissioner's factual findings, the court is limited to an examination of the record and must consider the record as a whole. Bass, 499 F.3d at 512-13; Wyatt v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 974 F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992). The court "may look to any evidence in the record, regardless of whether it has been cited by the Appeals Council," or in this case, the ALJ. Heston, 245 F.3d at 535; Walker v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 884 F.2d 241, 245 (6th Cir. 1989). There is no requirement, however, that either the ALJ or this court discuss every piece of evidence in the administrative record. See Kornecky v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 167 F. App'x 496, 508 (6th Cir. 2006) ("[A]n ALJ can consider all evidence without directly addressing in his written decision every piece of evidence submitted by a party.") (internal quotations omitted). If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, "it must be affirmed even if the reviewing court would decide the matter differently and even if substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion." Cutlip v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted).
It is difficult to discern Tyler's specific arguments in support of her motion for summary judgment. Her motion consists almost entirely of a compilation of quotations of black letter case law, with little accompanying analysis or application of that law to the facts of her case. Tyler does assert (in a heading in her brief) that the ALJ erred in "assessing [her] credibility and by failing to properly evaluate the medical records of evidence and, thereby, forming an inaccurate hypothetical that did not accurately portray [her] impairments." (Doc. #9 at 6). But, Tyler does not explain with any particularity whatsoever which medical records the ALJ purportedly "fail[ed] to properly evaluate." (Id.). Though she appears to argue that the ALJ violated the treating physician rule, she does not cite to any treating physician opinion, much less provide a fact-based explanation of how the ALJ purportedly erred in analyzing her treating physician records.
In response to Tyler's motion, the Commissioner argues that Tyler has waived any challenge to the ALJ's assessment of the medical opinion evidence because she has not made any substantive claims of error regarding those aspects of the ALJ's decision.
Fielder v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2014 WL 1207865, at *1, n. 1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 2014) (internal citations omitted). While Tyler's opening brief in the instant case was filed prior to issuance of the Fielder opinion, the Court notes that it is yet another "one-size-fits-all" brief, containing the very same "conclusory allegations" and "absence of developed argument" that Chief Judge Rosen found wholly insufficient in Fielder. Here, then, the Court could find that Tyler has waived her argument regarding the ALJ's assessment of the medical opinion evidence. See McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995-96 (6th Cir. 1997) ("[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.") (internal quotations omitted). Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness, the Court will consider this evidence in light of the arguments raised (albeit vaguely) by Tyler.
Tyler challenges the ALJ's credibility determination, asserting that her conclusion that she was not entirely credible was "clearly in error" because "her testimony regarding her severe medical impairments is backed up by medical documentation." (Doc. #9 at 11). In making this assertion, Tyler ignores the reasons articulated by the ALJ for discounting her credibility and fails to cite any medical evidence the ALJ actually failed to properly consider. As set forth more fully below, the ALJ reasonably discounted Tyler's allegations of disabling limitations because they were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence, the opinions of the state agency reviewing psychiatrist, and her daily activities. (Tr. 16-18).
As the Sixth Circuit has held, determinations of credibility related to subjective complaints of pain rest with the ALJ because "the ALJ's opportunity to observe the demeanor of the claimant `is invaluable, and should not be discarded lightly.'" Kirk v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 538 (6th Cir. 1981) (quoting Beavers v. Sec'y of Health, Ed. & Welfare, 577 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1978)). Thus, an ALJ's credibility determination will not be disturbed "absent compelling reason." Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 379 (6th Cir. 2001). The ALJ is not simply required to accept the testimony of a claimant if it conflicts with medical reports and other evidence in the record. See Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997). Rather, when a complaint of pain or other symptom is in issue, after the ALJ finds a medical condition that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant's alleged symptoms, he must consider "the entire case record, including the objective medical evidence, the individual's own statements about symptoms, statements and other information provided by treating or examining physicians ... and any other relevant evidence in the case record" to determine if the claimant's claims regarding the severity of her symptoms are credible. Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-7, 1996 WL 374186, at *1 (July 2, 1996); see also 20 C.F.R. §404.1529.
Here, the ALJ thoroughly discussed the objective medical evidence. As the ALJ noted, Tyler presented to Hurley Medical Center on June 1, 2009, claiming that she had had a seizure. (Tr. 285-315). It was noted that Tyler had been "noncompliant with her medications" for quite some time.
Tyler also complained of knee pain, and September 2010 x-rays show that she had mild arthritis. (Tr. 250). The medical evidence indicates that most of Tyler's physical examinations revealed normal lower extremity findings. (Tr. 244, 246, 254, 393). In October 2011, Tyler complained of knee pain and had decreased range of motion, but she could still walk around. (Tr. 464-66). In January 2012, Tyler was able to flex and extend her legs to 90 degrees, fully extend her legs, and straight leg raise bilaterally. (Tr. 423). Significantly, the medical evidence contains no notation that Tyler needed to elevate her legs above waist level, use a cane, or undergo knee replacement surgery, as Tyler asserted at the hearing.
In light of this objective medical evidence, the ALJ's RFC finding adequately accommodated Tyler's physical impairments, including her epilepsy, degenerative joint disease, and carpal tunnel syndrome. (Tr. 16). The ALJ concluded that Tyler could not climb ladders; could only occasionally climb stairs, crouch, and stoop; could not crawl; could perform no more than frequent handling, fingering, feeling, and reaching (with no reaching above shoulder level required); could not be exposed to hazards or vibration; and could not be required to drive as a work duty. (Tr. 16-18). Tyler has offered no evidence justifying greater limitations than those the ALJ identified resulting from these physical conditions.
With respect to Tyler's mental impairments, she asserts in her motion only that the record "revealed diagnoses of `major dep. — recurrent ...' as well as a [Global Assessment of Functioning ("GAF") score]
In addition, the ALJ noted that Tyler's allegations of disabling limitations were not consistent with her reported social functioning and daily activities. (Id.). For example, the ALJ noted that Tyler reported cooking complete meals, performing household chores, driving, shopping, socializing with others on a daily basis, and handling her finances. (Tr. 18, 180-82). In addition, the ALJ referenced Tyler's testimony that, during the relevant period, she was able to care for four young children six to eight hours per day. (Tr. 18, 42). It was appropriate for the ALJ to consider these facts in assessing Tyler's credibility. See 20 C.F.R. §404.1529(c)(3)(i) (an ALJ may consider a claimant's activities of daily living in evaluating credibility); see also Walters, 127 F.3d at 532 (an ALJ may consider household and social activities in evaluating the claimant's assertion of pain).
In the face of this substantial evidence, Tyler relies primarily on own her testimony and her subjective complaints to physicians. (Doc. #9 at 10-11). However, even where there is "objective medical evidence of an underlying medical condition ... an ALJ is not required to accept a claimant's subjective complaints and may properly consider the credibility of a claimant when making a determination of disability." Jones v. Comm'r. of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 475-76 (6th Cir. 2003). While Tyler might disagree with the ALJ's credibility assessment, she has not articulated a basis for overturning that finding, particularly in light of the great weight and deference an ALJ's credibility finding is due on review. See Kirk, 667 F.2d at 538; Smith, 307 F.3d at 379 (ALJ's credibility determination will not be disturbed "absent compelling reason"). Here, where the ALJ gave a reasonable explanation for discounting Tyler's credibility, and that explanation is supported by substantial evidence, her credibility finding should not be disturbed.
Tyler also asserts in her brief that "for a response to a hypothetical question to constitute substantial evidence, each element of a hypothetical must accurately describe the Claimant." (Doc. #9 at 10 (quoting Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1036 (6th Cir. 1994)). Then, however, Tyler simply states in conclusory fashion that "[b]ecause each element of the [ALJ's] hypothetical does not accurately describe [her] in all significant, relevant respects, the VE's testimony at the hearing should not constitute substantial evidence." (Id.). Although Tyler phrases this as a Step Five finding, the Court concludes that Tyler is attempting to refute the RFC finding via a purported Step Five error. See Kirchner v. Colvin, 2013 WL 5913972, at *11 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 2013) ("Kirchner's Step Five argument is a veiled attack on the ALJ's underlying RFC finding" because "this is not a scenario where the ALJ's hypothetical failed to match up to the RFC he ultimately imposed.").
In her decision, the ALJ thoroughly reviewed and discussed the record evidence, concluding that Tyler has the RFC to perform light work, with the following additional limitations: no climbing of ladders; occasional climbing of stairs, crouching, and stooping; no crawling; frequent handling, fingering, feeling, and reaching, with no reaching above shoulder level required; no exposure to hazards or vibration; no driving as a work duty; and simple, routine, low stress work (defined as no fast-paced work, no work that involves quotas, and no assembly line work). (Tr. 16-18). In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ considered the objective medical evidence, the opinion of the state agency reviewing psychiatrist, and Tyler's daily activities, as detailed above.
Tyler appears to argue that the ALJ erred in failing to include in her hypothetical that she purportedly needs to elevate her legs above waist level, would be absent from work more than two days a month, and would be off task more than twenty percent of the time, each of which she asserts would be work preclusive. (Doc. #9 at 11-12). However, Tyler does not point to any evidence in the record even suggesting — let alone establishing — that she is limited in these respects. No physician of record ever indicated that Tyler has such functional limitations. And, although Tyler testified that she stays in bed all day, three or four days a week (Tr. 34), the ALJ discounted her allegations as less than fully credible because of record evidence showing that she has been able to perform household chores, manage her finances, drive, shop, attend doctors' appointments, and even babysit four young children for a significant period of time. (Tr. 16-18). For these reasons, the ALJ was not required to include the limitations proposed by Tyler in the hypothetical question she posed to the VE. See Bartyzel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 74 F. App'x 515, 524 (6th Cir. 2003) (an ALJ is only required to pose those hypothetical limitations that he finds credible); see also Cookman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2013 WL 6631463, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2013) (same). As such, Tyler's argument that the ALJ formed an inaccurate hypothetical lacks merit.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court
