MARK A. GOLDSMITH, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Terrence Benshay Robinson's Motion to Vacate Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Dkt. 28). Defendant, who pled guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel due to a two-level sentence enhancement that affected his advisory sentencing guideline range because the firearm at issue was stolen. For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies Defendant's motion.
A federal grand jury returned a one-count indictment against Defendant in April 2012, charging him with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Indictment (Dkt. 1).
The parties subsequently agreed to a Rule 11 plea agreement. Under the agreement, Defendant would plead guilty, for which the agreement stipulated to the factual predicate. Plea Agreement (Dkt. 19). The agreement also specified that the agreed-upon sentencing guideline range was 70 to 87 months, and that, after factoring in any adjustments, the sentence of imprisonment imposed by the Court could not exceed the top of the sentencing guideline range under the agreement.
The agreement also stated that "Defendant understands that defendants generally have the right to attack their convictions and sentences by filing post-conviction motions, petitions, or independent civil actions. As part of this agreement, however, defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives that right and agrees not to contest his conviction or sentence in any postconviction proceeding, including — but not limited to — any proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255."
On July 16, 2012, Defendant consented to allow Magistrate Judge Michael Hluchaniuk to conduct a plea hearing according to the procedures outlined in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The United States Probation Department subsequently prepared a Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR"). In the report, the Probation Department found that the firearm at issue had been reported stolen on June 1, 2010 — a finding that was neither alleged in the indictment nor contained in the plea agreement. Given this finding, the PSR recommended that Defendant's offense level be increased by two levels from what was set forth in the plea agreement, pursuant to United States Sentencing Guideline ("U.S.S.G.") § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A). This resulted in an increased guideline imprisonment range of 84 to 105 months. The PSR recommended that, if the Court adopted the report, the Court consider giving Defendant an opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea in light of the increased range.
Defense counsel submitted an objection to the PSR, arguing that the finding of a stolen firearm had not been presented prior to the plea being entered and accepted. Counsel also argued that there was insufficient evidence that the gun had been stolen. The Probation Department responded that (i) it is not bound by the provisions of the plea agreement when preparing the special offense characteristics section of the report, and (ii) both a police report and the victim who reported the theft confirmed that the firearm was stolen.
Defendant's counsel then filed a sentencing memorandum addressing this change in the guideline range.
The Court held a sentencing hearing on December 11, 2012. At the sentencing, Defendant's counsel again raised the issue regarding the stolen firearm. Sentencing Tr. at 4 (Dkt. 38). However, counsel admitted there was no legitimate dispute that the firearm was stolen, and he agreed that the applicable range — with the enhancement — would be 84 to 105 months.
In light of Defendant's decision to move forward, and using the increased guideline range, the Court sentenced Defendant to 84 months imprisonment — a sentence that fit both within the original guideline range set forth in the plea agreement (70 to 87 months) and the updated guideline range based on the stolen firearm (84 to 105 months).
Defendant then filed the instant motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on December 13, 2013 (Dkt. 28). Per the Court's Order, the Government filed a response (Dkt. 36), and Defendant filed a reply (Dkt. 37).
This motion is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which provides in pertinent part:
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
To prevail on a section 2255 motion, "a petitioner must demonstrate the existence of an error of constitutional magnitude which had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the guilty plea or the jury's verdict."
A court should grant a hearing to determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law on a section 2255 motion "[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). No hearing is required if the petitioner's allegations "cannot be accepted as true because they are contradicted by the record, inherently incredible, or conclusions rather than statements of fact."
Defendant raises one central issue in his motion: was his counsel deficient for "failure to object to the two-level enhancement under § 2[k]2.1(b)(4)?" Def. Mot. at 9. Defendant argues he should not have been subject to the two-level enhancement because the "indictment did not notify [him] that he would have to defend himself against a stolen gun enhancement," as purportedly required by the Supreme Court's decision in
The Government responds that Defendant's motion must fail because counsel
The basis for Defendant's motion is that his counsel was ineffective. To satisfy the rigorous standard for proving such a claim, Defendant must show "(1) that counsel's performance was deficient in that it `fell below an objective standard of reasonableness'; and (2) that the defendant was prejudiced as a result of his counsel's deficient performance."
To the extent Defendant simply argues that his counsel was deficient in failing to object to the two-level enhancement, this claim is belied by the record: counsel did object to the enhancement in both the PSR and in his sentencing memorandum. Moreover, although counsel ultimately conceded at the sentencing that the sentence enhancement could apply (although he continued to request a variance), the Court gave Defendant an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea in light of the enhancement, but Defendant stated on the record that he did not want to do so. Sentencing Tr. at 4-10. Therefore, any deficiency was remedied when Defendant was informed of the enhancement, but he declined to withdraw his plea.
To the extent Defendant's claim is based on his counsel's purported failure to raise the Supreme Court's
In this case, however, the fact that the firearm was stolen neither increased the mandatory minimum sentence, nor the mandatory maximum. Instead, it changed the guideline range — a range that is advisory, not mandatory.
Therefore, because the gun's stolen status only affected the advisory guidelines, and not the mandatory maximum and/or minimum, the Supreme Court's decisions in
Defendant raises a number of other, cursory arguments that are meritless. Defendant first argues that the fact that the firearm was stolen was an element of the offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(j), possession of a stolen firearm, thereby requiring a jury finding. Def. Br. at 8. But Defendant was not convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 922(j); he was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), felon in possession of a firearm. That statute does not require that the gun have been stolen for a conviction. Therefore, the Court rejects this argument.
Defendant next argues that the Government did not prove that the gun had traveled in interstate commerce. Def. Br. at 8. But the plea agreement Defendant signed specifically stipulated that the Smith & Wesson firearm Defendant "possessed was manufactured outside the State of Michigan, [and] therefore it affected interstate commerce." Plea Agreement at 3 (Dkt. 19). This portion of the plea agreement was read aloud at the plea hearing, and Defendant agreed to it.
Third, Defendant claims, without citation to any authority, that the application of the sentence enhancement violated his due process rights because there was no evidence that he knew the gun was stolen. Defendant argues that the sentence enhancement must contain a mens rea requirement. Def. Br. at 9.
Lastly, Defendant raises arguments regarding the constitutionality of the state of Michigan's indeterminate sentencing scheme.
Because Defendant's claim for relief lacks merit, the Court will also deny a certificate of appealability. To obtain a certificate of appealability, a petitioner must make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To demonstrate this denial, the applicant is required to show that reasonable jurists could conclude that the petition should have been resolved in a different manner, or that the issues presented were adequate enough for encouragement to proceed further.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Defendant's Motion to Vacate Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Dkt. 28).
SO ORDERED.
The Court could avoid deciding this issue in light of the fact that Defendant's motion fails on the merits. Nevertheless, in the interest of completeness, the Court finds that Defendant did knowingly and voluntarily waive this right. The Sixth Circuit has held that a plea-agreement waiver of section 2255 rights is generally enforceable so long as the plea agreement was entered into knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
Here, Defendant does not argue that he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the plea agreement. Nor can he make this argument in light of the fact that the Court gave him an opportunity to withdraw from the plea agreement, but Defendant chose not to do so. Therefore, Defendant waived the right to bring this motion.