OPINION AND ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE RECEIVER'S EXPEDITED MOTION TO CONFIRM CONTRACT FOR SALE OF REAL PROPERTY

ROBERT H. CLELAND, District Judge.

On November 23, 2011, Plaintiff extended a $1,000,000 loan to Defendant Najero, Inc., which was secured by, inter alia, a guaranty of repayment executed by the remaining defendants (Dkt. # 32-3, Pg. ID 563-66) and a mortgage on property located at 22100 Telegraph Road, Brownstown Township, Michigan (the "Norian Property"). (Dkt. # 1-6, Pg. ID 65.) The court entered a stipulated order on June 19, 2014, appointing M. Shapiro Development Company LLC ("Receiver") as receiver for the Norian Property and additional mortgaged properties. (Dkt. # 30, Pg. ID 516.) On September 15, 2014, the court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants in the amount of $1,552,140.11. (Dkt. ## 35, 36.)

Now before the court is a motion by the Receiver to waive the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2001 and confirm the sale of the property located at 22100 Telegraph Road, Brownstown Township, Michigan (the "Norian Property") for a sum of $400,000. After listing the Norian Property on a real estate marketing website and installing a marketing sign, the Receiver received a phone call from Ed Boutrous expressing interest in the property. (Dkt. # 37, Pg. ID 679-80.) Negotiations concluded with execution of the purchase agreement for which the Receiver now seeks the court's approval. (Dkt. # 37-2, Pg. ID 684-95.) Defendants object to the Receiver's motion on the ground that the proposed sale price is one-third below the value of the property. (Dkt. # 40, Pg. ID 848.) The motion will be denied.

The private sale of realty is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2001(b), which provides:

While § 2001(b) contains discretionary language that allows courts to order the sale of realty "upon such terms and conditions as the court approves, if it finds that the best interests of the estate will be conserved thereby," the statute also includes mandatory language stating that (1) the court "shall appoint" three appraisers, (2) "[n]o private sale shall be confirmed at a price less than two-thirds of the appraised value," (3) the sale "shall be published" in newspapers at least ten days before confirmation, and (4) the sale "shall not be confirmed" if a bona fide offer guaranteeing "at least a 10 per centum increase" is made. 28 U.S.C. § 2001(b). "The permissive language allowing the Court discretion to determine what is in the best interests of the estate is therefore limited by the minimum standards delineated by Congress of what satisfies the best interest standard. These standards cannot be waived by this Court." Huntington Nat. Bank v. JS & P, L.L.C., No. 2:13-cv-13841, 2014 WL 4374355, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 4, 2014) (citation omitted); see also U.S. S.E.C. v. Wilson, No. 12-cv-15062, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 2013) ("The word shall in § 2001(b) unambiguously means must, and so this Court interprets the word just so. Before confirmation of any private sale, a court must appoint three disinterested persons to appraise the property. One will not do." (emphasis in original)).

Although the court cannot waive the requirements of § 2001(b), the requirements can be waived by the parties. See Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Big Sky Dev. Flint, No. 10-10346, 2010 WL 3702361, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 16, 2010). In Big Sky Dev. Flint, upon the concession of the defendant-intervenor, the court found that the § 2001(b) requirements were waived where the parties stipulated to a receivership order which provided that the receiver has "the fullest powers and duties of a receiver permitted under applicable law and equity" including the power to "negotiate and execute sales agreements with potential buyers of the Property . . . ." Id. at *2. While the stipulated order appointing the Receiver in the instant case contains broad language authorizing the Receiver to "recommend and consummate the sale of [the properties] (subject to the approval of the Court), as he deems appropriate . . ." (Dkt. # 30, Pg. ID 516), the order contains further language narrowing the Receiver's authority:

(Id. at 522-23 (emphasis added).)1

The court finds that the stipulated order did not waive the § 2001 requirements, as it specifically authorizes the Receiver to sell the properties "with the approval of the Court, consistent with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2001(a)." (Id. at 522-523.)

Section 2001(a) governs the public sale of realty, and § 2001(b) governs the private sale of realty. Defendants do not argue that the Receiver lacks authority to consummate a private sale of the Norian Property under § 2001(b); instead, Defendants challenge the proposed sale only on the ground that the sale price is unfair. (Dkt. # 40, Pg. ID 851.) Irrespective of whether the sale price is fair, the court does not have authority to confirm the proposed contract for sale of the Norian Property because the mandatory requirements of the § 2001(b) have not been fulfilled. The statute requires that the court "appoint three disinterested persons to appraise such property or different groups of three appraisers each to appraise properties of different classes or situated in different localities." 28 U.S.C. § 2001(b). The three appraisals have not been conducted. Accordingly, the court does not have authority to grant the Receiver's motion.

IT IS ORDERED that Receiver's Expedited Motion to Confirm Contract for Sale of Real Property, Proof of Service (Dkt. # 37) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.